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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE US ARMY

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CPYRGHT

In the opinion of US military specialists the achievement of success in military operations depends to a considerable degree not only on the effectiveness of intelligence activities in obtaining information on important objectives, intentions and actions of the enemy, but also on the methods of conducting an active battle against his intelligence.

The American Command believes that under present day conditions when the employment of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction is unthinkable without accurate and timely intelligence information on the objectives against which the strikes are planned, the battle against enemy intelligence activities has taken on primary significance and has become an absolute must in troop operations under any situation. Moreover many foreign military theoreticians point out that the best way to combat enemy nuclear weapons is by destruction of his intelligence-gathering means or by limiting its effectiveness.

Counterintelligence activities in the US army are carried out in close coordination with the active conduct of intelligence work. An American specialist in military intelligence, I. Haymont, writes on this question: "...intelligence and counterintelligence activities are conducted simultaneously and are inseparable" ([Note]: Irving Haymont, Takticheskaya razvedka v sovremennoy voyne (Tactical Intelligence in Modern Warfare), Military Publishing House, 1963, page 81). It is therefore not by chance that in the American army, as in the majority of armies of other capitalist countries, these forms of activity are joined in the intelligence service.

CPYRGHT

Counterintelligence activity, in the views of the US command, is directed toward disruption or neutralization of the enemy's active intelligence operations and toward concealing from him the operations of one's own forces, including deception of the enemy as to one's true intentions.

One of the most important tasks of counterintelligence is also the detection of attitudes among US troops which are undesirable for the aggressive circles of the US and a check of personnel reliability.

The organization and conduct of counterintelligence in the US Army is the responsibility of commanders and chiefs at all echelons. Direct responsibility for the planning and direction of all counterintelligence activities except for deception of the enemy is placed on the chief of the intelligence soyedineyiye (ob'yedineniye). The duties of the chief of intelligence also include supervision over the conduct of steps taken to detect "subversive" activity, no matter what form it may take.

The chief of intelligence has the authority to use any staff officers to fulfill these tasks and to use at his discretion the organic and attached military intelligence podrazdeleniya.

Various intelligence chasty and podrazdeleniya may be attached to a US Field Army. It is usually given a military intelligence battalion. This battalion is intended to carry out intelligence and counterintelligence missions in the interests of the Field Army, and its podrazdeleniya are attached to Army Corps and Divisions and used for the same purposes according to the plan of these soyedineniya.

A military intelligence battalion includes a headquarters and headquarters company, corps and divisional military intelligence detachments, and three companies: intelligence processing company, military interpreter company and security service (counterintelligence) company, which comprises around 130 men. The battalion total is around 1500 men.

The number of corps and divisional detachments in the battalion depends on the number of corps and divisions which make up the field army. Corps and divisional detachments are constituted from the military intelligence battalion on the basis of one for every corps intelligence branch and division intelligence section. The remainder of the battalion

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complement is used in the intelligence branch and other staff sections of the army. The corps and divisional military intelligence detachments also include a security service (counterintelligence) section.

The specific purpose and content of counterintelligence activities depend primarily on the military echelon (chast, soyedineniye or ob'yedineniye) within which they are carried out.

Counterintelligence activities in the division have as a primary goal the battle with enemy intelligence activities directed at discovering important objectives. Here the main attention is devoted to ensuring the security of stores of nuclear weapons and means of delivering the nuclear weapon to the target. The most typical measures are: limiting access of enemy intelligence to military objectives; ensuring secrecy of conversations over radio communications; limiting troop movements; camouflage and secret occupation of launch (fire) positions; strengthened guard and defense of objectives; creation of dummy objectives.

Personnel of the counterintelligence service are not organic to the division, but these specialists are found in the security service (counterintelligence) section of the military intelligence detachment, which is usually attached to the division. When reinforcement of the counterintelligence function is necessary the field army or army corps can additionally attach personnel of the counterintelligence service to the division.

Counterintelligence activities in the army corps are basically the same as in the division. However a greater number of men and podrazdeleniya of the security service participate and they are conducted on a broader scale. In addition to ensuring the safety of stores of nuclear weapons and means of delivery of nuclear weapons to the target and of reducing the effectiveness of enemy intelligence at discovering key objectives, the corps very frequently executes missions connected with ensuring troop security, with organizing an intelligence activity among the civil populace in border areas and on means of transportation, and also with combatting enemy radio electronic intelligence means.

Most typical missions are combatting enemy intelligence, organizing checks of refugees and other civilians arriving from territory under enemy control, capturing individuals and objectives of interest to counterintelligence, limiting movement of the civil population, and guarding and camouflaging important objectives.

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Counterintelligence in operations (soyedineniya) (in the field army and in group of armies) is carried out in its full scope, including ensuring the security of troops, supervision over the civil population, the organization of counterintelligence activities in ports, border areas and on means of transportation, military censorship and special measures directed against enemy intelligence. It is believed that success in accomplishing the majority of these missions depends on the ability of personnel to keep military secrets, to be invulnerable to enemy intelligence, to properly camouflage, and to observe and report the results of one's observations.

To combat enemy intelligence the US command intends to use the men and intelligence means of soyedineniya and chasty of all combat arms and special forces, army aviation podrazdeleniya, radio, radiotechnical and radar intelligence means, the Army Security Agency, diversionary reconnaissance groups (detachments), airborne landing parties and military police podrazdeleniya.

In view of the variety and complexity of the forms of combatting enemy intelligence, success in it is directly dependent on the concentration of main efforts on the most important axes and objectives, and also on how well these tasks are coordinated by a single organ on the level of soyedineniye or ob'yedineniye.

The battle against enemy intelligence, as with any other troop activities, assumes above all the timely delivery of necessary information on groupings disposition and the probable nature of operations of his troops, and also on all aspects of his intelligence activities.

In the examined aspect counterintelligence in the US Army has the tasks of timely detection of enemy intentions on the use of his intelligence network, the methods of training of enemy intelligence podrazdeleniya, and the techniques and methods of their operations.

It is stressed in the press that without knowing the disposition of intelligence forces and means on one's territory it is difficult to effect their destruction. For suppression of enemy radioelectronic intelligence means by jamming it is considered necessary to have an initial data base on the performance characteristics of these means, the procedures and methods of their usage, and also enemy capabilities in protecting his radioelectronic means against jamming.

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These counterintelligence measures consist of enemy aerial surveillance is in direct dependence on the timeliness and accuracy of data obtained on his reconnaissance aircraft bases, the performance characteristics of his aircraft, their on-board reconnaissance gear, the degree of antijam capability of the radioelectronic equipment, and also the methods by which he conducts reconnaissance.

With the aim of prohibiting penetration or limiting the sphere of activity of enemy intelligence podrazdeleniya in troop dispositions or in important objectives it is considered necessary to determine the possible ways and methods of penetration by his intelligence organs and the nature of their operations.

Finally, deception of the enemy is unthinkable without information on his intelligence operations. This information, as stressed in the press, must include indications on how informed the enemy is, which tells about his troops, on how easily the enemy intelligence organs can be fed false information and how this circumstance can be used to one's benefit.

Counterintelligence activities are by their nature broken down into active and passive.

Active includes the suppression of enemy attempts directed toward obtaining necessary intelligence information about American troops, the purpose being to destroy (suppress) enemy intelligence forces and means in his territory and to suppress his activities on one's own territory.

Obtaining information about enemy intelligence activities is viewed by the American command as the initial step in combatting them. In addition military specialists stress that uncovering enemy intelligence means is only one side. Another no less important side is their destruction (suppression) or neutralization.

As pointed out in the military press, the destruction of enemy intelligence forces and means in his territory and the suppression of their activities on one's own territory has as its purpose to deny or reduce the opportunities for the enemy to conduct intelligence activities.

Destruction (suppression) of enemy intelligence forces and means (reconnaissance aircraft, radar stations and complexes, radio intelligence means, intelligence organs, observation posts etc.) in past wars by the American command was

basically carried out by air force operations, artillery and antiaircraft artillery fire, security forces, and also divisionary groups and detachments. For example, before the landing of American and British troops in Normandy in the summer of 1944 a special operation was conducted to destroy and suppress with air and sea strikes the reconnaissance aircraft of the German Wehrmacht, and also the radar stations (posts) for detecting air and moving surface (ground) targets.

One day before the landing German radar stations were subjected to intense bombings from the air and to bombardment by artillery, as a result of which up to 80% of the radars were destroyed. A total of over 500 tons of aerial bombs were dropped on the radar positions, and a large number of artillery rounds were expended.

For the destruction of intelligence forces and means at the present time the American command is planning to employ almost all existing means of warfare, including nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction. It is stressed here that a large part of the enemy intelligence forces and means are taken out of action together with those destroyed enemy forces (objectives) which they support and near which or with which they are deployed. It is recommended to destroy the remaining portion of intelligence forces and means by specially assigned means.

It is planned to use nuclear weapons to destroy such important intelligence objectives as airfields where reconnaissance aircraft are based, pilotless drone pads, intelligence chast'i (podrazdeleniya), and the most important radio-electronic intelligence complexes.

Security is as before considered one of the active methods of combatting enemy intelligence. It has the task of protecting troops and important objectives against penetration by enemy intelligence into their areas.

As pointed out in the foreign press, under present-day conditions security should be organized according to a completely different principle, which is: do not allow enemy intelligence access to important objectives at such a distance that it can establish their nature and, more important, their coordinates. In this regard it is acknowledged as necessary to establish security at a distance of 2-3 km and more on approaches to objectives. It is believed that in this case not only will the reconnaissance of the objective be hindered, but the destruction of the objective will be excluded.

Podrazdeleniya from a company to a motorized rifle (tank) battalion can be assigned for protection and defense of operational-tactical rocket-nuclear means and other important objectives. The opinion is also expressed about the possibility of reorganizing the security and defense of rear objectives. To ensure the security of these objectives it is considered necessary to assign not only security and defense podrazdeleniya (chasti), but also mobile podrazdeleniya for combatting enemy intelligence.

In the aims of economy of forces and means in organizing security, especially of objectives of low mobility, it is planned to make wide use of various technical means (radar, television and automatic signalling).

Steps to prevent the penetration of enemy intelligence organs into important areas or objectives are recommended to be carried out with the use of natural obstacles limiting routes of approach to them and forcing these organs to conduct reconnaissance only on certain axes.

The rear area command is responsible for security of objectives. An important part in the work of the rear area command is maintaining the secrecy about means of delivery of nuclear weapons, stores of nuclear warheads, supply depots, rear establishments and means of transportation and communications, and also guarding these military objectives against reconnaissance and diversions. By virtue of its enormous territorial responsibility, the ground forces rear area command in a theater of military operations plans the conduct of broad counterintelligence activities ([Note]: Irving Haymont, Takticheskaya razvedka v sovremennoy voyne (Tactical Intelligence in Modern Warfare), page 86).

These are the present views of the American command on the content of the chief active measures in the fight against enemy intelligence. A brief analysis of these views shows that the main content of the fight against intelligence activities is the destruction of enemy intelligence forces and means and the suppression of their activity according to scope of measures undertaken, numbers of forces and means used and the significance. This once again proves that in the American army there exists a close tie between intelligence and counterintelligence as obligatory factors in the day to day activities of troops under present conditions.

Along with active counterintelligence measures the US Army devotes considerable attention to so-called passive measures. These do not have as their purpose the destruction

of enemy intelligence forces and means, but provide for the accomplishment of a large number of operations directed at hindering or reducing their effectiveness. These include: the ability of all personnel of the armed forces to withstand enemy intelligence activities, safeguarding classified documents, ensuring secrecy of conversations over all communications means, radio silence, strict observance of the rules of concealed control of troops, control over the movement and maneuver of troops, maintaining order, military censorship and combatting enemy radioelectronic intelligence means. In addition they include such forms of combatting enemy intelligence as deception or leading him astray.

Among various ways of passively countering the enemy radioelectronic means the American military command devotes special attention to electronic countermeasures. This question has received very wide illumination in the pages of the military press. It is stressed that in modern warfare electronic countermeasures will have enormously greater significance than in World War II. While at that time means were created which chiefly countered radars, at present there has been developed and perfected apparatus for intelligence and for creating interference for systems of radio communications, radio and radiotechnical intelligence, radio navigation, radio remote control and infrared equipment.

The advantage of the means listed for countering enemy radioelectronic means is, as noted in the foreign press, that they can be used even in those instances where the precise location of enemy radioelectronic means is not known.

Measures for electronic countermeasures against intelligence means provide basically for a disruption of radio communications and of operation of radio, radiotechnical and radar intelligence means, navigation and tracking systems and also intelligence radio nets as a whole.

In the overall systems of electronic countermeasures one of the most important tasks in countering radioelectronic means in general is the suppression by jamming of enemy radioelectronic intelligence means, especially the radio nets used by intelligence activities.

Jamming allows setting up a situation where the radio electronic device, being fully in order, cannot distinguish the desired signals and thus ceases to be a source of information. According to the method and means of creating interference, jamming is broken into active and passive.

Active jamming is done with special noise transmitters. To make the jamming effective the transmitter is tuned to the working frequency of the target radioelectronic device (radar station etc.).

PYRGHT

The US Army has various types of jammers classed according to their purpose and method of operation. These sets can be mounted in aircraft, helicopters, missiles, ships, vehicles and even Earth satellites. There are also jammers for one-time operation. Such jammers are usually dropped in a certain area and over a comparatively long time can interfere with the work of radioelectronic means situated in the vicinity.

For the conduct of the "radio war" the US Army has Army Security Agency groups. Such a group is usually attached to a field army and is designed for conducting radio intelligence, supervision over the concealed control of their forces and electronic countermeasures to enemy signal means. As the basic means of electronic countermeasures the Group uses special electronic countermeasures teams.

In the USAF jamming is usually done by the air radiotechnical intelligence means. It is conducted by specially equipped aircraft for the purpose of detecting enemy radioelectronic means and jamming them. The objectives of air radiotechnical intelligence are means of communications and radio intelligence, radars, navigation systems, radio remote control systems and jamming means.

Organizationally the air radio technical intelligence means are placed in air groups comprising several squadrons.

The creation of passive interference is based on the phenomenon of secondary reflection or dispersion of electromagnetic waves by various reflecting surfaces. This form of interference can be set up only by those radioelectronic means which work on the principle of receiving reflected radio signals. Such means, as is known, are the radars.

One of the means of creating passive interference are half-wave reflectors (dipoles), which were widely used by the American and British air forces during the Second World War.

Means for deceiving the enemy play an important part in the system of combatting enemy intelligence. Their goal is to intentionally feed to the enemy false information with the simultaneous concealment of everything of interest to

his intelligence and in addition to force upon the enemy an incorrect impression regarding groupings, dispositions and intentions of one's own forces. It is believed that deceiving the enemy will to a considerable measure make easier the attainment of success in modern combat and in an operation. It is recommended to deceive the enemy in any situation ir- regardless of the scope and combat mission of the ob'yedineniye, soyedineniya or chast.

The main methods for conducting missions aimed at deception of the enemy are misinformation, display of false targets (mockups of rockets, NURS [nepravlyayemyy reaktivnyy snaryad; free rocket] and nuclear artillery, pneumatic tanks etc.), demonstrations, concealment of troops and rear objectives (camouflage), maintaining military secrets and a periodic shift in troop dispositions.

One of the main means of misinformation is radio deception. This consists of transmitting false information by radio, imitating radio electronic radiations, distortion of the true picture of operation of radio electronic means, and increasing the volume of their work on secondary axes while maintaining the normal volume on the main axis. Radio deception is usually performed in conjunction with other means of deceiving the enemy. These means include false troop movements, the display of false objectives, the dissemination of provocative rumors, the outfitting of false fortifications and dumps, the simulation of traffic on the road network, the activation of air reconnaissance on secondary axes, and false agent data.

It is believed that radio deception in conjunction with other means of deception is capable of giving the enemy an impression of a concentration of rocket-nuclear means and troops and the preparation for operations where in reality there are none.

During the preparations for the Normandy landing the Anglo-American Command, as is known, worked out a complex system of steps designed to mislead the fascist German Army Command. In this one of the most effective means of deception was radio deception ([Note]: E. I. Townsend, Risk -- klyuch voyskovoy razvedki (Risk -- The Key To Military Intelligence), Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1957, page 52.).

The Command of the US and England decided to make radio deception the chief means of keeping their strategic plans secret. By means of radio deception they succeeded in leading the German Command astray, indicating that the

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main forces of the US and England would land in the area of
Paix de Calle. The deceived Commander of German forces in
the West, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, at the beginning of
the landing of Anglo-American troops in Normandy continued
to hold the 17-division 15th Army in the area of Paix de
Calle. When the fascist command realized their mistake it
was too late to change the course of events.

PYRGHT

The display (creation) of false objectives for de-
ceiving the enemy under present-day conditions is considered
to be not so simple a task. False objectives, in the opin-
ion of the American command, should not only have the outer
characteristics, but should to some degree reflect their
qualitative content. As an example, pneumatic or plastic
mockups of operational-tactical rockets cannot be represen-
ted as real if they do not have the properties for reflecting
electromagnetic waves, so that the appropriate enemy radio
electronic devices cannot establish the fact of a false dis-
play of the object. Therefore dummy objectives should be
prepared not only similar in exterior appearance, but they
also should have a real similarity to real objectives in a
number of other intelligence features.

It is believed necessary in creating dummy objectives
and setting up demonstrations to consider the fact that they
must not be disproven by any one of the enemy's intelligence
means.

The significance has not been lost even at present of
such a technique of misinformation as leaving behind a false
combat document (combat orders, instructions, plans etc.).
Here it is considered necessary that the originators of these
documents not be aware of their false nature and that the
security of such documents be set up on a par with that of
other classified documents.

As before, a prominent place among the other decep-
tion measures is occupied by camouflage, which is designed
to hide or eliminate revealing features of troops or genu-
ine objectives.

Camouflage primarily provides for the use of natural
masking properties of the terrain and the use of artificial
covers of different types.

The use of natural masking properties of the terrain
for hiding troops from ground observation is primarily
achieved by disposing and moving chastl and soyednitsya in
blind spots formed by the relief, forest masses, and other

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points or individual troops for the purpose of camouflaging from enemy air observation the troops (objectives) should be disposed in forests, brush, ravines and other cover.

CPYRGHT

An important condition in the battle with enemy intelligence is considered to be maintenance of a high state of alertness by personnel. This quality should show up in the ability of officers and men to detect and uncover enemy intelligence of all types.

These are some facts on the scope, content and methods of counterintelligence activities carried out by all ob'yedineniya, soyedineniya (chasti) and establishments of the US Army in preparation for and conduct of any form of combat operations. Thorough knowledge of and consideration for these measures will allow our officers to more successfully conduct intelligence activities in an operation and a battle if the aggressor dares unleash a war.