

APPROVED FOR
RELEASE - HISTORICAL
COLLECTION
DIVISION-HR70-14 DATE:
05-17-2012

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 8/30
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY - G

TO: S - Walt Cutler
THROUGH: S/S

Walt: INR sent this directly
to Mr. Johnson who found it
very interesting reading. He
thought the Secretary also should
see it.

INR would appreciate your
returning the document directly
to them when you are finished
with it. Thank you.
Mark

98-10-9A-doc 1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

August 30, 1961

~~SA~~ 20

Sir:

Mr. Johnson thought you
would be interested in reading
the attached CIA report.

Walter L. Cutler

981659

~~TOP SECRET~~

HR70-14

HR70-14

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
- HISTORICAL
COLLECTION
DIVISION-HR70-14 DATE:
05-17-2012

25 AUG 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

SUBJECT : View of Soviet Officials on Soviet Policy
Regarding Berlin

1. Enclosed is a report from a senior Soviet official,

[REDACTED]

The present
report consists of views of several Soviet officials

[REDACTED]

2. In view of the sensitivity of our source, it is
requested that this report be handled on a strict need-to-
know basis within your office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

[REDACTED]

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

CSDB-3/647,889

TS#181378

Copy No. 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

90

~~TOP SECRET~~

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

National Indications Center

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

TS#181378

Copy No. 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

98 16 59

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

CSDB-3/647,889

COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : Views of Soviet Officials on Soviet Policy
Regarding Berlin

DATE OF INFO: Up to 10 August 1961

[Redacted]

SOURCE : [Redacted] Soviet official [Redacted]

[Redacted] Comment: [Redacted]

[Redacted] Paragraphs 1 through 3 below are based on confidential conversations [Redacted]

[Redacted] Paragraphs 4 through 7 are primarily source's own views, as of 10 August 1961, [Redacted]

1. Cables which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow is sending out indicate that the Soviet Government is in a difficult position insofar as the Berlin situation is concerned.

2. A number of Soviet officials concerned with foreign affairs believe that President Kennedy's speech on Berlin on 25 July was the inevitable response to Khrushchev's actions, which the Soviets should have anticipated. These particular officials saw the full text of the speech, but most Soviet officials saw only a short version titled "Kennedy's Warmongering Speech".

3. According to information which has been received in Moscow from a Soviet Embassy in the West, Embassy sources have reported that the British, and possibly the French and Americans, are ready to negotiate with Khrushchev regarding the Berlin situation.

TS#181378

Copy No. /

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

980000

~~TOP SECRET~~

CSDB-3/647,889

4. Although the Berlin problem is not on the agenda for the 22nd Party Congress, it will most certainly be discussed there, perhaps even in advance of the official opening of the Congress.

5. The West has already achieved a small victory, as Khrushchev has started to send out notes and is once again talking about negotiations; his tone is softer. He will continue to make belligerent speeches even if negotiations take place, but he will use a different tone of voice and set new time limits. Today he embraces people in friendship and tomorrow threatens military action against them; in dealing with such an adversary, one must always expect to see his worst side.

6. It is vital that the West bear in mind and publicize the repeated boasts and threats of Khrushchev and Malinovski about the Soviet cudgel being more powerful than the West's. The West must without fail prepare to meet these threats by arming itself as well or better than the Soviets. This is the only argument to use against Khrushchev, and it is essential to point out to the world that Khrushchev alone is responsible for causing the West to take such measures, because of his bellicose attitude regarding Berlin. The West must use all forms of publicity to point out to the peoples of the world that since the Soviet leaders are always boasting of their military superiority, the Western governments have to take precautions for their survival by insuring that their military preparedness is not inferior to that of the USSR.

7. Since Khrushchev is concentrating exclusively on missiles and submarines, including antisubmarine warfare, President Kennedy's statement, supported by Mr. Nixon, that the West must increase its antisubmarine capability struck deeply at the Soviets. As the true nature of the situation, especially Khrushchev's bellicose role, becomes apparent to the Soviet people, which it is bound to, the resultant feeling of the Soviet people toward Khrushchev will be: "It is all your fault, you fool. Why didn't you keep your big mouth shut?"

TS#181378

Copy No. 1

-2-

~~TOP SECRET~~