THE FIRST YEAR AFTER KHRUSHCHEV:
SOVIET LEADERSHIP POLITICS AND POLICY ISSUES

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Summary

Khrushchev's removal left the basic ingredients of the Soviet political situation substantially unchanged. The men who had shared power with Khrushchev and engineered his ouster survived his passing without spectacular upheavals in their ranks. And the issues and arguments that had shaped the politics of the Khrushchev era continued to divide his successors. In the first year after Khrushchev, radical departures could be seen only in the intangible realm of political style and on the practical plane of bureaucratic organization.

Despite avowals of unity and assurances of continuity, Khrushchev's successors were not slow in forming lines of battle over the disposition of his legacy. On the pivotal question of economic priorities, which had plagued the regimes of both Malenkov and Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Kosygin emerged as protagonists, respectively, of traditionalist and reformist viewpoints. Among the other leaders who took strong public stands in this debate were the party ideologist Suslov, who lined up with Brezhnev on the traditionalist side, and the Ukrainian party whip Podgorny, who came out in support of the reformist position at a time when he appeared to be in strong contention for Brezhnev's post as head of the party machine. In the course of the debate a consensus in favor of the reformists appeared to have been reached by the end of 1964, when the 1965 economic plan was unveiled and a reduction in the military budget was announced.

In 1965, however, the balance of opinion appears to have swung in the opposite direction in response to the heightening of international tensions over the war in Vietnam, the increased claims of Brezhnev's new agricultural program on the resource base, and the resumption of active lobbying by representatives of the military establishment. It was against this background that the Soviet leaders began gradually but consistently to acknowledge the burdens imposed by defense on the fulfillment of other goals and
commitments. Brezhnev sounded the keynote in his V-E Day speech in May; and by July, after a succession of speeches by other leaders, Kosygin conceded that "in the present situation, to economize on defense would be acting against the interests of the Soviet state and the Soviet people." By the end of the year the ascendancy of the traditionalist viewpoint was symbolized by the announced increase in the military budget for 1966—reversing the policy trend of the previous two years.

Resolution of the debate over economic priorities on terms favoring the advocates of heavy industry and defense was suggested by the "draft directives" of the new five-year plan published on 20 February 1966. Despite general assurances of the regime's solicitude for the civilian economy, the directives envisage continued "priority development" of those sectors of the economy serving heavy industry and defense—euphemistically termed "progressive." At the same time, the directives do not point toward any major retrenchment in the civilian sector, providing reason to suppose that the issue of resource allocation will remain a focal point of contention.

The movement of opinion from reformism to traditionalism in economic policy was accompanied by signs of personal rivalry among the top leaders and bureaucratic jockeying between the institutions under their command. In the personal sweepstakes, the changing pattern of status symbols pointed to a marked improvement in Brezhnev's fortunes from the spring of 1965. By the end of the year Brezhnev appeared to enjoy a commanding lead over his potential rivals as a result of a series of political maneuvers adversely affecting Podgorny and Shelepin. Veiled criticism of Podgorny's old bailiwick, Kharkov, and of Shelepin's power base in the party-state control apparatus, followed by shifts in both men's official responsibilities, seemed a measure of Brezhnev's success in placing at least temporary checks on their ambitions. Although Kosygin's status in the hierarchy seemed unaffected by these maneuvers, he was clearly eclipsed by Brezhnev in the protocol symbols and applause meters that record the role of personality in Soviet politics.

In the sphere of party-government relations—a chronic source of tensions at every level of the hierarchy—the combatants appeared to be more intent on settling scores with the past than on launching new assaults upon each other. In the first major act of the post-Khrushchev regime, at the November 1964 CPSU plenum, the party was restructured along territorial lines—restoring its organizational integrity and relegating Khrushchev's 1962 party reform to oblivion.
Khrushchev's 1957 industrial reorganization suffered a similar fate about a year later, at the September 1965 CPSU plenum, when the ministerial system of economic management was revived in place of the regional economic councils. These reforms, which at least in the latter instance met with open resistance from party officials, not only restored the institutional balance within the power structure that had been disrupted by Khrushchev, but also set the stage for future conflicts within the leadership.

If in the aftermath of Khrushchev's political demise the military establishment failed to gain a share of institutional spoils, it was at least not denied a platform for expressing its views. This it did persistently and stridently beginning in early 1965. Against the background of the escalation of the war in Vietnam, military spokesmen gradually reopened the debate over controversial issues of defense policy that had been muted in the immediate aftermath of Khrushchev's fall. In the event, their arguments found their mark. In March, six months before the reestablishment of the ministerial system on a nationwide level, the defense sector of Soviet industry was reconcentrated under ministries. In the same month the regime's top expert in the armaments field, D.F. Ustinov, was promoted to candidate membership in the CPSU Presidium and, more important, to membership in the CPSU Secretariat. The latter move appeared to have established a tacit alliance between the traditionalist wing of the party and the military, since it brought Ustinov under the direct supervision of Brezhnev at a time when the latter was voicing an interest in defense and heavy industry priorities. Moreover, the failure of the leadership to venture into the realm of military strategy left the field open to the experts, who capitalized on the situation by quietly revising or eliminating Khrushchev's dicta in this field.

On the whole, in the period of more than a year since Khrushchev's ouster, the regime has managed to preserve enough staples of past policy to sustain an image of continuity, while issuing public statements sufficiently ambiguous or broadly phrased as to retain its freedom of maneuver. Conflict between reformism and traditionalism is evident now as in the past in practically every area of Soviet endeavor, with traditionalism apparently on the upswing at this juncture not only in the pivotal area of economic policy but in other areas as well. Indeed, on the delicate question of Stalinism—which in its implications, at least, touches on every aspect of Soviet behavior—there have been innumerable sparks which could ignite under proper conditions into a major reappraisal. Whether those conditions develop may well be determined by the approaching party congress, which, if precedent is any guide, should provide a setting for those intent on political arson.
THE FIRST YEAR AFTER KHRUSHCHEV:  
SOVIET LEADERSHIP POLITICS AND POLICY ISSUES  
I.. OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1964: UNEASY BALANCE

Conflicting pressures for change and continuity seemed manifest from the earliest days of the post-Khrushchev regime. The tensions and instability of the new coalition were reflected in imprecise, open-ended statements on key areas of policy associated with Khrushchev, particularly on the pivotal question of resource priorities. Kosygin's public complaint in March, at a Gosplan meeting, that "some leaders" objected to eliminating certain disparities in the economy in the interests of a more rapid improvement of living standards made explicit a situation that could be discerned beneath the surface of the new leaders' statements from the outset.

Early Statements Mirror Debate Over Resource Priorities

Divergent emphases in regard to resource priorities characterized Brezhnev's and Kosygin's first statements after Khrushchev's ouster, at the 19 October Kremlin meeting to welcome home the Soviet cosmonauts. Despite assurances of continuity with past policy, and implicitly with Khrushchev's consumer-oriented programs, Brezhnev's speech seemed to open the door for change. He asserted that the party's "prime task" in the realm of domestic policy was to develop the country's "productive" forces—a term traditionally connoting heavy industry—and "on this basis" to steadily improve the people's welfare. Three days later a PRAVDA editorial made explicit the relationship between welfare and heavy industry conveyed in Brezhnev's formula: "On the basis of the expansion of heavy industry there has been a steady growth in the production of consumer goods."

Viewed against the background of a thinly veiled controversy over resource allocations in recent years, Brezhnev's statement seemed...
to add up to an endorsement of the preferential development of heavy industry. The defenders of heavy industry have stressed that expansion of production is primary and that the development of welfare only occurs on this basis; the consumer advocates have reversed the formula to stress the primacy of the welfare goal in determining the development of production.

Kosygin appeared to lean toward preservation of the consumer-based policies developed under Khrushchev. Although his speech did not directly broach the production-consumption relationship, his remarks regarding the "burdens" of growing military expenditures and the need to concentrate on the "earthly affairs" of building communism seemed to betray his sympathies. On the question of the party's duties, Kosygin asserted: "There is no loftier and more vital task than that of insuring a steady growth of the living standards and of the welfare of the Soviet people."

Further argumentation on the general question of resource priorities appeared in a RED STAR article on 28 October by economist G. Provotorov. Addressing himself specifically to the question of the production-consumption relationship, Provotorov forcefully asserted the primacy of the consumption goal in determining production. Quoting liberally from Marx, he declared that the "immediate objective" of production under socialism is the "more and more complete satisfaction of the growing material and spiritual needs of men." At another point he stated: "Consumption creates the need for new production." The article went so far as to re-introduce the Khrushchevian argument that with heavy industry already built, the regime could concentrate its efforts on satisfying the needs of the consumer.

But other items in the military press during this period reflected strong pressures by the military for undiminished attention to their interests. Assurances that the military would receive priority treatment became a propaganda staple in RED STAR in the weeks following Khrushchev's removal. An editorial in the military paper on 23 October even suggested that the new leaders unite around a program based on a steady expansion of the military establishment. Implying military support for an element in the leadership that was disposed toward such a program, the editorial hinted at the presence of contention within the regime in the admonitory statement that "undivided" party leadership is the main source of Soviet military might.

THE SUSLOV INDICTMENT

The reported widespread circulation of a point-by-point indictment of Khrushchev authored by Suslov, specifically attacking the deposed
leader on the issue of his consumer policies, reinforced the
evidences of discord on this issue. Various, differing accounts
of such a document were reportedly being passed around in party
circles--all purporting to be the "text" of the indictment, with
differences ascribed to tailoring of the presentation for specific
audiences. One version, published in the communist-controlled
Italian weekly PAESE SERA on 30 October, contained a list of
"29 charges" against Khrushchev said to be circulating in Soviet
Komsomol organizations. The fourth and fifth counts of this docu-
ment charged the fallen leader with "excessive" increases in
allocations to consumer goods industries and "underestimation" of
the role of heavy industry, as well as inadequate investments in that
sector of the economy.

On 31 October, the Italian Communist Party organ L'UNITA published
a dispatch from its Moscow correspondent denying the existence
of a document containing "29 charges" against Khrushchev. TASS on
3 November denied the authenticity of a shorter but similar
document published in the Italian leftist weekly L'ESPRESSO on
1 November with attribution to East German sources. However,
the communist-sponsored quasiclandestine radio program "Oggi in
Italia," broadcast from Eastern Europe, had given credence to the
existence of such a document only a few days earlier. And most
of the charges contained in the various versions of the indictment
in fact surfaced in Soviet propaganda in one form or another in
subsequent months, adding to the credibility of the reports.

The regime's denial of the existence of a Suslov indictment is
explicable in terms of the implications that public acknowledg-
ment of such a document would have for current policy. An open
across-the-board denigration of Khrushchev for policy errors would
have suggested the imminence of radical change as well as exposed
the vulnerabilities of those elements within the leadership who
supported the offending policies or who were pressing only for slight
modifications of them. It is likely also that the negative
reactions to Khrushchev's ouster on the part of many of the East
and West European parties which opposed basic departures in policy
placed further restraints on those Soviet leaders who pressed for
immediate change.

Lines More Clearly Drawn on October Anniversary

The impression that Brezhnev was making a thinly disguised appeal
for support to heavy industry and defense interests during the
period just following Khrushchev's ouster was reinforced in his
October Revolution anniversary speech on 6 November 1964. Brezhnev's
statement that defense would be maintained "on the highest possible
level" strongly suggested that consumer claims on resources would

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continue to be shortchanged, despite his concurrent assurances of
the party's solicitude for improving the people's well-being.
Where the advocates of consumer priorities had long sought to
subordinate heavy industry to consumer production, Brezhnev
asserted that

the development of heavy industry must be subordinated
both to the demands of the constant technical reequipment
of the whole national economy and the needs of defense
and to the interests of the rapid rise of agriculture
and the light and food industries.

Although the formulation seemed evasive on specific resource
priorities, it nonetheless had the effect of diluting the importance
of the welfare goal, placing it in a position secondary to defense.
The impression that Brezhnev favored economic policies geared to
traditional priorities was strengthened in the PRAVDA editorial
of 11 November, which stated unequivocally for the first time
that the new leaders would devote "unrelaxed attention to the
development of heavy industry."

CHALLENGE FROM PODGORNY

The uneasy equilibrium that apparently obtained among competitive
interests within the new leadership was again reflected in an
October Revolution anniversary article by Podgornyy published in
the November 1964 issue of the Cuban journal CUBA SOCIALISTA.
This article— not carried in Soviet media—reasserted the rationale
advanced by Khrushchev on the eve of his ouster for a radical
consumer-oriented policy: Heavy industry had already been built,
and the regime could now focus its efforts on increasing consumer
goods output and improving the people's well-being. This and
other statements by Podgornyy in subsequent months suggested that
he was disposed toward developing a program with a strong consumer
plank as an alternative to the promotion of traditional retrench-
ment themes.

Podgornyy's emergence as a potential rival to Brezhnev in the
months following Khrushchev's ouster was foreshadowed at the Kremlin
reception marking the October anniversary. Podgornyy rather than
Brezhnev made the toast to the party, although the CPSU First
Secretary might have been expected to offer it. According to
PRAVDA, Podgornyy also offered his toast ahead of Brezhnev's toast
to the military. That the sequence involved a sensitive issue of
protocol ranking was mirrored in divergent treatments of it in
Soviet media. While PRAVDA's account of the reception placed
Podgornyy's toast ahead of Brezhnev's, the TASS and Moscow radio
versions put Brezhnev's first.
The succession of toasts appeared to identify the current members of the new leadership's inner circle (Kosygin, Suslov, Mikoyan, and Malinovskiy offered toasts, in addition to Brezhnev and Podgorny), as well as to suggest their broad responsibilities. Thus Kosygin's toast was to the workers, Mikoyan's was addressed to foreign guests and stressed the goal of world peace, and Suslov's was to unity of the socialist countries. To some extent, the toasts may possibly also have reflected the areas in which some of the leaders were seeking to build political support within the regime. Brezhnev's toasting of the military—and his reported invitation to Malinovskiy to join the circle of toasters, to Kosygin's obvious irritation—seemed particularly suggestive in this regard.

Divergent Propaganda Treatment of Allocations Issue

ECONOMIC GAZETTE on 11 November called attention editorially to Brezhnev's revolution anniversary speech, but put forward a number of arguments on the allocations issue that seemed to diverge from Brezhnev's statements. Although the editorial asserted that the First Secretary had "outlined" the regime's "first priority" problems in the sphere of domestic policy, it failed to cite Brezhnev's formulation on heavy industry and defense. Instead, the editorial pressed a line—to be incorporated later in the 1965 annual plan—that heavy industry itself must contribute to consumer production. This notion was further underlined with the statement that it was now possible not only to develop heavy industry at high rates, but light industry and agriculture as well. The editorial concluded with a reminder that improving the people's well-being was the "cornerstone" of CPSU economic policy as incorporated in Lenin's primacy-of-economics thesis.

The ECONOMIC GAZETTE editorial was noteworthy not only for its promotion of consumer themes closely associated with policy under Khrushchev, but because it seemed to counter a number of discussions in the same paper which had reflected a resurgence of conservative arguments on economic policy. For example, an ECONOMIC GAZETTE editorial on 24 October in effect called for the preferential development of heavy industry as the main task and reasserted the guiding role of politics, ahead of economics, in the solution of state problems. An earlier article in ECONOMIC GAZETTE, on 17 October, attacked the "narrow consumer approach" in the field of policy.

The intensity of the debate over the allocations issue was further underscored by the PRAVDA editorial on 16 November, which contained
a call for removing "people" who disregard popular needs from "leadership" posts. Linking the opponents of a consumer policy with the Molotov heresy of "production for production's sake," the editorial asserted that the party is "developing production not for the sake of production itself, but for the sake of man—for the fuller satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of the people." Khrushchev had used the same rationale in his drive to reorient the economy in favor of the consumer. Its appearance now in PRAVDA suggested that a strong element within the leadership favored its retention as a basis of regime policy.

Other articles in the party press during the October-November 1964 period suggested that the leadership was divided over questions relating to the future pace and development of the economy. An article in the Central Committee historical journal VOPROSI ISTORII KPSS (No. 11, signed to the press on 28 October) presented a strong argument for the preeminence of the heavy industry line in economic policy. Ostensibly a historical treatment of the "technical reequipping of industry" during the 1929-1932 period, a theme introduced in Brezhnev's October anniversary speech, the article seemed to suggest an analogy with the present: It stressed the Leninist injunction that the "foundation" of a socialist society "can only be a major machine industry," and it recalled the "rightist" opposition of Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskiy, who favored the priority development of light industry and even succeeded in having a resolution adopted which lowered industrialization tempo. An article in the 23 November PRAVDA by economist V. Yagodkin pressed the case for continuity with the policies of the Khrushchev era and argued against economizing on the people's needs. Yagodkin emphasized that the problem of solving the inadequate supply and production of consumer goods was not a "temporary campaign" but a "permanent issue"--that the "preferential treatment" of the consumption principle was as important as production itself.

DEFENSIVE STRESS ON "COLLECTIVITY"

A spate of discussions of the collectivity principle was one of several elements indicative of strains and uncertainties within the new leadership during the early post-Khrushchev period. While these discussions ostensibly underlined the legitimacy of Khrushchev's ouster by his colleagues on grounds of his violation of the principle, they also seemed contrived to cover up manifestations of divided opinion in the new leadership's own ranks. An editorial in RED STAR on 24 October even seemed concerned that the emphasis on collectivity might betray signs of weakness and indecision on the part of the new regime. It asserted the "indisputable rule" that while discussion is a joint matter, "responsibility is individual."
The November Plenum: Policy and Power Adjustments

Motives of politics as well as the professed ones of "rationality" and "efficiency" seemed to underlie the regime's first major policy move—the abrogation of Khrushchev's November 1962 party reform. Power adjustments that accompanied the restoration of a unified party and state apparatus at the unheralded 16 November 1964 Central Committee plenum represented the first major development in the maneuvering for strategic advantage within the new leadership. Shelest and Shelepin were elevated to full Presidium status and Demichev to candidate status, Kozlov was removed from the Presidium and Secretariat, and Polyaakov was removed from the Secretariat. Eight other political figures were promoted to full Central Committee status, and Adzhubey was removed from the Central Committee.

SHELEPIN

Shelepin's promotion to full Presidium membership—bypassing candidate status—seemed the most notable personnel change effected at the plenum. Shelepin's rapid rise to prominence was dramatized by the fact that he now became one of the top four figures who were both Presidium members and Secretaries—along with Brezhnev, Suslov, and Podgorny. Whether or not Shelepin owed his elevation to one or more of the present political leaders, and whatever the relationship between his elevation and his former role as KGB chief, his promotion made him at once a sharer of and competitor for power among those privileged Presidium figures having political bases in the Secretariat. By virtue of his chairmanship of the party-state control committee—which was retained in the plenum's reorganization despite the fact that it, too, was a product of Khrushchev's 1962 bifurcation of the party and state apparatus—Shelepin also retained his position as a deputy premier. Thus he had the further advantage, unique among the present Presidium members, of holding high posts in both the Central Committee and the state apparatus.

PODGORNYY

Podgorny's emergence as Brezhnev's rival in the party apparatus was underscored by his delivery of the plenum report abolishing the industrial and agricultural committees created under Khrushchev and restoring the single territorial organization of the party. His presentation of the report on the changeover also indicated that he was a key participant in the Secretariat's direction of party cadres and in a position to exert major influence on the selection of party personnel as a result of the merger.
That the question of personnel placement had become a point of contention at the plenum was suggested by the propaganda's treatment of the plenum decision. Published in PRAVDA on 17 November, the document stated that the Presidium drew up the proposals for the reorganization and specifically charged the Presidium "with the consideration and solution of all organizational matters" connected with the reorganization. Thus, the decision suggested that every Presidium member would have a voice in critical questions of personnel placement as well as in the handling of other problems stemming from the merger. However, PRAVDA's 18 November editorial on the plenum decision, while noting that the Presidium drew up the reorganization proposals, failed to cite the provision empowering the Presidium to oversee "all organizational matters" related to the reorganization.

PRAVDA's omission was obviously motivated by the partisan interests of the Secretariat in the determination of personnel placement. By slighting the prerogatives of the Presidium in this sensitive area of maneuver, PRAVDA gave notice that the plenum had failed to resolve the question of institutional relationships at the apex of the power structure and that the Secretariat was by no means prepared to yield its traditional responsibilities over personnel management by default.

II. THE DECEMBER 1964 SUPREME SOVIET: HEADWAY FOR REFORMISM

The propaganda's saturation with conflicting arguments on the question of resource priorities on the eve of the 7-11 December Supreme Soviet session seemed a measure of the lack of consensus over the solution of pressing economic problems and suggested that, for the time being at least, the new regime would adhere to the general framework of past policy. The Supreme Soviet session was evidently a sounding board for debates over issues of economic organization and policy. An open attack on Khrushchev by one speaker bore the earmarks of a factional initiative against elements within the regime who pressed for basic continuity with past economic policy. The party press failed to report this attack—an omission which, coupled with Podgorny's several uncritical mentions of Khrushchev on the session's last day, appeared calculated to thwart attempts within the regime to develop a public denigration of Khrushchev.
 CONTENTION OVER ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Soviet press accounts of speeches during the Supreme Soviet discussion indicate that in two notable instances, action was taken within the regime to suppress or conceal assaults on past or present economic policy.

THE POPOV SPEECH

Leningrad party chief G.I. Popov, at the 10 December session, condemned as "unsound" proposals which attacked the regional economic councils—established as a result of Khrushchev's 1957 industrial reform—and called for a return to a centralized ministerial system of industrial management. Popov evidently alluded to a proposal advanced in PRAVDA by two factory managers within his own bailiwick a week before the opening of the Supreme Soviet. PRAVDA had underscored the controversial nature of the proposal by prefacing it with the editorial note "for discussion." The two factory managers, the director and chief engineer of the Leningrad "Vulcan" plant, sharply criticized the performance of the regional economic councils and advocated restoration of the ministerial system of industrial management on a branch basis.

Popov's effort to place a damper on such proposals was apparently inspired by higher authorities. In an editorial on 6 December, the day before the opening of the Supreme Soviet session, PRAVDA had seemed concerned about the prospect of an economic reorganization and warned against attempts to "revert" to management practices that existed in the past: "It is logical," said PRAVDA, "that a hastily introduced reorganization should not be replaced by other, just as hasty reorganizations."

In reporting Popov's attack on the idea of abolishing the regional councils, PRAVDA represented him only as warning against "hasty" reorganizations of the economic management system and did not indicate that he explicitly defended the sovnarkhoz system. But IZVESTIYA's account reported Popov's specific defense of the sovnarkhos system and his warning against "unjustified" attempts to abolish it. Popov's remarks were fully reproduced in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA and duly appeared in the stenographic account of the Supreme Soviet session—signed to the press during the period from 17 December to 5 January.

THE BELYAK SPEECH

On the last day of the Supreme Soviet session, according to Western press accounts, a sovnarkhoz chairman, K.N. Belyak, combined a
direct attack on Khrushchev for "economic wishful thinking" with open criticism of the 1965 plan as presented in Kosygin's report to the Supreme Soviet. Belyak charged that Khrushchev had engaged in unrealistic economic planning—proposing far more than could be accomplished—and criticized the 1965 annual plan that Kosygin had presented two days earlier for repeating the mistakes of previous years.

While PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA gave varying accounts of Belyak's speech, neither reported Belyak as attacking Khrushchev or criticizing the 1965 plan. The stenographic record of the Supreme Soviet session contained Belyak's criticism of the 1965 plan but failed to register a specific attack on Khrushchev; an ellipsis in the stenographic account at a point where such an attack might have fit, however, gave credence to the Western reports that Belyak censured Khrushchev by name.

Kosygin Report Promises Fair Deal for Consumer

Kosygin's report on the 1965 plan at the 9 December Supreme Soviet session seemed to represent more a combination than a compromise of conflicting views on the resource allocations issue. On the one hand, Kosygin promised a 500-million-ruble reduction in military expenditures and a narrowing of the gap in growth rates between heavy and light industry. On the other hand, his speech reaffirmed the primary role of heavy industry and revealed that previous metal cutbacks had been partially restored. Yet despite the presence of these traditional claims on national resources, the picture presented in Kosygin's report held out promise that 1965 would see considerable gains for the Soviet consumer.

Kosygin's avowal of continued regime solicitude for the traditional sectors of the economy was somewhat counterbalanced by his reassertion of the Khrushchevian notion that heavy industry would devote an increased share of its production to consumer goods development. His statement that the 1965 plan was designed to "bring the pace of growth of production of consumer goods nearer to the pace of growth of the means of production" was underlined by the projected growth tempos of "group A," or heavy industry, and "group B," or light industry. He revealed that the planned development pace of heavy industry would hold the line at the 1964 level, while that of light industry would increase 1.2 percent over the 1964 level. His statement that the 1965 plan provided for a sharp increase in per capita income was a further indication of such intentions.

Kosygin's call for the broad introduction of self-regulatory planning mechanisms in the economy was a measure of his endorsement of
reformist notions that had been vigorously pressed in the propaganda prior to the Supreme Soviet session. That these ideas remained contentious was reflected in the subsequent press handling of his statement. Kosygin indicated in his speech that planning on the basis of consumer demand—a practice tested and widely publicized in the press in the case of two Soviet clothing factories—would henceforth be applied not only to consumer industries but to "all" branches of the economy; he thus implied that "profitability" concepts were just as applicable to heavy industry as they were to the consumer sectors of the economy. Although this statement was carried in the Moscow radio version of the speech, TASS and PRAVDA changed "all" branches to "other" branches, thereby modifying the implications of the statement for heavy industry. The same change was made in the stenographic report.

AGRICULTURE

Other aspects of Kosygin's plan report suggested contention over problems related to agriculture. Though Kosygin declared that the state would continue to increase capital investments in agriculture, he criticized "some leaders" for an "oversimplified" approach to questions concerning capital construction in agriculture. His remarks conveyed the impression that investment had exceeded results and that certain economies in agriculture could be achieved by scaling down agricultural construction programs. In this context, he said it was "inadmissible" that in a number of cases reinforced-concrete construction was being used in rural areas instead of less expensive local building materials.

Kosygin's assurances that agriculture would not be neglected were accompanied by investment figures which suggested a commitment to agricultural investment programs that was no greater than Khrushchev's had been. Khrushchev's agricultural investment program for 1964-1965—announced by Garbuzov at the December 1963 Supreme Soviet—seemed, in fact, to compare favorably with the revised 1965 program announced by Kosygin. The planned agricultural investment figures for 1965 presented by Kosygin were somewhat lower than those originally projected under Khrushchev's 1965 plan that had been scrapped by the new regime.

It is also noteworthy that while Kosygin charged Gosplan with working out measures in the draft five-year plan for overcoming the "backlog" in agriculture—"a large and complicated task which cannot be accomplished in a short time"—an unheralded CPSU plenum three months later was to hear a report by Brezhnev on "urgent" measures for developing agriculture.
DEFENSE CUT

Kosygin's favorable assessment of the world outlook—"a certain easing of international tension"—seemed intended to provide a further justification for a limited redirection of resources to welfare goals in the 1965 plan. These sanguine assumptions were accompanied by Kosygin's announcement of a 500-million-ruble reduction of the defense budget for 1965, which he avowed had been prompted by similar U.S. assurances. Although Kosygin stopped short of linking the consumer aspects of the 1965 plan to the envisaged defense reduction, a Moscow radio commentary in English on 9 January spelled out the connection: "The 500 million rubles slashed from this year's military budget will no doubt spur the development of the consumer industry."

This move dovetailed with the Soviet Union's presentation on 7 December, at the 19th session of the U.N. General Assembly, of a comprehensive statement on the feasibility of disarmament measures in the interests of a further relaxation of the international situation. Included among these measures were proposals for military budget reductions, troop reductions and withdrawals, and other measures which would "free considerable funds for developing peaceful branches of the economy and improving the people's welfare."

INDICATIONS OF A NEW ACCOMMODATION

Aggravated Conflict of Interests at Gosplan Meeting

Within three months after his report to the December Supreme Soviet, Kosygin virtually admitted that his efforts to incorporate the consumer aspects of the 1965 plan into the long-term planning period for 1966-1970 had met with resistance. At a meeting of Gosplan on 19 March, called to review the five-year plan, Kosygin combined an oblique attack on vested heavy industry interests with a call for readjustments in economic proportions aimed at "improving the people's living standards more rapidly." Attacking "some leaders" for their "parochial approach" to the problem of the imbalances in the economy, Kosygin asserted a need to "inevitably change" not only the "proportions among the basic departments"—that is, between heavy industry and light industry—but also "proportions which have formed themselves within each branch of the economy." The complaint about perpetuating imbalances in the
economy was not a new one; Kosygin had expressed concern on this score in his speech at the December Supreme Soviet session. But the direct admonition to "leaders" in the March speech seemed to acknowledge a sharpening of the debate in the intervening months.

Criticism of Gosplan chief Lomako was implied in the March speech in the statement that the question of proportions "cannot be answered even by the chairman of Gosplan himself." Tacitly rejecting the draft plan as presented in Lomako's report to the meeting, Kosygin said that "we must work out a good draft five-year plan capable of determining a clear long-term development of the economy and improvement of the people's living conditions."

Kosygin's public airing of high-level discord over the guidelines of the five-year plan—which had been in the drafting stage for some months--seemed a measure of the strength of regime elements resisting any change in traditional priorities. And the strong, persistent assertion of conflicting views seemed symptomatic of a situation in which Brezhnev and Kosygin were not wholly in accord.

Kosygin's attack on "individual leaders" and "prominent workers" who were guilty of "outright toadyism" and attempted to conceal their "errors" or their participation in previous policy mistakes seemed especially revealing:

You know that there were cases when individual leaders embarked on the path of outright toadyism and unobjectively illustrated the actual state of affairs, thus causing the adoption of incorrect solutions on economic questions... It is necessary to examine more critically the shortcomings in work and not to imitate those people who do not wish to admit their errors, trying to conceal them in every possible way, because these errors have been committed either by themselves or with their participation.

That Kosygin's remarks were contentious was pointed up by the failure of the central press to publish his report. It belatedly appeared only in ECONOMIC GAZETTE on 21 April, more than a month after it was delivered, and in the April issue of PLANOVYE KOZIYASTVO (PLANNED ECONOMY) which was publicly available at about the same time.

In the same report in which he registered his complaints about the draft five-year plan, Kosygin indicated that within a few days a CPSU plenum would discuss "large-scale measures" already "worked out" by the CPSU Central Committee for "considerably" increasing
capital investments in agriculture over the next five years. His remarks thus left the impression that a decision had been reached on the agricultural aspects of the five-year plan, but that divergent views regarding the industrial aspects persisted.

Plenum Stresses Agriculture Without Downgrading Defense

The most striking aspects of the agricultural program unveiled by Brezhnev at the 24 March CPSU plenum, from the standpoint of the resource allocations issue, were the size of the investment and the long-term nature of the commitment. The agricultural program outlined in Brezhnev's report involved a doubling of state expenditures over the next five years as compared with the previous five-year period and additional expenditures in the form of state subsidies for higher agricultural prices. The state's share of the total 71-billion-ruble investment amounted to 41 billion rubles and, according to Brezhnev, would be financed "through a redistribution within the state budget."

PERSONNEL CHANGES

Although Brezhnev's seemingly open-ended statement on the financing of the program suggested that the leadership had not fully determined which sectors of the economy would be cut back to support the program, personnel shifts effected at the plenum could be read as assurances that defense would not suffer. The promotion of leading representatives of the armaments industry to high party and government posts during the course of the plenum, as well as a reorganization of defense production agencies several weeks earlier, were major signposts in this direction.

USTINOY The plenum promoted D.F. Ustinov, the regime's top expert in the armaments field, to CPSU Secretary and candidate member of the Presidium. While Ustinov relinquished the posts of first deputy premier and head of the Supreme Economic Council, his promotion evidently signalled greater influence for defense interests within the regime's highest policy councils. Ustinov's long-time associate in the defense industry, V.N. Novikov, became head of the Supreme Economic Council—now somewhat downgraded—and returned to the Council of Ministers as a deputy premier.

These personnel changes followed a 2 March Supreme Soviet decree which reorganized six state committees connected solely with defense into ministries and created an additional ministry. The conversion of the former state committees into ministries—a reorganization
also involving changes in title from "Technology" to "Industry"—suggested a concurrent move in the direction of greater centralization of defense production.

NAZUROV The other major promotion registered at the plenum, while indicative of a shifting power balance within the party and government apparatus, held promise of greater support for Brezhnev's agricultural program. Belorussian party chief K. Nazurov was elevated from candidate to full Presidium status (shortly thereafter to lose his Belorussian party post) and was made a first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Nazurov's promotion was also noteworthy in view of Matskevich's reappointment as Minister of Agriculture the month before. Nazurov had opposed Khrushchev's move to strip that ministry of its operative functions in late 1960 at the time when Matskevich was removed following criticism by Khrushchev. Signs that Matskevich's return to the Ministry of Agriculture was contentious had accompanied the announcement of the reappointment. Izvestiya chose that time to publish a letter from a member of Matskevich's local government unit in Kazakhstan criticizing Matskevich and his colleagues for "bureaucratic behavior." The letter appeared in Izvestiya's evening edition on the 15th and again in the morning edition of the 16th. The government decree appointing Matskevich minister was dated the 17th and was broadcast by Radio Moscow the same day. Izvestiya on 18 February published Matskevich's rebuttal, but did not publish the decree until the following day—a day after Pravda's announcement of Matskevich's appointment. Whether or not the divergent press handling of the appointment reflected a clash between Pravda and Izvestiya—and by extension, Brezhnev and Kosygin—it suggested at least a deliberate effort to embarrass Matskevich and his patrons.

THE PLENUM DEBATE

Although Brezhnev's plenum speech contained a number of criticisms of past policies, it stopped short of a wholesale discrediting of the course followed under Khrushchev. The text—published in Pravda on 27 March, three days after the report was delivered—presumably represented an amalgam of views regarding the limit to which Khrushchev's past policies could be safely denigrated without casting aspersions on members of the present leadership. The stenographic report signed to the press on 8 August, however, contained a number of criticisms that threw light on the issues discussed in March.

Many of the speeches, published for the first time in the stenographic account, seemed to go beyond the measured criticism of
Khrushchev's policies contained in Brezhnev's report. The speeches of Mazurov and Mzhavanadze stood out in this respect. Although Mazurov did not name Khrushchev, he implicitly criticized the fallen leader for "incompetence" in agricultural matters and blamed him for the present lack of party discipline. Mzhavanadze attacked Khrushchev by name, criticizing his November 1962 party reorganization for violating the party statutes. In this context, the Georgian party leader branded such a "venture" the result of "a sick imagination and an unjustified desire to embrace the un-embraceable within a fantastically short period."

Mazurov's speech also contained what appeared to be a veiled criticism of a statement made by Kosygin at the December 1964 Supreme Soviet. In effect, Mazurov rebutted Kosygin's position that agricultural economies could be achieved by scaling down ambitious rural construction projects that used reinforced concrete instead of less costly local building materials. The substance of Mazurov's rejoinder was that rural construction "has not seen" such sophisticated building materials, being forced instead to use standard materials. His remarks suggested that he would have preferred the use of reinforced concrete in rural areas but that capital construction in agriculture had never enjoyed such priority:

We have a large construction base. It is being improved all the time, but it is created without regard for the special features of rural construction. In the past there was much enthusiasm for prefabricated reinforced concrete construction. Rural construction also was submerged under this enthusiasm, because rural construction still has not seen prefabricated reinforced concrete and must still use bricks and fiborlite, various types of blocks, and other auxiliary materials.

Another plenum speaker, G.S. Zolotukhin, an oblast first secretary, seemed to speak for the agricultural lobby present at the plenum. Zolotukhin urged that agricultural needs be considered second only to defense and that the five-year plan be a plan for raising agriculture. Further, he criticized the planning organs—"where no one has actually defended the interest of agriculture"—for previous attempts to "pump as much money as possible out of agriculture":

I would like the new five-year plan to become the five-year plan for raising agriculture, and this will find support among the people. The national economic
plans must consider the needs of agriculture for material and equipment right after the country's defense. We must do this because industry itself can become hampered and can get into a blind alley with the present lagging of the agricultural economy. And here we have the lessons of 1963.

The thrust of Zolotukhin's remarks was that while agriculture had been shortchanged in the distribution of resources in the past, the program presented by Brezhnev was an index of a heightened commitment. Whether or not Brezhnev himself fully subscribed to this position is uncertain, for his plenum report skirted the question of the agricultural program's impact on defense spending entirely. However, one remark in the report suggested that the First Secretary was just as committed as Zolotukhin to giving an increased priority to agriculture; Brezhnev stated that the successful construction of communism "vitality" depended on raising agricultural productivity, since questions of agriculture touched on the "very foundation" of the Soviet state—that is, the relationship between the working class and the peasantry.

In sum, the agricultural program outlined by Brezhnev seemed premised on the notion that faltering productivity in that sector had become a strategic weakness affecting the performance of the entire economy. Other nonagricultural consumer goals and commitments could therefore be subordinated to the task of placing agriculture on a firm foundation. Further, it could be argued that the increased investments to agriculture were deflationary, since the increased productivity that would be achieved by higher investments would offset the enhanced spending power of the population resulting from the agricultural program, from previously adopted wage hikes, and from other financial measures.

That Brezhnev's commitment to agriculture did not signal a deemphasis on defense was suggested by his repeated public commitment to the defense establishment before and after the March plenum. In his plenum report, Brezhnev simply indicated that the agricultural program would be financed through a "redistribution" of investment funds within the budget. Subsequent developments would suggest, however, that elements within the leadership were unwilling to scrap other consumer—and nonagricultural—aspects of the long-term development plan, insisting instead on cutbacks in the defense establishment.

Apparent Enhancement of Brezhnev's Authority

The precise impact of the March plenum decisions on the leadership question was unclear. However, Brezhnev's authority in the regime...
seemed enhanced as a result of the agricultural program and the personnel changes effected at the plenum. Although the stenographic report revealed that Podgorny presided over every session of the plenum, an unprecedented monopoly of the presiding officer's role in recent years, there were concurrent indications that Podgorny's position had become somewhat weakened as a result of political moves against him. The coincidence of these moves with the March plenum further suggested that the plenum represented a turning point in the Brezhnev-Podgorny relationship, and that Brezhnev's enhanced status resulted in a diminution of Podgorny's authority.

Propaganda preceding the March plenum suggested that the hitherto subsurface rivalry had intensified and was turning in Brezhnev's favor. Rivalry between Brezhnev and Podgorny could be traced through a colorful polemic in the press over the matter of which oblast, Kharkov or Dnepropetrovsk, was guilty of current shortcomings. Podgorny's long-standing connections with Kharkov and Brezhnev's with Dnepropetrovsk went unstated.

The discussion had begun with an article in the 26 January RURAL LIFE which criticized certain abuses in Brezhnev's bailiwick, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast. A month later, an article in the 24 February RURAL LIFE noted that the bureau of the oblast party committee, after discussing the earlier complaint, had taken steps to correct the problem. The following day RURAL LIFE published a lengthy report praising agricultural progress in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, apparently vindicating the oblast leaders' behavior. The polemic spread to the pages of ECONOMIC GAZETTE on 24 February with an editorial criticism of the Kharkovskiy sovnarkhoz for failing to fulfill its production quotas. Writing in ECONOMIC GAZETTE on the same day, the first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk oblast party committee, V. Shcherbitskiy—a close associate of Brezhnev, who would later be rewarded with Presidium status for his services—cited the enterprises particularly in Dneprodzerzhinsk as exemplars of economic proficiency.

In the weeks following the March plenum Brezhnev seemed to be consolidating his position at the expense of Kosygin as well as Podgorny. On 5 April, less than two weeks after the plenum, Brezhnev emerged at the "head" of a "party-government" delegation to Poland which also included Kosygin; a similar delegation a few months earlier had placed Brezhnev and Kosygin on an equal footing. Also on 5 April, it was announced that the CPSU Secretary in charge of party-organizational questions, V. Titov—a Podgorny protege and former associate in Kharkov—had been appointed second secretary of the Kazakh central committee. Although Titov retained
his CPSU Secretarial position until the September plenum, his transfer to Kazakhstan in effect sharply reduced any previous control he may have exercised over cadre selection and placement. The action against Titov also suggested that Brezhnev had moved to assume greater responsibility for cadres, undercutting at least some of Podgorny's influence in that sphere.

IV. MAY-JULY: INTENSIFIED MILITARY PRESSURES

A succession of leaders' statements in the spring of 1965 suggested that the economic programs had run into difficulties and that the problem involved issues which defense posed for resource allocations policy. From statements made in the May-June period, addressed to budgetary restraints imposed by defense, it appeared that a consensus had been reached regarding the inadvisability of seeking defense economies. Divergent emphases in the formulation of guidelines for the five-year plan in July, however, indicated that long-term defense claims on investment resources remained contentious.

The emphasis placed on domestic reform programs following Khrushchev's ouster can only have magnified the problem of balancing defense programs and investments against other goals and commitments. Kosygin's announcement at the December 1964 Supreme Soviet of regime intentions to further reduce military spending by 500 million rubles had seemed to hold little promise that the military were high on the list of favored recipients of investment resources. Similarly, the long-term agricultural investment program adopted in March did not seem to be premised on an expectation that disruptive investment shifts to defense would be necessary. But the May-June acknowledgments of constraints imposed on resource policy by defense suggested that some unanticipated development regarding military spending had occurred. And a renewal of military agitation over the ground forces issue at about the same time that the leaders' statements were reflecting new problems in economic policy suggested a possible connection between the two issues. As a major component of the military budget, the ground forces had long presented a problem to defense planners; any shift in their number would have tiding financial effects. In his comprehensive statement on defense policy in January 1960, Khrushchev had specified 1.6 to 1.7 billion rubles as the amount that could be saved annually by the 1.2-million-man reduction proposed at that time.
The section below traces the development of the public argument on the size and role of the ground forces—the key military issue left over from the Khrushchev period—as background for the developments relating to resource allocations in the spring and early summer.

Military Debate Over Role of Ground Forces

If questions regarding broad issues of military policy had seemed to move into the background of public commentary during the last months of 1964, the situation visibly changed in 1965. Signs began to accumulate in the first months of the year that differences over substantive issues of defense policy were coming to the surface. Missing from the new situation, however, was a precise formulation of the regime's attitude toward defense. Without a definition of regime intentions in this area, the statements made by military spokesmen lacked the focus they might otherwise have had.

The new leaders failed either to endorse or to clarify their attitude toward the troop reduction policy initiated by Khrushchev in December 1963—an equivocation which suggested that they were still temporizing on the matter of further reductions. Renewed agitation in the military press during the January-February period, after virtual silence since Khrushchev's ouster, suggested an effort to force the defense issue to the forefront of the leadership's policy considerations. Although the arguments in the military press were ostensibly aimed at policies under Khrushchev, they appeared to contain implicit warnings against similar incursions into defense by the new leaders.

One of the first evidences of such an effort was an article in RED STAR on 21 January over the signatures of Colonel Sidelnikov and Major General Bochkarev. The authors preserved the basic framework of standard doctrinal discussions, but introduced modifications of key formulas which suggested that some reevaluation of doctrine was under way. Thus the article reintroduced the doctrinal justification for a large standing army, but omitted the key word "only" from the standard formula: "Victory over an aggressor can be achieved [only] by the combined efforts of all types of armed forces." The omission seemed to reflect indecision over the precise status of the ground forces at the time and to leave the way open for a clarification of the regime's position.

THE SOKOLOVSKY PRESS INTERVIEW

That the ground forces issue was a key element in discussions of further defense economies during the first months of 1965 was
suggested by Marshal Sokolovskiy's comments in his 17 February press conference. According to TASS's international service and the reports of Western journalists who were present, Sokolovskiy declared that Soviet troop strength had been reduced to the 2,423-million level originally set by Khrushchev in 1960 and that a "certain further reduction in manpower is possible" as a result of the 500-million-ruble defense reduction announced by Kosygin in December. TASS quoted him as stating:

At the request of the IZVESTIYA correspondent, Marshal Sokolovskiy said that the Soviet armed forces today number 2.423 million men. He added that because of the reduction in Soviet military expenditures, "a certain further reduction in manpower is possible."

The motive behind Sokolovskiy's unprecedented public disclosure of Soviet military force levels and intentions remains obscure. It seems plausible, however, that the revelation—made in the presence of foreign journalists—was intended to convey the idea of Soviet willingness to take steps affecting the military establishment in the interests of easing international tensions. That the statement was made in response to a question by a correspondent of the government newspaper IZVESTIYA suggested political motivation.

Domestic radio audiences learned little of the contents of the interview, while varying accounts were provided in the press. None of the domestic media carried Sokolovskiy's disclosure of the current size of the armed forces. Those press and domestic radio accounts that referred to the armed forces level simply quoted Sokolovskiy as saying that the numerical strength of the armed forces "had been fixed" at 2,423 million men "by decision of the fourth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet." It was thus left unclear whether this force level was an accomplished fact or a goal still to be achieved. The issue was also handled in this way in a major article, covering much the same ground as the interview, which Sokolovskiy coauthored in the following issue of the MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL (No. 3, March 1965).

* For fuller detail on Soviet media's handling of the Sokolovskiy press conference, see the FBIS Survey of Communist Bloc Broadcasts of 4 March 1965, pages 45-47.
Sokolovskiy's disclosure provoked some apparent indirect reaction in the military press. In RED STAR on 24 February, four days after the press conference, Marshal Bagramyan implicitly deprecated Sokolovskiy's wartime leadership qualities. Ostensibly a historical treatment of a military operation during April 1943, when Sokolovskiy was commander of the Western front, Bagramyan's article tacitly disparaged the Western front commander's operational foresight:

At the staff of the Western front I was acquainted with the decisions of the front commander. To me it did not seem very promising, primarily because of the difficulties of organizing the cooperation of two armies at the junction of different fronts. A great number of operational and tactical surprises could arise in the course of breaking through the defense as well as in the period of developing the successful attack...

The publication of Bagramyan's article in February, anticipating the anniversary of the operation by almost two months, suggested that Sokolovskiy was being singled out for personal humiliation.

THE SHTEMENKO-ROTMISTROV DEBATE

Divergent views on the ground forces issue were registered in a polemic over whether the "queen of the battlefield," the infantry, had "yielded her crown" to the strategic rocket forces. The discussion began with an article in the weekly IZVESTIYA supplement NEDELYA on 7 February by the deputy chief of the General Staff, Colonel General S. Shitemenko. Shitemenko's rather innocuous assertion that "the queen of the battlefield has now yielded her crown to the strategic rocket troops" drew a response from Marshal Rotmistrov two months later. Reporting on a speech by Rotmistrov, PRAVDA on 15 April appended its own observation that Rotmistrov "convincingly criticized views which have slipped into the press that allegedly 'the queen of the battlefield--the land forces--is relinquishing her crown to the rocket weapons.'" This rebuttal was seconded by Malinovskiy, in the May issue of MILITARY THOUGHT, in the observation that "we consider it premature to 'bury' the infantry, as some people do."

Shitemenko was to virtually concede defeat in an article in SOVIET RUSSIA on 27 November, with what amounted to an acknowledgment that the infantry remained the "queen of the battlefield" even though
its character and capabilities had changed. That Shtemenko's concession was forced was suggested by an envenomed remark in the article deprecating the role of the tank troops—which Rotmistrov heads—in the "new" motorized infantry: "But it is still necessary," Shtemenko said, "to stress that the basis of these troops does not consist of tanks but of motorized infantry equipped with automatic weapons, guided antitank rocket missiles, and combat means of other branches of troops which strengthen its combat potential and enable it to wage all types of combat on land." This remark seemed to conflict with a number of Rotmistrov's statements during the year to the effect that the role of tanks in modern combat had been considerably enhanced despite the emergence of rocket-nuclear weapons.

DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS

It remains unclear whether the increased emphasis on the ground forces during the year reflected a decision to increase their number or merely a decision to halt their reduction. The general doctrinal literature which accompanied the discussion on the ground forces suggested that something more than a theoretical assessment was at stake, and that the military was pressing its case for practical measures to accompany an enhanced ground forces role.

Rotmistrov seemed to emerge as the champion of the conventional forces doctrine. Several of his articles in December 1964—one in RED STAR, another in LIFE ABROAD—took exception to views, allegedly being discussed in the West, that would exclude the "possibility of waging war without the use of nuclear weapons." Malinovskiy himself supported the notion on several occasions during 1965. On the Warsaw Pact anniversary on 14 May he went so far as to make the connection between numerical "superiority" and "non-nuclear" war explicit:

Irrespective of whether war is to be waged with the use of nuclear weapons or without them, we are convinced that the superiority in manpower and material will be on our side. This is being confirmed by substantiated calculations and conclusions, as a result of the experience of numerous large exercises.

THE OCTOBER STORM MANEUVERS

That the view stressing the need for conventional war preparations and contingencies had been generally accepted within the military
was suggested in the propaganda commentary on the "October Storm" Warsaw Pact maneuvers in mid-October 1965. The three-day maneuvers, involving four member states, envisaged a "surprise" conventional attack on East Germany from the West--employing "NATO's forward strategy"--which did not escalate into a nuclear exchange until the third day. Threatened with defeat after losing the strategic initiative, the West launched a tactical nuclear attack, which was met by a "devastating" Warsaw Pact nuclear counter-attack and deep penetration into "enemy" territory.

Although the available accounts of the scenario--primarily East German--studiously avoided specifying the extent of Western participation or the eventual scope of the mock war, the various descriptions of the maneuvers suggested that the encounter was limited to Central Europe despite the escalation into what appeared to be tactical rather than strategic nuclear exchanges. The scenario seemed to depart from the standard doctrinal tenet that any confrontation of nuclear powers in a limited or local war situation would "inevitably" escalate into a world nuclear war. This mutual deterrence doctrine had been a cornerstone of Khrushchev's efforts to scale down general purpose forces in favor of the strategic rocket forces.

Acknowledgments of the "inevitable" escalation tenet appeared in both the 1962 and 1963 editions of the authoritative Ministry of Defense publication MILITARY STRATEGY. The book contained the categorical statement that any direct confrontation of nuclear powers in a local war would "inevitably" escalate into a general nuclear conflict. However, even MILITARY STRATEGY seemed to reflect the view that greater attention should be given to "methods" of engaging in local wars and keeping them limited. Pressures for the removal of the doctrinal fetter of inevitable escalation had surfaced in military literature earlier. What seemed new in the current period were signs of an increased awareness of the possibility of waging a limited nuclear war.

One Soviet military commentator, writing in RED STAR on 3 August 1965, tacitly admitted the theoretical possibility of waging a limited nuclear war but indicated that such a concept could never apply in Europe. In a critical review of Herman Kahn's strategy of escalation, Major General V. Zemskov stated: "Thus in reality there can be development of a 'chain reaction' growing from a 'limited conflict' with the use of nuclear weapons into an irresistible avalanche of general nuclear war." As for the feasibility of a limited nuclear war in Europe, however, Zemskov declared: "It is obvious that a war in Europe saturated with
rocket-nuclear weapons would immediately take on the widest scope."

Further, Zemskov implicitly questioned whether even a limited conventional war could be waged in Europe: "How is it possible to use the term 'local war' at all, as applied to the European continent?"

Zemskov apparently did not represent the majority or currently accepted view in the defense establishment at the time. The October Storm maneuvers two months later were limited to Europe and evidently involved the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons. The notion that the military must be prepared for either a local conventional war or a limited nuclear war was never so forcefully presented as by Shtemenko in his 27 November article in SOVIET RUSSIA:

The infantry will, as before, remain the main and decisive force in local wars, without the use or with limited use of nuclear weapons. The possibility of the emergence of such wars is neither denied nor ignored, since they are already waged by imperialists in various areas of the globe.

"MULTIMILLION-MAN ARMIES"

Arguments for a numerically strong armed forces had been a staple of military agitation around Khrushchev's threatened force cuts in the past. Invocation of the need for "multimillion"-man armies was infrequent. Its reappearance in the September 1965 issue of KOMMUNIST dramatized an apparent change under the new leaders as well as the strength of the military since Khrushchev's removal. In a book review published in KOMMUNIST, No. 14 (signed to the press on 24 September 1965), Major General N. Pavlenko admonished the authors of a recent history of the party and military developments for failing to provide the "necessary proofs" that a future war will require "mass, multimillion-man armies."

The criticism seemed the more notable since the book in question did invoke the need for "multimillion-man armies," but in the context of a discussion of standard doctrinal tenets on a future war.

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CONFIDENTIAL
Acknowledgment of Budgetary Restraints Imposed by Defense

It was against the background of military agitation over the ground forces issue in the early part of the year that the Soviet leaders began to acknowledge the burdens imposed by defense on other goals and commitments. The apparent upgrading of the ground forces during the spring at about the same time that regime leaders were indicating that a turn in economic policy had occurred suggested a relationship between the two issues. The heightening of international tensions over the escalation of the war in Vietnam undoubtedly provided the military with ammunition to press its case. In any event, by July, and after a succession of leaders' statements on defense, Kosygin himself asserted that the pressing burdens of defense would require temporary postponement of consumer benefits.

V-E Day Speeches

Acknowledgments of the budgetary restraints imposed on the economy by defense date from Brezhnev's V-E Day speech of 8 May. Assurances of the party's solicitude for defense had become a generally consistent feature of Brezhnev's public remarks since Khrushchev's ouster, but the specific acknowledgment of the budgetary aspects of defense in the V-E Day speech was new. This issue had rarely been broached in public unless a decision had been made or was pending. Brezhnev declared: "We do not conceal the fact that a considerable part of our national budget goes to strengthening the combat might of our glorious armed forces," and the Soviet people fully support "the necessity of such expenditures." In the same context, he warned that the regime's peace policy should not be confused with "toothless pacifism."

Unlike Brezhnev's justification of defense expenditures, Kosygin's statement on 7 May, at the liberation anniversary observance in the GDR, skirted the issue of the defense establishment's claim on the budget entirely. Kosygin remarked only that the regime devotes "great attention" to defense; he concentrated on the "horrors" and "hardships" of war, declaring that a new war would "cost mankind immeasurable sacrifice and devastation never experienced in history." Podgorny's remark in Czechoslovakia on 8 May seemed in tune with Kosygin's. Podgorny spoke of the need to avert a "nuclear massacre," but added that such an effort had nothing "In common with appeasement." On an occasion which would seem to have called for at least a general display of concern for defense, Podgorny refrained from giving any assurances on the subject.
PODGORNYY ON CONSUMER PRIMACY

Propaganda during this period seemed to point toward contention over the scope of defense claims on national resources. Podgornyy's speech in Baku on 21 May not only offered a rationale for a redirection of resources to the consumer, but suggested that traditional heavy industry and military priorities were incompatible with present needs. He declared that the "main factor" in the party's policy is "constant concern for the well-being of the people." The substance of his argument—a careful rephrasing of the Khrushchevian line advanced in his CUBA SOCIALISTA article in November 1964—was that heavy industry and defense had already been built and that the regime could now channel greater investments to light industry and the consumer:

There was a time when the Soviet people deliberately suffered certain material restrictions in the interest of the preferential development of heavy industry and to strengthen our defense ability. These measures were fully justified because it is precisely production which is the material basis for the growth of culture and well-being of the people.... But now the communal riches are increasing every year, and the necessary conditions to meet the ever increasing cultural and living requirements of the working people are being created.

Podgornyy alluded to contention over such a consumer policy in the statement that "serious shortcomings" in this sphere were a result of an "evident negligence" and an "inattentive attitude" toward the people.

On 17 May, several days before Podgornyy delivered this speech, PRAVDA had published an article by the chief editor of KOMMUNIST, V. Stepanov, attacking views that Podgornyy seemed to espouse. Stepanov attacked "one-sided" and "primitive" notions about communism as a society "called upon only to satisfy material requirements, and elementary ones at that." Elaborating on the point, Stepanov charged that it would be a "great error" to reduce communism's aim to "'filling the belly'" and to "narrow 'practicism'" blind to ideological ideals.
MIKOYAN, SUSLOV ON DEFENSE

Mikoyan was the next to enter the discussion, with an endorsement of the regime's defense allocations policy. In a speech on 28 May, he declared that the state "is not sparing funds to produce new types of weapons in great quantity," regardless of the cost. He justified these expenditures on the grounds that "it would be even more expensive for us if we did not do so, because it is most important for us to be so strong that an enemy will never dare to attack us."

In Sofia on 2 June, in his first major statement since Khrushchev's ouster, Suslov stated that the USSR's "international duty" and "objective reality" both required the allocation of "considerable funds" for defense. He underlined the necessary restraints imposed by defense on the consumer in the statement that the regime's defense program "requires considerable material sacrifices by the Soviet people" and a "considerable part of the national income be spent on defense."

KOSYGIN'S JULY SPEECH

Finally, Kosygin's speech in Volgograd on 11 July rounded out the discussion with an acknowledgment that the burdens of defense were so pressing as to require indefinite postponement of the satisfaction of other needs. He declared that "in the current situation" it would be against the country's interest "to economize on defense" despite the "certain advantages" accruing from a policy of diverting "very large sums" from defense to "other branches" of the economy. The judgment seemingly expressed in Kosygin's statement was to be incorporated in a major editorial in KOMMUNIST (No. 12, signed to the press on 16 August) the following month:

In our time, tremendous funds are required for the equipping and maintaining of the armed forces. The party and government would like to channel such funds toward the peaceful branches of the economy. However, given the current situation, to economize on defense would mean to act against the interests of the Soviet state.

Then, quoting from Brezhnev's V-E Day speech, the editorial affirmed:

The Soviet people well understand the necessity for such outlays and fully support the party and government measures for strengthening the defense might of our motherland.
Focus of Controversy Shifts to Five-Year Plan Priorities

Differences in emphasis in leaders' statements during July on long-term policy commitments for the five-year plan period suggested continuing controversy over the size of the defense share of national resources. Repeated references to the five-year plan—some suggesting that the targets had already been set, others indicating that the plan was still in preparation—suggested that policy considerations underlying the plan had become a focal point of contention. Contrasting statements in Navy Day speeches in late July on the place defense would occupy in the five-year plan underlined the conflicting interests within the regime and suggested that a final accommodation had yet to be reached.

BREZHNEV ON DEFENSE NEEDS

Brezhnev was one of the first leaders to renew the public discussion of the five-year plan draft since Kosygin's censure of it in March. At a Kremlin reception for military graduates on 3 July, Brezhnev emphasized the "paramount importance" of defense in over-all state policy and suggested that defense would continue to be a favored recipient of investment resources. He stated that the regime was "sparing no efforts" to strengthen defense and was "allocating all necessary means" to equip the armed forces with not only the latest nuclear weapons, but conventional armaments as well. His stress on military needs was reflected in the guidelines he offered on the 1966 annual plan and the five-year plan, which he said were "being worked out." As in his previous formulations of over-all policy, he listed defense needs before consumer welfare:

A better and more rational utilization of national revenue is envisaged to insure the further development of our industry and strengthen our defense potential, bearing in mind the international situation; to raise agricultural production, and to improve the well-being of the Soviet people.

* Shelest brought up the plan in a speech in the Ukraine on 19 June, in a noncommittal reference to the "great work being done" in setting it up.
The general impression left by his remarks was that the USSR's military buildup should be a long-term and intensive effort not simply tied to current crisis situations or to other regime economic commitments. He cited Lenin to the effect that "the country's defense preparations do not require a sudden burst of activity nor a war cry, but long, intensive, tenacious and disciplined work on a mass scale."

Mzhavanadze joined in the renewed discussion of the five-year plan in an article in IZVESTIYA on 14 July. Although he spoke only for the Georgian republic, his remarks suggested that the production targets for the five-year plan period had already been set and that heavy industry would continue to enjoy its traditional priority:

In the years 1966-1970 the rate of development of the republic's economy will increase considerably. The average annual growth of the gross output of production will be 11.5 percent, the production of ferrous metal will increase by 46 percent, that of non-ferrous metal will increase tenfold, and the output of machine building and metal processing will increase two times.

KOSYGIN ON NEGLECT OF CONSUMER

Although Kosygin had sufficient opportunity to offer a formulation of the five-year plan tasks during June and July, he seemed intentionally to avoid committing himself. In a speech in Riga on 17 July, however, he again criticized "some people" for their "disdainful attitude" toward consumer services—for treating branches of the economy that served the population as "something of secondary importance." Kosygin argued that while formerly the investment resources were unavailable, the regime was now in a position to devote "the necessary attention and means to this question." Kosygin's insistence that the regime could earmark greater resources for the consumer was the more striking in that it came less than a week after the Volgograd speech in which he had indicated that the burdens of defense would require further consumer sacrifices. In the light of the public discussion that led up to his Volgograd speech, it appeared that Kosygin's admission at that time reflected a consensus against seeking defense economies. But his Riga statement suggested that he continued to favor a limited redirection of resources to the consumer within the framework of existing economic constraints. In any event, Kosygin's reproof of "some people" in his 17 July speech seemed generally in tune with remarks by Podgornyy about neglect of consumer interests in his Baku speech in late May.
THE NAVY DAY SPEECHES

Tensions that had evidently been growing over the guidelines of the five-year plan seemed to surface in statements marking Navy Day on 24 July. A number of leaders spoke on the occasion—Kosygin in Baltysk, Podgornyy and Shelest in Sevastopol, Kirilenko in Vladivostok, Shelepin in Severomorsk—and a similarity of format in all the speeches suggested an effort at coordination. But differences of substance pointed to continuing discord over long-term policy commitments.

SHELEPIN VS. KIRILENKO

The Shelepin and Kirilenko speeches in particular served to illustrate the interplay of doctrinaire and pragmatic tendencies within the leadership. The former, with its stress on external dangers and internal orthodoxy, encompasses a broad spectrum of conservative views. The latter, with its emphasis on the solution of pressing problems at home and abroad, spans a range of reformist views.

Shelepin's Navy Day speech was marked by language contrived to place production ahead of consumption as the immediate task in domestic policy, as well as by calls for strengthening defense in the face of a "gravely deteriorated" international situation, the "growing" threat to peace, and the "constantly threatening danger of being subjected to a new military attack from the imperialist beasts of prey." In harmony with this stress on the external danger—"ships and aircraft of the NATO countries constantly are roaming near the coasts of the Soviet Union"—he called for increasing discipline and "revolutionary enthusiasm" at home as well as "vigilance" and "revolutionary watchfulness" toward the enemy abroad.

By contrast, Kirilenko's 24 July speech placed unusual stress on consumer welfare as the "one goal" that guides "all measures" taken by the party and government. Noting that consumer needs were not being "fully" met, Kirilenko asserted that the regime was undertaking measures to remove such shortcomings and to raise living standards "within a brief period." Kirilenko's focus on the domestic economy was fully compatible with his portrayal of the international situation. Unlike Shelepin, Kirilenko did not paint a particularly alarming picture of the threat from "imperialism." Instead, when speaking of the USSR's "international responsibility" to the communist movement, he gave first place to a basically internal task—achieving "more and more new successes in the building of communism"—rather than to intensifying revolutionary struggle. And in acknowledging a "most important"
task to enhance the capabilities of the armed forces, he subordinated it to an invocation of the regime’s peace policy and desire to prevent a new world war.

HANDLING IN Varying presentations of the Shelepin and Kirilenko PRESS MEDIA speeches in radio and press media attested to propaganda disarray over the handling of evidently contentious issues, relating particularly to the general guidelines of the five-year plan.

Recorded excerpts of Shelepin’s speech broadcast in the domestic service included passages focused sharply on defense aspects of the plan, including an assurance that the government would devote unfiring attention “in the forthcoming five-year plan” to further strengthening the armed forces and developing the defense industry. PRAVDA’s account included a reassertion by Shelepin of the primacy of production forces in determining the welfare goal, but left out all references to the five-year plan and defense. Both the radio and PRAVDA versions of Kirilenko’s speech left out all specific references to five-year plan tasks.

RED STAR’s accounts of the speeches, in both cases fuller than PRAVDA’s and Radio Moscow’s, seemed curiously edited in such a way as to go against the special interests associated with the military paper. Notably, rearrangements and apparent editing in the RED STAR version of the Shelepin speech altered the impact produced by the radio’s recorded excerpts by excising Shelepin’s reference to the five-year plan from the passage in which he asserted party-government solicitude for defense needs. The plan was cited, however, in a statement that it would “insure the further upsurge of the national economy, of our economics, science, and culture, as well as of a rise in the Soviet people’s living standards.” Kirilenko’s remarks, as presented in RED STAR, conveyed the impression that five-year plan targets had already been set and included—in the context of the plan—a reassertion of the policy of reducing the gap between heavy and light industry introduced by Kosygin in December 1964.

Whatever the circumstances that produced this presentation of the speeches in RED STAR, the tailoring of the accounts to
reflect a strong consumer bias was striking. Material reflecting such a bias, on the rare occasions when it has appeared in RED STAR’s pages, has usually been in articles signed by people without official military standing or rank. Such articles could thus be read as representing views the military does not necessarily sanction. An example was an article appearing on 13 August, a few weeks after the Navy Day speeches, in which economist Allakhverdyan discussed the tasks envisaged in the five-year plan. Referring to the plan as still "being worked out," Allakhverdyan called for major structural changes in the heavy industry sector aimed at increasing the growth tempo of branches serving consumer goods production. A remark that such a policy would entail a corresponding "redistribution" of investment resources favoring light industry and public services must have come as a discordant note to military ears despite assurances of the regime's concern for defense elsewhere in the article. Allakhverdyan's statement was strikingly similar to Kosygin's in his mid-July speech and to arguments advanced by reformist economists in previous months.

Renewal of Military Bids for Priority Treatment

Despite the anomalies in RED STAR's pages, the main line of the arguments advanced by military spokesmen during the summer continued to express the appropriate institutional interests. Against the background of the leaders' statements during the summer, it would appear that the disagreement in the regime over long-term economic commitments was in some way related to new pressures being brought to bear by the military. A number of major articles in RED STAR during this period mustered arguments against the idea that any relaxation of the Soviet military effort was feasible or justifiable now or in the future. The public commentary on military matters was replete with warnings of the continuing growth of Western military budgets, manpower strengths, conventional weapons capabilities, and "imperialist" aggression on a "global" scale—drawing an especially threatening picture of Western military power and war preparations as a whole. While the lessons to be drawn from these discourses were for the most part left implicit, some spokesmen directly pressed the military's demands for undiminished attention to defense regardless of the cost or the drain on the economy.

THE MIFTIYEV ARTICLE

An article in RED STAR on 4 June by Colonel G. Miftiyev, for example, argued for a preferential distribution of the country's scientific and technical engineering expertise among the
defense-related sectors of the economy. Although Miftiyev acknowledged the economic drain this would impose on the civilian economy, he justified the military's claims on human and material resources on the grounds that it might be impossible to transfer industry to a war footing after the outbreak of war. At the same time, he asserted the "inevitably" growing significance of armed forces manpower strength despite the increased "firepower" of new weapons. Miftiyev's stress on the requirements of the war industry seemed in tune with several remarks by political leaders during the summer. Mikoyan, in a talk to the Tank Academy on 1 June, described the development of the military industry as "extremely" important. And Shelepin, in his Navy Day speech on 24 July, twice cited the regime's solicitude for the defense industry. A public specification of the defense industry is unusual in any context, and its appearance during this period suggested some topical relevance to discussions within the leadership.

THE KUROCHKIN ARTICLE

Another article in RED STAR, by General P. Kurochkin on 9 July, examined the relationship of Western arms expenditures and military manpower levels to the "aggressive" aims of "imperialist" states. Using data from Western sources, Kurochkin argued that NATO military expenditures had increased about four times during the period 1949-1964—exclusive of "indirect" and "concealed" expenditures—and that U.S. military manpower strengths had increased roughly nine times since the outbreak of World War II. He concluded with the reminder:

Our party is solving the task of unflinchingly strengthening the defensive capability of the USSR, the fighting power of the Soviet armed forces, and the fighting power and collaboration between the armies of Warsaw Pact member countries, and is assuring the military superiority of socialism over imperialism—a superiority whose single purpose is to tame an aggressor and to insure the security of the peoples.

THE KORNIYENKO ARTICLE

Major General A. Korniyenko, in a RED STAR article on 10 September, asserted the primacy of military claims on national resources despite the "unprecedented complications" and "high costs" of maintaining an up-to-date military establishment. He argued that victory in war—given the "right political leadership"—depends largely on the strength of the economy and its capabilities to produce armaments. In discussing economic mobilization during past
wars, Korniyenko cited the primary role of "heavy industry" in guaranteeing technological innovation in arms production.

Viewed in terms of political-military tensions over the priorities of the five-year plan and the annual plan that would be unveiled by the end of the year, the military arguments bore the earmarks of agitation by the defense establishment for undiminished attention to those heavy industry components serving the military as well as to traditional concepts of military power.

V. AUGUST: NEW SIGNS OF LEADERSHIP INSTABILITY

In a period when strident regime statements on the international situation and the need to "strengthen" defense capabilities were indicating a new currency for conservative arguments, political maneuvering—apparently related in some measure to the resource allocations issue—pointed in the same direction. By the beginning of August, there were signs that Podgorny’s position in the leadership had been weakened and that he had become politically vulnerable. His strong advocacy in Baku of a consumer-oriented program seemed to place him outside the consensus reflected in most other leaders’ speeches that followed. If an effective move against Podgorny had in fact developed, previous elements in the propaganda suggested that Brezhnev had engineered it.

Brezhnev-Podgorny Rivalry: Podgorny Loses Ground

The publication of a CPSU Central Committee decree in early August censuring the recruitment policies of Kharkov obkom—Podgorny’s bailiwick in the Ukraine—was a major portent of Podgorny’s shifting fortunes. The substance of the indictment, outlined in PARTY LIFE (No. 15, signed to the press on 2 August), was that the obkom leaders had indiscriminately increased party membership, particularly among young people, and had dropped qualifying restrictions. Other charges included slackening ideological indoctrination, tolerating violations of party and state discipline, and failing to adhere to the principles of criticism and self-criticism. PRAVDA pressed the case against Kharkov throughout August, although an editorial in the paper on 5 August sounded a dissonant note by implicitly challenging the validity of the charges leveled against Kharkov. Although it thus appeared that there was still some dissension over the issue, the effort snowballed through the remainder of the month.
The substance of the criticisms directed at the Kharkov obkom was not new. Charges of lax party discipline and low-level ideological shortcomings among party cadres had been a fairly steady undercurrent in the propaganda since Khrushchev's ouster. The speeches at the March agricultural plenum, reproduced in the stenographic record, underlined the important place these matters had assumed in inner-party debate. Brezhnev himself repeatedly spoke of a need to infuse party ranks with a greater sense of responsibility, ideological awareness, and discipline. Mazurov and Mzhavanadze took special pains to point up these issues in their plenum speeches. Suslov, in his speech in Sofia in early June, underscored the importance of party discipline and the principle of "criticism and self-criticism" for the "ideological armament" of the party. In a speech to the Georgian plenum on 25 June, Mzhavanadze went so far as to invoke Stalin in support of his argument: "Stalin said accurately and graphically: 'Our party is a fortress, the doors of which open only for the tested.'" This statement presaged one of the central charges leveled against Kharkov in August—the charge of indiscriminate recruitment of young people into the party.

That the Kharkov obkom was singled out for special opprobrium, despite the acknowledged fact that the problem was general, heightened the impression that the move was aimed at least in part at undercutting Podgorny's position in the leadership. As a key participant in the Secretariat's direction of party affairs, Podgorny had already suffered a setback in April when his long-standing associate Titov—also connected with Kharkov—as second secretary and away from his CPSU Secretariat function as head of the commission for party-organizational questions. The CPSU decree in August seemed to underline the permanency of Titov's status in Kazakhstan, while implicitly placing Podgorny's present functions in the Secretariat in question.

The other Presidium figure besides Brezhnev who appeared to gain from the move against Podgorny was Shelepin, whose rising prominence in the leadership seemed to parallel efforts aimed at undercutting Podgorny. By late summer, rumors originating in Moscow and circulating in the West suggested that Brezhnev's position...
had been weakened and that Shelepin would be the major benefactor of an imminent leadership shakeup. If contention in fact existed between Brezhnev and Shelepin, it remains unclear whether the motives were purely political or whether substantive policy issues were involved. On a number of issues relating to defense and foreign affairs, the stands taken publicly by Brezhnev and Shelepin were identical or similar. In some instances Brezhnev even reiterated formulations originally advanced by Shelepin; and the reverse was true in other cases.

Whatever the nature and extent of an actual or potential threat from Shelepin, propaganda during the period suggested that Brezhnev was continuing to accumulate the formal trappings of greater authority. The YEARBOOK of the Soviet Encyclopedia--signed to the press on 3 June but not publicly available until mid-September--included among Brezhnev's titles that of "Chairman of the RSFSR Bureau" of the Central Committee. The title had not previously been accorded him in the Soviet press, although the position had been held by the CPSU First Secretary since the creation of the RSFSR Bureau in 1956. Whether Brezhnev gained the position immediately after Khrushchev's ouster or some time later remains unclear. But it is noteworthy that an obituary of an RSFSR bureau functionary, T. Shykov, published in PRAVDA only a few weeks after Khrushchev's ouster, failed to include Brezhnev's name in a list that contained other members of the bureau as well as some non-members, including Kosygin. The absence of Brezhnev's name could be viewed as reflecting an effort at that time to limit his authority. The propaganda failed to cite Brezhnev in the RSFSR position even after the publication of the YEARBOOK in June, suggesting that if he in fact occupied the post his position in it may have been tenuous.

VI. CONTROVERSY OVER SEPTEMBER PLENUM PROPOSALS

The long delay in announcing the September plenum as well as the persistence of controversy up until the eve of its opening betrayed signs of high-level discord over the scope and extent of the industrial and planning reform which Kosygin unveiled on 27 September. It was widely rumored during the summer that a plenum which would reexamine the country's industrial and economic organization had been postponed several times because of differences within the regime. In his Gosplan speech in March, Kosygin had indicated the two poles around which the discussion was developing. One viewpoint favored a strict centralization of management and
planning with the restoration of the ministries; the other advocated maximum initiative at the lower levels, with Gosplan simply coordinating plans prepared locally. Kosygin rejected both viewpoints as "incorrect," favoring instead a "creative combination" of the "initiative and proposals of local organs with economically grounded schemes of the central planning organs for the development of specific branches of the national economy and of regions of the country."

Although the propaganda since the December 1964 Supreme Soviet had reflected various and often conflicting viewpoints regarding the economic organization and planning system, the positions of the top political figures seemed elusive on the specifics. Brezhnev, for instance, repeatedly indicated his support for the introduction of economic levers into the economy, but shied away from precise proposals concerning the planning or industrial management system. In fact, his admonitions against "fuss" and "haste" in reorganizations suggested that he might have favored retaining the existing organizational framework with only slight modifications. Only two weeks before the September plenum, at a Soviet-Czech friendship rally, Brezhnev spoke of the "large-scale work" being carried out to improve the country's economic management, but cautioned that such work "requires time" and has no place for "rashness" and "subjectivism;"

In the Soviet Union, too, large-scale work is being carried out in this direction. Such work, of course, requires time. Here rashness and subjectivism in the solution of these questions are particularly intolerable. The point is to analyze carefully all accumulated experience of the previous development of our economy, to carefully weigh the existing possibilities, and to work out forms of management of the national economy so as to conform best to the present level of the production forces and promote the maximum utilization of all the advantages of socialist production.

Podgorny's remarks on the "Leninist methods" of economic management in his 24 July Navy Day speech appeared also to espouse a line not fully in tune with Kosygin's statements at the March Gosplan meeting. Podgorny's definition of economic "centralism" seemed contrived to emphasize "local features," "local original thinking," and "local initiative;"

Centralism, understood in the really democratic sense, Lenin taught us, presupposes a possibility, created for
the first time in history, of full and unhindered development not only of local features but also of local original thinking and local initiative.

Kosygin in his March speech had criticized the view of "some people" that "workers in the provinces could compile the best plan" since "they have more insight there." Kosygin said such a "primitive planning concept" was incompatible with "all-state interests" and gave rise to "localist trends."

Military Resistance to Economic Reorganization

On the eve of the September plenum the military appeared to be demonstrating resistance to the threat of an economic reorganization inimical to defense interests. Arguments in the military press evinced concern over the possible enactment of economic measures aimed at decentralizing production or planning authority or at introducing economic "levers" which might weaken the heavy industry-defense establishment's claims on resources. Such a threat had presumably been posed by Kosygin's call at the December 1964 Supreme Soviet--widely discussed in subsequent economic literature--for planning procedures based on direct contacts on the basis of orders between the enterprise and the consumer, an economic reality that Kosygin indicated should be applied to heavy industry. Equally ominous from the military standpoint were the repeated invocations, by Kosygin and other leaders, of the need for heavy industry to devote an increased share of its production to the consumer sectors of the economy.

Typical of the military arguments was an article in RED STAR on 10 September by Major General A. Korniyenko. In discussing the "new claims," "high costs," and increased scales of military production which have "immeasurably" increased demands in the field of economic readiness, Korniyenko declared that any "rational" reorganization of the "entire national economy" must insure the fullest utilization of resources, taking into account the real needs of war, the possible losses and ways to make them good, and... the correct relationship between the amount of reserves and the scope of current production.

Similarly, an article in KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES (No. 19, signed to the press on 20 September) by Colonel A. Babakov underlined the party's solicitude for the special requirements of the...
defense industry"

The Central Committee is always engaged in the study of problems pertaining to the development of the defense industry, to the supply of strategic raw materials and skilled labor forces, to the distribution of enterprises which are important for defense, to improvement of the management system of these enterprises, and so forth.

Concern over an economic reorganization which might harm defense interests was evident in Babakov's statement that "the party has resolutely condemned the practice whereby big economic problems were sometimes solved by means of the creation of new institutions or departments or by a rearrangement of old ones, without the necessary study of practical experience."

MALINOVSKIY ARTICLE

Finally, an article by Malinovskiy in RED STAR on 24 September, three days before the plenum, criticized a "leader" who attempts to "discover America" even though it was long ago discovered. Although Malinovskiy was discussing the leadership qualities of military commanders, his criticisms were made in the context of "reorganizations." Taken as a whole, his remarks seemed to convey resentment toward attitudes that were not confined to the military:

What is the use of a superior who has the ability to thoroughly judge all kinds of matters but has an inadequate knowledge of his own obligations? Such a leader vacillates, does not tackle the tasks entrusted to him, and tries to "discover America" although it has long ago been discovered. This is impermissible. We must remember V.1. Lenin's words: "Let us have as few as possible general reorganizations; let us have as many as possible measures, habits, methods, and instructions that are businesslike, tested in practice, and proven by results already attained..."

It seems more than coincidental that Malinovskiy imputed the desire to "discover America" to leaders favoring reorganizations. Reformist economists had repeatedly defended themselves against the same charge—ostensibly in answer to "bourgeois critics"—in the discussion of the applicability of profits and other economic levers to the Soviet economy.

KOZYGIN PRESENTS ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT REFORM

The CPSU plenum convened on 27 September and heard a report by Kozyggin calling for a major overhaul of economic management aimed...
at strengthening centralized control of the economy while enhancing the authority of local enterprises and the role of economic levers in production. On the question of economic management, Kosygin proposed restoration of the ministerial system, reversing Khrushchev's 1957 reorganization which had set up a system of regional economic councils. He also called for strengthening the role of Gosplan as the supreme planning authority.

Although Kosygin gave assurances that the return to the ministerial system of economic management would not impair the role of the party in economic affairs, his verbal assurances are not likely to have assuaged the critics of the reorganization. In practical terms, the reconstitution of the ministerial system pointed not only to a strengthened role for the so-called party "technocrats" in the decision-making councils of the regime, but also to a reduction in the leverage of the party in local economic affairs. Evidence that the reorganization was opposed on precisely these grounds could be found in Leningrad secretary G.I. Popov's vigorous defense of the sovnarkhozes at the December 1964 Supreme Soviet session, when he argued that a return to the ministerial system would preclude "really effective party leadership of the economy locally."

THE AGANBEGYAN SPEECH

Kosygin's speech was remarkable for its striking similarity to a controversial speech by an Armenian economist, A. Aganbegyan, which according to Western sources was circulating in the USSR several months prior to the plenum. An article by Gloria Stewart in the NEW STATESMAN in July, containing an account of this speech, identified Aganbegyan as a Kosygin mentor whose findings on the Soviet economy had been distributed to the Central Committee sometime in December 1964 and were subsequently presented in a speech at a Moscow publishing house. The speech did not appear in the Soviet press, but a purported text surfaced in the Trotskyite Italian monthly BANDIERA ROSSA in July. How it came to be published in a communist organ with such political leanings remains obscure. If the purpose was to embarrass Kosygin, the maneuver evidently failed. But the similarities between BANDIERA ROSSA's text of the speech and Kosygin's plenum report support the authenticity of the document.
The Aganbegyan speech roundly criticized Soviet economic performance during the seven-year plan period, placed the blame for the current situation on the heavy drain of resources to defense, and announced that the sovarkhoz system would be abolished in favor of a return to ministerial guidance of the economy along with greater autonomy for enterprises. A comparison of key policy positions advocated in the Aganbegyan speech and those advanced by Kosygin at the September plenum shows a striking agreement of views, although on the question of defense Kosygin's position was less explicit than Aganbegyan's.

**ECONOMIC GROWTH**

**Aganbegyan Speech**

During the past six years the rate of development of our economy has decreased by two-thirds or so... During the same period the rate of increase in goods in circulation has decreased by three-fourths. There was also a large drop in the rate of increase of the population's real income.

**Kosygin Plenum Report**

One must note that during recent years there has been a certain decrease in the size of national income and industrial output per ruble of fixed production assets.

**HEAVY-LIGHT INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIP**

We have been holding doggedly to the line of ultra-industrialization for many years. Even in recent years when there was no longer any necessity to do so, this line of action was continued. All of this has been coupled with an artificial slowing down of the development of those sectors unrelated to heavy industry, to the detriment of the former.

An incorrect relationship existed between the development of group A and the industry of group B. For several years running the industry of group B has been lagging in its development. This backwardness is explained not only by the fact that the very plans envisaged a slower pace in the growth of the industries of group B, but also by the fact that even these plan assignments were systematically unfulfilled.
ECONOMIC LEVERS

Agambeyan Speech
Our system of economic levers has nothing in common with the plan and goes against the interests of the economy. It creates, in fact, contradictions between the interests of the state and those of the enterprise.

Kosygin Plenum Report
In order to widen the range of economic independence of enterprises, it is proposed to reduce the number of indices in the schemes to be approved by the enterprises.... Experience shows that the index of the volume of overall output fails to orient the enterprises toward placing on the market such products as are really needed by the national economy and the population.

UNEMPLOYMENT

Jobs must be created for 10 million young people in the next five years. At the same time, one finds that there has been an increase in the number of persons without work during the past two years. This phenomenon occurs above all in the small and medium-sized cities.

Of great importance for accelerating the rate of production development and raising the people's well-being is the rational use of labor resources.... There are considerable reserves of working forces in the small town....

TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS

There is an increased gap between the possibilities offered by technological progress and the actual achievement of these possibilities.

Plans for scientific research work and the assimilation of the achievements of science and technology into production are being consistently unfulfilled.
CONFI NTIAL

MACHINE-BUILDING

Aganbegyan Speech Kosygin Plenum Report

The chief sector of our heavy Things are particularly bad industry, the machine-building industry, has made two assimilation for the output of new machines.... New our economy. The number of technological processes are machine tools we have is not being assimilated into equal to the number in the industry sufficiently, The United States, but only half structure of machines and of ours produce effectively equipment being produced in while the others either are many branches is not accord- not used or are being re- repaired.

Divergent Lines in Brezhnev, Kosygin Speeches

Differing approaches in Brezhnev's and Kosygin's speeches at the September plenum emerge in sharpened relief against this background.*

Brezhnev's 29 September address appeared in the central press with the editorial note "printed with some abridgement," while another speech in which he discussed the forthcoming 23d CPSU Congress--scheduled for 29 March 1966--was not publicized. Although the published speech contained a general endorsement of the measures outlined in Kosygin's report, it seemed lukewarm in its treatment of some of the issues raised by the Soviet Premier, notably as regards the state of the economy. The overall impression conveyed by Brezhnev's remarks was not to the satisfaction of the management system we must correct to the situation.

Brezhnev seemed defensive regarding the rationale of the economic reorganization. Unlike Kosygin, who stressed the problems facing the economy, Brezhnev denied that the new measures were prompted by the "discovery" of "some kinds of failures in the work of our industry," On the contrary, he said, "our industry does not work badly." As documentation he pointed to the successes in building defense and supplying the armed forces with "most up-to- date, first-rate military equipment." In the same context, he *

* The central press reported "stormy, prolonged applause" but only "prolonged applause" for Kosygin, though it was Kosygin who delivered the formal "report" while Brezhnev simply delivered a "speech,"
implied that the growth of consumer goods was in line with the economy's needs. He stated that "industry more and more fully meets the demands of Soviet citizens" and that "the output of consumer goods has increased considerably and keeps growing all the time."

Where Brezhnev's remarks on resource policy seemed designed to give assurance that defense would continue to receive its traditional priorities, Kosygin's stressed the need for a redirection of resources to the consumer sectors of the economy. Kosygin's speech was replete with criticisms of neglect of consumer interests, disproportions between heavy and light industry, and "systematic" underfulfillment of light industry targets. He declared that "one of the most important tasks in the next few years is to increase the part of national income spent on consumption." And he invariably cited consumer welfare ahead of defense.

On the question of the application of technological achievements to industry, Brezhnev seemed to take umbrage at Kosygin's remark that "serious shortcomings" in this sphere had a "serious effect" on the rate of industrial growth. In speaking of qualitative changes in industry, Brezhnev commented that the share of those branches of the economy that were "decisive" for the level of technological progress "is continually increasing in our industry." In the same context, he went on to say that "we are beginning to use processes which only recently seemed to be far removed from practical application." Brezhnev's speech also contained an apparent rejoinder to Kosygin's criticism of "violations" of the branch principle of industrial guidance under the economic councils:

It was not without reason that even under the present territorial system of managing industry through economic councils, we had to retain the branch principle of planning industry. This, I must say, has saved us from many errors.

On the sensitive question of party-government relations, Brezhnev also seemed to be on the defensive. Recognizing that the captains of industry were likely under Kosygin's proposed reorganization to acquire a greater voice in economic affairs, he called on the
party to be vigilant in informing the Central Committee on the work of the ministries. Yet, as if to highlight the difficulties involved in carrying out the party's watchdog function in the economy, Brezhnev charged that the decisions of the March agricultural plenum had been undermined by "some links" of the "state apparatus" despite the "absolutely clearcut" nature of the decisions. And the "links" he criticized--"Gosplan, ministries, and different departments"--lay within Kosygin's sphere of bureaucratic jurisdiction.

Rumored Leadership Shakeuup Fails to Materialize

Despite widespread rumors prior to the plenum of a major leadership shakeup, only two personnel shifts were effected, and one simply formalized a de facto situation. Titov was finally removed from his Secretarial position, and F. D. Kulakov was promoted to the Secretariat, presumably filling the post vacated by Polyakov in November 1964.

An editorial published in PRAVDA on 26 September, the day before the plenum, had criticized the Kharkov party organization--which again brought Podgorny to mind--for "serious deficiencies" in its work. The editorial repeatedly invoked the need to "expel" from party membership a "worker" who "for years does not cope with the matters allocated to him." It is time, PRAVDA asserted, "to decisively put an end to the existing lenience and liberalism" regarding those party members "whose actions are incompatible with party membership."

VII. CONTINUING DISCORD ON RESOURCE ISSUE IN POST-PLENUM PERIOD

The implications of Kosygin's economic reorganization for the resource allocations problem were both direct and indirect. On the one hand, the reorganization could be expected to place certain direct claims on resources in support of industrial renovation. On the other hand, it would have the indirect effect of reducing the annual increase in production because of disruption caused by administrative and technical changes. Implementation of one critical feature of the measures was deferred: The pricing reform that accompanied the reorganization was shelved for almost two years, until 1967-1968. Kosygin
pointed to an evident source of resistance to the measures when he introduced them by invoking a need to increase the share of state investments to the consumer. Such resistance would presumably come from the heavy industry-defense interests, who—as Brezhnev succinctly stated at the plenum—had "not been doing badly" under the previous system.

The reorganization was formally approved at the Supreme Soviet session at the beginning of October, with Mazurov delivering the main report. Evidence that contention over the resource allocations issue persisted through the Supreme Soviet deliberations could be found in the propaganda's treatment of the regime's priority tasks as defined by Kosygin at the plenum and repeated by Mazurov in his Supreme Soviet speech. Kosygin's speech—and the plenum resolution—placed consumer welfare ahead of defense as one of the party's most important tasks in economic policy. Mazurov's Supreme Soviet speech did the same. But PRAVDA editorials on 2 and 12 October, pegged to the economic reorganization, reversed the order to place defense first. A RED STAR editorial on 5 October did the same.

The persistence of agitation over the issue during the October-November period pointed to continuing differences within the leadership at a time when the 1966 plan was in the final stages of preparation.

Leaders Stress Defense in Context of Vietnam War

A number of Soviet leaders' statements during November stressed the regime's heightened commitment to defense in connection with the war in Vietnam. Mazurov on 1 November, decrying "U.S. aggression" in Vietnam, called for "higher vigilance" and "unabated attention" to "strengthening" the USSR's military might. Where in his Supreme Soviet speech he had cited consumer welfare ahead of defense, Mazurov now reversed the listing. Malinovskiy's Red Square speech on 6 November predictably affirmed the party's "untiring concern" for strengthening the country's defenses in the context of a denunciation of the armed intervention of "American imperialism" in Vietnam. Malinovskiy's order of the day on 1 November cited "aggressive activities of the U.S. imperialists" and declared that the party and government "are taking all necessary measures" to enhance the armed forces' defense capabilities. Polyanskiy's October Revolution anniversary speech contained similar assurances of the party's concern for the armed forces in "present circumstances." Polyanskiy stated that in the current international situation—the USSR "will remain highly vigilant and will constantly strengthen its military might." Further, he cited the people's capacity...
Attention Turns to Adoption of 1966 Plan and Budget

By mid-November it appeared that some settlement on the resource allocations issue had been reached: On the 15th PRAVDA published a communique from the CPSU Presidium and Council of Ministers stating that the draft plan and budget for 1966 had been "approved." The language, however, was equivocal. The communique stated that the plan envisaged measures to "raise the people's living standards and strengthen the defense might of the country." At the same time, it promised the "priority development" of heavy industry and the allocation of "large sums" for the light and food industries.

Although the communique seemed to serve notice that the issues relating to the plan and budget had been settled, an unheralded CPSU plenum met on 6 December and "endorsed in the main" the draft plan and budget. Such a formal endorsement by a party plenum was without precedent in recent years. It seemed a remarkably gratuitous gesture in view of the previous communique and since a regular session of the Supreme Soviet had been scheduled to discuss and formally adopt the plan and budget the following day. And the plenum's endorsement only "in the main" attested to the tenuous nature of the "approval" announced in the communique on 15 November.

Defense Increase Announced at Supreme Soviet

Controversy over the allocations issue thus appears to have persisted up until the eve of the Supreme Soviet, where Finance Minister Garbuzov on 7 December announced a 600-million-ruble increase in the defense budget. The decision to increase defense spending seemed out of harmony with Kosygin's line on the economy but generally consistent with Brezhnev's statements on over-all economic policy over the past year. In an interview with the New York TIMES' James Reston on 6 December—the day the plenum met—Kosygin indicated that the move to increase defense expenditures by five percent would be announced on the following day, but he expressed concern about the implications of the decision. While he stated that the measure was prompted by similar U.S. actions, he avowed that "we our doing this against our own wishes." He also evinced concern over the prospect of further defense increases, implying that once the pattern was set it would be difficult to reverse.

*Polyanskiy's increased prominence in the leadership was also underlined a month earlier by his promotion to first deputy premier at the October Supreme Soviet session.
VIII. DECEMBER: NEW POWER BALANCE IN BREZHEV'S FAVOR

The decision to increase defense spending was accompanied by changes within the leadership which seemed further to consolidate Brezhnev's position. The coincidence of these developments reinforced the indications that Brezhnev's views had dominated the prevailing economic policy line. During the course of the plenum, V. Shcherbitskiy, a close and long-standing Brezhnev associate in the Ukraine, was promoted to candidate Presidium status and I. Kapitonov, a high-level RSFSR bureau functionary, was elevated to the CPSU Secretariat, presumably to fill the post once occupied by Titov. On 9 December at the Supreme Soviet, Shelepin was "relieved" of his government position on the Council of Ministers, Mikoyan relinquished his post as titular head of state, and Podgorny was "elected" as Mikoyan's replacement.

The cumulative effect of the changes suggested the emergence of a new power balance in Brezhnev's favor. A situation was created whereby a challenge by Podgorny seemed unlikely, Shelepin's growing authority was at least temporarily checked, and other political figures moving into important party posts were either known Brezhnev supporters or were filling positions once occupied by people owing their positions to prominent leaders other than Brezhnev.

SHLEPIN

Shelepin's removal from the Council of Ministers, in which he had held the post of deputy premier, was anticipated by Brezhnev's 6 December plenum speech calling for a reorganization of Shelepin's party-state control committee. Shelepin's control apparatus had always represented a potential threat to the entrenched power of the middle-level party and state bureaucracy. The reorganization proposed by Brezhnev—and duly adopted—suggested that Shelepin's agency, with its punitive potentialities, was regarded as an imminent threat, operating independently and outside regular party channels. Although at one point in the 6 December speech Brezhnev referred favorably to the past work of Shelepin's control apparatus, he asserted that his favorable comments did not mean that "there have been no shortcomings" in the work of the party-state control agencies. And his remarks on the new people's control organs seemed to contain admonitions applicable to Shelepin's control apparatus:

One should also have in mind the circumstance that people's control organs do not control the work of
party organs. This work is controlled by the control system within the party on the basis of the party statutes.

The same warning had appeared in the propaganda at the time the party-state control committee was introduced by Khrushchev in November 1962 as part of his party reform. That the party-state control committee remained after other aspects of the 1962 party reform had been abrogated by the new leaders suggested that powerful interests favored its retention.

In the months prior to the December 1965 plenum, there were signs that the control apparatus had become an issue in inner-party debate and that the discussion was partly related to Shelepin's position in the leadership. As far back as the March agricultural plenum, a move against Shelepin and his control apparatus seemed in the making. Shelepin's name was conspicuously absent from the membership of the commission named by the plenum to work out the agricultural decree, even though all the other members of the Presidium and Secretariat except Mikoyan and Shvernik were included. Shelepin's exclusion was the more notable in that his control apparatus was empowered by its charter to oversee the implementation of the plenum's decisions.

There were also indications during the summer of high-level support for Shelepin. In his article in IZVESTIYA on 14 July, Mzhavanadze specifically and favorably cited the work being done by party-state control committees: "With the help of the organs of party-state control, we are preventing many lapses in economic work caused by the lack of discipline of individual workers." And an article in IZVESTIYA on 3 August, by oblast first secretary M. Crakhmalev, paid fulsome tribute to the "struggle" being waged "in a principled way" by the party-state control agencies. Crakhmalev also made the point—which Brezhnev implicitly rebutted on 6 December—that party-state control agencies were neither duplicating nor hindering the work of regular party organs: "It can be said without exaggeration that in party-state control, party organs have received a powerful weapon which helps solve successfully the most important tasks of economic and cultural construction."

An article published in SOVIET STATE AND LAW (No. 11, signed to the press on 16 November) only a few weeks before the December plenum seemed to anticipate the charges implicitly leveled at Shelepin's control apparatus in Brezhnev's plenum speech. Calling for a "clarification" of the party-state control charter, the article charged that the control apparatus was paralleling and duplicating control functions of other Soviet organs and intruding into areas where it did not belong.
Kosygin as well as Brezhnev had grounds for concern about Shelepin's agency and his government position. With its loosely defined mandate and roughly five-million-man apparatus, the control organization may have become an obstacle to the implementation of government policies, and Shelepin's prominence in the party—outranking Kosygin by virtue of his Secretarial position—made him less sensitive to Kosygin's demands. Thus, the political expediency of downgrading Shelepin's agency, placing the new control organs under the government alone, and removing Shelepin from the Council of Ministers may have been welcomed equally by Kosygin and Brezhnev.

There were signs following the December plenum that the move against Shelepin's control apparatus was part of a larger—and not wholly successful—maneuver against Shelepin, who in the event retained his Secretarial position. The decree removing him from the Council of Ministers simply asserted that the CPSU Central Committee Presidium found it "expedient" for him to "concentrate his activity at the Central Committee of the party." Unlike Shelepin, who also owed his Secretarial position to his post as head of party-state control, the republican leaders of party-state control committees lost their Secretarial posts, were demoted from the republican councils of ministers, and were named heads of the downgraded people's control organs. Shelepin's retention of his post in the CPSU Secretariat allowed him to continue functioning as one of the four Presidium members holding Secretarial posts, the others being Brezhnev, Suslov, and Podgorny.

PODGORNY

Podgorny's position in the Secretariat remains tenuous given his replacement of Mikoyan as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. If precedent holds, a demotion is in store for Podgorny. Shelepin continues, in any event, to operate publicly in his Secretarial post, and Podgorny does not. Podgorny's continued presence in the Secretariat—at least formally—despite the opportunity to remove him at the December plenum suggests that the formal process of removing him is being impeded by strong forces within the leadership. A main item on the agenda of the 23d congress is the "election" of personnel to the party's leading organs.
IX. THE TREND SINCE DECEMBER

Indications of a conservative trend in the formulation of overall policy have been reinforced by developments since December. In the sphere of economic policy, the "draft directives" of the five-year plan "approved" by the CPSU plenum on 19 February suggest a consolidation of the already impressive gains made by heavy industry and defense interests at the end of 1965, despite some equivocal phrasing. Signs of an ascendant conservatism in other areas of policy have also characterized the political environment in the first months of 1966.

THE PLAN DIRECTIVES

Published in PRAVDA on 20 February for pre-congress discussion, the draft five-year plan directives envisage "priority development" of those sectors of the economy serving heavy industry and defense—euphemistically termed "progressive"—and call for an "acceleration of the rates of growth of the people's well-being." The directives also indicate that the Soviet leaders have scrapped the 1970 targets of the 20-year economic blueprint presented in the CPSU Program. Judging from the targets and investment data presented in the directives, however, Brezhnev's agricultural program launched last March continues to enjoy undiminished priority.

Despite general assurances of the regime's solicitude for the civilian economy as "its most important task" in economic policy, the specifics of the directives suggest that this slogan represents more an earnest of future intentions than a definition of practical policy. The directives repeatedly stress the need to develop heavy industry and "on that basis" to improve consumer goods production. At one point, the document objects to the "arbitrary" changing of proportions in individual branches of the economy. The objection is raised in a historical context; but Kosygin had repeatedly called for correcting imbalances and readjusting proportions with a view to channeling greater investment funds into the consumer sectors. On the question of the defense share of national resources, the directives point up the diversion of investment funds to defense in the "last few years" as a result of the "aggravation" of the international situation by "American imperialism" and offer assurance that the regime considers the "growth of defense" a "necessary prerequisite" for achieving its domestic and foreign policy goals.

The version of the draft directives that appeared in PRAVDA on 20 February seems to have contained at least one last-minute change.
A TASS English-language summary of the directives on the 19th included a passage envisaging the introduction of "a guaranteed monthly remuneration for the work of collective farmers, corresponding to the level of wages for workers at state farms," but the phrase did not appear in the official text carried in PRAVDA and broadcast in the domestic service. The omission can be explained in terms of opposition in some quarters to the substantial expenditures such a measure would entail. Brezhnev had spoken of a need to "ponder" the question of guaranteed wages for collective farmers in his speech to the March 1965 agricultural plenum, and Polyanskiy, the regime's agricultural administrator, had favored the idea in his October Revolution anniversary speech. Kosygin's position at the December 1964 Supreme Soviet on the need to achieve agricultural economies and his criticism of "leaders" for an "oversimplified" approach to agricultural questions suggests that he might have viewed the promise of a guaranteed wage for collective farmers with misgivings in an already strained economic situation.

ECHOES OF STALINISM

There have been other portents of a turn toward conservatism in the Soviet political climate. The partial rehabilitation of Stalin—sanctioned by Brezhnev in his V-E Day speech last year—appears to have made greater headway than might have been anticipated on the basis of earlier regime statements. A notable feature of the current situation is the appearance of explicit and strident expressions of a militant orthodox position. An article by three historians in PRAVDA on 30 January, for example, attacked the use of "the erroneous non-Marxist" term "the period of the personality cult" and revived a political slogan associated with some of the most flagrant excesses of the Stalin era—the "struggle against cosmopolitanism."

The campaign against "cosmopolitanism" during the late forties not only denoted an uncompromising view toward the West and things "Western," but also became associated with an undeclared policy of anti-Semitism. It seems noteworthy in this context that Kosygin, speaking in Riga on 18 July last year, denied the existence of anti-Semitism in the USSR and asserted that such a situation was alien to the communist outlook. Whatever the motives behind Kosygin's remark, a public reference to anti-Semitism is a rarity in Soviet propaganda in any context, and an echo of Kosygin's comment in a PRAVDA editorial on 21 August, shortly after the Riga speech, suggested that the issue was of more than academic importance.
In keeping with the seeming drift toward conservatism, Moscow domestic radio and press media almost ignored the 10th anniversary of the 20th CPSU Congress in the week of 14 to 25 February, although the occasion had customarily been marked to some degree even in the less important non-decennial years. PRAVDA gave only brief, pro forma recognition to the anniversary of the first big milestone in the annals of de-Stalinization, mentioning it in passing in a 26 February editorial on the forthcoming 23d CPSU Congress. On the same day, both PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA published signed articles commemorating the 70th anniversary of Andrey Zhdanov, one of the leading figures of the Stalin era whose main claim to fame lay in his advocacy of militancy in foreign policy and conformity in domestic affairs. The honoring of Zhdanov was anticipated by Brezhnev's favorable references to him in a speech in Leningrad last July, and the prominence accorded him at this time could foreshadow a new appraisal of the Stalin era at the 23d congress.