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SUBJECT

Czech Report to Warsaw Pact Members on NATO Combat Capabilities and Intentions.

SOURCE

[Redacted] This document, which is considered authentic, is the text of Czechoslovak presentation believed to have been delivered at the annual meeting of Warsaw Pact military intelligence services held in East Berlin in mid-November 1966. The five appendices mentioned in the document were not received.

Summary

This document is a report by the Intelligence Directorate of the Czechoslovak General Staff on NATO's combat capabilities and probable plans in the Central European Theater of Operations. The Czech presentation was intended to assist Warsaw Pact representatives in conference to find ways to improve intelligence coordination and information exchanges. The need for such improvements was based on Warsaw Pact conclusions with respect to the United States' continued determination to oppose and destroy Communism. In particular, the Warsaw Pact members were now being called upon to consider what should be done to prepare for the mounting American capability for mass destruction.

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In his conclusions, the Czech speaker pointed to the NATO forces' tactical air arm as the West's principal nuclear carrier and as a potent offensive weapon. At the same time, he thought the Western Powers did not have the manpower or large unit formations required to go beyond first-echelon strategic assignments. He also looked upon French withdrawal from NATO subordination and the reduced capabilities resulting from military commitments in the initial operational stages as factors weakening the Western forces insofar as they forced upon the West a greater complexity in planning. In addition, he thought Allied aircraft deployment and available surface-to-air missiles would not allow an effective defense against retaliatory air strikes from the East. These weaknesses might cause the NATO forces immediately, or eventually, to resort to a nuclear attack. The limited use of tactical nuclear weapons by NATO, however, would not afford the advantage of surprise and would not materially change the military balance in the West's favor even if the hostilities expanded into a general nuclear war. Hence, the conflict's development into general thermonuclear warfare should be expected.

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MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE  
General Staff  
Intelligence Directorate

Secret

November 1966

COMBAT CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PLANS FOR  
THE USE OF NATO ARMED FORCES IN  
THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

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- IV. Possible alternates for the beginning of a war in the Central European theater of operations and probable plans for the use of armed forces
- V. Conclusions

Five appendices Not included

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[redacted] Comment: The paragraphs of this document, which were originally unnumbered, have been numbered for convenience.)

Combat Capabilities and Probable Plans for the Use of NATO Armed Forces in the Central European Theater of Operations

I. Introduction

1. On the basis of recommendations of the Budapest conference of chiefs of military intelligence of SVD (Warsaw Pact Countries) armies, held in 1965, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak People's Army assumed the task of preparing and delivering a report on the subject "Combat Capabilities and Probable Plans for the Use of NATO Armed Forces in the Central European Theater of Operations," based on the experience of the "Autumn" exercises. [redacted] Comment: Presumably a reference to the NATO FALLEX exercises.)

2. In our report we set ourselves the following goals:

a. to make use of the conference of representatives of intelligence directorates of SVD armies for the discussion of one of the basic problems toward which the main efforts of all our intelligence services are directed;

b. to supplement and coordinate opinions and ideas concerning the possible use of enemy armed forces, and in that way to present the Command with more substantiated data for adopting decisions.

3. The present policies of imperialist powers, especially the U.S., have underscored the seriousness of this subject. The U.S. has not given up the principal goal of imperialism--to prevent, by all possible means, a further development of socialism in the world and to destroy socialism. To achieve this goal the U.S. is using against us all forms of political, ideological and economic influence, not even hesitating to use military intervention in the Dominican Republic. With this aim, the U.S. started and is expanding the war in Vietnam. At the same time, it refuses to accept all realistic proposals for disarmament and continues the armament race. The U.S. has given

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particular attention to the development of offensive weapons; it has designed new weapons and is actively engaged in conquering space for military purposes.

4. The U.S. armed forces, especially strategic forces, are used as a political weapon against their allies and as a means of intimidation and aggression against developing countries.

5. All this confirms the fact that U.S. policy concerning us has clearly "offensive" features. In Europe these same features may be found mainly in the military-political plans and aspirations of West Germany.

6. The current political situation forces us to hold our armed forces in constant high combat readiness; to watch the activities of the enemy; to evaluate his capabilities; and to expose his probable plans and intentions so as to prevent a surprise attack.

7. The Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak People's Army does not have documentary information concerning the intentions for the use of enemy armed forces in the event of war. The analysis of a possible utilization of NATO armed forces in the Central European theater of operations is based mainly on an evaluation of combat capabilities of the existing armed forces and on the immediate prospects for their further development. This analysis takes into consideration the possible application of strategic concepts of the U.S. and NATO command concerning the use of armed forces in the European Theater of Operations, as well as operational and tactical principles on the conduct of operations and data concerning major command and staff exercises of NATO troops. The Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak People's Army, in working on this analysis, has made use not only of its own information, but also of material which was given us as a result of the cooperation of all intelligence directorates of our fraternal armies.

8. We do not intend to give a complete analysis of all problems inherent in this subject, and we therefore consider our report as material for general discussion.

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9. The report does not discuss the problem of the outbreak of a war in the Central European TO in the near future, in view of the fact that a decisive prerequisite is a detailed analysis of the military-political situation.

10. We <sup>(Czech)</sup> base our report on the following general premises:

a. the danger of a military encounter between the two opposite social systems, considering the aggressiveness of the imperialist powers, cannot be discounted. The means for the development and conduct of such a war, especially weapons of mass destruction, not only exist but continue to be produced in increasing quantities, and principal attention is being given to strategic, offensive weapons;

b. the policies of imperialist governments headed by the U.S. and their struggle against the progressive movement, even including military intervention in Vietnam, have confirmed the danger of the outbreak of local wars. A particular threat in Europe is the revanchist policy of West Germany; in the event West Germany should obtain nuclear weapons, its policy would be an increasing source of tension in Europe. In the event of a further spreading of nuclear weapons there will be increasing danger that limited wars, which may be started against the socialist countries (possibly not even in the European TO), might grow into a military conflagration of tremendous scope.

11. Therefore, the danger of the outbreak of a war in Europe should not be definitely disregarded.

12. In my report I shall dwell on the following questions:

a. The presumable intentions for the application of the strategic concept of "flexible response" in the entire European and the Central European theaters of operation;

b. combat capabilities of NATO armed forces in the Central European TO at the present time, which are presumably to be used;

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c. alternates and possible plans for the conduct of war in the Central European TO.

II. Some questions concerning probable plans for the application of principles of the strategic concept of "Flexible response" in the entire European and Central European theaters of operations

13. Despite the fact that up to the present time the strategic concept of "mass retaliation" is still officially accepted by NATO, the U.S. is trying to make use of its leading position in NATO in order to impose its own strategic concept of "flexible response."

14. In accordance with the concept of "flexible response," as well as in view of the existing politico-military situation and the correlation of forces of both camps, the U.S. and the NATO command maintain a point of view according to which a general nuclear or a limited war between both camps may break out in the European area. The nature and the scale of the war would be determined mainly by political goals of the belligerents. In a general nuclear war the imperialists would pursue decisive and final goals, but in a limited war--only partial and temporary goals.

15. The goal of a general thermonuclear war would be the destruction of countries of the socialist camp and the striking of a death blow to socialism. The U.S. and other capitalist countries are counting on using all the means at their disposal, without any restrictions, in the event of such a war. They would try to start the war by surprise nuclear attacks in order to gain the strategic initiative, change the correlation of forces in their favor, and profit from the advantage of being the first to use nuclear weapons.

16. For the purpose of achieving a maximum element of surprise and the opportunity to make effective use of the results of a nuclear attack, the U.S. and other NATO countries are building up their armed forces in such a way that they will not depend on a preliminary mobilization of the decisive means for waging war and so that they will be able to start the first operations, immediately after the nuclear attack, with the available forces.

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17. Aside from a general thermonuclear war starting with a surprise attack, the NATO command has also considered the alternative which would involve a period of increased political tension preceding the war, lasting from several days to several weeks, or which would start with a limited war and, as a result of its escalation, become a general thermonuclear war.

18. The readiness to start a general thermonuclear war at any favorable time must at the same time be used as a threat, which would make it possible to carry out not only measures of a cold war, but also other forms of armed coercion.

19. A limited war may break out in Europe, if the situation is favorable for achieving particular goals by means of separate conflicts.

20. Political goals, the use of arms, and the geographical scale of a conflict must be limited in such a way that the conflict, which is constantly in danger of becoming a general thermonuclear war, should not go beyond the planned limits. Therefore, it is assumed that the war will be conducted, depending on the situation, either with conventional weapons only, or with the limited use of nuclear weapons, in which case the main prerequisite for limiting the war would be to eliminate strategic bombing of the territories of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

21. A more developed form of using the concept of "flexible response" under the specific conditions of the Central European TO is the so-called concept of "forward defense;" its substance is the intention to prevent the possible loss of the major portion of West Germany, to prevent West German territory from becoming a battlefield, and to act as quickly as possible in transferring combat operations to East Germany and Czechoslovakia. This is to be achieved by active combat operations directly on the borders of West Germany for the purpose of halting our offensive and transferring combat actions to the Warsaw Pact countries.

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22. The concept of "forward defense" must be regarded as a desire to conduct active combat operations from the very beginning of the conflict, especially in the event the war should start by a surprise attack and the NATO command should be able to gain the initiative. An implementation of this plan could also further the conduct of several planned measures, such as the movement of some units and sub-units of the Central and Northern groups of armies closer to the state borders of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the appropriate regrouping of organs and establishments of the operational rear services.

23. The strategic concept of "flexible response," which provides for the conduct of a general thermonuclear war, as well as of limited wars, in the European area, has confirmed the failure of the former strategy of "mass retaliation" which was oriented only toward the conduct of a general thermonuclear war against socialist countries; the concept of "flexible response" is merely an attempt to find new means of achieving the former goals.

24. From a politico-military point of view the theory of limited wars represents an adventurous plan of the Anglo-U.S. imperialist circles to wage a war on foreign territory and, if possible, with the help of allies, with the aim of preventing destruction of their own territory. From a military point of view, the concept of a limited war is full of contradictions and would be hard to carry out, especially in the European TO and in a situation which involves the use of small-caliber nuclear weapons. Despite the fact that we cannot completely dismiss this type of war, the conduct of a limited war in Europe, particularly in the Central European TO--unless it can be halted by peaceful means at the very beginning--would most probably lead to the outbreak of a general thermonuclear war, since it would involve the clash of basic interests of both coalitions.

25. The application of the strategy of "flexible response" in combat actions of the NATO armed forces in the Central European TO ("forward defense") does not have major significance from the point of view of general preparations for war. However, it should be taken into consideration, because it may affect combat actions of armies of the Warsaw Pact countries in the border areas, and also because the implementation of some of the planned

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measures might create more favorable conditions for a direct initiation of active combat operations of enemy armed forces, not only on our state borders but also on the territory of East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

26. The strategic concept of "flexible response" has not been officially accepted up to this time, since the NATO countries have failed to reach a uniform point of view until now concerning the justification and effectiveness of its application in the European area.

27. West Germany, although it admits the possibility of waging a limited war in Europe, has stipulated that this can be done only with the use of nuclear weapons from the very beginning of the armed conflict. On the other hand, France denies the possibility of successfully waging a limited war in Europe, and considers a general thermonuclear war as the only possible form of armed conflict in this area.

28. As a result, the coordination of joint actions has been complicated; on the other hand, the danger of making unilateral, adventurous decisions in a complex situation has increased. This disagreement on questions of strategy was one of the reasons for France's withdrawal of its armed forces from the subordination to NATO command.

29. One of the decisive factors which affect the implementation of plans in accordance with the above mentioned concepts are the capabilities of enemy armed forces in the Central European TO, which are to be discussed in the following part of my report.

III. Analysis of Capabilities of NATO Armed Forces in the Central European TO for the Conduct of War

30. The armed forces of NATO in the Central European TO, in accordance with the strategic concept of "flexible response," are preparing for the conduct of a general, thermonuclear war, as well as of limited wars.

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31. Capabilities for starting a general thermonuclear war. In the event of a general thermonuclear war, strategic weapons would participate in coordination with troops in the TO and with naval forces detailed for combat action in the TO. The ability to begin and conduct operations with NATO armed forces in the Central European TO, on the scale of a global, thermonuclear war, is determined by the high combat readiness and striking force of U.S. strategic, nuclear, offensive weapons. These weapons, together with tactical aviation forces and operational-tactical rocket weapons in the theater of operations are in the highest degree of readiness and represent the principal striking force of NATO armed forces for the purpose of starting a global thermonuclear war.

32. In order to carry out a nuclear attack with a duration of 4 - 7 days, the NATO armed forces have at their disposal about 1,400 strategic rockets, about 800 strategic aircraft and, in the European TO, about 3,000 pieces of nuclear ammunition for operational use by tactical aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and operational jet-propelled missiles.

33. A large number of weapons, which are kept in constant readiness, would make it possible to deliver 1,240 to 1,370 thermonuclear and nuclear attacks with the help of strategic and operational weapons during the first echelon; the launching of these missiles will presumably take place during a period of 1 to 30 minutes following the receipt of the appropriate signal. (This would take into account 80% intercontinental rocket launchers with a launching time of up to 1 or 2 minutes /760 missiles/; 20 Polaris submarines with a launching time up to 15-30 minutes /320 Polaris missiles/; 55 squadrons of tactical rocket-carrying aircraft, with 2 - 4 planes in each squadron, which are ready for takeoff in 15 minutes = 110 - 220 strikes; 30% Mace, i.e., 32 strikes up to 15 minutes; 25% Pershing rocket launchers--5 strikes up to 20 minutes; 9 squadrons of rocket-carrying aircraft, with 2 - 4 planes in each squadron, ready for takeoff in up to 15 minutes = 18 - 36 strikes, i.e., a total of 1,245 to 1,373 strikes.)

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34. The total number of strategic weapons of nuclear attack of the enemy (not counting the losses inflicted by our air defense and by a retaliatory nuclear attack) may reach about 3,450 strikes (1,200 strategic rocket launchers, 1,700 thermonuclear and nuclear strikes with aerial bombs and 550 nuclear strikes with guided air-to-ground rockets), most of these are of the megaton caliber. (This takes into account 80% technical preparedness of rocket launchers and aircraft; 100% for Polaris rocket launchers, which are on combat patrol duty; 760 Minutemen and Titan rocket launchers; 448 Polaris rocket launchers; 480 B-62 bombers carrying 3 bombs each,--this includes 240 aircraft Type G and N with 2 Hound Dog rocket launchers--1,440 bombs, and 480 Hound Dog rocket launchers; 64 B-58 bombers @ 3 bombs = 192 bombs; 70 British strategic aircraft @ 1 bomb each and one Blue Steel rocket launcher--or a total of 3,460 strikes). Most of the strategic weapons are to be used against targets in depth, i.e., outside the Central European TO.

35. Tactical aviation, which is the basic nuclear force in the Central European TO,--considering the state of training, armament, and technical equipment--can deliver 400-440 nuclear strikes during the first combat flight with a duration of 3 - 4 hours. If about 40% of nuclear ammunition in the TO is used for gaining nuclear superiority and supremacy in the air and about 20% for isolation of the battlefield, during the first 2 - 3 days of a nuclear attack in the interests of the European TO (not including strikes by strategic weapons) it would be possible to deliver about 1,800 nuclear strikes of operational significance, including 60% or more in the interests of troops of the Central European TO. Most of the operational nuclear strikes (about 80%, i.e., about 1,500 strikes) in the European TO would be delivered by tactical aviation.

36. The radius of action of tactical aviation makes it possible to deliver strikes to a depth of 900-1,300 km. from the airfields, i.e., approximately as far as Gdynia, Warsaw, and Budapest.

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37. Possible Plans for the Use of Nuclear Forces and Tactical Aviation are Shown in Appendix No. I.

Comment: Appendix missing from the original document.)

38. The joint ground forces in the Central European TO, consisting of 23 divisions and one brigade group,--together with 2 French divisions (1 armored division and 3 motorized (?) divisions) which are under national command,--represent the first strategic echelon which is to carry out the missions of the first operation during the initial period of a war.

39. The mission of these forces includes the participation with their weapons in a nuclear attack and the support of this attack; also, depending on the situation, they will immediately at the beginning or during the nuclear strikes start offensive actions. In the event of an unsuccessful result of the nuclear offensive, it is planned to turn temporarily to the defensive to support the completion of the nuclear attack, halt our offensive, complete mobilization deployment and bring up the reserves, and then turn to offensive action as quickly as possible.

40. The limited number of large formations of NATO armed forces places great demands upon the ground forces, mainly from the point of view of T/O & E status, fire power and striking power, mobility, and combat readiness. (All large formations subordinated to the NATO command are manned up to 75-80 percent of the wartime T/O strength, and the U.S. formations are up to full strength. Nuclear attack weapons represent the principal fire power /35 guided missiles for operational-tactical use, 166 rocket-type and 1,078 conventional tube-type weapons for tactical use, and 87 Davy Crockett launchers/. The striking force and mobility of troops is ensured by mechanization and by a large number of tanks in the ground forces /8,400 tanks/. Eighty-five percent of the personnel and combat equipment is in constant combat readiness.) The present number of large formations of NATO ground forces makes it possible to organize only the first operational echelon and to achieve in the zone of Northern Group of armies, covering a width of 240 km.,--operational troop density of 22 km. per division, and in the zone of the

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Central Group of armies, with a width of 400 km.--an operational density of 33 km. per division (including 23 km. in the Frankfurt area, and 60 km. per division in the Stuttgart-Munich area). With the use of French formations in the first echelon the density in the zone facing Czechoslovakia could be raised to 38 km. per division.

41. The immediate use of two French divisions in the first operations of the initial period of war and the subsequent introduction of mobilized French forces appears problematical at the present time; if the aim of the war should not meet French interests, France may join its allies only in the course of the war, or it may refrain completely from participating in it.

42. The increasing efforts both in offensive and in defensive operations will depend on the mobilization deployment of armed forces of West European and NATO countries and on the air lift of reinforcements from the U.S.

43. Between paragraphs 42 and 43 one full page and the top third of another page are missing. A footnote was included, however, which is in reference to a passage in the missing top third. This footnote is as follows:  
M+5 = 23 flotillas (11 FRG, 3 U.S.A., 4 France) of which 8 flotillas are aircraft carriers (2 FRG, 6 U.S.A.).  
M+10 = 30 flotillas (26 U.S.A., 2 France, 1 Belgium, 1 Netherlands), of which 24 flotillas are aircraft carriers (U.S.A.). M+20 = 2 flotillas (1 Belgium, 1 Netherlands). . . . approximately two battalions of Pershing guided missiles, two battalions of Sergeant guided missiles, and six battalions of Honest John free-flight rockets.

44. The possibilities of building up forces in the Central European TO are of vital importance for carrying out all kinds of plans, since in the absence of newly mobilized and air-lifted formations the NATO command would have no other combat-ready troops for the establishment of second echelons, which would be necessary to build up efforts and to replace losses as well as to conduct the subsequent operations

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45. Possible alternative for operational and mobilization build-up of ground forces to MZO (sic) is described in Appendix No. 2. Comment: Appendix missing in original document.) Capabilities of PVO (Air Defense) In view of the fact that the problem of anti-missile defense in the NATO program has not been finally solved, the forces and weapons of PVO in the theater of operations may be used only against piloted or pilotless airplanes. (In the PVO of area 2 and area 4 of the Joint Tactical Air Force (OTAK) there are 172 batteries of ZURS (surface-to-air guided missiles) with 1,248 launchers, that is, 3,744 ZURS (48 percent against low-flying and 52 percent against high-flying targets) and 20 fighter squadrons with a total of 400 fighter planes. The density of PVO weapons per one kilometer of front is as follows: in zone of the second Joint Tactical Air Force (Northern Group of Armies) 0.8 aircraft, and 7 ZURS; in the zone of the fourth Joint Tactical Air Force (Central Group of Armies) 0.5 aircraft and 5 ZURS. The greatest density of "Hawk" and "Nike" surface-to-air missiles would be in the area of Erfurt and Saarbruecken, which includes the main grouping of nuclear weapons and troops of the U.S. 7th Army, as well as most of the depots, especially for nuclear ammunition (the maximum density is 10 ZURS per one km. of front).

46. The front line of "Nike" ZURS overlaps the operational range of "Hawk" ZURS approximately as far as Kiel, Schwerin, Stendal, Magdeburg, Nordhausen, Erfurt, Bayreuth, Beilngries, Munich, and Bad Toelz.

47. A vulnerable spot in the PVO system in the Central European TO is the shortage of facilities for detecting air targets operating at low altitudes, as well as the location of airfields for fighter planes and fire positions of ZURS "Hawk" in considerable depth, which does not provide for reliable air cover for the first echelon formations of ground troops. Therefore one must assume that the "Hawk" ZURS battalions will be regrouped immediately at the outbreak of war, or before that time, to be located nearer the eastern border of West Germany.

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48. Material-technical support and operational preparations in the Central European TO. Reserve supplies of the armed forces in the theater of operations are equally distributed and should be sufficient for the armed forces of the U.S. and Canada for 90 days of combat operations, West Germany for approximately 55 days of combat operations, and France and Great Britain for 30 days of combat operations. The availability of supplies for other West European NATO countries may be estimated for approximately 30 days of combat operations.

49. A considerable number of depots in the TO satisfies the requirements for engineering equipment and conditions of anti-atomic defense, particularly the depots of nuclear and conventional ammunition, as well as POL.

50. The existing network of airfields and their condition meets present requirements of tactical aviation and makes it possible to disperse the squadrons on airfields of first and second class, even in the event of an increased number of aircraft. (There is a total of 169 first and second class airfields on the territory of West Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg. On the territory of Spain and Portugal there are 27 first and second class airfields. In Austria and Switzerland there are 21 first and second class airfields.) The most important airfield centers are connected with the general network of oil pipelines.

51. The theater of operations has a sufficient quantity of navigational support facilities, aircraft guidance facilities, and other means of radiotechnical support of the armed forces, and the highly effective combined system of communications provides for reliable control.

52. The density and capacity of the railroad and highway systems meets the requirements of operational and tactical movements of armed forces within the theater of operations, to the frontline, from the front to the rear, and along the frontline. No engineering fortifications in the TO have been noted, except for creating necessary conditions for placing nuclear ground mines along the eastern border of West Germany.

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53. Demolition facilities are being installed on the principal highways and railroad lines, and on bridges and dams in West Germany.

54. In general it may be said that the condition of material-technical support in the Central European TO meets the requirements for the support of operations both in a general and in limited wars.

55. Capabilities of NATO Armed Forces in a Limited War. For the conduct of a limited war the NATO command plans to use armed forces only on a scale which would be necessary for carrying out limited, predetermined military-political tasks. In the opinion of the NATO command, a limited war may require armed forces consisting of several smaller formations up to army corps and large formations.

56. The armed forces in the Central European TO have been trained for conducting a limited war during the past few years in respect to organization, equipment, and operational-tactical training.

57. The methods and scale of the use of nuclear weapons in a limited war will depend completely on the importance of a limited armed conflict and on the general political and operational situation in the area of combat operations.

58. In a limited war it is not planned to carry out strategic bombing of the territory of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. However, immediately after the outbreak of a limited war all strategic weapons may be brought to a condition of complete combat readiness so that they may be ready for successive or concentrated use, since there will be a danger of the limited war developing into a general thermonuclear war.

59. In the event the aims of a limited war cannot be reached by conventional weapons, it is believed possible that operational-tactical and tactical weapons of nuclear attack (up to 100 kilotons) may be used to a limited extent against military targets, mainly against those in the area of combat operations (the category of operational-tactical weapons of nuclear attack includes tactical aircraft and

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guided missiles of the types Mace, Pershing, Sergeant, Corporal, and the category of tactical weapons includes free-flight rockets, Honest John, Little John, atomic artillery, and nuclear ground mines.) A portion of these weapons will be held in complete combat readiness from the very beginning of the armed conflict so that they may be used immediately at any time; depending on the scale of the conflict only a portion of these weapons may be used in combat operations, that is, only with the use of conventional ammunition.

60. On the basis of information obtained from an analysis of major exercises, the NATO command plans to use nuclear weapons also in a limited war in the following instances:

- a. If the enemy should use nuclear weapons first;
- b. Or if NATO troops should be unable to carry out their assignments with conventional weapons.

61. In view of the fact that the structure of NATO armed forces is designed mainly for preparing and conducting a general thermonuclear war, the NATO command in the Central European TO has at its disposal considerable striking forces of operational-tactical and particularly tactical weapons of nuclear attack, consisting of air forces and ground forces.

62. Tactical aviation in the Central European TO, in a limited war, would be in a position to carry out PVO assignments for the theater of operations and air support of ground troops to a maximum of three combat flights per day; the maximum intensity of reconnaissance flights may be 40 to 50 percent more. Approximately one third to one half of the rocket-carrying planes is held in constant combat readiness to carry out missions involving nuclear weapons; the remaining planes may take part in combat for the purpose of gaining supremacy in the air or isolating a zone of combat operations.

63. Ground Forces, from the point of view of their organizational structure and equipment, are ready to carry out tasks in a limited war on a minor scale so that

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the forces introduced into combat would serve the required purpose. However, the general number of NATO ground troops in the TO is not sufficient for a successful conduct of a limited war with conventional weapons, which may develop into a conflict with the main forces of the Warsaw Pact forces. In the event of such a conflict, the danger of the use of nuclear weapons increases, and this would make it impossible to control and would obviously further the development of such a limited war into a general thermo-nuclear war.

64. Some of the units of the NATO joint forces are detailed to the so-called "mobile forces," which the NATO command intends to use in various parts of the European TO at the outbreak of specific conflicts, in particular in the South European and North European TO. These forces represent a well trained and very mobile reserve for the TO commander and are capable of being introduced immediately into combat to suppress internal riots, destroy enemy landing forces, and, possibly, to conduct major diversionary activities. They can divert the attention of a considerable portion of the enemy forces, and they can conduct independent combat operations on a limited scale for a certain time. In addition, the use of such forces has a political significance, as it involves joint actions of the principal NATO partners. The fact that eight exercises of NATO mobile forces were conducted during the past 5 years indicates how important these forces are considered by the NATO command. (The mobile forces of NATO include 6 reinforced battalions of mobile ground forces (one battalion each from the U.S., Great Britain, West Germany, Belgium, Denmark, and Canada) and 7 squadrons of tactical aircraft of the mobile air forces of NATO (one squadron each from the U.S., Great Britain, West Germany, Belgium, Italy, Holland, and Canada.) Troop airlifts are carried out by transport aircraft in the TO, mainly by 322 U.S. aircraft. One must take into consideration that the mobile forces will be gradually increased.)

65. Conclusions: The principal theater of operations, where a decisive encounter between capitalism and socialism may take place, is Europe, particularly the Central European TO. Regardless of the manner in which a war may break out in this area, it would most probably develop into a general war.

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66. On the basis of an analysis of combat capabilities of strategic weapons and armed forces of NATO in the Central European TO, we are able to determine the strong and weak points which would have a decisive influence on the general evaluation of combat capabilities of NATO armed forces in this theater of operations.

67. The following may be considered as strong points of the enemy:

a. The strategic and operational-tactical nuclear weapons represent an impressive NATO striking force and, because of their high combat readiness, they can begin combat operations within a minimum period. Their effective use in a nuclear surprise attack on a global scale could seriously affect an armed conflict between capitalism and socialism in the initial period of war;

b. The tactical air arm in the Central European TO represents the principal striking force, and, in view of their combat equipment and training of flight personnel, it is capable of carrying out missions in a nuclear attack to a depth of 900 - 1,300 kilometers from their airfields. The present number of tactical aircraft may be considerably increased in a short period by airlifting air force units from the U.S.;

c. The ground troops in the TO are well-equipped with tactical nuclear weapons by virtue of their T/O strength, organizational structure, and level of operational and combat training, are prepared to carry out assignments in modern combat operations;

d. Air defense in this TO represents a well-organized and trained system, which is effective against piloted and pilotless aircraft at all altitudes; the material-technical support and operational training in the TO meets the requirements for modern combat operations both in a general and in limited wars.

68. The weak points of the enemy are as follows:

a. The inability to prevent a crushing retaliatory blow;

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b. an unfavorable correlation of forces of the ground troops. From the point of view of manpower and the number of large unit formations, the ground troops are able to carry out only first echelon strategic assignments; the success and nature of such combat operations would depend directly on the effectiveness of a nuclear attack and mainly on the effectiveness of the surprise element of attack; the subsequent assignments to be carried out by ground troops would depend completely on the mobilization deployment of forces in the TO and the airlift of troops from the U.S.;

c. The complex operational planning of combat operations in the initial period of war, as a result of the withdrawal of French armed forces from NATO subordination and the reduced capabilities resulting from the commitment of forces in the initial stages of operations;

d. The present location of ground troops does not yet fully meet the forward strategy concept; therefore in order to achieve an operational formation it would be necessary to carry out an appropriate regrouping of troops;

e. The existing system of ZURS launching positions and the location of fighter aircraft on airfields which are located in great depth, would not make it possible without preliminary airfield maneuvers to provide for an effective defense of large formations of the first echelon against retaliatory strikes of our aviation.

69. The relatively small depth of the territory of Western Europe, mainly West Germany, as compared with the extensive rear area of the socialist camp, is a weak point from the strategic point of view, since nuclear weapons and troops of NATO would be completely vulnerable to strikes of our rocket weapons, which would also disrupt the mobilization and movement of reserves in an effective manner.

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70. The following conclusions may be drawn from a general evaluation of combat capabilities of the armed forces in the Central European TO:

a. At the present time the armed forces of NATO are not ready for a decisive encounter with the Warsaw Pact countries with the use of conventional means;

b. This means that in the event of the outbreak of a limited war, the armed forces of NATO may be supported mainly by nuclear weapons, which they can use either immediately at the outbreak of war, or within a short period thereafter;

c. The limited and consistent use of tactical nuclear weapons by the armed forces of NATO would not afford the advantage of surprise and would not materially change the balance of forces in NATO's favor even if a limited war expanded into a general nuclear war, nor would it destroy the principal sources of the socialist camp, which are necessary for a successful conduct of war;

d. Therefore it must be taken into consideration that an encounter between the armed forces of NATO and the principal grouping of joint armed forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries in the Central European TO would most likely develop into a general thermo-nuclear war, for which purpose the build-up of NATO armed forces is continuing and strategic and tactical nuclear weapons are being maintained in a state of high combat readiness.

IV. Possible Alternatives for Beginning a War in the Central European Theater of Operations and Probable Intentions for the Use of Armed Forces

71. It may be concluded from an analysis of the strategic concepts of the NATO command and of the combat capabilities of armed forces and strategic aims of the imperialist ruling circles in Europe that in the event of a war against the Warsaw Pact countries the most probable form of an armed conflict in Europe in general, and in the central European TO in particular, would be a general

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thermonuclear war which may start in the following ways:

- a. By a surprise attack;
- b. After a period of preparation in the event of a worsening of the international situation;
- c. By a limited war beginning in the Central European TO or in another part of the world, which would then develop into a general thermonuclear war.

72. Beginning of a General Thermonuclear War By a Surprise Attack (Alternative One) In the event a war should begin according to this alternative the main efforts will be concentrated on achieving a maximum element of surprise as basically necessary for gaining the strategic initiative. The principal method for achieving the element of surprise will be a sudden and unrestricted use of all nuclear weapons within the shortest period after the decision has been made. The first concentrated strike will be delivered by strategic guided missiles and operational-tactical weapons of the air forces, and also as far as possible by operational-tactical weapons of the ground forces in the TO. For this purpose the U.S. and NATO commands would use nuclear weapons which are maintained in constant combat readiness and ready for use within a period from 1 - 30 minutes after receiving the signal for delivering a strike. In using this alternative it is assumed that all necessary measures preceding the attack will be carried out secretly by the U.S. and NATO command.

73. The staffs and troops in this case would be placed in combat readiness within reduced periods, or immediately before or during the first concentrated strikes.

74. It is assumed that the operational formation will take place on the move without preliminary troop regrouping and with complete dispersal of aviation for the purpose of committing troops as quickly as possible and making the most effective use, during a minimum period, of the results of the first nuclear strikes, despite the order of their occurrence. In view of the general situation in the Central European TO and the present status of the joint armed forces of NATO, it is assumed that in order to achieve a maximum element of surprise, the NATO troops

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will be placed in combat readiness as a result of secret measures conducted before the attack under the pretext of a periodic checking of the system, which would make it possible during a period of 2 - 3 hours after receiving the signal:

- a. To move the staffs from the garrisons and to organize field communications;
- b. To place air force and PVO weapons in combat readiness;
- c. To move the greater part of ground troops away from the attack zone;
- d. To start transporting nuclear warheads and other items of material-technical supply.

75. One should not discount another alternative, which would include a preliminary carrying out of essential measures only, leaving the other measures to be carried out during the nuclear attack.

76. The nuclear weapons which are not maintained in combat readiness at that time would be moved to firing positions and moved closer to the state border; the air force would carry out a partial dispersion, and ground troops would be placed in operational formation. The present troop location would allow the forward detachments of the nearest formation to begin deploying in the border area during a period of 2 hours, some of the large formations of the first echelon in a period of 4 - 6 hours, and the most distant formation in a period of 10 - 16 hours after the alarm has been sounded.

77. The operational aims and missions of the ground troops will depend on the element of surprise and the effectiveness of the first concentrated attack, as well as on the success of the nuclear offensive.

78. In the event the planned element of surprise is achieved and the nuclear attack is successful, the NATO ground troops in the Central European TO could be assigned the task of exploiting the results of nuclear strikes, destroying the striking forces of our troops and

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establishing a better balance of forces for an offensive, so that within a period of D+10 - D+13 it would be possible to take possession of the territory of East Germany, Bohemia and Moravia, and create conditions for developing an offensive to the East with the help of newly moved-up forces.

79. Possible plans for an offensive and combat operations of the enemy are described in Appendix No. 3.

Comment: Appendix missing in original document.)

80. In the event NATO troops should fail to achieve an element of surprise and their first strikes should be ineffective, the NATO ground troops will be ready to carry out a mobile defense in order to prevent the advance of our troops to West Germany; for this purpose all artificial and natural obstacles will be used in the zones which were originally intended to be used for the offensive.

81. The probable boundary lines on which the troops on the defensive would try to halt our offensive, and their efforts to make possible a continued nuclear attack and to improve the balance of forces so that a counter-attack might be started, are indicated in Appendix No. 4.

Comment: Appendix missing in original document.)

82. The advantage of this alternative lies in the fact that any signs of preparations for war, such as placing the troops in combat readiness, may be disguised as routine activities and may become apparent only within a short period (2 - 3 hours, or even less), which would make it much more difficult to detect them. This increases the probability of achieving a surprise element, including all the advantages resulting from the destructive effect of a nuclear attack for the side which will be first to use a nuclear weapon.

83. In evaluating the possible course of NATO combat actions in the Central European TO it is necessary to take into consideration the possible situation on the NATO right flank, i.e., from the point of view of the importance of Austria and the possible actions of armed forces of Italy.

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84. The Austrian armed forces at the present time do not represent any important factor, either for the Warsaw Pact armies or for the NATO forces. The importance of Austria lies above all in its geographic location, and in the event of a general nuclear war the territory of Austria could be used by the armed forces of the Western imperialist coalition.

85. Officially Austria has declared its neutrality; however, politically and economically it is oriented toward the West, in particular towards West Germany, and its position in a possible future war will depend on general developments. If Austria should consider the developments to be favorable to the socialist countries, it may be assumed that it will preserve its neutrality, and that it will be prepared to defend its sovereignty, as well as use its armed forces against any violation of this neutrality by countries of the socialist camp.

86. If the development of the situation should be favorable for NATO, Austria may defend its borders against the countries of the socialist camp and may permit its territory or air space to be used by the NATO armed forces.

87. The strategic situation of Italy determines its important role in the western part of the south European TO. In addition to tasks to be carried out within the program of control over the Mediterranean, the ground forces of Italy, and mainly its air forces, could to a certain extent influence the combat operations of NATO's right flank in the Central European TO.

88. The principal task of the Italian air forces is to participate with the attack air force group of the U.S. 6th Fleet (one aircraft carrier) in carrying out a nuclear attack, directing their main efforts against targets in Hungary and Yugoslavia. However, one should not discount their use against targets as distant as the cities of Lodz, L'vov and Brasov.

89. The aircraft which are maintained in constant combat readiness could deliver 16 to 24 nuclear strikes with takeoffs within a period of CH /H - Hour/ +15 to 30 minutes, and during the first takeoff, within a period of CH+3 to 4 hours, --up to 90 nuclear strikes. (Italy

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has 54 aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons, there are 18 U.S. aircraft with this capability in Aviano, and 48 on an aircraft carrier deployed in the Naples area.) After the delivery of nuclear strikes, the aircraft may be shifted to ground support, including support on behalf of forces of the Central European TO in the event of isolation of the theater. The present ground forces consisting of 7 divisions and 11 brigades could be reinforced to full strength by M+5 to M+10; they could be reinforced by three brigades by M+20, and by four more brigades by M+30.

Comment: M probably means mobilization day.) The nuclear support for these forces would be provided by the First U.S. Guided Missiles Command.

90. In the event of their commitment to combat, the ground troops would be assigned to an independent group of armies, the main body of which would consist of units of the Third Field Army.

91. The ground operations would depend on the general situation, and in particular on the results of a nuclear attack.

92. The Third Army would be committed in the operational area of Verona and Lyublyana; the first echelon would consist of 3 and 5 "ak" /army corps/ and the second echelon of 6 "ak" and a separate tank division "Centauro." The northern part of the border with Yugoslavia should be defended by the "Karnia" fortress troops, and the Alpine passes by four "ak."

93. These forces would mainly be committed to defensive positions on the rivers Talgiamento and Piave as far as Vicenza and Padova for the purpose of halting the enemy and preventing him from taking possession of north-east Italy, and of returning to the offensive by D Day+20.

94. In the event a nuclear attack should be successful, there could be an immediate offensive by forces of the Third Army in the direction of Lyublyana.

95. As an alternative, operations by Italian armed forces would be determined by the general situation in the southern European TO, where Italy would be involved. A detailed analysis of this theater is outside the scope of this report.

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V. Conclusions

96. The possibility of the outbreak of war in Europe and the implementation of plans for the use of NATO armed forces in the Central European TO would be influenced in a decisive manner by the general military and political situation, which in turn will be determined mainly by the political, economic and military strength and solidarity of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union.

97. In view of the fact that the ruling imperialist circles have not given up their principal goals in fighting against socialism and progress throughout the world and are continuing to build up offensive armed forces, mainly nuclear rocket forces, one should not dismiss the possibility of a military conflict between capitalism and socialism. The scale and character of the war would be determined by its political aims.

98. In the event such an encounter should take place in Europe, where the vital interests of both coalitions meet, it would have decisive goals and would probably be conducted in the form of a general thermonuclear war.

99. It is tempting for the U.S. and NATO commands to consider the alternative of starting a general thermonuclear war by a global nuclear surprise attack using strategic and operational weapons in the entire depth of the socialist camp in order to change the unfavorable balance of forces in their own favor.

100. For this purpose, the U.S. has directed its main efforts toward building up strategic strike forces, which, together with operational-tactical nuclear weapons, are maintained in a state of constant combat readiness.

101. The accepted procedures for bringing NATO forces to a state of combat readiness in the Central European TO makes it possible to carry out the necessary measures in a period of 2 - 3 hours for the defense of troops against a retaliatory nuclear attack and for the maintenance of combat readiness for the purpose of continuing the nuclear offensive and exploiting its results.

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102. Current ground force capabilities would allow a transition to a successful offensive only in the event a complete element of surprise had been achieved and the nuclear attack had been carried out successfully, which would radically change the balance of forces in the Central European TO. Only the initial operational goals of the army groups could be achieved with the help of existing forces, and a further increase of efforts would depend completely on the movement and mobilization of reserves, which would be carried out under the complex conditions of a thermonuclear war.

103. In the event of an unsuccessful beginning and a failure to conduct a nuclear offensive as planned, the ground troops would most likely be shifted to mobile defense in order to complete the nuclear offensive. The NATO command believes the ground troops would in that case be ready to carry out a steady and effective defense.

104. The development of a global thermonuclear war, after a period of advance preparations, would therefore, as described in the second alternative, be unlikely in the Central European TO.

105. The outbreak of a general thermonuclear war as a result of the expansion and development of a limited conflict should always be considered possible for the following reasons:

106. In view of the balance of forces which is not in their favor, the Joint Armed Forces of NATO in the Central European TO would not be in a position to defeat the Warsaw Pact countries by means of a limited war without the use of nuclear weapons. It is also impossible to achieve a radical change in the balance of forces with even a limited use of nuclear weapons;

107. In view of the military and political situation in Europe and the solidarity of the European socialist countries, an attack against any country of the Warsaw Pact would be repulsed by all socialist countries, which would result in a clash of forces of both coalitions; this in turn would create the danger of a rapid transition to a general thermonuclear war.

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108. The principal factor which militates against an attack on the socialist camp is the political and economic strength of the socialist countries and the availability of powerful nuclear forces capable of delivering a destructive retaliatory strike.

109. It appears from the analysis that the armed forces of the U.S. and NATO represent a constant threat to peace and that the measures carried out by them in various NATO countries have increased their striking force designed to carry out their aggressive plans. Therefore, our armies must constantly increase their combat readiness and be prepared to repulse and defeat the enemy at any time.

110. A successful defense against NATO depends on the unity of socialist countries and on the coordinated combat actions of armies of the Warsaw Pact countries.

111. This obliges us to prevent any surprise actions, to keep the enemy constantly under observation, and to transmit prompt reports to our command; all countries must, according to their capabilities--in addition to their principal areas--give attention to the strategic forces which will play a decisive role in such a military conflict.

112. Since the period for preparation may be short and the opportunities of individual intelligence services for exposing all facts indicating an imminent surprise attack may be limited, a further expansion of the coordination and rapid exchange of information between our intelligence services may be required. It would be expedient to study the problems related to closer cooperation between our operational and strategic intelligence facilities.

113. The possible outbreak of a war is directly connected with the military and political situation, the balance of forces in the world, and the state of readiness of armed forces. In this connection it is particularly important to achieve unanimity concerning the military-political situation, the strategic concepts of the enemy, the condition of the armed forces of capitalist countries and their further anticipated development, so that we may promptly take the necessary measures for preventing a surprise move.

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114. The further military development and the use of new combat equipment which would affect the beginning of a war and the conduct of operations requires a constant improvement of their readiness and supply of modern equipment. This would eliminate the conflict between the capabilities of weapons and the capabilities of intelligence to provide the necessary data for our operations.

115. Therefore, our delegation believes that in our further mutual cooperation we must, after the appropriate approval from the command of separate armies, intensify the coordination of intelligence concerning strategic nuclear weapons and concerning major problems related to the structure of armed forces and indications of an impending attack, and we should coordinate these actions in both peacetime and war.

116. Our opinions concerning possible alternatives in the plans for the use of armed forces and some of our conclusions should--because of the limited possibilities of our intelligence--be considered as tentative, and we should be very glad to have them supplemented by your opinions and evaluations of these problems which are important to all of us.

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