CRISIS OVER BERLIN

American Policy Concerning the Soviet Threats to Berlin,
November 1958-December 1962

Part III

From the End of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting to the
Abortive Summit Meeting, August 1959-May 1960

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FOREWORD

This is Part III of a comprehensive study, to be issued in eight parts, which, when completed, will cover American policy concerning the Soviet threats to Berlin, November 1958-December 1962. Each part is separately bound. Also separately bound is an Introduction which covers in broad sweep the developments between the final phase of World War II and the outbreak of the Berlin crisis in November 1958.

The study was requested by Martin J. Hillenbrand for the Berlin Task Force and the Bureau of European Affairs. The research and writing were done by Arthur G. Kogan.
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Chapter I

MOVES TOWARD AN EAST-WEST SUMMIT CONFERENCE,
AUGUST-DECEMBER 1959

A. President's Trip to Europe, August-September 1959

1. United States Objectives

At a White House news conference on August 25, President Eisenhower issued a statement that he was about to embark on a visit to Europe. The itinerary of the visit included the Federal Republic, Great Britain, and France, all of which, the President stated, were "immediately concerned in problems involving our relations with the Soviets." The President further stated that he would have conversations with the Head of Government of each of these countries, and of Italy, and with the President and Secretary General of the NATO Council. The President's announcement made it also clear, however, that the discussions in which he would engage would not be limited by any means to the problems of East-West relations or of Germany and Berlin but would cover a variety of matters of common concern.1

In the general position paper prepared by the Department, the President's trip to Europe was characterized as a "normal prelude" to the planned exchange of visits between the President and Khrushchev which would "serve a necessary psychological function and provide a valuable means of political consultation" with our principal NATO allies. It was emphasized in this position paper that the West was able to maintain the current stalemate on Berlin only by making clear that the Western position in Berlin would be held at the cost, if necessary, of global war. If Western unity and continued public support for the acceptance of such a risk could be maintained, the existing position could be expected to be held indefinitely. It would therefore be useful, it was suggested in the paper, to indicate that the Western Powers would look for an active German contribution to policy development in an area of such vital concern.

to Germany. The brief period of relaxed tensions resulting from the projected exchange of visits should be used for constructive planning to meet the great likelihood of renewed Soviet pressure over Berlin, and the Western Powers ought to find new ways of seizing initiatives as the developing tactical situations might permit. In the "improbable event" that Khrushchev had something new to say regarding Berlin, it would be a matter for consultation with the allies.  

2. **Conversations in Bonn**

**Eisenhower-Adenauer Talks.** The President and his party arrived in Bonn on August 26 and held policy discussions with the Germans the following day. A private meeting in the morning of August 27 between the President and the Chancellor attended also by Martin J. Hillebrand and the German interpreter Heinz Weber, and a subsequent meeting with senior advisers present, dealt primarily with questions not related to Berlin or Germany. The problem of relations with the Soviet Union was touched upon in the earlier of these two meetings mostly with reference to a letter from Khrushchev which the Chancellor had received a few days before and to which he was about to reply. According to Adenauer, Khrushchev had advocated economic cooperation between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union and had also suggested that the remnants of the last war should be removed. Adenauer told the President that he would reply to Khrushchev in a reasonable and moderate tone and would argue that tension was not caused by the remnants of the last war but by the armaments race. Therefore, the achievement of controlled general disarmament would be a decisive step. The President remarked in this context that he would take the same line in his forthcoming talks with the Soviet Premier.  

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2Memorandum by Hillebrand (EUR) of conversation between the President and Adenauer (US/MC/1), Aug. 27, 1959, secret; unsigned memorandum of conversation among the President, Adenauer, and senior advisers (US/MC/2), Aug. 27, secret. For text of Adenauer's letter to Khrushchev which was handed to the Soviet Ambassador, Aug. 28, see airgram G-87 from Bonn, Sept. 1, 1959, official use only.
The principal discussion regarding Berlin and Germany between the President and the Chancellor took place at a second private meeting at which the only other person present was Dr. Weber, the German Foreign Office interpreter.¹

The President opened by asking the Chancellor whether he had any ideas for bringing about a better situation with respect to Berlin, guaranteeing the protection of the city, and making progress in the field of reunification. Adenauer replied that he fully understood that nobody could or should go to nuclear war over these questions. He declared that he would like to see free life in the Soviet Zone but that he was wondering whether the people there would be able to withstand constant Communist pressure and whether they might not capitulate some day. In Berlin, however, where the three Western Powers had occupation rights, the situation was different, and he was asking the Western Powers to stand on their rights in Berlin.

In the course of a brief discussion of Soviet attitudes toward disarmament and of the difficulties experienced by the Soviet economy, Adenauer emphasized that Khrushchev would be able to overcome his economic difficulties by gaining control of the economic potential of the Federal Republic. The President expressed agreement with Adenauer but stated that he was thinking of the immediate future, especially with respect to divided Germany and Berlin. He therefore was asking the Chancellor whether he would regard an increase of contacts with the Germans of the Soviet Zone as feasible. This would not involve recognition of the East German regime but would awaken new forces in both parts of Germany.

Adenauer told the President that Secretary Dulles and his advisers had raised similar questions during the Secretary’s last visit to Bonn, which indicated that they were not familiar with actual conditions in the Soviet Zone. The Chancellor

¹Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director of the Office of German Affairs, was supposed to accompany President Eisenhower to this meeting but was prevented from doing so when the Chancellor hurriedly ushered the President into his study and closed the door behind them (information given to the writer by Mr. Hillenbrand).
emphasized how dangerous and difficult it was for East Germans to establish contacts with West Germany but promised that the Federal Government would do everything that could be done in this matter. The President then inquired about the possibility of exchanges involving certain groups such as managers, farmers, teachers, doctors, etc., for limited periods. If such proposals were made, the East Germans would have to show their true colors while the West would have displayed greater flexibility. The President conceded that the persons selected by the East German regime were likely to be reliable party-line Communists but expressed the hope that in the later stages of the exchange program individuals might come over who would not stick to the party line. Adenauer said that he would gladly have this proposal studied and that he would therefore reserve his position for the moment.

With respect to Berlin, the Chancellor felt that the Western answer must be a decisive "no" if the Soviet Union should start something over Berlin. He did not believe, however, that the Soviet Union would let it come to a war over Berlin. According to the German minutes of the conversation, as translated by Embassy Bonn, the Chancellor then continued as follows: "For the most extreme emergency, but only for it, there is still another possibility. In his November 1958 note, Khrushchev made an alternative proposal to change Berlin to a free city under four-power and U.N. guarantee. But then the three powers would give up their rights in Berlin. Therefore it must be carefully studied, if and when occasion arises, whether one could admit such an idea." Finally, in reply to a question by the President, Adenauer denied the possibility that Khrushchev, in speaking of free access to Berlin, had been thinking of cession of a corridor to the Federal Republic.

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1 The Chancellor's remarks on this subject, according to the version given to Hillenbrand by the German interpreter immediately following the President's meeting with the Chancellor (see next footnote), were to the effect that the Western Powers, if forced to such a point, "would, of course, have to be extremely wary of Soviet trickery."

2 The minutes of this meeting between the President and the Chancellor were taken by the interpreter of the German Foreign Office who was the only other person present (see ante, footnote 1, p. 3). Since these minutes had to be approved by Adenauer and

(Footnote continued on following page)
Herter-Brentano Conversation. The Chancellor's ideas regarding a "free city" solution seemed vague and puzzling to American officials, the more so as they were not sufficiently clarified in a conversation between Herter and Brentano which also took place on August 27.\(^1\)

According to Herter's account of the conversation, Brentano was more forthcoming on this occasion than he had been at Geneva, because he frankly stated that the relationship between West Germany and East Germany could be settled if it were not for the emotional problem involved in a Berlin settlement. He also declared that the West German Government did not want to enter into any agreement regarding Berlin which would weaken the Federal Republic or would involve moves toward the neutralization of West Germany. Thus, as Herter interpreted it, West Germany did not want to make any sacrifice in connection with a Berlin settlement.

Brentano then declared that it would be desirable if the West could get a moratorium for three years which would carry through to the next West German elections and in the interim period work out some status arrangement for Berlin which the Berliners and the Soviet Union could accept. According to therefore were not given to the United States right away, the German interpreter, after the meeting, gave Hillenbrand a quick summary of the principal points covered. Memorandum by Weber (German Foreign Office) of conversation between the President and Adenauer (US/MC/3), Aug. 27, 1959, secret; memorandum of Aug. 27, 1959 by Hillenbrand of conversation with Weber regarding a private meeting between the President and Chancellor Adenauer on Aug. 27, 1959, secret.

\(^1\)Hillenbrand pointed out in a memorandum to Deputy Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant that it was not clear whether the Chancellor was thinking merely of the three Western sectors of the city in this context or of a "free city" to include the Soviet sector as well. "Before anybody gets too far committed, we should be quite clear which of these two possibilities we have in mind." Memorandum by Hillenbrand to Merchant, Aug. 30, 1959, secret.
Herter's account of the conversation, Brentano envisaged "some kind of free or guaranteed city with U.N. responsibility made an important element there." Herter told Brentano that it was very important for the President to get the Chancellor's thinking on this whole subject before the Khrushchev visit. Brentano promised that he would try to have this matter delineated as thoroughly as possible the next day and to write Herter a personal letter about it.1

Public Reaffirmation of Policy on Berlin. In connection with the President's visit to Bonn there was also public reaffirmation of United States policy regarding Berlin. This reaffirmation appeared in the U.S.-German Communiqué of August 27, the President's news conference of August 27 in Bonn, and the President's letter of August 28 to Mayor Willy Brandt.2

3. Conversations in London

During the President's stay in London from August 27 to September 2, he and Secretary Herter discussed with the British Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary a number of problems of mutual concern. Only one of these discussions, however, the meeting at the Prime Minister's country seat at Chequers on August 29, in the presence of Herter and Lloyd, dealt with the question of Berlin and Germany.

The President first acquainted Macmillan with the substance of his discussions with Chancellor Adenauer, especially with reference to their second private meeting. Secretary Herter noted in this context that the Bonn conversations had introduced the new element of a possible acceptance by the Germans of a free city of Berlin. He also briefly reported about his conversation with Brentano, emphasizing that he had indicated to the latter that the United States was tired of a negative attitude. Herter had therefore suggested that Brentano talk

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1 From London, tel. CAHIO 5, Aug. 29, 1959, secret. The letter promised by Brentano was not sent to Herter until November. See post, p. 35.

2 See "President Eisenhower's European Trip, August-September 1959" (Department of State publication 6888), pp. 4-12.
to the Chancellor about adopting a more positive approach. The President remarked at this point that it would be most helpful if one could think up a program and suggest it to Adenauer because matters would become progressively more difficult if the Germans themselves did not move. Foreign Secretary Lloyd observed that if the Germans were now contemplating a free city solution their emphasis had indeed changed.

There was some discussion of the possibility of a moratorium on Berlin. Macmillan remarked that at one time during the Geneva negotiations it had looked as if the Soviet Union would accept a moratorium. But subsequently there had been a change in the Soviet position, and the Soviet Union had refused to make any commitments as to what would be the status of Western rights at the end of the moratorium. Herter pointed out in this connection that any interim agreement involved the danger of undermining or giving up the Western position. In reply to a question from Macmillan regarding the next phase of the Berlin problem, Herter stated that the United States did not want rights in perpetuity in Berlin but wanted these rights recognized until the situation could be changed by mutual consent. He pointed out that Gromyko had shown his hand at Geneva with respect to the Soviet Union's expectation of an East German take-over of West Berlin after any moratorium. The President observed that the Western Powers must not go back on their announced position that the situation in Berlin could be changed only by mutual consent. He admitted, however, the difficulties inherent in Berlin's geographic position and remarked in this connection, according to the minutes of the meeting, that "we have a genius for getting in a hole" and that "to protect ourselves we are always having to defend Matsu or some other out of the way place."

When Macmillan raised the question of the relationship between the Khrushchev visit and a summit meeting, the President replied that he could not go to a summit meeting without some progress having been made. After a brief discussion as to what would constitute "progress", the President declared that he would reject any suggestion made by Khrushchev that the United States and the Soviet Union should agree between themselves on some form of progress. The President said that he would hope, however, that Khrushchev, upon his return home, might think matters over and issue a public statement which would make a summit meeting possible. The Allies could then determine their reaction as they had the right to do. Finally, the President
expressed the belief that Khrushchev would avoid embarrassing him or the United States while in that country, and he remarked, "If we stall long enough, maybe this will constitute a moratorium". 1

4. Conversations in Paris

Talks with the French. Only a relatively small portion of the conversations held with the French, the top NATO officials, and Premier Segni of Italy during the President's visit to Paris, September 2-4, dealt with the questions of Germany and Berlin, or, for that matter, with the Khrushchev visit. The first discussion of these matters with the French took place in a meeting between President Eisenhower and President de Gaulle in the presence of their advisers on September 2.

President Eisenhower stated at the outset that there were no differences of view between them regarding Berlin. The United States was not going to desert two million Berliners. It was ready to discuss Berlin with anyone, even with Khrushchev, but these discussions would have to take place within the framework of existing rights in Berlin. In reply to a question from de Gaulle, President Eisenhower declared that he would not attend a summit meeting unless there was some assurance in advance that it would produce results. De Gaulle indicated that these were exactly his sentiments, too. When the President remarked that he did not expect any results from the Khrushchev visit, de Gaulle declared that he did not expect any either but regretted that the decision to invite Khrushchev to the United States had been taken unilaterally. The President thereafter said that he had already assured Adenauer and Macmillan that he would not make any proposals to Khrushchev or start any negotiations with him. He was now giving the same assurance to General de Gaulle. 2

1 Memorandum by White (EUR) of conversation between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan (US/MC/20a), Aug. 29, 1959, secret.

2 Memorandum by McBride (EUR) of conversation between President Eisenhower and General de Gaulle (US/MC/26), Sept. 2, 1959, top secret.
The only other discussion with the French on matters pertaining to Berlin was held between Secretary Herter and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville on September 4. The Secretary referred to President Eisenhower's suggestion to Chancellor Adenauer that he should consider a long-term solution to the Berlin problem, and pointed out that occupation could not be a permanent solution. Although a moratorium might be satisfactory for the time being, Herter said, the West ought to think in terms of a long-term solution. Couve de Murville inquired whether there might be a solution between the extremes of Berlin's incorporation into the Federal Republic and the establishment of a free city. Herter replied that some solution might be found involving international guarantees, probably with troops remaining in the city.

Herter agreed with the French Foreign Minister that there was no evidence of a change in the Soviet position. He said that if Khrushchev should come up with new suggestions it would probably become necessary for the Foreign Ministers to reconvene. When Ambassador Alphand asked in this connection whether the meetings on contingency planning in Washington should go on, Herter indicated that he did not think it likely that a contingency as envisaged in the planning would arise prior to the exchange of visits between the United States and the Soviet Union.  

Talks with Others. The President's conversation with NATO Secretary General Spaak and with the President of the North Atlantic Council, Dutch Foreign Minister Lans, on September 3, touched on the matters of Berlin, Germany, and the Khrushchev visit only insofar as the President informed the NATO officials briefly about his discussions with the other Western leaders regarding these subjects. It is not without significance that the President stated on this occasion that he felt it would be necessary at some point to find a way of eliminating the need for occupation forces in Berlin but that the United States was going to stand firm as of now. With regard to the Khrushchev

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1 Memorandum by Kidder (Embassy Paris) of conversation among Herter, Couve de Murville, and others (US/MC/35), Sept. 4, 1959, secret.
visit, the President told the NATO officials that he wanted to reaffirm that he did not intend to negotiate with Khrushchev although he would try "to soften him up a little." The President stated, however, that he was not optimistic about the results of these talks with Khrushchev, and he emphasized again that the exchange of visits did not indicate any new policy on the part of the United States.\footnote{Memorandum by Nolting (USRG) of conversation among the President, Spaak, Luns, and others (US/MC/30), Sept. 3, 1959, secret.}

The President also informed Prime Minister Segni of Italy of his talks with the Allied leaders and of his ideas regarding the Khrushchev visit. In the course of their conversation, on September 3, the President told Segni that the Western position on Berlin should be firm but not entirely rigid, and sufficiently flexible so as not to impede a solution. Again the President stated that it was not desirable to have occupation troops remain in Berlin forever.\footnote{Unsigned memorandum of conversation between the President and Segni (US/ME/25), Sept. 3, 1959, confidential.}

5. Results of President Eisenhower's Trip to Europe

The President achieved his purpose of reassuring the European allies that the United States would not engage in any substantive negotiations with Khrushchev without them and that the talks with the Soviet Premier would essentially be exploratory. The President as well as Herter had tried to impress upon the Germans the need for greater flexibility and for new German proposals, especially with respect to German reunification. Adenauer's reaction to these suggestions did not offer many prospects for such a German initiative. On the other hand, the Chancellor's apparent willingness to consider a "free city" solution for Berlin in certain circumstances was in odd contrast to the rest of his position and remained a vague and puzzling factor. Finally, it was not without significance that the President, while reaffirming United States determination regarding Berlin, had expressed concern over the long-term aspect of the Berlin problem, specifically with respect to an indefinite duration of the Allied occupation of West Berlin.
Allied agreement regarding Berlin was publicly reaffirmed in a joint report by the President and the Prime Minister, televised at London on August 31, and in a U.S.-French communiqué released at Paris on September 3.\(^1\)

B. Premier Khrushchev's Visit to the United States

1. Preliminaries

Premier Khrushchev's conversations with the President during his visit to the United States, September 15-27, dealt with many aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations. Yet it was generally understood that it was the crisis over Berlin which had brought on the exchange of visits between the President and the Premier and that the Berlin issue therefore would be in the center of their discussions.

The subject of Berlin was touched upon only briefly in the first conversation between the two leaders immediately after Khrushchev's arrival in Washington September 15. The President told the Premier that he agreed with him that the situation in Berlin was abnormal. He emphasized that until the United States was able to discharge its obligation to the German people, however, there should be no unilateral action by the Soviet Union which would embarrass the United States and prevent it from discharging these responsibilities. The United States could not abandon these responsibilities, the President declared, until there was an acceptable settlement. He also stressed that the Berlin issue was a symbolic one and that it was irritating to the Soviet Union as well as unpleasant for the United States. Khrushchev, for his part, said that he would give a detailed exposition of his views later on but that he wanted to state even at this time that the Soviet Union was not contemplating unilateral action and would try to find a solution which would not impair the prestige of either of the two powers.

It was agreed in this first conversation and in a subsequent meeting between Harrer and Gromyko on September 16 that the substantive discussions between the two leaders would be held at

Camp David following Khrushchev's tour of the United States and that these talks would cover not only Germany and Berlin but also a number of other topics such as disarmament, nuclear tests, Laos, etc.  

2. Discussions of Berlin and Germany at Camp David, September 26

Morning Session. The President began the Camp David discussion in the morning of September 26 by enlarging upon the statements which he had made in his first meeting with Khrushchev on September 15. He stated that the Berlin problem was a matter of deep concern not only to the Government but also to the people of the United States. Once tension over Berlin was eased, progress could be made on other questions affecting the two countries, and he therefore hoped that an honorable way out could be found. The President declared that the United States did not want to keep occupation troops in Berlin forever and agreed that the existing situation should be corrected. This, however, should be done on a reasonable basis in accordance with the responsibilities of the United States toward the people of West Berlin and its own security.

Khrushchev professed to be in general agreement with the President's statements but said that he failed to see how the Soviet proposal for a free city of West Berlin could affect American security, especially since Berlin had no strategic importance and since the number of troops there was likewise without significance. According to Khrushchev, the Soviet Union approached the Berlin problem from the necessity of ending the state of war and concluding a peace treaty with Germany. Such a step would settle the Berlin problem, paralyze German revanchism, and calm the fears of the Poles and Czechs. The Premier asserted that the United States was maintaining an abnormal situation and a state of war because of the position taken by Chancellor Adenauer and that he felt that the latter ought not to be encouraged. Khrushchev suggested in this connection that

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1Memorandum by Kohler (EUR) of conversation among the President, Chairman Khrushchev, and others, Sept. 15, 1959, secret; to all NATO capitals, circular 309, Sept. 16, secret.
the United States could avoid the question of recognizing the GDR by concluding a peace treaty only with the Federal Republic while the Soviet Union would sign peace treaties with both German states.

Khrushchev declared that, even though there was no prospect of German reunification in the near future, the powers concerned with Germany should agree on a definite period of time during which the two existing German states should be encouraged to reach agreement. He did not expect them to do so, but the powers would thereby be released from certain responsibilities. Moreover, the Soviet Premier stated that he actually did not believe that the Allies really desired German unity, and he referred in this context to alleged preferences for several "Germanies" expressed in circles close to de Gaulle, and to British fears of a unified German state that would upset the balance of Europe.

The President replied to Khrushchev that the Europeans agreed that in the long run the German people ought to be reunited in the interest of a peaceful world. The last war had brought about an unnatural situation which affected all of them. Berlin and the division of Germany were residues of war, and the question was how to deal with these problems. The President said that he would not object if the Soviet Union concluded a peace treaty with East Germany as long as the Western position was not affected thereby.

The President's remark regarding the relationship between Western rights and a separate peace treaty prompted Khrushchev to state that the maintenance of these rights was prejudicial to the Soviet position and that the Soviet Union could not agree to such an impossible condition. But he declared that Berlin could, nevertheless, remain free and prosperous, and he furthermore conceded that some period of time would be needed to take the edge off the Berlin question so that the prestige of the United States might not be injured. Khrushchev also expressed agreement with the President's view that Berlin and Germany were only a part of the whole international picture and that the principle problem was disarmament.

The President noted that Khrushchev seemed to believe that the United States and its allies attached too much importance to Berlin. But the President felt that, if no
agreement were reached on the question of Berlin, that issue would hang over them and make it difficult to deal with bigger problems. The American people, the President said, felt that the West was faced, if not with an ultimatum, at least with some threat of unilateral action. They would not understand it if the President and Khrushchev went on to other problems and left the Berlin question unsolved.

Khrushchev thereupon declared that he would give a frank explanation of the Soviet position. The Soviet Government felt that the United States had been trying to operate from a position of strength, and that consequently many international problems had become frozen. The Soviet Union, however, had found itself in a minority in the United Nations General Assembly and other international bodies. This, according to Khrushchev, did not represent the true state of affairs in the world. The Soviet Union, therefore, seeing no prospect of an agreed settlement on Germany, had decided to end the state of war with that country. The Soviet Union wanted to proceed in this matter in accord with the United States, but, if the latter refused, the Soviet Union would take action of its own. Khrushchev then explained that the Soviet Union felt justified in taking such a decision in view of the fact that the United States had promoted unilaterally the peace treaty with Japan as a result of which the Soviet Union had been pushed out of Tokyo. This gave the Soviet Union the right to act in the same manner in Europe. After Herter disputed this assertion, Khrushchev further stated that the Soviet Union had put a time limit on a Berlin agreement the previous year as a result of the high-handed attitude of the United States toward the USSR. But, he said, he was now interested in improving relations.

The President declared in conclusion that the discussion had been useful in clarifying respective positions and suggested that both sides should prepare short memoranda on what they would propose. Khrushchev declared that the Soviet side had already fully explained its views but that he had no objections to the preparation of a paper by the United States.  

1Memorandum by Ambassador Thompson and Kohler (EUR) of conversation among the President, Chairman Khrushchev, and others, Sept. 26, 1959, at 9:20 a.m., confidential.
Afternoon Session. For the afternoon session the United States experts drafted a paper on problems and procedures which was approved by the President. This brief document listed the major problems and irritants between the United States and the Soviet Union as follows: 1) Berlin and Germany, 2) disarmament, including nuclear test negotiations, 3) propaganda and the lack of adequate contact and exchange of persons and ideas, 4) ideological and other conflicts involving third countries. The paper stated that these problems were all interrelated and that it would be best to set up procedures to assure a continuous search for solutions through peaceful negotiations. Accordingly, it was suggested in the paper that a permanent consultative machinery should be set up providing for review of progress by the Foreign Ministers and by the Heads of Government after certain specific periods. Special machinery could be set up for more extensive study of these problems. Finally, it was stated in the paper that it would be made clear "that all of the above presupposes that no unilateral action will be taken at any time which would vitiate the operation of this process of peaceful negotiations."

When this paper was read to Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier declared that it contained nothing substantive and seemed to freeze existing positions rather than suggest steps for solving existing problems. The only thing provided for in this paper, Khrushchev asserted, was a Soviet commitment not to sign a peace treaty with Germany. He declared that the paper confirmed reports circulating before his arrival that the United States expected to impress him with American wealth and power so that the Soviet Union might retreat from its position on Germany and Berlin. Khrushchev went so far as to assert that the paper was in effect an American ultimatum and declared that it would merely result in a restatement of old positions by the Foreign Ministers. This in turn would lead to the Soviet Union's signing a peace treaty with Germany, with all its consequences.

The President attempted to persuade Khrushchev that there was no intention to impress him with American power and that it was most unadvisable in the current situation to talk of ultimatums. The big problem was to move ahead and to find solutions. The President, for his part, pointed out that the Soviet position appeared to be that the United States must run away if this problem were to be solved. This was, of course, unacceptable. The President declared that he did not know when and how German reunification could be brought about and that he therefore wanted a solution
acceptable to the people in West Berlin and in both parts of Germany, and to the other powers that had signed the armistice protocol with the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev repeated his criticism of the paper and added that it would result in putting off solutions for ten or fifteen years, or even indefinitely which would be in accordance with Adenauer's ideas. He then restated the familiar Soviet position that the United States and the Soviet Union should urge the two Germanies to settle their differences and come to terms within a definite time limit, regarding the duration of which the Soviet Union would maintain a flexible position. If the two German states achieved no progress after expiration of the time limit, a peace treaty would then be signed by agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Replying to this, the President emphasized that the major question between the two countries was not Berlin but the Soviet Union's insistence that the Berlin question had to be settled according to its wishes and that the other problems could be negotiated afterwards.

There was more discussion on similar lines. Khrushchev criticized the American paper for having nothing new to offer regarding disarmament and a relaxation of tension, while the President pointed out that the paper dealt with procedures only and that the United States was quite willing to set forth its position on disarmament and other issues. Khrushchev again complained that the West had rejected the Soviet proposals on Germany at the Geneva Conference. Above all, the Soviet leader asserted, the paper was devised to bind the Soviet government while the United States would be permitted to conduct its policy from a position of strength. Khrushchev considered such a policy unpleasant and outdated. While he was pleased with his reception in America and with his meeting with the President, he said, the old positions taken at the Geneva Conference reappeared as soon as the discussion got down to specifics.

The President replied that he was willing to make any procedural concession if Khrushchev could suggest a better method of negotiations. But he had to stress one point, namely, that he would have to resign if he ever accepted a time limit after which the United States would have to withdraw from Berlin. Such a position would never be accepted by the American people. The President stated very emphatically that he simply could not agree to being forced out of Berlin and then sit down and discuss other problems.
Khrushchev professed not to understand why the President had put the problem in such terms and denied any Soviet intention of forcing the United States out of Berlin. He then suggested that the two sides might draw up a document on Berlin which would neither set a time limit nor be formulated in such a way that it could be interpreted as an endorsement of a continuation of the occupation regime. Khrushchev stated that he understood the President's concern and difficulties, too. In this connection Khrushchev referred to alleged threats made in the press and by American generals regarding a breakthrough to Berlin with tanks, and also to Chancellor Adenauer's opposition to a peace treaty.

The President stated by way of summary that, since the United States did not want to perpetuate the occupation regime and the Soviet Union did not wish to force the United States out of Berlin, the two sides would try to negotiate and try to resolve their differences in this matter. If progress could be made on this basis, the negotiations could then be broadened to include other areas. Finally, the President suggested that the Soviet Union prepare a short paper for the next discussion. Khrushchev doubted the usefulness of another paper but said that he did not object to the President's suggestion.¹

3. Continued Discussions at Camp David, September 27

Morning Session. When the President and Khrushchev met again in the morning of September 27, no more mention was made of a new paper to be presented by the United States or the Soviet Union. The President, however, after some discussion accepted Khrushchev's suggestion that a brief communique should be issued at the conclusion of their talks.

The President first recapitulated the agreement reached between him and Khrushchev the previous day, namely, that the United States would not try to perpetuate the situation in Berlin and that the Soviet Union would not force the Western Powers out of Berlin. The President and Khrushchev had further agreed that

¹Memorandum by Akalovsky (LS) of conversation between the President and Khrushchev, Sept. 26, 1959, 1:00 p.m. afternoon session, secret.
there should be more frequent meetings between them and also between the respective Foreign Ministers. Thus, there was a general improvement in the atmosphere conducive to more useful negotiations.\footnote{It appears from a remark made by Khrushchev at this meeting in the morning of September 27 that he and the President had had another talk in the evening of September 26 along the lines of the afternoon conversation of that day. No record of such a conversation has been found in Department files.}

Khrushchev declared that the President's summary was correct. He wanted to make it clear, however, that the statement regarding Berlin should not be understood to mean that the Soviet Union and the United States were in favor of prolonging the occupation status and that they were giving up the idea of a peace treaty. Khrushchev emphasized once more that the Soviet Union would have to seek a unilateral solution if it could not encounter any understanding on the part of the United States. The Soviet Premier further declared that connecting the solution of the German problem with reunification would be unrealistic, would put off a settlement indefinitely, and would therefore indicate a lack of desire to reach one.

The President repeated what he had said to Khrushchev with respect to reunification and the question of Berlin in the course of their previous conversations. He said that he had no formula for reunification and that the Berlin situation was uneasy. But it had been created by himself and Khrushchev's predecessors, perhaps unwisely, and they had now to cope with it. After a brief discussion of disarmament, with respect to which Khrushchev expressed the belief that prospects for advances were greater than with respect to Germany where the positions had become rigid, it was agreed that the President's visit to the Soviet Union should take place in May or June of the following year. The President also stated his willingness to attend a summit meeting if there were some progress and prospects of results. According to the minutes of this conversation, the President explained at this point that "a situation where he would not act under duress could be regarded as progress" and that he felt on the basis of the understanding reached with Khrushchev that "duress no longer existed and therefore he would be willing to go to a meeting on the highest level."
Khrushchev assured the President that the Soviet Union had never intended to create a situation of duress, and the President remarked that this was the way the American Government and people had understood the situation. Perhaps this had been one of the misunderstandings which had to be cleared up. The President suggested therefore that on the basis of what had been said in these talks they should consider the situation as having changed at least that much.

Discussion by President and His Advisers. Following the session with Khrushchev, the President met with Secretary Herter and other members of the American group at Camp David and reported the results of his conversation. After summarizing the main points of his discussion with Khrushchev, the President remarked to his advisers, according to the record of the meeting, "that he saw no choice but to resume negotiations as long as we in fact did not see a perpetuation of the situation in Berlin; clearly we did not contemplate 50 years in occupation there." The President also said that he had told Khrushchev that he would rather have a summit meeting before the start of negotiations on disarmament and that "in this sense he had made Berlin a catalyst."

There followed a general discussion regarding the outlines of a communiqué. The President and the Secretary agreed that it should cover the following points: 1) General disarmament is the primary problem. 2) A Berlin solution should be acceptable to all people concerned. 3) There had been no agreements of substance. 4) There is understanding that negotiations should be free of threat. 5) The Moscow visit will take place next spring.¹

Drafting of a Communiqué. The United States group now prepared a draft communiqué which, after it had been approved by the President, Herter went over with Gromyko.² Their talk

¹Memorandum by Akslovsky (IS) of conversation between the President and Khrushchev, Sept. 27, 1959, 11:45 a.m., secret; memorandum by Kohler (EUR) of conversation among the President, Herter, and others, Sept. 27, secret.

²In this original United States draft, the passage dealing with Berlin read as follows:

(footnote continued on following page)
produced a new draft reporting the results of the discussion, including points not yet agreed upon.

The passage relating to Berlin in the joint U.S.-Soviet draft communiqué read as follows:

"With respect to the specific question of Berlin an understanding was reached, subject to the approval of the other parties concerned, that negotiations would be reopened with a view to achieving a solution which would be in accordance with the interests of all concerned, and in the interest of the maintenance of peace. It was further agreed that these negotiations should not be prolonged indefinitely (but that there would be no fixed time limit on them.)"

The clause in parentheses had not been agreed to by Khrushchev.

Afternoon Session: Decision on the Communiqué. The draft communiqué was presented to the President and Khrushchev at 1:45 p.m., September 27. At the opening of the discussion Khrushchev asked that the parenthetical clause in the paragraph on Berlin be eliminated. He confirmed that he had agreed substantially to the language used in this sentence but said that he felt its inclusion in the communiqué would lead to difficult and embarrassing questions. Khrushchev stressed particularly that this clause would be claimed as a "great victory for Adenauer", who had spoken of spinning out negotiations over as much as eight years.

The President at first responded that it might be possible to omit the whole sentence in question, provided he could tell his own people that there would be "no fixed time limit". Khrushchev thereupon declared that he could confirm such a statement if the President should make it. Secretary Kermit pointed out to the President, however, that omission of this important phrase could be very dangerous. Gromyko, on the other hand, argued that negotiations might go on for fifty years if the phrase were included. Although

"With respect to Berlin, an understanding was reached, subject to the approval of France and Great Britain, the two other occupying powers in Berlin, that negotiations would be opened with a view to achieving a solution satisfactory not only to the four occupying powers but also to the people of West Berlin and others directly concerned. It was further agreed that these negotiations should not be prolonged indefinitely but that there would be no time limit on them."
Khrushchev repeated his offer to confirm a public statement by the President, the latter showed increasing reluctance to omit the clause. If the sentence represented what had been agreed between him and Khrushchev, the President wondered, why was Khrushchev unwilling to say so in the communiqué. The President indicated that the argument that the phrase might be exploited by Adenauer failed to convince him, and he declared that he saw actually no use in having the communiqué without that sentence as the rest were merely generalities. The President also said that the language was directly connected with the question of a summit meeting and that he did not know what he would be able to say to his allies on this subject.

The discussion continued, with the same arguments, for some time. Finally, the President agreed to omission of the sentence from the communiqué but declared that he would use it in his press conference. Nevertheless, he still expressed puzzlement at Khrushchev's unwillingness to have it included in the communiqué.¹

The Communiqué, September 27, and Press Conference Statements of September 28-29. The joint communiqué was released on September 27. As arranged, the President declared in his news conference on September 28 that he and Khrushchev had agreed, in addition to what was said in the communiqué, "that these negotiations should not be prolonged indefinitely but there could be no fixed time limit on them." On September 29 Khrushchev carried out his part of the bargain by stating at his news conference, when asked to comment on President Eisenhower's statement of the previous day, that the President had "correctly characterized the agreement reached by us." Khrushchev also said that "we agreed indeed that talks on the Berlin question should be resumed, that no time limit whatsoever is to be established for them, but that they also should not be dragged out for an indefinite time."²

¹Memorandum by Kohler (EUR) of conversation among the President, Khrushchev, and others. Sept. 27, 1:45 p.m., with attached United States draft of communiqué, and joint U.S.-Soviet draft communiqué, secret.

²For text of Joint U.S.-Soviet Communiqué and of press conference statements made by President Eisenhower on Sept. 28 and by Khrushchev on Sept. 29, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1961 (Committee Print, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 87th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 584-586.
The President's news conference statement regarding the absence of a fixed time limit on future negotiations, with its subsequent confirmation by Khrushchev, was calculated to relax tensions and to provide a more favorable climate for negotiations. Another statement, however, which the President made toward the end of this press conference on September 28, raised many queries and had to be clarified by White House Press Secretary James Hagerty shortly after the press conference. In reply to a question whether the Western Powers, in the new negotiations, would be guided by the same principles as before, namely, that any solution must guarantee Allied rights in Berlin and protect the freedom of the West Berliners, the President declared that he did not know what kind of solution might finally prove acceptable. The President further said that "the situation is abnormal" and that it was brought about by a military truce after the end of the war, which put a number of free people "in a very awkward position." It was now necessary, he said, to find a system acceptable to all the people in that region, including those most concerned, the West Berliners." Hagerty's subsequent clarifying statement was to the effect that "the President, of course, did not mean that the freedom of the people of West Berlin was going to be abandoned or that Allied rights were going to be surrendered by any unilateral action." Hagerty explained that the President had merely wanted to say that he could not at this time give in detail the ultimate solution of the Berlin question but that any agreement must be acceptable to the people of the area "including the most concerned--the people of West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany." 1

C. Aftermath of the Khrushchev Visit: The President's Exchange with Allied Leaders Regarding a Summit Meeting

1. The President's Messages of September 30 and October 9 to Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Adenauer

The U.S.-Soviet communique at the conclusion of Khrushchev's visit to the United States had committed both sides to a new round of discussions regarding the problem of Berlin. It became

1For text of statements by President Eisenhower and Press Secretary Hagerty, both of Sept. 28, 1959, see Background of Heads of Government Conference, 1960 (Department of State publication 6972), pp. 465-469.
now necessary to determine the form and substance of these new discussions, and this in turn required speedy consultation with the Allies.

First of all, the President sent Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Adenauer a memorandum concerning his conversations with Khrushchev, together with personal letters to these Allied leaders conveying his impressions of the meeting. The memorandum made clear that "the emphasis throughout the negotiations was on Berlin, with the President underlining the implications of Soviet efforts to place duress on the Western Powers", and that the conversations concentrated on Berlin primarily because the President refused to move on to other subjects until he was satisfied that the threat of duress over Berlin had been removed. In his letter to General de Gaulle, the President expressed the belief that the talks with Khrushchev had removed many of his own objections to a summit conference. The President also told de Gaulle that the visit was a good investment for the future even though, as expected, there were no concrete results. That assurance was couched in even stronger terms in the President's letter to Adenauer, in which he stated, "You will have gathered that no detailed negotiations of any kind have in fact taken place."

Preparations within the Department for the next round of East-West discussions began at once. The question of whether the United States was now prepared to go to the summit, and, if so, whether there should be a prior meeting of Foreign Ministers or their deputies, was raised by Hillenbrand in a memorandum of September 30. On that occasion Hillenbrand also took up the matter of the substance of the talks, especially whether the United States was still thinking in terms of a standstill agreement on Berlin along the lines of the Western proposals made at Geneva on July 28, or whether the approach should now be more fundamental, aiming at an arrangement for Berlin which would last until reunification. On October 6, EUR suggested in a memorandum to the Secretary that it was now

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1. To London, tel. 2602 (1408 to Paris, 717 to Bonn); to Paris, tel. 1407; to Bonn, tel. 714; to London, tel. 2601; all Sept. 30, 1959, Presidential handling, secret.

2. Memorandum by Hillenbrand (GER) to Kohler (EUR), Sept. 30, 1959, secret.
desirable to set in motion the process of arriving at agreements with the Allies and that the basic assumption was that a summit meeting was preferable to another Foreign Ministers conference. It was therefore further suggested that the President should raise the question of a possible summit meeting in letters addressed to Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Adenauer and request their views. Letters from the President to the three Allied leaders in accordance with these suggestions were dispatched on October 9.¹

The President's main argument, as expected, was that the Camp David talks had, in his view, removed many of the objections to a summit conference because the appearance of threat and duress had now been sufficiently altered. The President admitted that in these talks Khrushchev had not modified any of the substantive Soviet positions regarding Berlin, German reunification, and other major international questions, but he felt that there had been "sufficient indication of a change of tone" to justify further exploration. He therefore believed that the Western Powers would assume a heavy responsibility if they refused to meet Khrushchev at the summit. If such a meeting were held, however, the President stated, the Western Powers must be united "regarding the limits which our national interests place upon us", for they might find themselves under severe pressure to accept proposals dangerous to their interests under the threat of a total breakdown of negotiations. The President was certain that the Western Powers would be able to resist this and that in case of a failure of negotiations at the summit they would be in a better position to win world support than if they refused to meet with the Soviet Union at all. The President also said that he was aware of the advantages which the Soviet Union might derive from pulling the West into euphoria and a false sense of security but that he believed it would be possible to deal with this aspect of a summit meeting.

In the event that the other Western heads of government agreed that a summit meeting could now be held profitably, the President suggested that they consider a date early in December, prior to the NATO Ministerial meeting scheduled for December 15, which would make possible more detailed negotiations.

¹Memorandum by White (EUR) to the Secretary, Oct. 6, 1959, secret.
at the Foreign Ministers' or experts' level before the spring. In concluding, the President asked the heads of government for their views on these questions and also for suggestions regarding the possible place for a summit meeting.¹

2. Reaction of the Allied Leaders

Not surprisingly, the President's proposal for an East-West summit meeting in early December following a Western summit meeting received the full approval of Prime Minister Macmillan. In a letter of October 12, Macmillan declared that at such a summit meeting the aim should be to reach agreements in principle, leaving specific agreements to be worked out subsequently in more detailed negotiations on other levels. But Macmillan believed that one should leave open the possibility of getting a specific agreement at the summit on at least one of the issues under discussion. If the summit meeting was confined to issuing guidance to the Foreign Ministers, Macmillan wrote, there would be a risk of discrediting the concept of the summit meeting "and possibly of undoing the good work which you have done on Mr. Khrushchev in persuading him to withdraw his Berlin ultimatum." Macmillan felt that for these reasons the Western Powers should keep in mind "the possibility of concluding an interim agreement on Berlin at the Summit Meeting." Finally, Macmillan told the President that he had asked Ambassador Caccia to convey a number of additional points to Hertel.

Caccia in his letter of the same day to Hertel stated that the United Kingdom generally agreed with the United States position regarding a summit meeting, except that, as Macmillan had already said in his letter to the President, it believed that the summit meeting ought to try to reach a specific agreement on an interim arrangement for Berlin. This agreement should be "on the lines of that which was being negotiated when the Geneva Conference ended." Repeating the arguments used in Macmillan's letter, Caccia stressed that a summit meeting should not be confined to issuing guidance for subsequent meetings at a lower level.²

¹Letters, Eisenhower to Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Macmillan; all Oct. 9, 1959, Presidential handling, secret.

Chancellor Adenauer, replying to the President's letter on October 13, expressed the belief that the results of the Khrushchev visit justified the President's arguments in favor of a summit meeting. But the Chancellor stressed that preparations for such a meeting must start in good time and that, above all, vigilance was necessary during this preparatory period in view of the possibility that the West might be placed under severe pressure, psychologically and with respect to propaganda. The Western Powers must also guard against the spread of a feeling of false euphoria, a danger which could only be met by a comprehensive agreement "on the possibilities of a summit meeting and thus also on the limits beyond which we may not go." Adenauer had no objection to the holding of an East-West summit meeting in early December provided there was sufficient time for careful preparation which must include, of course, a Western summit meeting. The Chancellor suggested that such a Western summit meeting ought first to consider the agenda for the East-West meeting, and he expressed the view, as he had done on many earlier occasions, that the first item on that agenda should be the question of disarmament "which is and remains, as one knows, the decisive question" even with respect to all other questions. In the Chancellor's view, a general relaxation of tensions could come about only as a result of genuine progress in the field of disarmament because it would prove that the Soviet Union was serious about wanting to remove tensions.1

The President's letter to General de Gaulle putting forth the proposal for a summit meeting crossed a letter from the French President of October 8, which was a reply to the President's earlier message of September 30 regarding the Khrushchev visit. With obvious reference to the President's argument that the talks with Khrushchev had removed his objections to a summit meeting, de Gaulle expressed the view that one ought to watch in the next few months what the Soviet Union was going to do about relaxation of international tensions. The Soviet Union, de Gaulle said, would then have an opportunity to show not only in theory but also in practice whether it was in favor of reconciliation. If this should be the case, the improvement in the political climate might then permit envisaging a summit conference, preparations

3. The President's Communication of October 16

The President spelled out his views on a summit meeting in greater detail in letters sent to the Western heads of government on October 16. The three letters were substantially identical although the one addressed to de Gaulle naturally attempted to overcome the General's negative attitude in the matter. The President expressed the feeling that the Western leaders owed it to the world and to themselves to explore the Soviet attitude, and he emphasized that the recent exchange with Khrushchev had caused a "slight thawing of the international freeze" and that a certain momentum had been achieved. The President, too, felt that it was too early to assume that the Soviet Union was going to make concessions, but he thought that there was a better chance of getting something from Khrushchev "if we don't permit him to disengage from conversations with us for too long a period of time."

With regard to a meeting of Western leaders, the President declared, it was desirable to meet at an early date to make sure that they were in agreement in their evaluations of the possibility of reaching a modus vivendi on Berlin at a summit meeting with the Soviet Union. When the Geneva conference had ended, the President pointed out, there was still a wide gulf between the Western and Soviet positions, and while there was a varying measure of agreement on some of the less important elements of the Western position there was none on the vital question of the Western rights at the end of the interim period. The President declared that the Western Powers should also reach agreement with respect to a possible Soviet request for enlarging the circle of participants in a summit conference. It was his opinion that the meeting should be on the same basis as the Geneva conference of heads of government in 1955. In conclusion, the President

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1Letter, de Gaulle to Eisenhower, Oct. 8, 1959, Presidential handling, secret.
indicated that he would be willing and able to attend a meeting of Western heads of government at the end of October in Paris.¹

4. De Gaulle's Reservations: Agreement on a Western Summit Meeting

Macmillan and Adenauer expressed their full agreement with the President's proposals as well as their willingness to attend a Western summit meeting in Paris at the end of October.² But General de Gaulle remained adamant, and in a letter of October 20 he explained to the President in greater detail his strong reservations regarding an early summit meeting.

De Gaulle declared he was afraid "that we might compromise many things by plunging into this meeting" while there was still no chance of a satisfactory agreement on any of the subjects to be brought up at a summit conference. In de Gaulle's view, only the subject of Berlin had undergone sufficiently explicit negotiations to be considered at a summit meeting "without unfortunate improvisation" but its solution appeared more uncertain than ever in spite of its having been explored thoroughly. The French President stated that Khrushchev had by no means changed his objective regarding Berlin, and that the very fact that the West, on so many occasions, had consented to discuss this issue could but confirm him in his determination to pursue this objective. In this situation de Gaulle wondered "what a summit meeting at this time could accomplish besides highlighting a fundamental disagreement between East and West or surrendering more or less, to Soviet claims to Berlin." The first alternative would only aggravate the cold war while the second one would mark the beginning of a series of Western retreats with grave consequences. The General feared that neither would result in a relaxation of tensions.

De Gaulle believed, however, that such a relaxation might develop during the coming months provided the two camps did not come face to face on crucial questions. Only after East and West


had been on better terms and had promoted contacts without trying to settle controversial questions in the heat of passion could there be a summit conference under satisfactory psychological and political conditions. During such a period the powers would also have to watch Soviet attitudes in the United Nations and Soviet policy in South East Asia, Africa, etc. Until then there was no pressing problem for the West in Berlin unless the Soviet Union created one. De Gaulle stated in conclusion that he proposed "contemplating the principle of holding a summit conference" at the end of May or in June and that he agreed with the President that a "leisurely preliminary meeting" between the Western Powers, with Adenauer participating, would be necessary in order to define a common position on various problems, particularly that of Berlin. But he felt that to have such a meeting now would be premature and that early spring would be the best time for it. Moreover, Western policies could be coordinated through ambassadorial channels and possibly by visits to London and Washington on which he might embark.1

The President replied to de Gaulle on October 21 that, while he understood the General's reasoning, he could not agree with his conclusions. The President felt that he had demonstrated American determination not to retreat or surrender on any vital points but that "to show readiness to negotiate is not to demonstrate weakness." But since a somewhat better atmosphere in East-West relations had been established, the President believed that the Western Powers would be "derelict in their duty" if they did not explore the possibility of making some progress on disarmament and also with respect to "a modus vivendi on Berlin in the light of their action in removing the time limit for Berlin negotiations". The President stated, however, that he did not want to impose any fixed date for a summit meeting. As for a Western meeting, he felt that the views of the Western leaders were sufficiently diverse so that an early meeting "becomes more rather than less urgent". Such a meeting should not be put off until spring, the President believed, because to do so would present to the world a picture of Western inaction and "would not, in my view, lead to a more forthcoming attitude on the part of Mr. Khrushchev." On the contrary, it would result in a renewed

1Letter, de Gaulle to Eisenhower, Oct. 20, 1959, Presidential handling, secret.
hardening of the latter's attitude. For all these reasons, the President suggested that the Western summit meeting should take place well before the NATO Ministerial meeting in mid-December.1

Prime Minister Macmillan, who fully agreed with the President regarding the desirability of an early Western summit meeting, likewise tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade de Gaulle to accept the President's point of view. Macmillan nevertheless expressed the hope, in a letter of October 21 to the President, that the President would again bring de Gaulle round as he had done so often "in the old days."2

De Gaulle's reply to the President's last letter, however, which was dispatched October 26, indicated no change regarding the General's profound hostility to the idea of a precipitated East-West summit meeting. Repeating many of the arguments of his letter of October 20, de Gaulle declared that a summit meeting would be limited "to banal declarations of a general nature without positive results". Such a meeting, he stated, could not be improvised but ought to be carefully prepared. This would require first an improvement in the international climate, especially through contacts of the Camp David type, and he had therefore recently invited Khrushchev with this purpose in mind. The French President stated that Khrushchev's acceptance of this invitation and his removal of the time limit for a Berlin settlement at Camp David indicated that he desired a summit meeting very much and that the West had therefore time to prepare for it properly.

For the sake of such preparation, de Gaulle readily agreed to the President's suggestion for a meeting of the three Western heads of government "with Mr. Adenauer joining us when we discuss Germany", and he proposed that the meeting start on December 19. At such a meeting the heads of government could work out the entire position "which we would support at a Summit Conference". Thereafter, the Western Powers would closely watch the general direction of Soviet policy as expressed in Soviet actions throughout

1Letter, Eisenhower to de Gaulle, Oct. 21, 1959, Presidential handling, secret.

2Letter, Caccia to Herter, Oct. 17, 1959, top secret; letters, Caccia to Herter and Macmillan to Eisenhower, Oct. 21, both Presidential handling, secret.
the world and in Khrushchev's talks with the French, and they would then be in a position to invite Khrushchev to a summit conference, probably towards April of the following year. Before the opening of the summit conference, the Western Powers would have another meeting "to establish definitively our common position." In this way the East-West summit conference, according to de Gaulle's view, would really be prepared carefully.¹

In a letter of October 28, President Eisenhower declared that he accepted the date of December 19 for a Western summit meeting. He indicated at the same time that Secretary Herter would inaugurate talks with the three Ambassadors in Washington regarding preparatory discussions for such a meeting.² The British Government informed the United States on October 29 that it agreed to the date of December 19 and to having preparatory work done in Washington but that it did not accept the rest of de Gaulle's program and would press for an East-West summit meeting much earlier than April.³

D. Preparations for a Western Summit Meeting

The date for a Western summit meeting having been set, the Western Powers decided on the procedures for the preparatory work. Final responsibility was to be with the Secretary and the three Western Ambassadors while the detailed work was to be handled by a Consultative Working Group chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Hoy D. Kohler, with representatives designated by the three Ambassadors.⁴ Such discussions were held in Washington between November 4 and December 9. By the time this four-power Group met, however, considerable substantive discussion of an agenda for a Western Summit Meeting had taken place, including the first reading of draft papers, consideration of the Ambassadors' documents, and provision of reports to the Secretary of the four-power consultations.

¹Letter, de Gaulle to Eisenhower, Oct. 26, 1959, Presidential handling, secret.


³To London, tel. 3476, Oct. 29, 1959, secret.

⁴Memorandum from Kohler (EUR) to Merchant (C), Oct. 29, 1959, secret.
summit meeting in preparation for an East-West summit meeting had been carried on within the Department and also between some of the Western governments.

1. Intradepartmental Proposals

The range of these discussions with regard to Berlin can be gauged from memoranda submitted to the Secretary by Kohler on October 31 which had been drawn up for the Secretary's use in a forthcoming conversation with the President. The paper summarized a number of possible new proposals regarding Berlin, giving the pros and cons in each case. Such new proposals envisaged the following possibilities:

1) A stand-still agreement on Berlin for less than five years.

2) Tacit Western concurrence in Soviet withdrawal from responsibility for access in return for a declaration by the GDR, with which the Soviet Union would associate itself, that existing access arrangements would be preserved. This actually was re-statement of "Alternative C" of the London Working Group Report of April 1959 (see Part I, p. 89).

3) Several varieties of a suspension or termination of Western rights of occupation in Berlin in combination with a "guaranteed city" concept. Such a guarantee to be issued by the four Powers and supervised by the United Nations could be supplemented by the stationing of troops up to an agreed number at the request of West Berlin authorities.

4) Incorporation of West Berlin in the Federal Republic as the eleventh Land, with provision for maintaining Allied forces in the city.

5) A trusteeship over West Berlin exercised by the Federal Republic, France, Britain, and the United States, the terms of which would be submitted to a West Berlin plebiscite and also to the U.N. Security Council for approval. This arrangement also provided for unrestricted access to West Berlin and for the stationing of troops from one or more countries in the city.
Under consideration were also some proposals linking a Berlin solution with German reunification. Noteworthy, for instance, is a composite plan combining a Berlin solution on the basis of the various alternatives referred to above with a German declaration recognizing the Oder-Neisse line as a German-Polish frontier "which would be acceptable in a German peace settlement", and also with partial troop withdrawals and with inspection against surprise attack in a European inspection zone which had been agreed upon by the Western Powers in the London disarmament negotiations but was never offered to the Soviet Union. Of some interest is also a "Possible Proposal on German Reunification and U.S. Troop withdrawal" submitted to the Secretary for transmission to the President but which the Secretary did not forward. This proposal started from the assumption that substantial cuts in the number of United States troops in Germany would have to be made and that it was highly important to do so in a way that would minimize as much as possible the resulting damage to U.S.-West German relations. Such troop reductions should therefore be linked with negotiations on German reunification and the Western Peace Plan could be revised accordingly, possibly by adding new disarmament proposals in stage II of the Plan or a proposal regarding the Oder-Neisse line similar to that of the composite plan mentioned above. If the Soviet Union should refuse to discuss a Western Peace Plan with these modifications and if American troop cuts were still considered unavoidable, then the partial troop withdrawals might be "linked to a Berlin settlement but sterilized, in so far as possible, from any implications of a more general type of disengagement."  

2. Anglo-American Discussions

Discussion of new Berlin proposals in this period was not only intradepartmental, however; indeed, the foregoing memoranda

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1 Memorandum by Kohler (EUR) to the Secretary, Oct. 31, 1959, with attachment A ("Possible New Proposals on Berlin"), attachment B ("Schematic Comparison"), attachment C ("Composite Proposal, Oder-Neisse"), all secret; memorandum by Kohler (EUR) to the Secretary, transmitting " Possible Proposal on German Reunification", Oct. 31, secret; attachment A, "Draft Memorandum for the President"; attachment B, "Possible Proposal on U.S. Troop Withdrawal to be made to the Soviet", all secret.
mentioned that the United States and Britain had exchanged papers regarding possible changes in the final Western proposal of July 28 in Geneva. The British paper, handed to Merchant on October 22, made two principal points:

1) The British believed that the Soviet Union would never be willing to state that the Western rights in Berlin could not be modified except by mutual agreement. They were therefore prepared to accept a Soviet statement that no unilateral action to end Western rights would be taken, at least not until after negotiations at the end of the interim period had broken down.

2) The British proposed to replace the formula for a continuing conference proposed at Geneva on July 20 (see Part II, p. 65) by another one providing for a four-power commission which should meet during the period of the interim agreement and which would be authorized to discuss all aspects of the German problem. East and West Germans would participate, the West regarding them as experts and the Soviet Union as representatives of the two German states. The West, according to the British proposal, would instruct the two German delegations to get together and try to reach agreed recommendations for submission to the commission.

The United States, for its part, had given the British on October 16 a draft declaration on Berlin. It was a streamlined version of the Western proposal of July 28, differing little from the former in substance. However, the time limit of the temporary agreement was reduced from five to three years, disputes were to be settled among the four Powers directly without the instrumentality of the quadripartite commission, and there was to be no U.N. supervision on the commitment with respect to objectionable activities.

Lord Hood, Minister of the British Embassy in Washington, and Kohler exchanged views on the two papers on November 5. The British representative expressed approval of the United States draft declaration but doubted that Khrushchev would agree to any mention of rights in an agreement. Kohler, on the other hand, expressed grave doubt that Adenauer would accept the British proposal for discussions between East and West German representatives. Kohler remarked in this connection that the United States had been trying to induce some flexibility in the Germans but that their
position was now harder than before. He felt that the German idea, apparently shared by the French, that the Berlin problem could simply be put aside at a summit meeting was unrealistic. There was some discussion whether the two papers should be submitted in the Four Power Consultative Group. Lord Hood felt that the British paper in its existing form was not suitable for that purpose. Kohler said that the United States would welcome submission by the British of their paper and might do the same with its own draft declaration to focus the discussion.

3. German-American Exchanges

The lack of flexibility on the part of the West Germans to which Kohler had alluded in his conversation with Lord Hood, their reluctance to offer new proposals on Berlin or even to have the Berlin problem discussed at a summit conference, was clearly reflected in a communication from Foreign Minister Brentano which was received by the Secretary on the eve of the four power talks in Washington.

Brentano's letter was actually sent in response to Secretary Herter's request for Chancellor Adenauer's ideas on a long-term settlement for Berlin which Herter had put forward in his conversation with Brentano on August 27 in Bonn (see ante, p. 6). Although Brentano had promised a quick reply at that time, the message bore the date of October 23 and was not delivered at the Department until November 6.

Brentano began with what was perhaps the strongest official German criticism made so far of the Western proposal at Geneva of July 28, saying that it went "to the limits of what is practicable—if not beyond." Brentano even wondered "whether it was at all wise to make that proposal," for he believed that the West had lost ground at Geneva while the Soviet Union had maintained its rigorous standpoint; consequently, in future negotiations the West would start from a position weaker than that

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1To London, tel. 3250, Oct. 22, 1959, secret; "Suggested Draft Declaration on Berlin, Oct. 16; secret; memorandum by Hillenbrand (GER) of conversation between Kohler (EUR) and Hood (British Embassy), Nov. 5, secret.
at the beginning of the Conference. Brentano also emphasized that since the end of the Geneva Conference the Soviet Union had not indicated any change of attitude regarding Berlin and Germany.

Brentano declared that the foregoing remarks ought to explain why he could not give a positive answer to the question whether the Federal Republic was in a position to develop ideas and offer proposals of its own. In his view the Federal Republic could see no possibility for making a proposal which would fulfill two conditions. On the one hand, it would have to go beyond the Geneva proposals since the Soviet Union had rejected even those "far-reaching concessions." On the other hand, the proposal would have to secure the preservation of Berlin's freedom, which meant that "the essential substance of the present status of Berlin should not be changed." The West, Brentano stated, was faced with the dilemma that the status of Berlin was unsatisfactory but that, in view of the Soviet attitude, "any change of Berlin's status will necessarily be change for the worse." Brentano mentioned that he and his collaborators had examined whether this existing status of Berlin might be replaced by new agreements providing for a U.N. guarantee. But such a U.N. guarantee "could at best be given additionally" but could not replace the guarantee by the three Western Powers expressed through the physical presence of their forces in Berlin. As for the German question as a whole, Brentano declared that the real issue was not the reunification of the two separate parts of Germany but rather that any solution of the German question presupposed that the people of the Soviet Zone should be given back the right of self-determination. Therefore, reunification could not be discussed with representatives of the East German regime whose task it was to maintain the Communist system in the zone while making the Federal Republic ripe for the assault.

Brentano realized that Helter might say "that my position is rigid" and remind him that international conferences were imminent on the outcome of which life and death might depend. But he, Brentano, also knew that Germany's freedom was at stake and that the rest of Europe would soon share that country's fate "should a mistaken political decision abandon Germany to bolshevism." Nevertheless, there was, in Brentano's view, a better way for achieving a relaxation of tensions, and he proposed, as Adenauer and he had done on earlier occasions, that talks on disarmament be held and that this question "should be the first and perhaps even the only one to be placed on the agenda of the
first summit meeting." Such disarmament negotiations could give a clue as to the sincerity of the Soviet Union's desire for a relaxation of tensions. Brentano even suggested that one might propose to the Soviet Union that it should recognize the existing status of Berlin for a period to be agreed upon. At the same time the Soviet Union could be told that a solution of political problems such as Berlin would be easier after conclusion of some initial agreement regarding disarmament. Rejection of such a proposal by the USSR would merely demonstrate that there was no serious basis for negotiations. Brentano admitted that the West would then face a serious crisis but declared that it could not avoid it "by not wanting to see it."

Brentano's letter, which was characterized by Kohler in a memorandum to the Secretary as "a stern and inflexible reflection of the traditional hard German line," was taken up in a conversation between the Secretary and Grewe on November 10. The Ambassador modified Brentano's statement in one respect, by stating that the Federal Government did not then believe that disarmament should be the only item to be discussed at the summit meeting and that it would obviously be necessary to deal with the questions of Berlin and Germany. Herter declared that Brentano's criticism of the Western proposal of July 28 would indicate that he did not wish to consider a temporary agreement. But the Secretary wondered whether any solution could be found with respect to a Berlin arrangement designed to last until German reunification. If no such solution was found, Herter said, a separate peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the East Germans would have to be expected. Grewe stated that he had examined the range of possible solutions but that he had come only to negative conclusions. He finally promised full German participation in the four-power talks in preparation for the Western summit meeting.

1 Letter, Brentano to Herter, Oct. 23, 1959, secret, eyes only.

2 Memorandum by Kohler (EUR) to Herter, Nov. 9, 1959, secret.

3 Memorandum by Hillenbrand of conversation between Herter and Grewe, Nov. 10, 1959, secret.
4. Washington Four-Power Consultations

In preparation for the meeting of the Western Heads of Government, consultations between the Secretary and the three Western Ambassadors and also among their representatives in a Western Working Group were held in Washington, November 4-December 9. The Washington consultations dealt with procedures and arrangements for an East-West summit meeting and also with the scope of such a meeting, as a basis for discussion by the Western heads of government. It may suffice to state here that, in addition to Germany and Berlin, the topics discussed in preparation for both summit meetings included disarmament, general East-West relations, aid to underdeveloped countries, and others. It was understood that the views expressed in the Washington conversations did not reflect established policies of the participating governments or commitments undertaken by them, and that they merely represented joint recommendations for the use of the Western leaders. However, the paper on "Germany including Berlin" was drawn up by the United States delegation only and was carried as a special annex to the record of the consultations, for reasons which will be explained below.

After a brief discussion of various approaches to the Berlin problem, it was stated in the paper that the Governments would have to provide guidance on a number of points. Various questions were listed which related to the most important operating assumptions on which agreement had to be reached before a Western position could be fully developed. On November 3, prior to the Four-Power Working Group sessions, Hillenbrand had explained in a memorandum the reasons for using the "old device of having the Working Group draw up series of 'loaded questions'" which would lead to replies by the governments intended to guide the Working Group during the next stage of preparations. He believed that, since any frank discussion of possible proposals might leak to the press and since on the other hand the Working Group had to make some realistic contribution to the preparations for a summit meeting if its proceedings were not to be meaningless, a questionnaire might provide a partial solution to the problem. By careful drafting of the questions, "possible proposals may be suggested without committing anyone to their premature espousal."¹

¹Memorandum by Hillenbrand (GER) to Kohler (EUR), Nov. 3, 1959, secret.
The Working Group paper raised the following questions:
a) Assuming that Khrushchev will begin by presenting again the Soviet peace treaty proposals, should the West respond by putting forward the Western Peace Plan?  
b) If so, can the Peace Plan be modified to make it more negotiable?  
c) Are there any circumstances making it advantageous for the Western Powers to discuss the principles of a peace treaty on a quadripartite basis?  
d) Must the West be prepared at the summit meeting to discuss Berlin outside the context of German reunification?  
e) If German reunification is not likely in the near future, are there reasons why maintenance of the status quo in Berlin can not be considered a feasible course of action in view of announced Soviet intentions to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR?  
f) Is there a practical way of deterring the Soviet Union from signing a separate treaty in the absence of a modus vivendi, in the presence of a modus vivendi, or by the terms of a modus vivendi?  
g) If the Soviet Union signs a separate peace treaty with the GDR in the absence of a modus vivendi on Berlin, what will be the effect on Western rights and responsibilities in Berlin?  
h) If the problem of Berlin alone is taken up at the East-West summit meeting, should the Western Powers insist on the maintenance of the status quo until reunification?  
Should they aim for an interim agreement of the type discussed at Geneva?  
Or should they try to achieve directly an arrangement designed to continue until reunification?  
i) Is the Western negotiating position at the expiration of an Interim agreement of the kind envisaged at Geneva likely to be stronger or weaker than it is now?  
j) Can new proposals be developed by a new arrangement designed to last until reunification, which would be acceptable and consistent with Western obligations to maintain the freedom of the city?  
k) If an arrangement to last until reunification can be negotiated with the Soviet Union, is the latter likely to continue to respect it?  

3Record of Washington Consultations Preparatory to a Meeting of the Heads of Governments of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Revised), Dec. 10, 1959, secret, Annex III, "Germany Including Berlin", secret.
and Germans, after having raised many objections during the sessions, finally decided to disassociate themselves from the paper. Secretary Herter took the matter up with the Western Ambassadors on December 8, telling them that the drawing up of the list of questions was in no way an attempt to prejudge the issue but rather to elicit answers to these questions—even if negative—from the Western Heads of Government to provide guidance in the preparation of an East-West summit meeting. Alphand stated that these questions unjustifiably led to the conclusion that a new status for Berlin was possible. Grewe also criticized the paper for indicating that a new solution for Berlin was possible while in reality the Berlin question had been discussed for a long time without any new solutions having been found. Secretary Herter made the point, which was not disputed, that the President had the right to introduce these questions for discussion. Caccia also emphasized that to exclude these questions from consideration would prejudice the results of the deliberations of the Heads of Government. Alphand then said that this was a matter which the Heads of Government would have to decide for themselves. In the end, to avoid the impression of a split between the French and Germans on one hand and the British and Americans on the other, it was decided that the questionnaire and the preceding section would go forward as an American paper and be designated Annex III of the record of the Consultative Group.¹

E. Discussions of Germany and Berlin at the Western Summit and NATO Meetings at Paris, December 1959

The four Western Heads of Government had agreed that they would meet in Paris in December 1959 to discuss a joint Western position at the East-West summit meeting and to provide guidance for the detailed work of preparing for this meeting. But the simultaneous presence of the NATO Foreign Ministers gathered at the Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Council made it certain that problems relating to the East-West summit meeting would also be taken up in that forum. The discussions and decisions at the Western summit conference, i.e., the meetings of the four Western

¹Memorandum by McSweeney (EUR) of conversation among Herter, Caccia, Alphand, and Grewe, Dec. 8, 1959, secret; memorandum by Kohler (EUR) to the Secretary, transmitting memorandum for the President, Dec. 15, 1959, secret.
Heads of State and Government and their Foreign Ministers, and at the meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council determined the next phase of the Western preparations for a summit meeting with respect to procedure as well as substantive issues.

1. The NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 15-17

The general problem of an East-West summit meeting and the specific question as to how it ought to deal with the issues of Germany and Berlin were discussed by the NATO Ministerial Council on December 15 and 17.

Secretary Hertel stated with regard to the problem of an East-West summit meeting as such that there were sufficient indications of some shift in the Soviet Union's approach to warrant further exploration. He said that the West would seek to make progress regarding the "continued division of Germany and related problem of Berlin" and emphasized that as the result of NATO's firmness in the face of the Soviet threat the Soviet Union had somewhat qualified the ultimate aspect of its position. He also stressed that, while West Berlin had remained prosperous and the division in the alliance for which Moscow had hoped had not occurred, the Soviet purpose, namely, to end the responsibilities of the occupying powers in Berlin, remained the same. Hertel indicated that in the coming months the Western Powers would continue to advance the cause of German reunification in freedom as well as a peaceful solution of the Berlin problem. The two problems were intrinsically tied to each other, he stated, and the Soviet Union's negotiating position with respect to them would be the "acid test" of its serious interest in relaxing tensions.

Belgian Foreign Minister Wigny warned that the agenda of the summit meeting must not be strictly limited to the problem of Germany as the West would run the risk of being exposed to a kind of blackmail in view of popular expectations of positive results emerging from the summit sessions. Wigny asserted that this situation even raised the question whether it would be wise to make the Geneva Conference proposals the point of departure in the negotiations or whether the West should rather start all over again and then go as far at the summit meeting as it did at Geneva. The Belgian Foreign Minister further emphasized that the Western Foreign Ministers ought to be in accord also on what they were determined to refuse and on the consequences of such a refusal.
West German Foreign Minister Brentano declared that the fact that the Soviet Union had not changed its expansionist goals did not prevent the West from making new attempts to mitigate international tensions. Brentano reaffirmed the position of the Federal Government that the principal objective in East-West negotiations should be to initiate measures in the field of controlled disarmament and that this would permit the creation of the necessary conditions for serious discussion "of a second point on the agenda, i.e., the German problem." Asserting that the division of Germany was a result of world tensions, Brentano asked for the support of the NATO allies in reaffirming that the German problem could be solved only if the German people were given the right of self-determination. As for the problem of Berlin, Brentano said, it would not be solved in isolation but only within the framework of the problem of Germany. Brentano warned that the status of Berlin was nothing but the guarantee of its freedom which must not be compromised or menaced, and he asked the NATO Governments to affirm once more unequivocally their adherence to the principles of the NATO declaration of December 1958.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd's principal point with regard to Berlin and Germany was that the West should not assume that Khrushchev would never take any further action regarding Berlin because he was afraid of the consequences. Lloyd felt that the Soviet Premier's prestige was too much involved in this question to permit him to leave Berlin alone indefinitely. Lloyd then suggested that in any discussions with Khrushchev the Berlin problem should be treated the way it was at Geneva. In this connection Lloyd also stated emphatically that the British never believed in the concept of disengagement and that he doubted "whether we ever will."

Dutch Foreign Minister van Houten echoed the warnings previously uttered by Wigny and declared that the West had to guard against concessions going beyond the proposals contained in the Western Peace Plan. He said that the desire to achieve a satisfactory Berlin settlement should not tempt the West to water down the essentials of the Western position on this issue. Van Houten declared that there was no objection to an agreement "on the way in which the Western rights are exercised", but that the status of Berlin "on which the Western rights in that city are based should remain intact." The Dutch Foreign Minister emphasized that with regard to the Berlin question the Western Powers were hardly in a position to go any further than they had done in the final Western proposal at Geneva.
French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville emphasized two principal concerns of his country: 1) that nothing essential be abandoned in the discussions with the USSR (this applied specifically to the matter of Berlin); 2) that the West not be taken in by appearances. In apparent agreement with Brentano, Couve de Murville then stated that disarmament was the first problem that had to be discussed at the summit meeting. But he also declared that, of all the specific problems, the problem of Germany and Berlin was the most essential one and that the fate of Europe and the free world depended on the manner in which it was settled. Couve de Murville warned that the Soviet Union would make a maximum effort at the summit meeting with respect to the whole issue of Berlin and Germany and would try to make the West accept the Soviet idea of a separate peace with Germany. This would mean, he said, the final division of Germany as well as a Berlin arrangement which would in fact establish a new regime for Berlin, more or less under control of the GDR. Couve de Murville also said that there was much truth in Wigny’s statement that from a tactical point of view it would not be reasonable to start the discussion of Berlin and Germany at the summit meeting from the point where matters stood at the close of the Geneva Conference. He felt that this matter required further consideration.

The representatives of some of the other countries did not say much on the subject of Germany and Berlin. Greece and Turkey urged in particular that the West not weaken its position regarding Berlin in any circumstances and expressed grave doubts as to any change in Soviet attitudes. Most of the small NATO Powers urged that the Powers which would be responsible for preparation and conduct of negotiations with the Soviet Union should consult closely with the NATO Council at all stages of their work.1

On December 17, the NATO Ministerial Council discussed specifically the "Record of the Washington Consultations" in preparation for a Western summit meeting. After expressing their views on the various points relating to procedures and scope of

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an East-West summit meeting, the NATO Powers discussed the section on Germany and Berlin. It was recognized that this section had been left intentionally vague, and the following points were stressed in the discussion:

1) That nothing should be done without full agreement of the German Federal Government.

2) That all NATO members had a direct interest in the Berlin problem.

3) That nothing must be done to endanger the rights and freedoms of the people of Berlin.

4) That a final Berlin solution could be found only within the framework of a German settlement.

5) That the current Western position on German reunification was logical and strong, and should be maintained.¹

2. Meetings of Western Heads of State and Government

Quadripartite Meeting, December 19. In the Western summit meeting, the first and most complete discussion of the problem of Germany, including Berlin, took place on December 19 in the course of a conversation held by the President and the three other Western Heads of Government on the general subject of the forthcoming East-West summit conference. The positions taken by the four Western leaders were as follows:

Chancellor Adenauer, throughout the discussion, was emphatic that there must be neither de jure recognition of East Germany nor any change in the legal status of West Berlin. The Chancellor

¹Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Dec. 17, 1959, morning session, Verbatim Record G-VR (59) 49, Dec. 17, NATO secret; memorandum by Spaak (Secretary General) to Permanent Representatives in the North Atlantic Council, "Points Made During the Council's Discussion Held on 17th of December, 1959 on the Record of Washington Consultations Preparatory to the East-West Summit" (PO/59/1663), Dec. 18, 1959, NATO secret.
made it clear that neither the Federal Republic nor West Berlin would welcome it if the Geneva proposals of July 28 were brought up for discussion again. In any event, these proposals represented the absolute limit of what was tolerable and left no margin for bargaining. The Chancellor stressed the danger of considering any form of an all-German committee, pointing out that on the West German side all parties would be represented, including the Social Democrats, whose plan for German unification would lead to the communization of Germany. The East German representatives on the other hand, would all be Communists so that the danger of a Communist majority on the committee would be very great. Adenauer painted a black picture of the effects of any concessions on Berlin and warned that in the elections of 1961 the balance might swing to the Social Democrats. This, Adenauer said, would mean that the Russians would be up to the Rhine. The Chancellor doubted that Khrushchev would want to start a war over Berlin but declared that the Senate and the people of West Berlin would defend the city come what may. He emphasized time and again that NATO and the Western Powers had pledged to defend Berlin on its existing legal basis and that it would be possible to foresee the consequences for Germany if the West should abandon its position.

President Eisenhower stated that there was no question of making any concessions to the Soviet Union which would involve abandoning principles, and that Berlin was a symbol of Western determination. But the President repeatedly made the point that Berlin was surrounded by Soviet forces and that therefore its normal civilian communications with West Germany could be blockaded. The President emphasized that he was concerned with the practical and technical question as to how West Berlin could be supplied in case of blockade, and he asked what would happen if the population of Berlin were reduced to a diet of 1,000 calories a day. He did not think that the West could go to war over this issue. The President reminded the other Western leaders that Khrushchev's argument was that Berlin was situated in hostile territory and that he had therefore advanced his proposal for a free city with every kind of guarantee but no longer tied to the Western occupying powers and without Western garrisons. The President said that the West had rejected Khrushchev's proposal but that he himself, after studying the question, had come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union could do a great deal against Berlin which would not give the West cause to go to war because it would not involve any breaking of treaties by the Soviet Union.
General de Gaulle agreed with the President that the position of Berlin was difficult but also stressed that the Communists must not be allowed to improve their position with respect to Berlin. Even a small Western retreat, he said, would have serious effects not only on Germany but also on France. De Gaulle’s principal point was that the German question was the real test of Soviet intentions and that Khrushchev would not make trouble if he wanted peace. It was up to Khrushchev, he said, to make proposals on Berlin since he had raised the issue, and the West could then consider these proposals. De Gaulle emphasized that everything depended on what Khrushchev wanted. If he really wanted peace and detente, perhaps Berlin would not be so important after a while.

Prime Minister Macmillan made primarily the point that the Geneva Conference had broken down in its attempts to reach a Berlin settlement over the question of what would happen at the end of the interim period. If the rights of both sides were to be preserved, he said, then everybody’s position at the end of the interim period must be the same as before, and it would perhaps be possible to find a solution along these lines. Macmillan believed that the Geneva Conference had nearly reached an agreement on Berlin but that the Soviet side in the end had failed to take the final step. The Prime Minister felt that there was an advantage in not pressing issues of principle with respect to this problem and expressed the view that the best hope lay in striving for a provisional agreement which might perhaps last indefinitely.

The results of this discussion among the four Heads of Government were summed up by General de Gaulle at a plenary session of the Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers which was held later that day. De Gaulle declared that the talks relating to Germany had centered on Berlin and that there had been agreement that the juridical status of Berlin and the rights of the Western powers in that city should not be called into question. It had also been considered and agreed, according to de Gaulle’s summary, that the Governments should plan measures to be taken in the event of interference with Western access to Berlin. Finally, de Gaulle said, the Heads of Government were agreed that developments with respect to Germany depended on Khrushchev’s intentions. If he should indicate that he intended to make difficulties, it would mean that he did not want a detente.
The Heads of Government had agreed to tell Khrushchev that he had raised the question of Berlin and that it would be up to him to put forward proposals.¹

**Tripartite Meeting, December 20.** The three Western Heads of Government who would eventually face Khrushchev at the summit conference met on December 20, without the Germans but with French Premier Michel Debré present, to discuss the position which they should adopt at that meeting.

General de Gaulle first expressed the view that the West should not let the Soviet side use the argument of the abnormality of the situation in Berlin. If that side should raise the matter, the Western Powers should point out that the real abnormality was the creation of an artificial state by the Soviet Union, namely, the GDR. De Gaulle urged that the West not allow the Soviet Union to adopt a "holier than thou" attitude, and he emphasized that the West should not raise the issue of Berlin and Germany unless the Soviet Union did so first. The French President suggested again that the Western Powers should indicate to the Soviet Union that its attitude regarding Berlin would be the test of its real desire for the relaxation of tensions. President Eisenhower remarked in this connection that the West should be careful not to make this appear to be an ultimatum.

Prime Minister Macmillan expressed the view that the Western Powers should not go back on their offer of July 28 made at Geneva. He stated that it was his feeling that the Soviet Union had come close to accepting the offer at Geneva. The Prime Minister suggested that perhaps Khrushchev wanted to reserve the acceptance of that offer to himself. In the end, the three Western Heads of Government agreed that they should hold to the offer of July 28.

In connection with a discussion of the problem of German reunification in this tripartite meeting, de Gaulle also raised the subject of the Oder-Neisse line, asking the President and Macmillan for their views regarding the borders of Germany. Macmillan refused to be drawn into a discussion of this matter and declared that it would become a problem only after Germany had been reunified. De Gaulle remarked that the French were in no great hurry for German reunification, emphasizing, however, that the Western Powers must never give the appearance of abandoning Berlin or Germany. He reminded the others that prosperity as well as political stability in Germany were very fragile. President Eisenhower remarked in this context that a permanently divided Germany was a source of difficulties for Europe. Returning again to the subject of the Oder-Neisse line, de Gaulle said that the French and British seemed to feel that at this time the status quo was the best solution with respect to Germany's frontiers. As for the future, the French President mentioned that Chancellor Adenauer had once hinted to him that he might accept the Oder-Neisse border but not before the 1961 Federal elections, in view of the many refugees from the lost territories currently living in the Federal Republic. This acceptance was a bargaining card which the Chancellor did not want to play, de Gaulle said, until the time of a final settlement. 1

3. Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, December 20

The four Western Foreign Ministers met on December 20, to discuss various documents which were to emerge from the meetings of the Western Heads of State and Government. Among them was the four-power communiqué to be issued at the termination of the Western summit meeting. Brentano criticized a draft prepared by a working group because it did not include a substantive paragraph on Berlin and Germany and declared that he was greatly concerned about the lack of any reference to these two matters. If Berlin was not mentioned in the communiqué, Brentano said, the press would assert that there was no longer any agreement among the four powers as there had been a year ago. Secretary Herter declared that he sympathized with Brentano's objective but made the point that the Western Powers had to be careful not to single out Germany and Berlin. Brentano declared that he understood this point but that the Germans were highly sensitive

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and would note any silence on the subject of Germany and Berlin. They would attribute significance to it and interpret it as abandonment of the Western position. Brentano stressed that the Chancellor was in agreement with this viewpoint.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd said that it had been his impression that the Government of the Federal Republic did not want the topic of Berlin to play a prominent part at the summit meeting. If the Western Powers were now to issue a special declaration on this subject it would be in contradiction with that position. Couve de Murville admitted that this was a difficult problem and suggested the possibility of saying something about the matter in the report to be made to NATO. It could be assured, he said, that this would automatically leak. After some discussion, it was finally agreed that a sentence would be added to the communique reaffirming the Western declaration on Berlin of the previous year.¹

4. **Quadrupartite Meeting of Western Heads of State and Government, and of Western Foreign Ministers, December 21**

At a meeting of the four Heads of Government with their Foreign Ministers and senior aides on December 21, General de Gaulle declared that the talks had gone very expeditiously and that there was little left to be discussed. Summarizing the results of the conversations to date, de Gaulle said that the four Heads of State and Government were agreed that the Communist danger was as great as ever but that, nevertheless, note should be taken of Khrushchev's pronouncements regarding a relaxation of tension and peaceful coexistence. For this reason they had agreed to meet with the Soviet Premier. With regard to the substance of the talks, the four Western leaders had discussed the German question and had decided that their position should be very reserved, especially with regard to Berlin. They were determined that the West must not do anything that would result in Berlin's falling into the hands of the Soviet Union, and they were of the opinion that in this respect the positions taken by the Western Foreign Ministers at Geneva

¹Memorandum by Hillenbrand (US/MC/11) of conversation among Herter, Lloyd, Couve, Brentano, and others, Dec. 20, 1959, secret.
were still valid. All in all, as far as the German problem was concerned, the four Heads of State of Government felt that a new approach to a solution would be possible only after there had been a relaxation of international tensions; in any event, they had no great expectations as to what could be accomplished at the summit conference with regard to the German problem.

De Gaulle's summary, which, of course, included subjects other than Germany and Berlin, was characterized by President Eisenhower as an admirable summation of the discussion.1

F. Results of Western Summit Meeting

1. Letters to Khrushchev and Communiqué Issued by Western Heads of State and Government

The results of the deliberations by the Western Heads of State and Government in the matter of an East-West summit meeting were reflected in the letters which the President, Macmillan, and de Gaulle sent to Khrushchev on December 21, and in the communiqué issued the same day.

President Eisenhower stated in his letter to Khrushchev that he had just met with Prime Minister Macmillan and President de Gaulle and that they had discussed the possibility of meeting with Khrushchev to consider "international questions of mutual concern." The President said that they had agreed that it would be desirable for the four Heads of State and Government "to meet together from time to time in each other's countries to discuss the main problems affecting the attainment of peace and stability in the world." The President expressed his readiness to meet with Khrushchev, de Gaulle, and Macmillan at the "earliest feasible time", and he suggested April 27 as the opening date of the conference and Paris as the place.

The text of this letter was transmitted to the Embassy in Moscow on December 20, to be delivered before noon on December 21. The Embassy was also instructed to concert its actions with the British and French regarding delivery of their substantially

1Memorandum by Kohler (EUR) of conversation among the President, de Gaulle, Macmillan, Adenauer, and others (US/MC/18), Dec. 20, 1950, secret.
identical letters. At the time of delivery the three Ambassadors, in accordance with this instruction, should indicate that among the subjects to be discussed at the summit meeting were "disarmament, Germany, including Berlin, and East-West relations." It should be made clear, however, that this was not an all-inclusive list of topics and that it was the understanding of the Western Governments that each of the participants would be free to raise and discuss any topic he might wish. It was further stated in the instruction that, if Gromyko should raise the question of additional participants in the meeting, the Ambassador should reaffirm the concept set forth in the letter that the meeting should be limited to the four Heads of State and Government as this would facilitate full discussion of subjects of mutual concern. If there should be a suggestion of an observer status for Germans, the Ambassador should make it clear that this would be inappropriate since the discussion would also cover subjects in which not only Germans but others would have an interest.

The Soviet Premier replied to the President's letter on December 25, welcoming on behalf of the Soviet Government the suggestion of a meeting "at the highest level" from time to time and expressing willingness to hold the summit meeting in Paris. Khrushchev pointed out, however, that the proposed date of April 27 was not convenient and suggested alternative dates. The President, after consulting Macmillan and de Gaulle, then proposed May 16 as the opening date of the four-power summit meeting in Paris. This proposal was accepted by Khrushchev on December 30.1

The communiqué by the Western Heads of State and Government, the text of which had been discussed by the Foreign Ministers, was issued at the close of the talks among the President, de Gaulle, Macmillan, and Adenauer on December 21. The communiqué stated that the four Heads of State and Government had discussed various subjects of common interest and that they had also given consideration to the views expressed by the NATO

Council in its meetings from December 15 to December 17. The subjects discussed were East-West relations, disarmament, and "problems relating to Germany including Berlin". On that last point the Heads of State and Government "reaffirmed the principles set forth in the Four Power communique of December 14, 1958, and in the declaration of the North Atlantic Council of December 16, 1958, on Berlin."

The communique further declared that the Heads of State and Government agreed on the desirability of a meeting with the Soviet Premier and that letters proposing such a meeting were being delivered in Moscow that day. It was also stated in the communique that the Heads of State and Government had agreed on the procedures to be followed in preparing for the proposed meeting and had issued the necessary directives to that end. Finally, it was stated that the North Atlantic Council would be informed of the results of the four-power conversations at its meeting of December 22, and would be "regularly consulted during the course of the preparatory work."

2. Decisions on Preparations for an East-West Summit Meeting: NATO's Role

*Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, December 21.* The communique by the Western Heads of State and Government had referred to the procedures to be followed in the preparations for the summit meeting with Khrushchev and also to the consultations with NATO regarding this preparatory work. These questions were taken up by the four Western Foreign Ministers and their advisers in a meeting held on December 21.

The question of consultation with NATO arose first in connection with the discussion of the report on the Western summit meeting which Couve de Muroville was to make to the NATO Ministerial Council on December 22 on behalf of the four Western Powers. In the discussion, Ambassador Warren Randolph Burgess, the United States Permanent Representative on the Council, stated that it was important to give the impression that there would be full consultation. Foreign Secretary Lloyd pointed out that during the next four months the press would try to manufacture

differences between the Western Powers and that NATO should therefore be warned not to expect too much too soon from the powers charged with preparatory work. After some procedures for possible consultation had been suggested in the course of the discussion, Lloyd emphasized again that it was necessary to get away from the idea that, prior to important negotiations with the Soviet Union, the NATO organization could be given the entire Western position. He felt that a formula to the effect that NATO would be kept frequently and regularly informed should suffice.

The four Foreign Ministers also discussed in this meeting procedures for the preparatory work in general. Secretary Herter said that the necessary directives for this purpose referred to in the communique by the Heads of State and Government had actually not been issued. A United States draft directive to cover the next phase of the preparatory work on Germany and Berlin, which had been circulated, was discussed by the Foreign Ministers in this meeting but eventually not issued. Secretary Herter emphasized the difficulties experienced during the preparatory work for the Western summit meeting and referred particularly to the fact that some representatives were prevented from engaging in substantive discussions either by lack of instructions or by specific instructions to that end. Couve de Murville gave assurances that the French representatives would have more latitude to engage in substantive discussions, and Brentano also promised that the German delegation would be better instructed and would be strengthened by the addition of experts. With respect to substantive issues, Lloyd declared that it was not necessary to emphasize that the basic Western position would not be abandoned. He expressed the hope, however, that the Western Peace Plan could be dusted off and looked at to see if any "presentational ornamentation" could be added.¹

NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 22. The Western position, as expressed in the meetings of the Heads of State and Government and of the Foreign Ministers, was reported to the NATO Ministerial Council by French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville on December 22. With regard to Germany and Berlin, Couve de Murville referred to

¹Memorandum by Hillebrand (GER) of conversation among Herter, Macmillan, Couve, von Brentano, and others (US/MC/16), Dec. 21, 1953, secret.
the reaffirmation of the principles set out in the Four Power and NATO Council communiqués of December 1958, and then stated that the basic position regarding these two problems at the Western summit meeting would be as follows: 1) The Western Governments were resolved to continue to seek ways of bringing about the reunification of Germany in freedom. 2) They were resolved to defend the freedom of the population of Berlin and to safeguard the rights of the Allies in Berlin.

With respect to procedures for the preparation of the East-West summit meeting, Couve de Murville explained that a Four Power Steering Committee consisting of a Department of State representative and of the three Ambassadors in Washington would have the general task of coordination and guidance for the preparation of the summit conference. Working groups would be set up to study particular subjects, one of which would deal with the problem of Germany and Berlin. Couve de Murville emphasized that during the period of preparatory work closest and fullest liaison would be maintained with the NATO Council, to whose views full consideration had been paid at the meetings of the four powers. The French Foreign Minister declared that the Powers that would go to the summit meeting were fully conscious of their responsibilities toward the Western community and that the members of the Atlantic Alliance could rest assured that any comments or suggestions put forward by them would be given most serious consideration.

In the discussion at the Council meeting, the members expressed agreement with the substantive position taken by the four powers, especially with regard to Berlin and Germany. Several delegates expressed concern, however, over the acceptance of the principle of a series of summit meetings dealing with a wider range of subjects, which could result in the establishment of a political directorate with the Soviet Union as one of its members. In this connection, demands were expressed for a greater degree of NATO participation in the preparations for the summit conference. As a result, it was decided that all Working Group reports would be submitted to the NATO Council before being formally submitted to the Governments concerned and that a member of the NATO International Staff would be assigned as observer to the working group on East-West relations.

The Communiqué issued by the NATO Council at the close of its session of December 22 stated that the Council recognized that the views expressed by the four Governments and communicated
to the Council "fully reflected those which had been expounded by its members on December 15", and that it fully supported the position adopted by the four Governments. With respect to Berlin, the NATO Council, "while welcoming the new prospects of negotiations and agreements," thought it necessary to reaffirm the principles set forth in its statement on Berlin of December 16, 1958, "and to emphasize once again that the Alliance must remain vigilant and strong."\footnote{Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Dec. 22, 1959, Summary Record C-R (59) 51, Dec. 22, NATO secret; Background of Heads of Government Conference, 1960, pp. 475-476.}
Chapter II
PREPARATIONS FOR AN EAST-WEST SUMMIT MEETING,
JANUARY-MAY 1960

A. Quadi PARTite Discussion of an Agreed Western Position
on Germany and Berlin, January-April

The stage seemed now set for continuing the work of preparing
a Western position on Germany and Berlin on the basis of the
decisions reached by the four Western Heads of Government. The
plan was to have a Working Group report ready for review at the
meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in Washington, April 12-14.
Taking account of the views and directives of the Foreign Ministers,
the Working Group would prepare another report for further review
by the Western Foreign Ministers and NATO Foreign Ministers and
by the Western Heads of Government.¹

1. Intradepartmental Discussions

In a memorandum of the Department's Bureau of European Affairs,
commenting upon the decisions taken at the Western summit meeting,
it was pointed out that any proposals, such as those for a guaranteed
city, which involved a change in the juridical basis for the Allied
presence in Berlin, were ruled out but that various possibilities
for exploring the Western position were still open. Listed in this
connection were such variants of proposals on Berlin as solution C
of the London Working Group report of April 1959 (see Part I, p. 89);
ways of submerging the Berlin issue in the discussion of disarmament;
and "sweetening the Geneva proposals with certain all-German features."
Among the latter were the British proposal given to Merchant by Lord
Hood in October 1959 (see ante, p. 34), which had avoided the issue
of rights and provided for all-German talks under the cover of a
four-power group, as well as a proposal by Ambassador Thompson ex-
tending the time limit in the Western Peace Plan to 7 to 10 years
to prove to the Soviet Union that for an extended period there
would be no showdown resulting from free elections. According

¹Memorandum by Merchant (M) to the Secretary, "Status of Summit
to the memorandum, a completely negative German and French reaction to such proposals had to be expected.\(^1\)

It should be mentioned here that Thompson's recommendations were the result of his somewhat critical and pessimistic appraisal of the effects of the Western summit decisions on Soviet policy. Thompson felt that, if the Western Powers took the position that at most they would renew their Geneva offer or that the Berlin problem could be solved only in connection with reunification, the United States would in fact go back on its Camp David commitment that it would secure the agreement of its allies for a solution of the specific problem of Berlin. On the basis of a recent talk with Khrushchev, Thompson was convinced that in the absence of "new major proposals" by the West the Soviet Premier would carry out his threat to conclude a separate peace with the East Germans which would extinguish Western rights. The Ambassador referred to pressures exerted on Khrushchev by the East Germans and the Chinese which were all related to Khrushchev's leadership within the Soviet bloc. This analysis had prompted Thompson to propose an extension of the time period in the Western Peace Plan to 7-10 years since a fresh approach to the question of Germany which had sufficient attraction for Khrushchev might make him postpone action on Berlin.\(^2\)

2. Contingency Planning and Preparations for the Summit Meeting

The quadripartite Working Group began its discussions on Germany and Berlin on January 25, and by April 9 it had produced a report for review by the Foreign Ministers. No attempt shall be made here to deal at any length with the discussions from which the report emerged. One aspect of these discussions ought to be noted, however, because it resulted in a somewhat closer integration of preparations for the summit meeting and of contingency planning regarding Berlin.

Even prior to the first Working Group meeting, it was clear that the Germans and the French were taking the position that the maintenance of the status quo in Berlin was an essential ingredient of the Western position. In the course of the discussions,

\(^1\) Memorandum by White (EUR) to Merchant (M), Jan. 11, 1960, secret.

\(^2\) From Moscow, tel. 1779, Jan. 2, 1960, secret, eyes only.
both the French and the Germans submitted position papers which were based on absolute maintenance of the status quo in Berlin. This attitude apparently prompted Hillenbrand to suggest, in a memorandum of January 15, that it would be appropriate to re-examine "what in practical terms would be involved in maintenance of the status quo" and to reconsider the merits of "standing pat as a specific course of action."

Hillenbrand pointed to the problem that the Germans had only limited knowledge of contingency planning, namely, through the report given to the North Atlantic Council on April 1, 1959 (see Part II, p. 112) the general information received in SHAPE, and limited consultations with the three Embassies in Bonn. Consequently, as Hillenbrand saw it, the Germans had given their allies good reason to complain about their failure to develop new ideas regarding the problems resulting from the Soviet threat to Berlin and about their "stubbornness" in insisting that "we take a 'firm stand'". But he admitted that the Allies had kept from the Germans "one of the key pieces of the puzzle". Therefore, if the Germans were acquainted with the decisions already taken as well as with the decision which it had not yet been possible to take "for dealing with the situation after negotiation fails," their contribution to the development of negotiating positions by the four powers "would start from a more realistic basis." Hillenbrand then suggested that the tripartite contingency planning paper on Berlin of April 4, 1959, be made available to the Germans in the Working Group together with a hypothetical study prepared in GDR which examined what might be involved if existing Western contingency plans were to be carried out.

Hillenbrand's suggestions were incorporated in a memorandum submitted by Kohler to Merchant on January 19, which stated that the time had come "when there must be a closer correlation between the quadripartite development of a negotiating position on Berlin on the one hand and tripartite contingency planning on the other."

The matter was taken up in meetings of the tripartite group on contingency planning for Berlin on February 4 and March 4. The consensus was that the hypothetical study should be modified.

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1 Memorandum by Hillenbrand (GER) to Kohler (EUR), Jan. 15, 1960, with annex, "A Study of the Possible Consequences of the Western Powers' Failure to Reach Agreement with the Soviet Union on Berlin," both secret; memorandum by Kohler (EUR) to Merchant (M), "Contingency Planning in Light of Negotiations on Berlin", Jan. 19, 1960, secret.
before it was given to the Germans. On March 9, copies of the tripartite contingency planning paper on Berlin of April 4, 1959, and a revised version of the hypothetical study were given to the Germans in the quadripartite Working Group.\footnote{Record of Meeting of US-UK-French Tripartite Planning Group, Berlin Contingency Planning, Feb. 4, 1960 (Bercon R-4, Feb. 18), secret; Berlin Contingency Planning, Meeting of Tripartite Ambassadorial Group, Mar. 4, 1960, secret; Summary Record of Ninth Meeting of Quadripartite Working Group on Germany and Berlin (II WW G/9.9), Mar. 9, 1960, confidential; "Situation which could Arise if Soviets Withdrew from their Functions with Respect to Allied Access to Berlin" (II WW G/5.5), Mar. 9, 1960, secret.}

On April 11, Ambassador Grewe handed to the Department an aide-mémoire which, he said, should dispel any doubt about full German support for contingency planning. In this aide-mémoire, the Government of the Federal Republic expressed its readiness to cooperate in further contingency planning "both theoretical and practical", and it offered the cooperation and assistance of the German civilian and military agencies for any measure "necessary to maintain the operational freedom of the armed forces of the three powers."

The West German aide-mémoire also suggested including the following in the contingency plans: (a) In the case of a unilateral denunciation by the Soviet Union of its obligations, the President of the United States should state publicly or in a private message that the United States was resolved to defend its rights in Berlin and its rights of access "with all the means at its disposal"; (b) it should be considered what measures might be taken in case of a stoppage of civilian communications; (c) any economic measures to be taken in accordance with the tripartite contingency planning paper should be examined in greater detail.\footnote{Memorandum by Kohler (EUR) to the Secretary regarding possible point on contingency planning to be raised by the British in tripartite meeting, undated (presumably of April 12, 1960), secret; aide-mémoire of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Apr. 11, 1960, no classification.}

It is, of course, impossible to state whether and to what extent this act of acquainting the Germans with tripartite contingency plans influenced the German attitude in the preparations for a quadripartite Western position at an East-West summit meeting. In any event, the problem of German participation in contingency planning concerning Berlin raised many other questions which will be taken up in subsequent sections of this study.
3. Working Group Report

The report of the Working Group on Germany including Berlin, which was to be reviewed by the four Western Foreign Ministers, was completed on April 9. It contained an estimate of what would be Soviet intentions regarding Berlin and Germany at the coming East-West summit meeting; a discussion of the question of Germany, with recommendations to the Foreign Ministers; and the Working Group's conclusions regarding the question of Berlin, accompanied by an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of various possible approaches to an agreement on Berlin. The whole paper was preceded by a discussion of tactics to be followed at the summit meeting and represented a synthesis of the views of the Working Group members on this subject. The most important features of the report were the following:

Tactics. In the field of tactics, the report stated that the main goal of the Western Powers at the summit meeting should be to eliminate the Soviet threat to Berlin without sacrificing the basis of their general policy in Germany. To reach this goal, the Western Powers might (a) induce the Soviet Union to lift the threat by means of agreements in other fields; (b) maintain the existing situation by providing for continuing discussions; (c) reach a mutually acceptable arrangement in Berlin without altering the essentials of the situation.

Regarding their tactical approach, the Western Powers might start by re-submitting their Peace Plan of 1959. If the Soviet Union, as was to be expected, rejected the Western Peace Plan, the Western Powers would then advance their proposals for a plebiscite to be held in both parts of Berlin and Germany. The report suggested that, when discussions turned to the subject of Berlin proper, the Soviet Union would again assert the desirability of its "free city" proposal. The West, while insisting on its basic position that a lasting solution regarding Berlin could be found only within the framework of German reunification, might then put forward a proposal for all Berlin. If it seemed that an impasse had been reached and that the Soviet Union might unilaterally divest itself from its responsibilities in the field of access, the West, the report suggested, might consider making a proposal "involving a series of interlocking but unilateral declarations on Berlin access, propaganda, etc." The aim of the proposal would be to freeze existing access procedures "with ultimate Soviet responsibility being maintained although implementation might be by the East German authorities;" along the lines of Solution C in the London Working Group Report of April 1959. Assuming the Foreign Ministers agreed, a proposal along these lines might be further refined by the Working Group.
Question of Germany. With regard to the question of Germany, the report stated that reunification in peace and freedom was the unalterable goal of Western policy and the only basis for a genuine solution of this question, including its Berlin aspect. The report accepted the fact that there was little reason to believe that reunification on the basis of self-determination was then negotiable, but stated that the Western Powers must nevertheless keep this issue alive until genuine negotiation was possible. Therefore, the logical opening position for the Western Powers at the summit meeting would be to present anew the Western Peace Plan submitted in Geneva in 1959. The report stated that the reunification features of the Plan required no amendment but that the security sections might be affected by developments in the field of disarmament. It was therefore suggested that the Western Powers might preface their presentation of the plan with the statement that they were prepared to adjust the security provisions of the Plan to take into account the results of the discussions at the Ten Power Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in February and at the summit meeting itself.

In view of the fact that the Soviet Union could again be expected to propose a peace treaty with a "confederation of the two German states", the report suggested that the Western powers, after pressing for discussion of the Western Peace Plan, should respond by a dramatic emphasis on the principle of self-determination. Specifically, they might counter the Soviet peace treaty proposals by calling for a plebiscite to be conducted in all parts of Germany under conditions which assured freedom of expression. In such a plebiscite the German people would choose between (1) having a peace treaty concluded by the World War II Allies with a freely elected government of a reunited Germany, as proposed by the three Western Powers and the Federal Republic, and (2) having separate peace treaties concluded with the Federal Republic and the GDR, whereby relations between the Federal Republic and the GDR would be left to be settled between them as suggested by the Soviet Union. In this connection, the Working Group stated that the Western Powers would, of course, reject the Soviet idea of an all-German committee as proposed at Geneva while declaring that they were always ready to discuss the question of Germany in a four-power forum and that they did not exclude consultations with appropriate German experts during such discussions. Finally, the Working Group pointed out that any discussion of the question of Germany could be expected to be reduced quickly to a discussion of the problem of Berlin. But before being drawn into a discussion of that problem and in order
to show it in its proper perspective, the Western powers should emphasize the issues which concerned them, i.e., not only the division of Germany but also the unrepresentative and oppressive nature of the regime in the Soviet-occupied area.

Berlin. The Working Group report visualized a solution of the problem of Berlin only in the context of German reunification. The Working Group assumed, however, that at some point in the summit meeting it would be necessary to discuss certain aspects of the question of Berlin outside the context of German reunification.

The Working Group examined various proposals that might provide a basis for an arrangement with the Soviet Union on Berlin and in this connection established the following list of essential conditions for such an arrangement:

(a) Recognition, at least by implication, of the continuing validity of basic Allied occupation rights until changed or terminated with the consent of the occupying powers.

(b) Continuation of existing Western Allied and NATO guarantees for West Berlin’s security. Maintenance of Allied forces at appropriate strength to carry out their mission.

(c) Avoidance of anything that would create new obstacles to reunification and prejudice Berlin’s role as a future all-German capital. No recognition of the GDR as a de facto regime.

(d) No severance of ties between Berlin and the Federal Republic.

(e) No further erosion of the principle of the unity of Berlin. Changes in the Western sectors to meet Soviet demands must be compensated by appropriate Soviet concessions.

(f) Maintenance of the freedom of access, at least at the existing level, and aiming for an improvement in the situation, for example through express confirmation of Four Power responsibility for maintaining freedom of access.

(g) Continuance of constitutional government in West Berlin based on free elections and guaranteeing democratic process and civil rights.

(h) The arrangement must be acceptable to the people of West Berlin.
The Working Group report indicated that the Working Group had discussed certain possible proposals involving a change in the status of West Berlin such as incorporation of Berlin as an eleventh Land into the Federal Republic, placing Berlin under the protection and guarantee of the United Nations, and making West Berlin a free city with Allied troops remaining as security forces. The Soviet proposal for a demilitarized free city was not considered for discussion. The Working Group came to the conclusion that in the existing circumstances "the serious disadvantages of any of these arrangements would greatly outweigh any possible advantages." While these proposals, the Working Group stated, might improve the modalities of access for a while, they would abolish the last vestiges of four-power responsibility, render definitive the division of Berlin, make it more difficult to avoid dealing with the GDR, and, finally, gravely affect the NATO guarantee for Berlin.

The Working Group report further stated that in the course of the summit meeting it might be desirable to propose an all-Berlin solution. The Working Group was elaborating such a proposal based on the Western proposals put forward by Secretary Herter at Geneva on May 26, 1959 (see Part II, p. 10), but it was also taking account of the fact that the new proposal would be made outside the context of the Western Peace Plan. A detailed proposal along these lines was attached to the report.

The Working Group report also referred to certain possible arrangements which, if accepted by the Soviet Union, might usher in a period of "relative quiescence on the Berlin question." One specific proposal in this category was the one made by the Western Powers at Geneva on July 28, 1959. Its access provisions, while "imperfect", would have brought "a certain clarity and improvement" to the existing access situation. The report pointed, however, to the disadvantages of any new arrangement with a time clause. It would be regarded only as a period of grace by the Berlin population and as a first step toward the reduction and possible withdrawal of Allied forces from Berlin. The renunciation of nuclear weapons for Allied forces in Berlin might provide the Soviet Union with a pretext for claiming the right to inspect Allied traffic to the city. Similarly, the commitment to restrict certain activities might provide a pretext for Soviet and East German interference in West Berlin and thus sap the spirit of resistance among Berliners and East Germans.
The Working Group accordingly reached the following conclusions regarding Berlin:

(a) There was little likelihood that the Western Powers might be able to improve their negotiating position significantly as long as the question of Berlin was dealt with in isolation.

(b) Since the objective of Soviet pressure on Berlin was less the local situation than the general policy of the Western Powers in Germany, any eventual agreement would have to be considered in the general context as well as in terms of advantages and disadvantages affecting Berlin directly.

(c) In the prevailing circumstances the disadvantages of a change of status in Berlin "considerably outweigh the advantages."

(d) The only type of new arrangement that might be acceptable would be one which would make only minor or procedural changes while maintaining the essential features of the existing regime.

(e) If the Soviet Union should advance any new proposals on Berlin, these proposals should be evaluated in the light of the foregoing considerations and in terms of the essential conditions for a settlement regarding Berlin set forth earlier.1

4. Review of Working Group Report by the Western Foreign Ministers, Washington, April 13

The Western Foreign Ministers met in Washington April 12-14, in order to review the preparatory work for a summit meeting. The Western position on Berlin and Germany was taken up in the meeting of April 13. The basis of the discussion was, of course, the Working Group report.

The Foreign Ministers approved the basic approach of the Working Group report on tactics relating to Germany and Berlin. They agreed that the Western Powers should be prepared at the summit meeting to advance a proposal for a plebiscite in all of Germany concerning the Western and Soviet concepts of a German

peace treaty. Brentano was particularly pleased with the proposal and believed that it emphasized the principle of self-determination. Brentano also declared that the Federal Government and the Berlin Senate in principle welcomed the idea of a proposal for the reunification of Berlin, but he suggested a number of changes in the Working Group draft. The most important of these suggestions was that the proposal should be accompanied by a four-power commitment to resume negotiations on Germany on the basis of the Western Peace Plan. Brentano also felt that the proposal as phrased could be constructed to mean that the NATO guarantee for Berlin was no longer in effect, and he therefore wanted to see it redrafted. Also, he believed that there should be a provision that all decisions to be taken by the four powers under this proposal should be made by majority vote, i.e., that the Soviet Union should not have a veto power.

French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville was cool to the idea of a proposal for all Berlin. It seemed to suggest to him the creation of a "third German state", which, to be sure, would be a link between the other parts of Germany but would have nothing to do with German reunification.

Secretary Herter declared that the "all-Berlin proposal" was of a purely tactical nature and was aimed at pointing up the division of the city. It should be put forward only after the issue of German reunification had been discussed at the summit meeting. Herter, however, as well as Foreign Secretary Lloyd, expressed agreement with some of Brentano's suggestions for changes in the draft proposal. In the end, the Foreign Ministers agreed that the Working Group should revise its draft in the light of their comments and criticism.

The French and Germans also opposed the Working Group proposal that the principles of a peace treaty be included among the possible subjects for four-power discussions on Berlin and Germany in another forum following the summit meeting. The Germans declared that they could accept discussing principles of a peace treaty on the basis of the preliminary draft adopted by the Western Foreign Ministers at their last meeting before the opening of the Geneva Conference on April 30, 1959, only on condition that the Soviet Union accepted the first principle, namely, that the peace treaty must be negotiated with an all-German Government. The Germans also opposed any all-German discussions even under four-power sponsorship.
At the conclusion of their meeting on Germany and Berlin, the Western Foreign Ministers issued the following instructions to the Working Group: (1) To draft a directive, for possible use at the summit meeting, to recommit the task of further negotiations to a subordinate body, and also to draft a reciprocal declaration that might accompany such a directive. (2) To draft a version of the Working Group paper on the essential conditions for an agreement on West Berlin which might be presented to the Soviet Union; the Working Group list of essential conditions had been drafted for internal use only. (3) To draft an improved version of the Western proposals presented at Geneva on July 28, 1959. These papers would be "stand-by papers" which the Western Powers would not be committed to present in discussions with the Soviet Union.1

Following the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, the original Working Group report was revised slightly and forwarded to the North Atlantic Council but without the section on tactics and the "All-Berlin proposal".2

5. Supplementary Working Group Report

The directives and comments of the Foreign Ministers were taken up in further meetings of the Working Group on Germany including Berlin held in Washington April 14 and April 19-21, and resulted in a supplementary and revised report. In addition to preparing the papers explicitly requested by the Foreign Ministers, the Working Group took account of other suggestions put forward in the Foreign Ministers meeting. Accordingly, the Working Group also submitted a revised draft proposal for an "All-Berlin agreement" and a simplified version of Solution C of the London Working Group Report of April 1959.

1 Memorandum by McKiernan (EUR) of conversation among Herter, Lloyd, Couve de Murville, Brentano, and others (US/NC/8), Apr. 13, 1960, secret; to Bonn, tel. 2214, Apr. 13, secret.

2 To Paris, tel. TOPOL 2091, Apr. 15, 1960; tel. TOPOL 2110, Apr. 19; both secret.
The following revisions of and additions to the original Working Group report resulting from the discussions of the Foreign Ministers seem worth noting:

The paper on "Possible Improvements in the Western Proposals of July 28, 1959" now contained the following sentence regarding the activities which were to be restricted: "Measures will be taken, consistent with fundamental rights and liberties, to avoid activities in or with respect to Berlin which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests of others or affect the preservation of peace." The original proposal of July 28, 1959, had mentioned in this context also activities "which would amount to interference in the internal affairs of others". On the other hand, it had contained no reference to activities which might "affect the preservation of peace." Furthermore, the proposal, as revised, provided for an addition to the last paragraph of the original proposal stating that "the rights of the Four Powers shall in no way be affected by the conclusion or eventual modification or termination of this agreement." Finally, a new paragraph was added stipulating that the parties to the agreement "shall refrain from any act inconsistent with the terms of the agreement."

The changes in the paper on "Essential Conditions for an Arrangement for West Berlin" were mostly those required by the transformation of this document from an internal paper into one which might be presented to the Soviet Union. The one substantive innovation was that any agreement embodying a new arrangement on West Berlin "must be concluded only among the Four Powers."

In the "Proposal for Reunification of Berlin", changes suggested by Brentano and concurred in by the other Foreign Ministers were carried out. Added was the provision that actions of the Government of Berlin could be "cancelled and suspended only by unanimous decision of the Four Powers." It was also spelled out clearly that the freedom of Berlin and access to the city would be guaranteed by the four powers "who would continue to be entitled, as at present, to station troops in Berlin". The wording replaced the formulation in the original Working Group report that the security of Berlin would be maintained by the forces of the four powers "on the basis of arrangements to be worked out" and that Berlin "shall not participate in any of the military arrangements of other parts of Germany nor shall any other military forces be brought into Berlin." That change was calculated to calm the misgivings of the Foreign Ministers of West Germany and France regarding a possible impairment of the NATO guarantee for Berlin.
Difficulties developed, however, over German insistence that the wording of the "all-Berlin proposal" should indicate that its acceptance must be accompanied by the resumption of four-power negotiations on the reunification of Germany. In a memorandum submitted to Under Secretary for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant on April 25, Kohler commented that this was another instance proving that "nothing frightens them [the Germans] as much as their own shadow." Kohler stated that the proposal for reunification of Berlin, when put forward in the Working Group as a tactical device for possible use at the summit meeting, had at first been greeted by the Germans with "considerable enthusiasm." But now, he said, they were having second thoughts, apparently following consultations with the Berliners. Kohler stated that the German suggestion regarding four-power negotiations on German reunification tended to detract from the public relations value of the proposal for reunification of Berlin, which was its main function. The tactical developments at the summit conference, Kohler said, would probably make it inexpedient to put forward such an "all-Berlin" proposal, but the Western Powers, nevertheless, should not exclude making use of it if this was advantageous.1

The next step with respect to the Supplementary Working Group report was a review by the Foreign Ministers, who were scheduled to meet on May 1 in Istanbul on the eve of the NATO Ministerial meeting to take place May 2-4. Before dealing with these discussions of Berlin and Germany at the Istanbul meeting, it will be necessary, however, to take up certain other high-level conversations and exchanges prior to these meetings which influenced the positions adopted by the Western Powers on the eve of the East-West summit meeting.

B. Other High-Level Discussions Involving Germany and Berlin, March-April 1960

1. Chancellor Adenauer's Visit to Washington, March 14-17, and the Plebiscite Proposal

Visiting Washington March 14-17, Chancellor Adenauer talked with President Eisenhower, Secretary Hertel, and others about a wide range of subjects, including, of course, the problem of

1 Supplementary Working Group Report, Apr. 21, 1960, secret; memorandum by Kohler (EUR) to Merchant (M), Apr. 25, secret.
Berlin and the preparation of a common Western position at the forthcoming East-West summit meeting. Yet the most surprising development in the Chancellor's visit did not result from these top-level conversations but from a public address delivered by him at the National Press Club in Washington.

President Eisenhower, in conversations with the Chancellor on March 15, stated that the United States would not even discuss the possibility of the withdrawal of American troops from Europe until more substantial progress in the field of disarmament had been made. The President also assured the Chancellor that the American flag would continue to fly over Berlin as long as the existing conditions prevailed and as long as no agreement acceptable to the people of West Berlin and West Germany had been concluded.

At a meeting with the Chancellor held the same day, Secretary Hertler discussed the question of access to Berlin. He expressed concern that the Soviet Union might tolerate Allied access to the city but seek gradually to restrict civilian access. The Germans stated their view that the New York and Paris agreements of 1949 confirmed the right of civilian access. Accordingly, it was agreed that the right of civilian access as well as Allied rights of access were to be regarded as non-negotiable.

The one unexpected development during the Chancellor's visit resulted from his statement made in an address to the National Press Club in Washington on March 16, that he was recommending to the Western Powers "that a plebiscite be held in Berlin even before the Summit Conference" and that the question to be voted on should be whether the Berliners wanted "the present legal status of Berlin to continue until reunification."

Secretary Hertler referred to the Chancellor's proposal in the course of an after-dinner meeting later that day in the presence of top-level advisers on both sides. Hertler expressed the view that the matter should be considered in the context of a wider application of the principle of self-determination. Hertler stated that the vote in West Berlin would undoubtedly be a free vote and overwhelming in favor of maintaining existing arrangements but that an unsupervised vote in Communist territory would produce an impressive vote quite contrary to the true wishes of the inhabitants. Therefore, the Secretary said, there was an argument in favor of inviting supervision, for example, by the United Nations over any...
expression of the popular will in Western territories so that the principle of impartial supervision would also apply to any plebiscite in East Germany and East Berlin.

Chancellor Adenauer reacted violently against these suggestions, stating that an election in West Berlin would be fair and free and that it would therefore be derogatory of democracy if outside neutral supervision were requested. Moreover, he said, there would be no time for making the necessary arrangements before the summit meeting. Yet this proposal for a plebiscite, the Chancellor felt, had to be made in advance of the summit conference in order to show Khrushchev how the Berliners felt. According to the record of this meeting, the argument continued "but the Chancellor remained adamant in his point of view." It was also apparent that Brentano tried to argue with the Chancellor but "with no apparent success."

A frank exposition of American misgivings about the Chancellor's plebiscite proposal was put forward in a letter of March 19, in which Herter informed Foreign Secretary Lloyd about the talks held with Adenauer. Herter declared that the plebiscite proposal "not only caught us by surprise" but was also a new idea to the Chancellor's entourage and to the German Embassy. The Secretary emphasized that the idea of a plebiscite, even if modified, had certain disadvantages. The question to be voted on would have to be formulated very carefully, and there was also the possibility that the result of the plebiscite "might be less than overwhelming on our side." But Herter felt that the most dangerous aspect of the proposal was the implication "that the results of the plebiscite are designed as a form of pressure on us, rather than the Soviets, that it somehow gives us less freedom of action than we might otherwise have." Herter expected the Germans to introduce the proposal in the Working Group on Germany including Berlin. Actually, as shown earlier in this study, the proposal of a Berlin plebiscite along the lines of Adenauer's ideas ultimately played no part in the discussions or recommendations of the Working Group.

According to Merchant's memorandum of the Chancellor's discussion of the plebiscite proposal with the Secretary, Adenauer was extremely disturbed by the suggestion of any modification of his proposal for a plebiscite which was to be confined to West Berlin and conducted before the summit meeting. This memorandum also noted the Chancellor's concentration "on maintaining the status quo in West Berlin" and his relative lack of interest in
and concern for measures "designed to keep the emphasis on the reunification of Germany in the forthcoming negotiations."  

2. Discussion of a European Inspection Zone (Norstad Plan)

Features of the Plan. A specific plan for a European inspection zone, generally referred to as the Norstad Plan, also played a certain part in Chancellor Adenauer's Washington conversations. This matter, however, which originally developed from discussions of disarmament proposals and which had certain implications for Allied policy on Germany and for West German-American relations, requires a separate treatment at some length. Moreover, misunderstandings resulting from the Chancellor's Washington conversations aggravated already existing sensitivities, particularly on Adenauer's and Brentano's part, about the policy to be followed by the Western Powers at the East-West summit meeting.

Early in 1960, General Norstad put forward certain ideas regarding a possible proposal for a European inspection zone to be made at the summit conference. Norstad had actually been identified with such ideas for several years prior to 1960, but they had mainly been expressed within American and British circles and had not been communicated to the Germans. General Norstad's suggestions were related to discussions at the 1957 Disarmament Conference concerning the establishment of an inspection and control system in various areas involving Europe, the Soviet Union, North America, and the Arctic. The main features of Norstad's plan for an inspection and control system, as eventually developed, were as follows: (1) Mobile ground inspection in as large an area as possible between the Atlantic and the Urals but to include as an irreducible minimum the two Germanies, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Benelux, and at least part of Denmark or the

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2 See Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959 (Department of State publication 70008), II, 837-839.
equivalent. (2) Aerial inspection over an area not less than that covered by ground inspection. (3) Overlapping radar stations to be maintained by West and East on the Western and Eastern perimeters of inspection.

General Norstad believed that his proposals would greatly reduce the dangers of surprise surface attack and provide increased security against surprise air attacks without any impairment of NATO's protection of Western Europe. Moreover, the inclusion of countries other than West Germany and the establishment of mixed teams operating throughout the entire inspection area regardless of the division of Germany would clearly indicate that the plan involved no abandonment of the goal of German unity.

General Norstad discussed his ideas with Secretary Herter on March 8, 1960, and they agreed that Norstad would submit a report on his ideas to the North Atlantic Council and would propose to the President that the latter take up the matter with Adenauer during the Chancellor's visit to Washington.¹

Adenauer's Reaction. President Eisenhower raised the matter with Chancellor Adenauer during a luncheon on March 15. The two accounts of the conversation, one by the interpreter, and the other by President Eisenhower himself as given to Merchant, do not agree entirely. According to the President's account of the conversation, which was more specific, the President had spoken of a scheme for testing inspection techniques and Soviet good faith without identifying it as the Norstad Plan. He had told Adenauer that Germany would be part of the limited area covered in Europe but had linked this with the possibility of concurrently securing Soviet agreement to an inspection zone for Alaska and part of Siberia. Adenauer had reacted favorably, saying that it was an excellent idea and that it would be a useful test of Soviet good faith. The Chancellor had suggested that, after the Western Allies had worked out the details, the plan would be put before the Soviet Union, and even if the latter turned it down "capital could be made of this fact." The interpreter's account quoted the President as speaking of a plan for "continuous aerial inspection, divorced from any disarmament aspects, and operating in selected regions." It also quoted the President as saying with respect to the inspection, "if we had one or two or three of such

areas, say, Siberia, Alaska or Central Europe, aerial inspection could be tried out apart from any disarmament." On other essential points, however, the two accounts agree.  

Yet in a discussion of the following day (March 16) with the Secretary, Adenauer vigorously denied that there had been any mention of an inspection zone in Europe, declared that the only talk had been of a zone in Siberia and Alaska, and expressed strong objections to any inspection zone in Europe which would include Germany. On March 17, the subject was again raised with the Secretary, this time by Brentano, who said that he had discussed the matter with the Chancellor. Brentano declared that his Government, for political reasons, found such proposals highly objectionable as they would set in motion a chain of causation leading to the neutralization of Germany. Herter declared that there was no intention to advance this proposal for an inspection zone in the disarmament negotiations but that he thought that if the proposal were made at the summit meeting it might possibly test the Soviet Union's good faith as to whether it might accept inspection. Herter then suggested that the subject should be raised in the Four Power Group on Germany. Brentano did not object to a discussion of the pros and cons of the Norstad plan in the Working Group, but he emphasized to the Secretary that the Federal Republic would not accept such a proposal and would insist upon extending the area involved. In this connection, Brentano also referred to thoughts of this kind entertained in "certain British circles" which would find further nourishment in this proposal. It was finally agreed that, prior to a discussion in the Working Group, Norstad should be asked for a statement of his views. This would also provide West German military authorities with a basis for their comments.  

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1 Memorandum by Charlick (LS) of conversation between the President and Chancellor Adenauer, Mar. 15, 1960, secret; memorandum by Merchant (M) to the Secretary, Mar. 15, secret.

2 Memorandum by Merchant (M) of conversation among Herter, Adenauer, Brentano, and others, Mar. 16, 1960, secret; memorandum by Hillenbrand (GER) of conversation among Herter, Brentano, and others, Mar. 17, secret; to Paris, tel. 3941, Mar. 20, secret.
A visit by West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss at General Norstad's headquarters revealed that the rejection of the Norstad plan by the Federal Republic was by no means unanimous. Strauss told Norstad that he and his military advisers had spoken in favor of the plan while Brentano and his people had opposed it. As a result of these discussions within the West German Government, Strauss said, the Chancellor was now worried, could not recall that the President had spoken to him about the inspection plan during the Washington visit, and wanted to talk matters over with Norstad personally. The latter indicated his willingness to go to Bonn for this purpose, and arrangements for such a meeting were subsequently made.\footnote{From Paris, tel. 5026, Apr. 28, 1960, secret.}

\textbf{British and French Reactions.} The British were in favor of considering a European inspection zone in the Four Power Working Group and of asking Norstad for a statement of his views. The French were opposed to both suggestions but admitted that they could not object if the United States asked Norstad to put forward his views and then made them available to the Working Group. Accordingly, Norstad elaborated his views regarding a European inspection zone in a statement transmitted to Washington on April 15, and a paper concerning that matter was circulated in the Working Group by the United States on April 22. The United States stated on this occasion that it had not yet taken a firm position on these proposals and that the subject might be discussed further at Istanbul either by the Western Foreign Ministers or by the Working Group.\footnote{To Paris, tel. TOPOL 2034, Apr. 8, 1960; tel. 4286, Apr. 12; from Paris, tel. 4800, Apr. 13; to Paris, tel TOPOL 2141, Apr. 22; all secret.}

Support for the Norstad plan by German military circles did not change the basically negative attitude of the French toward the plan. When Under Secretary of State Dillon took the matter up with Foreign Minister Gouè de Murville during General de Gaulle's visit to the United States (see \textit{post}, p. 79), with special reference to Norstad's forthcoming visit to Adenauer, the Foreign Minister stated that the French felt that the political disadvantages would
far outweigh any possible military advantages of the proposed
inspection zone. Couve de Murville indicated that the French
attitude might be more favorable if the inspection zone were
large enough to encompass the area "Atlantic to Urals" but that
a special zone as suggested in the Norstad scheme was the first
step toward the neutralization of Germany. He and Dillon agreed
that Norstad's visit to Adenauer should not take place until
the four Western Foreign Ministers had discussed the matter at
Istanbul. Dillon later informed the Secretary that de Gaulle
himself had indicated his reluctance to accept an area of limited
inspection, with arguments similar to those used by his Foreign
Minister. ¹

Continued German Hostility: Abandonment of the Plan. Contrary
to original intentions, the Norstad plan was never taken up on
a quadripartite basis by the Western Foreign Ministers. In
accordance with a German request, the matter was dealt with bi-
laterally by Herter and Brentano at Istanbul on May 7. In fact,
this occasion was the de facto burial of General Norstad's scheme.

In this conversation Brentano expressed strong objections to
the paper on the Norstad plan which had been circulated in the
Four Power Working Group and emphasized that this kind of a
military plan had important political aspects regardless of any
legitimate concern over surprise attack. Brentano used the well-
known argument that discrimination against Germany as the principal
country affected by the scheme would encourage neutralism and a
tendency toward an accommodation with the Soviet Union among the
German people. He even asserted that, if the Norstad proposal
should fall into the hands of the political opposition in the
Federal Republic, it would cause an extremely difficult situation
for the Government. In the propaganda of the opposition, he said,
inspection would be transformed into simple emphasis on troop
withdrawal. Brentano therefore expressed the hope that the plan
could be shelved. He declared that the Norstad plan would not
be so dangerous politically if it did not attempt to define so
specifically the area involved. If, he said, the area had merely
been defined as extending from the Atlantic to the Urals, it might
have been considered by the Five Powers Disarmament Group.

¹Memorandum by McBride (EUR) of conversation between Dillon
and Couve de Murville at New Orleans, Apr. 29, 1960, secret; to
Tehran, tel. TOSEC 42, Apr. 29, and teIs. TOSEC 53 and TOSEC 54,
Apr. 30, all secret.
The Secretary told Brentano that he had avoided the whole subject on the first day of meetings of the Foreign Ministers and that the United States was not planning to raise this question. He pointed out, however, that General Norstad had not taken an initiative but had put forward, upon request, his military views and thus had stayed within legitimate military limits.¹

As a result of this conversation with Brentano, Herter informed the Embassy in Paris on May 3 that no further discussions on this subject would be held in Istanbul. The Secretary stressed Brentano's sensitivity, displayed during the conversation, with respect to the mention of "two Germans" in the description of the zone of inspection, which, he felt, would inject a political matter into a military paper. The Secretary also expressed the belief that in these circumstances no useful purpose would be served by General Norstad's visiting Bonn. But the Embassy at Bonn reported that Chancellor Adenauer, though insisting that the Norstad plan had been dropped, was planning to talk to General Norstad on May 5.²

General Norstad aptly characterized his presentation of his plan at the meeting with the Chancellor in Bonn on May 5 as the delivery of "a funeral oration for a funeral that had recently taken place at Istanbul." Emphasizing that President Eisenhower still was interested in the plan and that Secretary Herter still had confidence in it, Norstad presented an outline of his plan that stressed its military advantages in preventing surprise surface attack and also in limiting the chance of surprise air attack. During Norstad's presentation Adenauer frequently questioned and criticized not only the political but also the technical aspects of the proposal. Adenauer stressed in particular the danger of a penetration of the Federal Republic by teams of inspectors from the East; the scheme, he said, was like a "Trojan Horse" and would lead to "agitation and the end of my government." The Chancellor also brushed aside the arguments cited by Defense Minister Strauss regarding the possible benefits of Norstad's plan in the fields of intelligence and propaganda and insisted that the plan would

¹From Istanbul, tel. SECTO 43, May 1, 1960; tel. SECTO 51, May 2; both secret.

²From Istanbul, tel. SECTO 61 (to Paris, tel. 37), May 3, 1960; from Bonn, tel. 2087, May 3; both secret.
enable Russia to gain a firm position in Germany without providing the Federal Republic with protection against attack from outside the area of inspection, especially by intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the end the Chancellor stated flatly that the West would get no benefits from Khrushchev's attendance at the summit meeting or from the President's forthcoming journey to the USSR, and he asked why the West should offer the Soviet Union anything. He also wondered why the summit meeting could not be held a year hence.

Defense Minister Strauss, in an apparent attempt to smooth over matters, said that plans of this kind would always come up and might require further discussion at some time in the future.1

The significance of the Norstad plan lies in the fact that it again demonstrated West Germany's sensitivity with regard to any proposal put forward in East-West negotiations that would impose special security arrangements on the Federal Republic. But the story of the Norstad plan is also significant as another example of the periodic crises of confidence which the Federal Republic experienced with respect to the United States, especially on the eve of important East-West negotiations.

3. Eisenhower-Macmillan Talk, March 28

In the course of Prime Minister Macmillan's visit to Washington, March 26-30, 1960, Western policy regarding Germany and Berlin was discussed by the President and the Prime Minister at Camp David, on March 28.

The President and the Prime Minister first exchanged views on the subject of Germany's frontiers. The President commented on the importance which the Soviet Union attached to the German postwar borders and on its fear of a reunited armed Germany. He believed that the time would come when the Western Powers would have to make a statement regarding the German borders. He realized that the Germans would not like such a statement and that the Allies must be careful not to destroy German morale. But the fact was

1 Memorandum by Thurston (SHAPE) of conversation among Adenauer, Norstad, and others, May 5, 1960, secret; from Paris, tel. 5193, May 6, secret.
that the existing borders could be changed only by war. Macmillan suggested that this subject might be explored in connection with the summit meeting and that it might be worthwhile to issue a statement such as the President had mentioned if something could be obtained in return. The President agreed that the Soviet Union should not be allowed to obtain such a statement cheaply, but he thought that the West should have a statement along these lines in readiness and make use of it at a certain moment in the negotiations. Yet, he said, it might be premature to do this at the summit meeting.

When the discussion turned to the subject of Berlin, the President and Under Secretary Dillon mentioned the possibility of obtaining a reasonable Soviet position on Berlin in return for Western concessions in the field of nuclear agreements. The President specifically mentioned the offer of a moratorium of two years on nuclear testing in exchange for a Soviet offer of a similar moratorium on Berlin.

Macmillan then criticized what he called the adamant German position and recalled the President's effort at the Western summit meeting in Paris to persuade the Germans and French to realize that in the event of an impasse at the summit the Soviet Union would make a separate peace treaty with the East Germans putting them in charge of access to Berlin. Macmillan said that, even though Adenauer had spoken of having armed Allied columns sent through to Berlin, the British did not intend to engage in such a move and believed that the United States felt similarly in the matter. The President replied that, if Khrushchev should bring Allied treaty rights to an end unilaterally, the Allies would have to go through with armed force. But the real weakness of the Berlin position lay in supplying the civilian population, and he recalled his efforts at the Western summit meeting to elicit replies from Adenauer and de Gaulle as to what ought to be done in the event of a Soviet move affecting civilian access to Berlin.

There was a brief but interesting exchange which pointed up certain differences between the two Allied leaders in their appraisal of Germany's role. The President emphasized that the Germans must not be let down as they might shift their political course and even turn neutralist. The President was concerned as to who, in such an event, would hold the central bastion in Europe. The Prime Minister declared that he did not share the President's concern and that he thought the Germans liked their effective military build-up far too
much to give it up. The President said that he was prepared to accept a strong Germany. The West was afraid of a strong Germany when the USSR was weak, he said, but now the central problem was the strength of the Soviet Union.

The discussion reverted once more to the subject of Berlin. Macmillan stated that West Berlin would be better off under a "free city" arrangement on the lines of various plans which the Western Powers had considered. But, as such an arrangement was not obtainable, the only remaining choice was an interim agreement. The President admitted, as he had done on similar occasions in the past, that he was unable to see how West Berlin, surrounded by hostile forces, could survive in the long run. Macmillan agreed and declared that it was important for the Western Powers not to get into a position which they were unable to maintain. Yet, on the other side of the argument, the President stressed the serious blow to Western prestige that would result from any show of Western weakness in Germany.

Toward the end of the conversation the President told Macmillan of Adenauer's rejection of the concept of inspection zones and in this connection stated that some kind of agreement on this subject would represent a very useful product of the forthcoming summit meeting.¹

4. Discussions with General de Gaulle in Washington, April 22-25

In the course of General de Gaulle's visit to the United States in April, the French President held several significant discussions with President Eisenhower and other American officials regarding Berlin and Germany. Several times de Gaulle referred to the conversation he had had with Khrushchev during the Soviet Premier's visit to France at the end of March 1960. According to de Gaulle's account, Khrushchev had told him that Berlin represented a dangerous situation and that there was still fire smouldering in the ashes of World War II which might flare up again unless the situation were settled. Khrushchev had declared that he would not allow East Germany and West Berlin to belong to Adenauer although he would not insist that West Berlin must become a part of East Germany. In reply, the General had stated that, if the Soviet Union insisted on keeping Germany permanently divided and on treating Berlin as something apart from the rest of Germany, it

¹Memorandum by Kohler (EUR) of conversation among the President, Macmillan, and others at Camp David, Mar. 28, 1960, secret.
would re-kindle the fires and provide the Germans with a reason to want war. De Gaulle had asked Khrushchev also why he was raising the question of Berlin, which could only lead to trouble, if he really wanted to reduce tensions. Khrushchev had then made the statement that he might go along with the existing arrangement for two more years but that he would have to sign a peace treaty with the East Germans if no settlement had been reached after this period.

De Gaulle told the President that, if Khrushchev's statement meant that the Western Powers would have to get out of Berlin after such a two-year moratorium, the answer was "no go". In fact, he had not left Khrushchev in any doubt that the Western Powers would not let themselves be pushed out of Berlin. De Gaulle indicated to the President his view that no essential concessions should be made in any negotiation of a temporary agreement on Berlin. He suggested that the Western Powers might reduce their garrisons by one thousand or make some other small gesture. But he insisted that they should reject anything that would alter their legal right to be in Berlin. The President expressed his agreement and the two leaders concurred that the Western Powers ought not to negotiate under any kind of time limit or threat such as a two-year moratorium or a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the GDR.

General de Gaulle obviously believed that there was currently relatively little room for negotiations regarding Berlin and Germany. For this reason, he suggested that these matters might be left aside at the summit meeting. He expressed the view that a settlement of these problems required a more relaxed atmosphere and that East and West should first explore what could be done in other areas.

Secretary Herter expressed concern that, if at the summit meeting agreement were reached on a number of other matters first, the Soviet Union might become very tough on the subject of Berlin toward the end of the conference. De Gaulle thereupon declared that the Western Powers should make it clear to the Soviet Union that all agreements reached at the summit conference were linked together and that, if the conference broke up over the issue of Berlin, anything agreed upon earlier would not hold. The General admitted that such tactics involved a gamble, namely, that Khrushchev wanted to be known as the man who had relaxed world tensions.
General de Gaulle also revealed some of his long-range thinking on German frontiers and German reunification. He expressed the feeling that the Oder-Neisse line might be a permanent one and that the possibility of its being guaranteed by the Western Powers might be a valuable card to be played if tacit West German consent could be obtained. The latter was not likely prior to the West German elections of 1961, but thereafter one ought to hope for some German flexibility. De Gaulle made the point, too, that a Western guarantee of the Oder-Neisse frontier might relieve Polish pressure on Khrushchev, which was strong, for the reason that not only the Communists but all Poles were concerned about this frontier. De Gaulle was likewise frank on the subject of German reunification. He stated that France, while eager for close relations with the Federal Republic, was not keen for German reunification or to see Germany grow larger. And while de Gaulle repeatedly and vigorously asserted that the Western Powers must not allow themselves to be pushed out of Berlin, he cautioned the President that even with respect to the Berlin problem one should not use the word "never, never, never."1

5. Herter-Lloyd Conversation, April 28, 1960

The meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) at Tehran, April 28-30, 1960, provided the last occasion prior to the Foreign Ministers meeting in Istanbul for high-level discussion of what would be the Western position regarding Berlin at the summit meeting.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd, in an exchange of views with Secretary Herter on April 28, expressed the belief that, if an interim agreement on Berlin were not reached at the summit meeting, Khrushchev would renew pressure on West Berlin. Lloyd felt that it would therefore be preferable to seek an interim agreement for three years, or possibly even two years, on the lines of the Western proposal of July 28 made at Geneva. He declared it essential, however, that in any such agreement provision should be made for full maintenance of Western rights at the expiration of the agreement.

The Secretary indicated general agreement with this position and stressed the importance of bridging the period of the West German elections. He also told Lloyd about the agreement reached

1Memoranda by Walters (White House) of conversations between President Eisenhower and General de Gaulle, Apr. 22, 24, and 25, 1960, all top secret.
with General de Gaulle that the summit meeting results must be considered in totality in order to avoid the possibility of Khrushchev's adopting a tough line on Berlin at the end of the conference, assuming that the talks on a detente and disarmament had gone well at an early stage of the summit meeting. Lloyd concurred in this decision; he and Herter accordingly agreed that it would be wise to delay the discussion of the problem of nuclear tests until the last stage of the Paris summit meeting since the Soviet Union appeared to be interested in securing agreements in this field.¹

C. Discussions at Istanbul, May 1–4

The Istanbul meetings of the four Western Foreign Ministers and of the NATO Ministerial Council took place from May 1 to May 4, in an unusual and tense setting. Turkey, the host country, was beset by domestic unrest, climaxing by riots and demonstrations which ultimately led to the downfall of the regime of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. On the eve of the meetings, martial law was proclaimed in Istanbul and Ankara on April 29.²

1. Western Foreign Ministers Meeting, May 1

Discussion of Summit Meeting Purposes. According to the scheduled agenda, the four Foreign Ministers were to take up the Supplementary Working Group Report. At Brentano's request, however, the Foreign Ministers met first in restricted session, each accompanied by one adviser only, to discuss a paper on "Summit Purposes" which Herter had sent to the Western Foreign Ministers on April 22.³

¹From Tehran, tel. SECTO 15, Apr. 28, 1960, confidential.

²From Istanbul, tels. 912 and 913, Apr. 29, 1960, both unclassified.

³It has not been possible to locate this document in the files of the Department of State.
Brentano declared that the paper in question had aroused the Chancellor's concern because it disregarded in two respects the agreed conclusions of the Working Group. The Chancellor, he said, was first concerned over the use in connection with an interim agreement of the phrase, "to preserve the existing situation in Berlin for a period of time," because he felt that any interim agreement was dangerous unless it was stated explicitly that the period would last until the reunification of Germany. Secondly, he was concerned over a statement in the paper that, in order to deter Khrushchev from adopting a hard line on Berlin, the Western Powers would declare their unwillingness to continue disarmament discussions or to consider that an atmosphere of detente was developing. Brentano thought that this was an inadequate deterrent with which to confront Khrushchev if he expressed determination to void Allied rights in Berlin. Brentano also remarked that he had prepared a letter on these two points which he would have delivered to the Secretary later in the day.

Secretary Herter declared that Brentano's first point, the length of the period for a temporary agreement on Berlin, would be discussed at a subsequent meeting of the Foreign Ministers. As for Brentano's second point, Herter declared, it was based on a misunderstanding. The paper, he explained, merely intended to say that, if Khrushchev attempted to declare Western rights invalid, the Western reaction, as a matter of tactics, should be that in these circumstances it would be ridiculous to hold disarmament discussions at the summit. This, Herter emphasized, was different from Western contingency planning, which contemplated the use of force to maintain the Western position in Berlin if the Soviet Union should make a physical move against the Allies. In this connection the Secretary also drew attention to the fact that it had been agreed in the meetings with General de Gaulle in Washington that all subjects discussed at the summit meeting would be interlocking and that there would be no agreement on any single item until the results of all discussions could be incorporated in a comprehensive communiqué.1

British Foreign Secretary Lloyd stated that the American paper on summit purposes in no way altered the Working Group paper on tactics. French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville remarked with reference to Brentano's second point that he had never assumed

1See ante, p. 80.
that direct Soviet action against Berlin would result in a Western statement that "this spoils the detente". Brentano thereupon declared that, if all were agreed that the Working Group paper on tactics had not been modified, his fears concerning the paper on summit purposes would disappear. The Foreign Ministers confirmed that they were agreed on this point.1

After some further discussion on the point raised by Brentano regarding an interim agreement on Berlin, Brentano admitted that it was theoretically possible to accept an interim arrangement for West Berlin for a stated period of years provided the status quo as to rights prevailed at the end of that period. In this connection the Foreign Ministers agreed that the term "interim" with reference to a Berlin arrangement was bad and should be replaced by the simple term "arrangement".2

Discussion of Supplementary Working Group Report. The four Western Foreign Ministers continued their discussions in a wider circle, with additional advisers present, when they reviewed the Supplementary Report of the Four Power Working Group.

Certain changes in the report were suggested by Brentano. He objected that the language in the revised Western proposal of July 28 seemed to imply that access to Berlin under existing policies was completely free and unrestricted. Brentano therefore suggested language indicating that free and unrestricted access to Berlin should be "established" or "restored" rather than "maintained" and that the procedures governing access should be improved. Brentano also proposed that the revised

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1In his letter which he sent Herter later that day, Brentano acknowledged that the discussions had made clear that the Secretary's memorandum of April 22 was in no way intended to modify the conclusions reached by the Working Group and approved by the Foreign Ministers. Brentano enclosed an earlier letter, drafted April 29 but never sent, containing observations on the Secretary's paper of April 22 with emphasis on the two points raised in the meeting. Brentano asked Herter to bring these observations to President Eisenhower's attention. Letter, Brentano to Herter, May 1, 1960, secret.

2U.S. Del. memorandum (US/MC/3) of conversation among Herter, Lloyd, Couver de Murville, Brentano, and others, May 1, 1960, secret; from Istanbul, tel. SECTO 47, May 1, secret.
text of the July 28 Geneva proposal should omit references to the restriction on activities "which seriously affect the rights and interests of others", since this would give the Soviet Union a pretext for continued intervention in West Berlin. With respect to the revised text of the "all-Berlin proposal", the West German Foreign Minister continued to insist on the need to maintain the link between the "all-Berlin proposal" and the resumption of negotiations on German reunification.

The Foreign Ministers decided that the points raised by Brentano should be referred to the Working Group, which would then agree on new language for the passages in question.

After Secretary Hertel raised the question as to what the major Western objective at the summit meeting should be regarding Berlin, the Foreign Ministers agreed that the summit discussions could not be expected to go into the details of a Berlin arrangement and that at the most they could result in a directive to a subordinate body which would work out the specific details of an arrangement. Foreign Secretary Lloyd indicated a preference, however, for an agreement on a Berlin arrangement at the summit meeting, provided Khrushchev acknowledged that the status of the Western Powers in Berlin would be the same at the termination of a specific period of time, and provided that this period was satisfactory. Lloyd suggested that this might be preferable to continuing negotiations over which the Soviet threat would be hanging. Couve de Murville pointed out that even if Lloyd's two assumptions were accepted it would still be necessary to achieve special agreements at a post-summit meeting. Yet once the principle was accepted, he said, there would be no urgency to arrive at the special agreements, and the time consumed in the process added to the period of the agreement itself would give the West time to "defuse" the Berlin problem.

At the end of the meeting the four Western Foreign Ministers agreed to meet in Paris on May 14, on the eve of the East-West summit meeting.¹

¹U.S. DoI memorandum (US/MC/7) of conversation among Hertel, Lloyd, Couve de Murville, Brentano, and others, May 1, 1960; from Istanbul, tel. SECTO 46, May 1; both secret.
Working Group Meeting. The Working Group met later on May 1, to reach agreement on the revision of the Supplementary Report on the basis of the discussions of the four Western Ministers. The principal substantive changes were in the text of the draft proposal for possible improvement in the Western proposal of July 28, and in the language of the "all-Berlin proposal".

In the July 28 proposal the passage relating to access was amended to read finally as follows:

"Free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, water, and by air shall be guaranteed for all persons, goods and means of communication including those of the Western Powers stationed in Berlin. The procedures in effect in April 1959, shall be improved with the view to facilitating communications."

These changes took account of the West German view that access procedures had become actually less favorable, especially for German civilian traffic to Berlin, and that they should therefore be improved.

The passage in the July 28 proposal regarding the restriction of certain activities was changed to read:

"Measures shall be taken, consistent with fundamental rights and liberties, to avoid activities in or with respect to Berlin which might either disturb public order or seriously affect existing rights."

This change omitted the reference in the earlier draft to activities which might "seriously affect the rights and interests of others or affect the preservation of peace." It reflected existing misgivings that such language might provide a pretext for continued Soviet interference.

One substantive change was made in the "Proposal for the Reunification of Berlin" (generally referred to as the "all-Berlin proposal"). A passage was inserted at the beginning stating that the Western Powers believed "that an attempt might be made to create more normal relations between the two parts of Berlin as
a first step towards the reunification of Germany which remains the ultimate goal." This reference to reunification represented, of course, a concession to the German view. At the same time, however, the Germans gave up their insistence that a clause be included committing the Powers to resume negotiations on German reunification immediately after "all-Berlin" agreements had come into force. Heretofore the Germans, in the Working Group and in the Foreign Ministers meetings, had insisted on such a provision.

Except for these modifications and some minor changes in wording the Supplementary Working Group Report was left as it stood.1

2. **NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 2-4**

*Discussions.* The NATO Ministerial Council, meeting May 2-4, discussed the problem of Germany including Berlin in its first session.

In his opening statement Secretary Herter emphasized the importance of NATO’s unity and firmness on Berlin in creating a "proper psychological and political climate" for negotiations with the Soviet Union. Turning to specifics, Herter referred to preliminary discussion of the Working Group Report on Berlin and Germany in the Permanent NATO Council on April 26, in the course of which the Netherlands Representative had expressed misgivings over the proposal for a plebiscite in both parts of Germany and in all of Berlin. The fear had been voiced that such a proposal might be exploited by the Soviet Union in claiming that the GDR had been recognized as a legitimate government. Herter now stated that the four Western Powers had carefully considered this point and had reached the conclusion that no plebiscite proposal could be formulated without designating the administrative area over which the East German regime exercised control. But Herter conceded that the concern expressed by the Netherlands was legitimate and that care must be taken to minimize the possibility of providing the Soviet Union with a basis for such claims. Finally, the Secretary informed the NATO Council that the four Western Foreign Ministers had reviewed developments since their meeting in Washington in April and had come to the conclusion that nothing new of any significance had emerged with respect to Berlin and Germany which might affect the basic approach recommended by the Working Group.

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1"U.S. Memorandum, May 1, 1960" (SMR REF-113), May 7, 1960, secret.
The NATO Foreign Ministers generally expressed agreement with the Working Group Report and with the proposed Western position on Berlin and Germany at the forthcoming summit meeting. Some of the NATO Foreign Ministers took significant positions on the specific points in the Working Group Report, especially on the plebiscite proposal.

Belgium's Foreign Minister Wigny called the proposal ingenious as well as new but suggested that, in formulating it, it might be better to stress the fundamental idea of self-determination. On the subject of Berlin itself, Wigny declared that the maintenance of Western forces in Berlin was essential but suggested that it be considered whether a new basis for the presence of these forces might perhaps be found.

Denmark's Foreign Minister Krag voiced considerable reservations regarding the plebiscite proposal, pointing to the abuse of the plebiscite by dictators in recent times. He felt that care should be taken in proposing plebiscites as instruments of international propaganda. With respect to reunification, Krag saw little likelihood that reunification of Germany in the Western sense was then negotiable, and he therefore suggested that the West seek ways and means to keep the problem alive. In this connection Krag proposed that a four-power body of experts, supplemented by experts from the Federal Republic and the GDR, should study all aspects of the German problem and prepare for new talks at the governmental level.

Foreign Minister Segni of Italy, after stating his belief that the Western peace plan was a suitable basis for starting negotiations with the Soviet Union on German reunification, praised the plebiscite proposal as a constructive and practical measure. Segni also suggested that, if the Soviet Union attempted to turn the all-German committee of the Western peace plan into a forum for all-German talks in a different context, the Western Powers should express their readiness to consult with German experts as long as discussions among the four powers bearing basic responsibility were going on.

A number of the NATO Foreign Ministers inquired about contingency plans for Berlin, specifically, whether the plans, regarding which a report had been given to the NATO Council in April 1959, were still valid.
Commenting on the discussion, Secretary Hertter declared that it might have revealed some differences in emphasis but that he did not believe that there were any differences in principle. With regard to Wigny's suggestion of finding a formula other than occupation rights for justifying the presence of Western troops in Berlin, Hertter stated that no such formula had been found and that the Western Powers would place themselves in a false position at the summit meeting if they assumed that a new basis for the Western presence in Berlin could be established. Regarding the Danish Foreign Minister's idea of a four-power body, Hertter declared that this matter and similar ones would have to be remanded to a subordinate body. The question therefore was at what level further negotiations would continue. The Secretary also expressed gratification that there had been basic agreement on the idea of proposing plebiscites in response to Soviet emphasis on a peace treaty with the GDR. Finally, he assured the NATO Council that the contingency plans of the three Western Powers were still in effect.1

NATO Council Communiqué. The communique issued May 4, at the conclusion of the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, welcomed the prospect of negotiations with the Soviet Union and expressed hope for a resulting improvement in international relations. But the communique also made clear that the Atlantic Alliance, while "desiring a true international detente", could not be satisfied with a "formula of peaceful coexistence" under cover of which attacks on individual member of the Alliance would continue. In this connection the communiqué referred specifically to Soviet propaganda efforts "to discredit the Federal Republic of Germany." The Council also reaffirmed its view that the solution of the problem of Germany could only be found "in reunification on the basis of self-determination." Recalling its declaration of December 16, 1958, the NATO Council once again expressed its "determination to protect the freedom of the people of West Berlin."2

1From Istanbul, tels. SECTO 55 and SECTO 56, May 3, 1960, both secret.

2From Istanbul, tel. SECTO 78, May 4, 1960, unclassified.
3. Brandt-Herter Exchange

While attending the NATO Council meeting in Istanbul, Secretary Herter, on May 3, received from the German Delegation a letter Governing Mayor Willy Brandt had written to convey to the Secretary his views on the eve of the East-West summit meeting.

Brandt expressed agreement with the Allied position that a final solution of the Berlin problem was possible only in connection with a solution of the German question, and he stressed the desirability of giving the German people, for the purpose of realizing this aim, an opportunity to make sure of their "national right of self-determination." But the West Berlin Mayor sounded the warning that a false decision by the West in the Berlin question would have "disastrous effects" not only for the people of Berlin and of the Soviet Zone but also for the balance of power in Europe; for the latter would shift in favor of the Soviet Union, providing it with a strong initial position for a future German settlement.

Brandt urged therefore that two basic prerequisites be observed if an interim Berlin agreement should be seriously discussed at the summit: 1) The "original occupation rights" of the three Western Powers and the "supreme responsibility resulting therefrom must continue in force." 2) Within the framework of the supreme authority of the three Western Powers "the close linking West Berlin has achieved during the past twelve years by the integration in the legal and financial system of the Federal Republic" must continue.

Brandt stated that the right to unhampered traffic between Berlin and the Federal Republic resulted from these two prerequisites. He felt, however, that it would be advisable to conclude additional agreements for safeguarding traffic by land, sea, and air, "in order to do away with obscurities and to remove difficulties." He also urged that nothing be done to divest West Berlin of its function as a meeting place of people from both parts of Germany. 1

In his reply of May 10, Secretary Herter thanked Brandt for the expression of his views and drew his attention to the meeting

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1Letter, Brandt to Herter, Apr. 26, 1960, confidential.
in Istanbul as indicating "how firmly resolved we are to stand by our obligations to the people of West Berlin." Herter assured Brandt that all were agreed with regard to the "most essential items" mentioned by Brandt, and he also expressed satisfaction over the fact that Dr. Paul Hertz, a member of the West Berlin Senate, while visiting in Washington, had held useful discussions with officials of the Department of State.¹

¹Letter, Herter to Brandt, sent to Berlin as tel. 533, May 10, 1960, official use only.
Chapter III
THE ABORTIVE SUMMIT CONFERENCE, MAY 1960

A. Preliminaries

1. Hardening of the Soviet Position on the Eve of the Summit Conference

During the many months in which the Western Powers were hammering out a joint position for the forthcoming East-West summit meeting, there were growing indications of a hardening of the Soviet position on Berlin and Germany.

As early as November 1959 Soviet official statements and propaganda efforts with respect to the German question were characterized with increasing frequency by two features: 1) Continued attacks on the Federal Republic and Chancellor Adenauer personally. 2) Resumption of Khrushchev’s threats to sign a separate peace treaty with the East German regime. The campaign against the Federal Republic "seemed to be a central feature of Soviet presummit tactics", as Secretary Herter subsequently declared before a Congressional committee. It eventually compelled the NATO countries at their Istanbul meeting, as shown earlier, to take a stand against the Soviet attempts to discredit the Federal Republic.1 As for renewed threats to conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR, these were uttered by Khrushchev in speeches before the Hungarian Communist Party Congress on December 1, 1959 and before the Supreme Soviet on January 14, 1960, again in a letter of January 28, 1960 to Chancellor Adenauer, once more at a press conference at Djakarta, Indonesia, February 29, 1960, and then in several addresses delivered during his visit to France, March 23-April 4.2

1Events Incident to the Summit Conference: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate 86th Congress, 2nd sess.), p. 6.

2Ibid., pp. 16-19.
Moreover, on February 4, 1960, the Warsaw Pact Powers issued, in Secretary Herter's words, "the first blockwise commitment to sign a separate GDR peace treaty." 1

The United States soon realized the need to react to these increasing expressions of Soviet militancy. In a speech delivered in Chicago, April 4, 1960, Secretary Herter stated that the repetition of Khrushchev's threat to conclude a separate peace treaty "cannot help but complicate the situation and affect adversely the international atmosphere". Herter also took this opportunity to declare that recent Soviet attacks "labeling the Government of the Federal Republic as 'militaristic'" were "completely without foundation." 2

The strongest American response to these frequent manifestations of a hard line policy by the Soviet Union was given in a speech delivered by Under Secretary of State Dillon at New York on April 20, 1960. After criticizing the Soviet position on Berlin, Dillon declared that, while the United States had every intention of seeking mutually acceptable settlements at the summit meeting, "Mr. Khrushchev and his associates will be profoundly disillusioned if they assume that we will bow to threats." Dillon also stressed that it would be "highly optimistic to predict that prospects of an early agreement are bright." 3

Khrushchev's reply to Dillon, given in a speech delivered in Baku, April 25, 1960, breathed the same spirit of harshness which had recently entered the East-West dialogue. Accusing Dillon of misrepresenting Soviet views, of making a speech which "reeks of the 'cold war' spirit," and of trying "to strike a note of ill will and suspicion on the very eve of the summit conference", the Soviet leader repeated his warning that the Soviet Union, in case of a Western refusal to settle the problem of a German peace treaty, would sign a peace treaty with East Germany as a result of which the Western Powers would lose their rights in Berlin. 4

1Ibid., p. 7.
2Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 594-596.
3Ibid., pp. 596-598.
4Documents on Germany, pp. 598-603.
Thus, in the words of Secretary Herter's statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of May 27, 1960, "as the summit drew nearer the prospects for important agreements seemed slender." Then, when the NATO and Western Foreign Ministers were gathering at Istanbul to give final approval to the work of preparation for the summit conference, the shooting down of an American U-2 reconnaissance plane over the Soviet Russia city of Sverdlovsk brought about a new and serious crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations which ultimately doomed not only the prospects for a successful outcome of the summit conference but even the convening of the conference.

2. The Soviet Proposal of May 9

On May 9, a few days before the scheduled opening of the East-West summit conference, the Soviet Ambassador to France, Savey A. Vinogradov, handed to President de Gaulle a memorandum containing a new Soviet proposal on Berlin which the Soviet Union intended to present at the summit conference. When the French circulated the text of the proposal in the Four Power Group on Germany including Berlin on May 13, the American Delegation felt that this text bore an "obvious relationship both to the Soviet proposal of July 28, 1959 and to the Smirnov memorandum given to SPD leader Ollenauer on January 13, 1960." (The latter reference was to a memorandum which Smirnov, the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn, had handed to Erich Ollenhauer, leader of the Social Democratic opposition party in the Bundestag. At the time of the memorandum given to Ollenhauer, the American Embassy had made the comment that the Soviet position on Berlin was "spelled out as rigidly as ever" in that memorandum but was "cloaked with phrases and vague promises designed to give the Kremlin's stand in this matter an aura of reasonableness." The Embassy referred particularly to passages in the Soviet memorandum concerning "a mutually acceptable solution" and possible Soviet guarantees for "undisturbed access" between Berlin and the outside world.)

1Events Incident to the Summit Conference, p. 7.
3From Bonn, desp. 1148, Jan. 23, 1960, secret.
The Soviet proposal of May 9 proceeded from the assumption that the Soviet Union, while favoring an immediate peace treaty with the "two German States", was prepared to agree to an interim solution in the form of a temporary agreement signed among the "four principal members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition." This temporary agreement on West Berlin should be "suited to prepare conditions for the ultimate transformation of West Berlin into a free city and the adoption of measures leading to the preparation of the future peace settlement." The temporary agreement outlined in the Soviet proposal of May 9 differed on the following specific points from the Soviet proposal of July 28, 1959:

With respect to the duration of the agreement, the May 9 proposal provided for a two-year period as compared with a 1 1/2-year period under the July 28 proposal.

Regarding a reduction of Western forces in Berlin, the May 9 proposal provided for a progressive reduction in several stages without mentioning a specific figure, while the July 28 proposal had set a ceiling of 3,000-4,000.

The May 9 proposal stated explicitly, as the July 28 proposal had not, that its purpose was to prepare for the eventual transformation of West Berlin into a free city, and it also listed the attributes of such a free city. These were: no prejudice to Western interests; maintenance of West Berlin's way of life; no integration into the GDR; no prejudice to West Berlin's economic and financial relations with other states, including the Federal Republic; ability to establish its own relations (except military relations) with all states and international organizations; guarantee by the United Nations as well as by the four powers.

In the matter of access, the May 9 proposal provided for a declaration by the Soviet Union as well as by the GDR stating that access in the existing form would be preserved for the duration of the agreement. The July 28 proposal had envisaged only a Soviet declaration.

According to the May 9 proposal, subversive activities and hostile propaganda directed against other states were to be prohibited in West Berlin. Moreover, prohibition of subversive activity and hostile propaganda "with respect to West Berlin" might also be envisaged under an "appropriate form." The proposal of July 28 had envisaged the prohibition of subversive activities, hostile propaganda, and interference in internal affairs in West Berlin.
The two Soviet proposals also differed in certain respects with regard to the role of the GDR. As mentioned earlier, the May 9 proposal provided for a GDR declaration regarding the preservation of communications in their existing form. These engagements undertaken by the GDR could take a form "which would not signify diplomatic recognition of the GDR by the Western Powers". The July 28 proposal had merely provided for a declaration by the GDR that it would not interfere in West Berlin's internal affairs and that it would respect the interim status of the city.

The May 9 proposal made no mention of a time limit within which the Four Power Committee that would supervise the execution of the temporary Berlin agreement would have to be set up. The July 28 proposal had stipulated that it should be set up within a month.

Finally, in the matter of all-German negotiations the differences between the two proposals were these: According to the May 9 proposal, if the two "German states" refused to engage in conversations with one another, or if it became clear at the expiration of the agreement that they could not arrive at an understanding, the four powers would sign "a peace treaty with the two German states or with one of them, as they would judge it desirable." Moreover, measures would be taken to transform West Berlin into a free city, with the Soviet Union expressing a preference to elaborate this free city statute jointly with the Western Powers. But the July 28 proposal had envisaged that after expiration of the temporary agreement the states represented at Geneva would hold new negotiations on Berlin.1

3. Western Discussion of the Soviet Proposal of May 9

Foreign Ministers Meeting, May 14. The Western Foreign Ministers met at Paris on May 14, for a discussion of the Berlin problem with the main emphasis given to the new Soviet proposal of May 9. The Foreign Ministers were in general agreement with the view held by Brentano, namely, that the most important difference between this proposal and the Soviet proposal of July 28, 1959 was that according to the May 9 proposal expiration

1From Paris, tel. SECTO 4, May 13, 1960; tel SECTO 5, May 14, both secret.
of the temporary agreement would result in a peace treaty—or treaties—and in the transformation of West Berlin into a free city, while the earlier Soviet proposal had projected the holding of new negotiations upon expiration of the agreement. Foreign Secretary Lloyd declared that the new proposal was actually a step backward; French Foreign Minister Gouven de Murville emphasized that the most important issue in the summit discussions on Berlin would not be the precise number of Western troops in Berlin but rather the question of what was going to happen at the expiration of the interim agreement. West German Foreign Minister Brentano agreed that the key question was the duration of the agreement and what would come after it, and he pointed out that the proposal represented the maximum Soviet demands. Secretary Herter expressed the view that at the summit meeting Khrushchev might quickly turn away from the subject of a peace treaty to the subject of an interim agreement on Berlin.

Some of the Foreign Ministers considered it likely that the Soviet Union would publish its proposal of May 9, and that the Western Powers should therefore prepare arguments against it. It was therefore decided that the Working Group on Germany including Berlin should have such arguments ready. On the other hand, the Foreign Ministers reached the conclusion that the Western Heads of Government would probably not want to discuss in detail the new Soviet proposal at the summit meeting or put forward a counter-proposal. The Foreign Ministers also agreed that of decisive importance in the summit discussions would be the question of what would happen upon expiration of any interim agreement.2

Meeting of the Heads of Government, May 15. Prior to any meeting with Premier Khrushchev, the three Western Heads of Government, as agreed earlier, met with Chancellor Adenauer in the afternoon of May 15. The chairman of the meeting, President

1A paper was subsequently drafted by the Working Group with the title, "Western Critique of New Soviet Proposals on Berlin to be Put Forward if Soviet Proposals are Released for Publication".

de Gaulle, stated that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the problems of Germany and Berlin which would be taken up at the summit meeting—"if," he added, "there is a summit." The reason why de Gaulle introduced this element of doubt was that Khrushchev had indicated during a visit to de Gaulle earlier in the day that he would attend the summit conference only under certain conditions.

The latest Soviet proposal on Berlin was, of course, in the foreground of the discussion of the Berlin problem by the four Western Heads of Government. President Eisenhower noted one aspect of the proposal, namely, that it seemed to permit Berlin "freedom of political and economic agreements" with other countries. De Gaulle, however, doubted that the Soviet Union would allow Berlin to be part of the Federal Republic.

President Eisenhower felt that the worst feature of the new Soviet proposal was the stipulation that there had to be a new status for West Berlin at the end of the two-year period. Prime Minister Macmillan, President de Gaulle, and Chancellor Adenauer fully agreed with the President on this point. De Gaulle said that if Khrushchev obtained Western agreement to a change of Berlin's status after two years he would have "part of the cake."

President Eisenhower then asked the other Heads of Government for their views regarding the possible consequences of Soviet efforts to strangle Berlin economically without changing the juridical position of the Western Allies in the city.

President de Gaulle pointed out that the real question was whether Khrushchev wanted a detente. If he did not, he could harass Berlin and put it in a difficult economic position. However, he said, any backing down in the Berlin issue would gravely endanger Western prestige. The West should therefore stand on its rights. The Western Powers had, after all, lived with the "awkward Berlin situation", as de Gaulle put it, for a considerable time and they could continue to do so. Chancellor Adenauer also warned of the repercussions throughout the world of a Western retreat in Berlin and expressed the belief that Khrushchev would not risk a general war over the Berlin question.

President Eisenhower agreed that Western juridical rights in Berlin must be maintained, but he wondered whether these Western rights included "the right of West Berlin to make a living." The President felt that he had not yet received a real
answer to the question as to what would happen if the Western Powers continued to maintain their juridical rights and to keep and supply their troops in Berlin while the Soviet Union used all technical means to strangle the city economically. Macmillan, expressing full agreement with the President, mentioned the possibility that economic pressure might be put on Berlin under the pretext that railroads were not running and that canals, roads, and bridges were in a poor state of repair.

President Eisenhower stated that he was still looking for an answer to the question as to what the West could do and by what means it could keep the Berliners "healthy, happy, and prosperous" in the long run. He concluded, somewhat in a mood of resignation, that Khrushchev had to want a relaxation of tensions, since otherwise there would be no real answer to the problem of Berlin.¹

B. The Collapse of the Summit Conference

1. Khrushchev's Conditions for Attending the Conference

At their meeting in the afternoon of May 15, referred to in the foregoing, the four Western Heads of Government were already fully aware of the shadow which had fallen over the whole prospect of the summit conference as a result of Khrushchev's statements to de Gaulle earlier that day.

When the Soviet Premier had called on President de Gaulle in the morning of May 15, he had left a memorandum setting forth certain conditions which would have to be met before he would attend a summit conference. That afternoon, shortly after the four Western Heads of Government had adjourned, Khrushchev called on Macmillan and read the same statement to him. The statement dealt, of course, with the downing of the American U-2 reconnaissance plane over the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk on May 1, and contained a violent denunciation of American policy and of official United States statements issued in connection with the affair, especially those by Secretary Herter and the President. The gist of Khrushchev's statement was that, unless

the United States undertook not to violate the frontiers of the USSR by plane flights, condemned such "provocative acts committed in the past", and promised to punish "those responsible for such actions", the Soviet Government saw no possibility of constructive negotiations with the United States at the summit conference.¹

2. Tripartite Meeting of Heads of Government, May 15

In a meeting held in the early evening of May 15, the three Western Heads of Government discussed the situation created by Khrushchev's statements to de Gaulle and Macmillan and the Soviet Premier's presumable intentions. Proceeding on the assumption that substantive issues might still be discussed with the Soviet Union at this conference, they took up some of these subjects. With regard to Berlin, President Eisenhower thought that the Western Powers might perhaps suggest some possible reduction in the level of Western forces in Berlin. He also wondered whether one ought perhaps to talk to Khrushchev on the basis of his latest paper, leaving out, of course, that part which would lead to a treaty with the GDR.

De Gaulle declared that the Western Powers should "not even tacitly" accept a change in the status of Berlin after two years.

The President agreed that the West could not accept anything that would reduce its rights in any respect after a two-year period. He added, however, that, if a formula could be found maintaining all the essentials and providing for a plebiscite rather than a free city at the end, then perhaps the Western Powers might accept it. The President emphasized that the West could not go on for ever just saying "no" and taking a completely negative position regarding an issue where the Western position was fundamentally weak.

De Gaulle reminded the President that the proposal for a plebiscite after the two-year period was not to be found in the Soviet memorandum. For the rest, he reiterated his familiar viewpoint that the whole Berlin question came down to whether or not the Soviet Union wanted a detente.

¹From Paris, tel. SECO 14, May 16, 1960, official use only.
Macmillan stated that, while it would be bad for Western morale to lose Berlin, it would be worse to promise to defend Berlin against a Soviet squeeze and then find out that one was unable to do so. Therefore, trying to find a solution was worthwhile, and a delay of two years would provide an opportunity for finding such a formula.

The President declared that it would be fatal for the West to weaken now, and he stressed again that, while the Western Powers could not prevent the Soviet Union from concluding a treaty with the GDR, they could not accept the assertion that all their rights would be eliminated by the signing of such a treaty.

After a brief discussion of the possibilities for an "all-Berlin" solution, the Western Heads of Government adjourned. They had agreed earlier that the meeting with Khrushchev the following morning (May 16) would reveal the Soviet Premier's intentions with regard to the summit conference.1

3. Meetings, May 16-17: Khrushchev Torpedoes the Summit Conference

The one and only meeting of the three Western Heads of Government with Khrushchev was held in the morning of May 16. Secretary Herter's characterization of the meeting, as expressed in a telegram to the Department, was that it merely demonstrated Khrushchev's determination "to torpedo the conference" accompanied by an effort to place the responsibility for the U-2 affair on the President. Khrushchev read a statement the first part of which was identical with the memoranda given to de Gaulle and Macmillan the previous day but which combined also some additions "even more offensive". The Soviet Premier also withdrew the invitation extended earlier to President Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union and finally suggested that the conference of the Heads of Government should be postponed "for approximately six to eight months." Not only the cancellation of the visit but also the proposed period of postponement were calculated insults to President Eisenhower, whose term of office would have expired by the end of such a period.

President Eisenhower delivered a statement clarifying earlier statements by him and Secretary Bertur to the effect that the U-2 flights had been suspended after the recent incident and would not be resumed. After further discussion the President explicitly stated that the suspension of these flights was valid for the duration of his tenure of office.

The Soviet Premier declared that the President's statements were not sufficient because they did not express regret for the "insult" inflicted on the Soviet Union. He also made it clear that he did not consider this meeting a summit conference, but rather a preliminary meeting dealing with procedural matters. The meeting then adjourned after Macmillan and de Gaulle had attempted in vain to persuade Khrushchev not to publish his statements made in the meeting.¹

In a meeting held in the morning of May 17, the three Western Heads of Government agreed that President de Gaulle would call a meeting for the same afternoon in such a manner as to make clear that it would be a summit meeting and not a preliminary one. Accordingly, de Gaulle stated in the invitations sent to the Heads of Government that he was calling a meeting to ascertain "whether the summit meeting can begin examination of those questions which we had agreed to discuss."² At the appointed time, however, Khrushchev did not appear but instead sent a series of messages to the meeting all of which made the point that he would attend a preliminary meeting to see if conditions permitted a summit conference but that he would not participate in a conference of the summit. At the same time the Soviet


Premier released a statement to the press setting forth the conditions which the United States would have to meet before he could attend a summit meeting.¹

Thus, Khrushchev’s insistence on his conditions ended once and for all the East-West summit conference and all the hopes for progress in the solution of pressing world problems which had been associated with it. The Western Heads of Government could do nothing more than state this fact publicly. In a meeting held in the evening of May 17, the Western Heads of Government agreed on a communique stating that “because of the attitude adopted by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union it has not been possible to begin, at the Summit Conference, the examination of the problems which it had been agreed would be discussed between the four Chiefs of State or Government”.²

4. Possible Soviet Motives for Wrecking the Summit Conference

The motives of the Soviet leader in wrecking the summit conference must remain a subject for speculation as long as Soviet documents on this episode are not available. In any event, the Western Foreign Ministers at the time were convinced that the Soviet Union had wanted to torpedo the summit conference and had merely used the U-2 incident as a pretext.

The Western Powers did not hesitate in presenting their interpretation of the Soviet action to their NATO allies. In a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris on May 19, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville gave a summary of the developments at the abortive summit conference and closed with the comment that Soviet words and actions at Paris indicated a clear desire by the USSR to prevent the holding of the summit conference. Foreign Secretary Lloyd expressed agreement with Couve de Murville and declared that, after having talked to Gromyko for nearly two hours in order to test Soviet intentions, he had found it clear that the Russians did not want a summit meeting.

¹From Paris, tel. CAHTO 10, May 18, confidential.

Secretary Herter expressed the conviction that Khrushchev had decided before coming to Paris that the summit conference would be non-productive from the Soviet point of view and that it therefore should not take place. Herter rejected the ostensible reason put forward by Khrushchev in defending his actions and said that the President's clear statement that overflights would be terminated and not resumed had removed this issue. Elaborating on what he felt were Khrushchev's real reasons, Herter expressed the opinion that Khrushchev had torpedoed the conference because he did not believe it would bring the necessary results to satisfy his requirements at home. Herter said that evidence for this had been mounting since Khrushchev's speech in Baku, April 25.1

The Secretary interpreted Soviet actions in Paris in a similar fashion in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 27, 1960. On this occasion Herter emphasized specifically (1) that Western unity on Berlin had "presumably signaled to the USSR that prospects for eroding the Western position or obtaining Soviet terms on Berlin remained slight" and (2) that the NATO Council meeting in Istanbul (May 2-4) had also "reaffirmed the Western position on German reunification."2

C. Effects on the Berlin Problem Resulting From the Collapse of the Summit Meeting

1. Renewed Concern

Whatever Khrushchev's motives, his wrecking of the summit conference changed immediately and profoundly the nature of the discussion of the Berlin problem by the Western Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers assembled at Paris. Before Khrushchev revealed his intentions, the Western Powers had discussed primarily the terms of the possible settlement of the Berlin problem which could be negotiated with the Soviet Union at the conference. But when it became clear that the conference would not be held and that an era of increased East-West tensions might be approaching, the central question became how soon a new crisis over Berlin might develop and how the West should cope with it.

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2Events Incident to the Summit Conference, p. 7.
As early as May 16, following the only meeting between
Khrushchev and the other Heads of Government and before Khrushchev's
refusal to go ahead with the conference had become final, Foreign
Secretary Lloyd raised the question with the other Foreign Ministers
whether Khrushchev's suggestion for a postponement of the summit
meeting for six to eight months could be interpreted as an in-
tention to maintain the status quo in general, and in Berlin in
particular. After some discussion, the Foreign Ministers agreed
that the Western Heads of Government should take the opportunity
of their being present in Paris to discuss the new situation,
particularly as it affected Berlin. They also agreed, however,
that care should be taken not to give any hint of concern over
Berlin.  

Following this meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers,
Foreign Secretary Lloyd and Secretary Herter had a brief exchange
which reflected the rising concern and even anxiety over Berlin
in the Western camp. Lloyd spoke to Herter with "some emotion"
about the possibility of trouble over Berlin after the break-
down of the summit conference. He declared that it was "unthink-
able" for the British Government to take the country into war
over a question of formalities relating to access to Berlin,
especially in view of the large extent to which the West Germans
were dealing commercially with the East Germans. Lloyd insisted
that the Western Powers had to make clear that they would not
go to war "for the sake of a stamp on travel documents."

Secretary Herter demurred at Lloyd's statements, and Assistant
Secretary Kohler pointed out that the question of a stamp was
not the issue and that one ought not to refer to the problem in
those terms.

Lloyd admitted that the stamp was not the issue but stressed
that as long as the Western Powers had satisfactory access to
their garrisons in West Berlin they could not bring about a
conflict over a question of procedures relating to access.  


2U.S. Del. memorandum (US/MC/17) of conversation among Herter,
2. Uncertainty Regarding Soviet Intentions

Following the definitive breakdown of the conference, after Khrushchev had refused to attend the meeting called by de Gaulle in the afternoon of May 17, the Western statesmen began to examine carefully the actions and words of the Soviet Delegation in Paris in order to detect clues as to the next Soviet moves. Uncertainty increased considerably when it was reported that Khrushchev would stop off in East Berlin on his return to Moscow.

At the meeting of the three Western Foreign Ministers in the evening of May 17, Lloyd reported about a talk which he had had with Gromyko earlier that day. Referring to Khrushchev's suggestion for a postponement of the summit conference for six to eight months, Lloyd had asked Gromyko whether the Soviet Union intended to avoid an increase in tensions in the interval. Gromyko had replied that the Soviet Union did not intend to take any action that would increase tensions or create trouble and that it would wait for another summit conference. Lloyd thereupon had tried to sound out Gromyko further and, referring to the reports that Khrushchev would return to Moscow by way of East Berlin, had asked Gromyko whether Khrushchev was planning to use this opportunity to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. Gromyko's answer was that he had nothing to add to the substance of Khrushchev's statement of April 25 in Baku, namely, that the Soviet Union would sign a separate treaty with the GDR if no agreement was reached with the Western Powers. Lloyd told the other Foreign Ministers that he regarded Gromyko's statements as standard Soviet doctrine and that they were not necessarily to be construed as Soviet intentions to conclude a German peace treaty in the near future.¹

Statements made by Khrushchev prior to his departure from Paris still gave no clear indication as to any imminent Soviet moves with regard to Berlin. In his farewell visit with President de Gaulle on May 18, Khrushchev made no mention of Berlin and otherwise expressed regret over the setback to his policies as a result of the collapse of the summit meeting. Although Khrushchev was highly emotional at his press conference of the same day, the Embassy in Paris noted that "despite verbal violence,

including insulting remarks about the President, he avoided making any new threats and was cautious on the subject of Berlin and [of a] German peace treaty." When Khrushchev was asked on that occasion whether he intended to sign a separate treaty during his forthcoming visit to East Berlin, he replied that the Soviet Union intended to sign a "peace treaty" with the GDR which would deprive the Western Powers of their occupation rights. As to what this would happen, he said, "this is our business." Somewhat more disquieting perhaps were the remarks which Khrushchev made during his farewell visit with the British Prime Minister in Paris on May 18. As Lloyd related the matter to the NATO Council on May 19, the Soviet Premier told Macmillan that the Soviet Union would continue to strive for the settlement of such questions as disarmament, Germany, and Berlin, but that the last-named problem would have to be treated differently, for the reason that with regard to Berlin the West had accepted Adenauer as its "main ideological leader." That policy, Khrushchev declared, could not lead to any solution, and the Soviet Union, accordingly, was "obliged to try and seek a unilateral solution of this problem." ¹

Khrushchev's words and deeds prior to his departure from Paris, although inconclusive, were not of a nature to dispel Western apprehensions that as a result of the break-up of the summit conference a new dangerous phase of the Berlin problem was at hand. This impression was strengthened by Khrushchev's scheduled stopover in East Berlin, which gave rise to reports that a separate treaty with the GDR would be signed on this occasion. The Western Powers were, of course, afraid that such a step would immediately lead to a serious crisis over Western rights of access. There was general expectation among the Western delegations at Paris that "the crunch" was about to come. ²

That this mood of expecting the worst was not restricted to the participants in the summit conference is borne out by a message sent to the Secretary by Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador

¹From Paris, tel. SEXT 38, May 18, 1960, confidential; tel. 5390, May 18, official use only; Events Incident to the Summit Conference, pp. 235-237; from Paris, airgram POLTO G 1276, May 22, secret.

²As stated to this writer by Martin J. Hillebrandt, Director of the Office of German Affairs in the Department.
to the United Nations, on the evening of May 17. Lodge expressed the view that Khrushchev’s going to East Berlin immediately from the summit conference raised the prospect of unilateral Soviet action on East Germany and Berlin. Without pronouncing on the probability of such a development, Lodge proposed that the Secretary consult with the British and French so that the Western Powers could bring the issue immediately before the Security Council “once Khrushchev’s intentions [are] known and before he acts, for purposes of having SC endorse status quo.”\(^1\)

These expectations of an imminent new crisis over Berlin gave special urgency to the resumption of a discussion of Berlin contingency plans, which now become the principal concern of the Western delegations.

D. Resumed Discussion of Berlin Contingency Planning

1. Western Foreign Ministers Meeting, May 18, a.m.

The Western Foreign Ministers met in the morning of May 18, and agreed that it would be prudent in the light of the developments at Paris to examine the state of Berlin contingency planning. A special tripartite working group was instructed to prepare immediately a brief report on the subject which the Foreign Ministers would be able to submit to the Western Heads of Government later in the day.

In the course of this discussion by the Foreign Ministers, Couve de Murville suggested that all planning activities should henceforth be centralized in Paris. Herter, however, stressed that it would be better to continue coordination of all contingency planning through the Washington Ambassadorial Group, especially in view of the suggestion just put forward by Ambassador Lodge regarding planning for possible action in the United Nations.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd suggested that more attention be given to the harassment of civilian access, a problem which, he said, troubled the Germans very much. The Foreign Ministers accordingly agreed that the matter should be studied jointly.

\(^1\)From USUN, New York, tel. 59, May 17, 1960, secret.
with the Germans and that preliminary work should be done in
the Washington Ambassadorial Group, to be followed by detailed
planning, as necessary, at Bonn and by LIVE OAK.¹

At the close of the meeting, Couve de Murville stated that
it would be advisable not to let it be known publicly that
renewed attention was being given to Berlin contingency plan-
ing.²

2. Berlin Contingency Planning Paper of May 18

Preparatory Work. When the Foreign Ministers decided on
May 18 that a report on the state of Berlin contingency planning
should be submitted to them later in the day, preparation for
drawing up such a paper had already begun in the American Dele-
gation on the assumption that after the break-up of the summit
meeting the Soviet Union might move fairly rapidly toward con-
clusion of a peace treaty with the GDR which would result in
the transfer of functions regarding access to GDR officials. A
summary of contingency plans, prepared by members of the Office
of German Affairs attached to the U.S. delegation in Paris, was
submitted to Kohler by Hillenbrand on May 17.

In forwarding this memorandum, Hillenbrand pointed out that
British commitment to certain aspects of the tripartite agreed
Western plans "has been largely verbal," and that the British
had been "unenthusiastic" about the procedures which the Western
Powers would announce that they would observe should the controls
at the checkpoints be turned over to GDR officials. It was
stated in the memorandum that only those aspects of contingency
planning were covered which might have to be implemented imme-
diately but that stand-by plans had also been elaborated to deal
with later aspects. The memorandum pointed out that there were
no commitments to the implementation of such plans and that some

¹See Part I, Chapter III, p. 105.

²U.S. Del. memorandum (US/38/34) of conversation among Herter,
Lloyd, and Couve de Murville, May 18, 1960, secret.
of them suggested alternative courses of action, leaving the choice to be made later.\footnote{Memorandum by Hillenbrand (GER) to Kohler (EUR), May 17, 1960, secret, forwarding memorandum by McKiernan (GER), "Berlin Contingency Planning," May 17, secret.}

Making use of such preparatory work, the tripartite special group acting on instructions by the three Foreign Ministers was able to produce within two hours a contingency planning paper to be presented by the Foreign Ministers to the three Western Heads of Government.\footnote{Statement by Martin Hillenbrand to the writer.}

**Contents.** In Section I of the working group paper, after a review of contingency planning since November 1958, it was suggested that the Heads of Government should (1) confirm agreements already made concerning certain measures; (2) be made aware of decisions which would have to be taken at some later time; (3) direct that additional planning be undertaken.

In Section II it was stated that, while Soviet intentions were not yet clear, it was unlikely that Khrushchev would take in the immediate future any action going beyond preliminary steps toward the eventual conclusion of a separate peace treaty. However, should the Soviet Union withdraw, or appear likely to withdraw, from its functions regarding access, Allied planning contemplated the following measures:

1) Prior to Soviet Action

a) Preparatory Military Measures

Precautionary and preparatory measures of a kind not to cause public alarm but to be detectable by Soviet intelligence had been taken following the Soviet threat of November 1958. Plans now existed for additional measures of this sort, such as increased alert, preparation for unit deployments or dispersal, and preparation for evacuation of non-combatants in Berlin and Germany. The Governments would have to decide which of these measures or which other measures should be taken and at what point.
b) United Nations Action

It had been agreed that, if unilateral Soviet withdrawal from access functions were clearly imminent, it would be desirable to forestall this through a United Nations Security Council resolution calling on the four powers not to violate existing agreements regarding Berlin, to negotiate their differences, and to report the results of their negotiations to the Security Council. To initiate Security Council action now would be premature but "an urgent decision could be required at any time."

2) At the Time of Soviet Action or After It

  c) Notice to Soviet Government

  Drafts had been prepared of notes to the Soviet Government and a public statement re-emphasizing Soviet responsibility under agreements concerning Berlin, explaining Western legal interpretation of the Soviet action, and serving notice as to the procedures which the Western Powers would follow in maintaining access after Soviet withdrawal.

  d) Surface Access Procedures

  After Soviet withdrawal, efforts would be made to continue normal traffic but the three powers would put into effect new procedures for identifying Allied movements as being entitled to unrestricted access to Berlin. The procedures involved handing to the East German personnel at the checkpoints a copy of the Allied travel order but not accepting the stamping of a travel order as a condition of passage. Practical preparations for instituting the new procedures had been completed.

  e) Air Access Procedures

  Every effort would be made to maintain unrestricted air access after a Soviet withdrawal from the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC), and the Center would continue to operate on a tripartite basis. For safety considerations,
attempts would be made to communicate flight information directly by radio broadcasts and, if feasible, directly to the East German traffic control authorities. Technical details remained to be worked out.

Section III of the paper dealt with the most crucial aspects of contingency planning in the following manner:

If the foregoing measures had been taken and the East Germans refused to accept Allied surface access procedures or attempted to block air access, Governmental decisions would be required on certain aspects of planning which had been developed on a stand-by basis but without commitments as to the necessity of the timing of their implementation.

1) Measures to Maintain Air Access

a) Plans existed for maintaining civil air services under flight safety conditions "not usually considered normal."

b) Plans existed for a "garrison airlift" of personnel and equipment of Allied forces which could not be moved by surface routes.

c) Plans existed for movement of civilian passengers by military aircraft when civil airlines were no longer prepared to operate.

d) Plans had been developed to cope with physical interference with air access.

2) Probe of Soviet Intentions

There were three alternate plans for a probe along the Autobahn to determine whether the Soviet Union would use or permit the use of force to prevent passage. Decisions would have to be made regarding the timing of the probe and as to which of the three detailed plans would be accepted.

3) More Elaborate Military Measures

The military commanders had plans for more elaborate military measures which, while they might not succeed in reopening access in the face of Soviet determination, could
nevertheless "take the initiative regarding ground access from the Soviets, provide circumstances in which negotiations with the Soviets might prove fruitful, and compel the Soviets to face the unmistakable imminence of general war". Decisions regarding implementation of such plans, choices of possible courses, and timing of actions would have to be taken by the Governments in the light of developing circumstances.

Section IV dealt with the problem of indirect countermeasures. It stated that consideration had been given to indirect countermeasures such as economic measures, steps against Soviet aviation, and a naval blockade, to increase pressure on the Soviet Union and the GDR if Allied access should be forcibly obstructed. Further consideration would be given to these aspects of planning if the Heads of Government approved.

Finally, in Section V, it was stated that the planning discussed above dealt only with the possibility of interference with Allied access. Extensive stockpiles existed in Berlin and there were plans for a quadripartite airlift in the event of a total Soviet-GDR blockade of land access. It was advisable that more attention be given to the possibility of "gradual harassment of civil (i.e., German) access". If the Heads of Government approved, joint planning with the Germans would be initiated in this field.¹

3. Discussion of the Contingency Planning Paper

Western Foreign Ministers Meeting, May 18, p.m. In a meeting held in the afternoon of May 18, the three Western Foreign Ministers reviewed the Berlin contingency planning paper prepared by the tripartite working group and agreed that its conclusions should be presented to the Western Heads of Government.

Regarding the paragraph of the paper which dealt with action in the United Nations, Couve de Murville made the point that a decision on submitting the Berlin problem to the United Nations could only be taken in the light of the circumstances at the appropriate time, particularly with regard to the state of public opinion and the general atmosphere. Lloyd remarked in this

¹From Paris, tel. SECto 40, May 18, secret; "Berlin Contingency Planning", May 18, secret.
context that the Governments would have to decide whether they wanted to carry the action over into the General Assembly.

Secretary Herter stated that the only point which he wished to make was that the language in Section V relating to plans for a Berlin airlift should not be construed to mean that a decision had already been taken to mount such an airlift but that it merely indicated that relevant plans for an airlift existed.

After some discussion of the suggestions made in Sections IV and V of the paper for further planning, the Foreign Ministers agreed that German participation in some aspects of this planning would be necessary. The Foreign Ministers also decided to recommend to the Heads of Government that there should be further planning regarding indirect countermeasures and harassment of German civilian access.

The Foreign Ministers likewise accepted a proposal which Brentano had made to Couve de Murville earlier, namely, that the Four Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin should meet the following day (May 19) prior to the departure of the delegations from Paris. Herter suggested that the need for further study of the problems treated in Sections IV and V of the paper might be indicated to the Germans at such a meeting.

Finally, the three Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their conviction that it would be most unfortunate if the fact became publicly known that the Western Powers were currently reviewing their Berlin contingency plan.¹

Meeting of the Western Heads of Government, May 18, p.m.
At the meeting of the Western Heads of Government which immediately followed the deliberation of the three Foreign Ministers, Couve de Murville reviewed Berlin contingency planning and declared that it was generally satisfactory except for those points where additional planning was required. One point related to the action that might be taken in the United Nations if there was a threat of a disruption of Allied communications. The other related to

the problem of supplying the civilian population of West Berlin in the event of a rupture of communications, which had been raised by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan in a previous meeting of the Heads of Government.

In reply to a question from President de Gaulle with respect to the supply of West Berlin's civilian population, Couve de Murville stated that it was a matter of stocks available in Berlin as well as of transporting supplies from the Federal Republic to Berlin. At this time there were stocks of foodstuffs for about six months, he said, and it should be considered whether anything further needed to be done. As for transporting food and other necessities, Couve de Murville declared that the only feasible means of transportation in the event of a complete blockade would be an airlift, which, however, would not be as easy as in 1948.

President Eisenhower pointed to the problem that the Allies might have to face a succession of little events, none important enough in itself to arouse public opinion. But unless the world realized that a major act of injustice was involved the Allies would not be able to take strong measures. This, the President said, indicated the necessity for even closer cooperation between the three Western Powers.

President de Gaulle agreed that an actual blockade of Berlin was less likely than measures of harassment, in which case economic countermeasures would be the most effective means of action against the GDR. De Gaulle inquired in this connection whether the Foreign Ministers had considered specific measures of this kind.

Couve de Murville replied that the Foreign Ministers had a rough idea as to what should be done but that the experts had not yet studied the problem in detail, since they had mainly concentrated on the question of Allied communications. He pointed out in this connection that Allied communications were guaranteed by agreements with the Soviet Union and that this provided a basis for action, while civilian traffic between Berlin and the Federal Republic was under the control of East German authorities. President Eisenhower finally suggested that the Working Group
should consider all possible measures to ensure the supply and
the health of West Berlin.¹

Meeting of the Working Group on Germany Including Berlin,
May 19. In accordance with the decision taken by the Foreign
Ministers in their meeting of May 18, the Working Group on
Germany Including Berlin met on May 19 to discuss Berlin con-
tingency planning as well as the possibility of a peace treaty
between the USSR and the GDR. The chief representatives were
Martin J. Hillenbrand for the United States, Sir Anthony Rumbold
for the United Kingdom, Jean Laloü for France, and Karl Carstens
for the Federal Republic.

The consensus at the meeting was that a separate treaty was
not imminent but that Khrushchev's speech in East Berlin would
shed further light on his immediate intentions.

The British and French stressed that it would be advisable
for the Western representatives in Berlin to avoid "discretely"
any actions that could provide the Soviet Union with a pretext
for harassments. The British stated that they were issuing
specific instructions in the matter.

At the request of the Germans, the Group discussed whether
any action might be taken to prevent a separate treaty or to
cope with unfavorable consequences of such a treaty were it
concluded. The consensus was that little could be done to
prevent the Soviet Union from going ahead with a separate treaty
once it had decided to do so. Regarding the probable con-
sequences of the treaty, Hillenbrand declared that it would be
used as a basis for claiming that Allied rights in Berlin had
ended and for harassing Allied access. The latter would be the
most serious consequence.

With regard to the legal position which the Western Powers
would adopt in the event of the conclusion of a treaty, there
was agreement that it would be better to concentrate on the
argument that the treaty could not affect Western rights rather
than on the argument that there was no such state as the GDR.

¹U.S. Del. memorandum (US/MG/42) of conversation among
Eisenhower, Macmillan, de Gaulle, and others, May 18, 1960, secret;
from Paris, tel. CAHTO 12, May 19, secret.
The Germans expressed some concern over the effect of a separate treaty on the neutrals and the possibility that the latter might recognize the GDR in the belief that the treaty signified the permanent division of Germany. The British and French, however, expressed doubt that the treaty would greatly change the existing situation. The United States pointed out that the Germans might be more effective than the three powers in dissuading neutrals from recognizing the GDR, by emphasizing the importance of their economic relations with the Federal Republic.

Carstens mentioned that the Germans had thought of the possibility of a new treaty between the Western Powers, or NATO, and the Federal Republic in the event of a treaty between the Soviet Union and the GDR, but that the German Foreign Office was divided on that issue. Carstens said that the signatories of such a new treaty would undertake to do everything possible to achieve a just peace treaty for all of Germany and not to conclude or recognize a separate peace treaty with any part of Germany. Other states would be asked to accede to the new treaty, and as a result there would be counterpressure on the neutrals. Presumably, Carstens said, the neutrals would decide to accede to neither treaty and thus the status quo would be preserved. The United States wondered whether the suggested treaty would have any other function than "to neutralize the neutrals". The British and French expressed strong reservations, suggesting that the West had already assumed the obligations contained in the suggested treaty and that the latter itself would be regarded as a separate treaty and thus only add to the confusion.

The Germans were told that the three Western Foreign Ministers, in reviewing contingency planning, had decided that further urgent attention would be given to the question of civilian access and had agreed that the appropriate Western response would be selective economic countermeasures the burden of which would fall most heavily on the Federal Republic. The Germans concurred that such measures should be planned, but they doubted whether they would be as effective as during the 1948 blockade, in view of the development of East Germany's economy since that time. The French representative stated, in conclusion, that contingency planning with respect to civilian access would be initiated in Washington shortly and that the
three Western Embassies in Bonn and the German Foreign Office would be delegated to develop more detailed planning.¹

E. Khrushchev's Speech in East Berlin, May 20:
Postponement of the Crisis

Apprehensions among the Western delegations that the collapse of the summit conference might result in a new Berlin crisis had centered on Khrushchev's stop-over in East Berlin on his return trip to Moscow. But, contrary to the expectations of many, this visit did not produce any faits accomplis. The tone of an address Khrushchev delivered for the occasion, on May 20, was rather mild. At the beginning of this address, to be sure, the Soviet Premier aroused the expectation of his audience of East German Party officials by stating that "we are not going to wait too long" for the conclusion of a peace treaty and the "settlement of the West Berlin issue". But he went on to announce "to the visible disappointment of his audience", as the United States Mission in Berlin reported, a joint Soviet-East German decision that in anticipation of a summit conference to be held in six to eight months it was worthwhile "to wait a little longer and try to find by joint efforts of all four victorious powers" a solution to the problem of a peace treaty "with the two German states." Khrushchev declared that "the existing situation will apparently have to be preserved, till the Heads of Government Meeting, which, it is to be hoped, will take place in six or eight months." He made it clear, however, that this commitment was made on the assumption that the Western states would "abide by the principle not to permit any unilateral moves."¹

Thus, no immediate Berlin crisis resulted from the breakdown of the summit conference. Nevertheless, the period of a relaxation of East-West tensions, which had begun at Camp David, had come to an end when Khrushchev wrecked the summit conference and engaged in violent attacks on the United States and President Eisenhower. Despite Khrushchev's commitment not to take any unilateral action during the next six to eight months, the deterioration of the international atmosphere after the events in Paris compelled the West to prepare for new possible pressures.

in Berlin and at the same time continue the search for possible solutions on the lines considered prior to the collapse of the summit conference. The United States was confronted with the additional problem that this was the period of President Eisenhower's final months in office and that consequently no new initiatives regarding Berlin or any other problem of foreign policy could be expected.
Crisis Over Berlin: Part III (R.P. 614-C)

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