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SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet and East European general purpose forces through mid-1971, and general trends in those forces over the next 10 years.

NOTE

This estimate covers those portions of the Soviet military establishment which correspond generally to the DOD planning categories: General Purpose and Airlift and Sealift forces. It should be recognized that this treatment of the subject is somewhat arbitrary. For instance, such general purpose force elements as antisubmarine warfare forces, air defense missile units in the ground forces, and fighters in Tactical Aviation contribute to strategic defense, while cruise-missile submarines could be used for strategic attack. Conversely, Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles subordinated to Strategic Rocket Troops and medium bombers of Long Range Aviation would, in nuclear theater warfare, provide support to the ground forces.

East European ground and air forces are considered theater forces for the purpose of this estimate. This treatment is also somewhat arbitrary since most East European combat aircraft have the role of national air defense and can be logically considered westward extensions of Soviet strategic defenses.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. During the past year the trend toward larger and more flexible Soviet general purpose forces has continued. Ground and tactical air elements have grown, primarily as a result of the continuing vigorous military build-up along the Sino-Soviet border, and the Soviets have taken further steps to improve the capabilities of these forces for non-nuclear as well as nuclear operations.

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Theater Forces

B. The deployment, structure, readiness posture, and equipment of Soviet ground and tactical air forces reflect concern for both Central Europe and the Sino-Soviet border areas as potential arenas of major theater warfare. Out of at least 157 ground divisions, 31 are deployed in Eastern Europe, all are combat ready. About 30 are in the Sino-Soviet border area; at least 13 of these are believed to be combat ready, and the Soviets are continuing to strengthen this force. In both areas there are considerably higher levels of artillery and tactical missile support than are found elsewhere in Soviet ground forces. The Soviet forces opposing NATO, are bolstered by the East Europeans, and can be readily reinforced by the large ground forces which can be quickly mobilized in the western USSR. Forces on the Chinese frontier are supplemented by 6 Mongolian divisions and a large force of militarized border troops (about 70,000 men); they could further draw upon 15 additional divisions in the military districts (MDs) bordering China, and could be reinforced by forces from west of the Urals.

C. *Mobilization.* Soviet ground divisions in Eastern Europe and some opposite China appear to be ready for combat without further mobilization, as do the airborne divisions; they have no significant shortages of equipment or personnel. Among the other divisions, some of those in the western USSR can be fleshed out with reservists and civilian vehicles and made ready to move in a day or two; these divisions and those maintained at combat strength we designate Category I—that is, immediately available. A second major grouping of divisions consists of those generally requiring mobilization of half or more of their personnel and with significantly lower peacetime availability of major items of equipment; these divisions, which we designate Category II, could probably be fleshed out and deployed within a week. Soviet divisions which appear intended for longer term mobilization we designate Category III.

D. *Equipment of Ground Forces.* Soviet Category I and II divisions inside the USSR probably have most of the essential major items of equipment found in divisions in Eastern Europe with the exception of trucks and armored personnel carriers (APCs); in most cases they have a higher percentage of older model equipment. The current Soviet inventory of APCs is about 60 percent of the total requirements,

and about half of the available APCs are old models—essentially armored trucks. Category III divisions receive some new models, but the amount and quality of their equipment is generally much lower than that in other categories; new production would be required to equip them like other Soviet divisions.

E. *Fire Support.* There has been a significant increase in the conventional artillery support available to Soviet ground forces in Eastern Europe and to some of the forces along the Sino-Soviet border, considerably improving the capability of these forces to conduct non-nuclear operations. Soviet fire direction techniques and doctrine for employment of artillery, however, are not up to those of the US. The Soviets have also recently increased the nuclear fire support capabilities of their forces in East Germany with additional large free rocket (Frog) and tactical ballistic missile (Scud) launchers.

F. *Tactical Aviation.* Soviet Tactical Aviation now has about 3,700 fighters and light bombers—1,600 in air defense regiments, 1,500 in ground attack or tactical strike regiments, and 600 in reconnaissance or reconnaissance strike units. Almost all of the air defense elements are now equipped with the all-weather Mig-21 Fishbed, but over half of the ground attack and reconnaissance aircraft are obsolescent Mig-17 Frescos and IL-28 Beagle light bombers.

G. Soviet tactical fighters are characterized by short combat radii and small payloads; their design and rugged construction make them well-suited for operations from unimproved airfields. These characteristics would permit a high sortie rate from improved bases where sufficient logistics and maintenance support were available. Soviet tactical air doctrine, however, places heavy emphasis on operations from dispersed unimproved airfields; from such airfields the sortie rate would be low.

H. *Air Defense of Theater Forces.* A combination of SAMs and interceptors provides Soviet theater forces with good capabilities against attacks at medium and high altitudes, and some capabilities below 1,000 feet. Capabilities for detection and tracking of aircraft at low altitudes have been considerably improved by the widespread deployment in East Germany of a tower-mounted radar and data transmission systems. The Soviets have an excellent family of anti-aircraft artillery weapons for the defense of forward elements of the

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ground forces. The new SA-6 SAM system now under development will probably have sufficient mobility to accompany maneuvering ground forces and will have improved low-altitude intercept capabilities.

I. *Air and Sea Lift.* Soviet airlift capabilities are improving through the continued introduction of new, larger transport aircraft. At present the Soviets could, with the military aircraft assigned to this purpose, transport the assault elements of two of their airborne divisions for airdrop to a radius of 950 n.m. Efforts to improve tactical air assault capabilities are indicated by the formation of helicopter-equipped air-mobile units of battalion or regimental size. There is now sufficient Soviet naval infantry and amphibious shipping in each of the four Soviet fleet areas to support battalion or brigade-size landings. Sealift of large Soviet forces, however, would require the use of merchant marine ships and offloading ports.

Naval Forces

J. There has been a general improvement in the combat capabilities of Soviet naval forces which has been reflected in the expanded scope and frequency of operations outside home waters. These capabilities could be particularly effective in confined seas, such as the Mediterranean. The past year saw an intensification of Soviet efforts to improve naval capabilities to counter the threat posed by Western navies. Task force exercises involving surface combatants, submarines, aircraft, and auxiliaries increased in number and complexity; some were anticarrier, while others were antisubmarine warfare-oriented (ASW). At the same time, the Soviets made increased use of their growing capability to deploy small naval task groups in distant waters. Open ocean activities have increased in tempo as the Soviets experiment with newly developed equipment, tactics, and organizational concepts. Despite continuing improvement in equipment and training open ocean ASW capabilities remain limited. Soviet capabilities to combat naval task forces and to interdict sea lines of communication are based primarily upon missile-equipped medium bombers and submarines, and on surface-to-surface missile equipped surface ships.

Capabilities For Theater Warfare

K. We believe that in the event of a major military confrontation with NATO, Warsaw Pact planning calls for the deployment of five

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*fronts*¹ in Central Europe, to be comprised of Soviet forces in Central Europe and the western MDs of the USSR together with the national forces of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The Soviets probably have some doubts concerning the reliability and effectiveness of the Czechs, at least for the near term, but we have no evidence that their planning has changed. Such a force when assembled would probably contain about 1,290,000 men (60 percent of them Soviet), 20,000 tanks, 4,900 conventional artillery pieces, 3,700 combat aircraft (2,050 in air defense regiments and 1,650 in ground attack or reconnaissance regiments) and up to 350 nuclear capable tactical missile and rocket launchers. These forces would possess formidable capabilities for nuclear and non-nuclear offensive or defensive theater warfare. They would still be best suited, however, for nuclear warfare for which they were basically designed, and would be less effective for sustained conventional operations. If speed were the primary requirement the key elements of these five *fronts* could be assembled in about two weeks. In a situation where offensive capability against NATO (rather than maximum speed) was the prime consideration, the Soviets would almost certainly take at least three weeks to complete mobilization and a forward deployment.

L. The Soviet forces deployed against China provide the capability for either nuclear or non-nuclear warfare in Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia, and Manchuria. They do not provide the capability for a sustained conventional war deep inside China. The heavy tactical nuclear missile support provided these forces suggests a Soviet readiness to resort to nuclear weapons in a major conflict with China.

Future Trends

M. We have no evidence to suggest that any major changes will be made in Soviet theater force deployments in Eastern Europe, or that the number of divisions along the Sino-Soviet border will continue to grow much beyond the approximately 30 that are now there. The Soviets continue to develop and produce a remarkable variety of new weapons and weapons systems; equipment modernization programs for all theater forces will surely continue through the decade, but there is no evidence at present to suggest an impending change in the tempo of these programs.

¹ A Soviet term denoting a wartime organization roughly equivalent to an army group.

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N. Nevertheless, there is currently an unusual degree of uncertainty in estimating future trends in Soviet theater forces. The extent of deployments along the Chinese border could have far-reaching effects on Soviet theater forces as a whole. The trend toward improved non-nuclear capabilities, and the introduction of improved equipment, could result in considerable growth in the size and cost of both ground and tactical air forces. And the competition for resources between theater forces and strategic forces claimants might intensify or diminish, according to the fate of the arms control negotiations and the development of political relationships in the world generally.

O. The Soviets will continue vigorous efforts to improve ASW capabilities, introducing new submarine, surface, and airborne anti-submarine systems. These developments will not solve the main problem, however, which is to acquire a dependable capability to detect, localize, and classify submarines operating in the open ocean. It seems likely that any basic improvement in Soviet ASW capabilities—such an improvement as would gravely impair the value of Polaris as a strategic weapon—can arise only from technological innovation, concerning which we cannot make a useful estimate. Short of more complete success, however, we believe that by 1975 the Soviets will probably have the capability to detect and track some nuclear submarines; this capability will be greatest in the vicinity of narrow or restricted passages such as are found in the Mediterranean and Norwegian Seas where antisubmarine capabilities may be concentrated. Detection in the open ocean would result almost entirely from chance encounters.

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DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The main missions of Soviet general purpose forces include: security of the territory and coastal waters of the USSR and of neighboring allies against external attack; military pressure on or actions against Western Europe and China in support of broad Soviet objectives; deterrence of or action against developments in Eastern Europe contrary to Soviet interests; and the establishment of a military presence (primarily naval) in areas distant from the USSR. Forces developed for these missions contribute significantly to the main missions of other parts of the military establishment, i.e., strategic defense and attack forces.

2. Soviet theater forces (ground and tactical air forces) have been the main beneficiary of Russian military tradition; Soviet marshals would not be content with anything less than a massive standing army backed up by an efficient mobilization system. However, Soviet theater force development has been adversely affected by a decade or more of competition for resources with Soviet strategic attack and defense programs. During the Khrushchev regime theater forces were sharply reduced and equipment modernization programs were slowed. In recent years, however, these trends have been reversed; theater forces have grown, primarily as a result of the build-up of forces opposite China, and their capabilities have been improved.

3. The Soviets view Central Europe and the Sino-Soviet border areas as the most important potential arenas of major theater warfare. Soviet forces deployed in both areas enjoy priority for men and materiel and are maintained in a relatively high state of combat readiness. Other areas contain theater forces of lesser size and lower priority. Reinforcements and reserves for both major potential theaters of war would be drawn from the areas of greatest population density, primarily west of the Urals.

4. During the past year we have acquired important new evidence on Soviet mobilization procedures and on the differences between Soviet ground forces stationed in Eastern Europe and reinforcing units stationed inside the USSR. Further analysis along with some new evidence has permitted more confident estimates of the availability of certain types of ground force equipment.

II. GROUND FORCES

5. The Soviets maintain a large number of relatively small, heavily armored divisions at various levels of readiness. For the most part, divisions at the higher levels of readiness are subordinated to armies (in some cases to corps); in wartime these armies and corps would be incorporated into *fronts*. As compared with most Western forces, the combat power of Soviet ground forces is to a greater extent contained in the divisions; the higher echelons have fewer combat and support units. In general, the levels of service support are austere.

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Fronts

6. We have no evidence that the Soviets consider any of their present large theater force commands as *fronts*; the term is apparently reserved for wartime situations. A wartime *front* would consist of at least three ground armies (and/or corps) and a tactical air army; it might also include one or more airborne divisions. In addition *fronts* would contain such non-divisional support as artillery divisions or brigades, tactical missile units, air defense missile units, engineer units, and rear services.

7. The Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), is virtually a *front-in-being*. This is now probably also true of the Far East Military District (MD) which contains one army, three corps, a tactical air army, and heavy non-divisional combat support. The Transbaykal MD may in due course achieve near wartime *front* status, and in case of major hostilities with China, a *front* would probably be formed in the new Central Asian MD.² Upon mobilization for operations in Europe, two *fronts* would probably be formed in the western MDs for reinforcement opposite the Central Region of NATO, and one might be formed in the Odessa MD on the southern flank of NATO.

8. In wartime, the Soviets would establish theater-level headquarters in areas involving more than one *front* and/or elements from several types of forces, e.g., theater forces, air defense forces, and strategic attack forces.

Armies and Corps

9. We believe that in wartime Soviet ground forces would be deployed and fought primarily as armies or corps. There are 19 Soviet ground armies; we expect that additional armies will be formed in the Sino-Soviet border area. Most of the armies within the USSR would require mobilization of army level support units prior to commitment. The armies in GSFG, however, are almost certainly combat-ready as they now stand; those along the Sino-Soviet border, will probably also be maintained at or near combat-ready status.

10. Soviet armies have from 3 to 5 line divisions and additional supporting units. These armies are probably intended for commitment with their normally assigned division structure, but the Soviets have demonstrated that divisions can be readily transferred among armies if necessary. Armies are nominally of two types: the Tank Army, in which all or a majority of the divisions are tank divisions, and the Combined Arms Army in which all or a majority of the divisions are motorized rifle. Most armies now appear to be of the combined arms type.

11. Soviet armies have rather light combat support. Typical of army level combat support units are: an artillery brigade (54 guns); a Scud missile brigade (6-9 launchers); an air defense missile regiment; a signal regiment; engineer bridging and assault river crossing units. The inclusion of such units in the various armies

²The Soviets have recently carved this new military district from the Turkestan MD.

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apparently depends upon wartime missions and peacetime readiness levels. For example, in GSFG one, possibly two, of the five armies lack an artillery brigade. The army troops of Soviet armies in GSFG range from 9,000 to 12,000 men.

12. There are a dozen or so Soviet corps headquarters. They do not represent an intermediate echelon between division and army headquarters; in most cases they function as small army headquarters. They have few non-divisional support units, sometimes none. Three of the five divisions now deployed in Czechoslovakia are probably subordinated to a corps headquarters.

Divisions³

13. The Soviets now have at least 157 line divisions of three different types: 97 are motorized rifle, 53 are tank, and 7 are airborne. This is four more than estimated last year, reflecting almost entirely the build-up opposite China.

14. The Soviet motorized rifle and tank divisions are basically designed for combat of short duration on a nuclear battlefield. They have a very high proportion of tanks to personnel; when fully equipped with vehicles they have excellent tactical mobility. To achieve these characteristics the Soviets have sacrificed staying power to some extent. The divisions are apparently designed to fight until relieved by fresh divisions.

Categories of Readiness

15. Soviet ground divisions vary widely in terms of peacetime personnel strength, levels of major items of equipment on hand, and the modernity of equipment on hand. They also vary as to the extent and type of training conducted. We believe our evidence on Soviet divisions provides a reasonably firm basis for estimating equipment levels and the extent of training activity. However, our information on personnel strengths is less complete. We believe, nonetheless, that there is a relationship between equipment and personnel levels.

16. Despite considerable variation, Soviet divisions fall into three general groupings consistent with the states of readiness described in Soviet military writings. Divisions stationed in areas where filler personnel and equipment are not readily available, such as those in Eastern Europe and some of those in the Sino-Soviet border areas, probably have all or almost all of their equipment and personnel. The seven Soviet airborne divisions are probably equipped and manned at the same general levels. These divisions are essentially combat ready as they stand. We designate them Category I.

17. We also designate as Category I a number of divisions located in the western USSR which can be readied for commitment very quickly. They are not manned and equipped at the same high levels as those described above, but can be fleshed out with specified local reservists and some 400-600 civilian vehicles and be made ready to move within a day or two, thus meeting the

³For numbers and deployment of Soviet ground divisions, see Table I.

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criteria for a high state of readiness. These divisions have about 75 to 80 percent of their equipment on hand. Their personnel strengths probably range around two-thirds of that found in divisions in GSFG, but with considerable variation among divisions. Personnel strengths in subordinate tank units would tend to be higher; in motorized rifle units, lower.

18. The second major grouping consists of divisions having about 45 to 65 percent of their equipment. Their personnel strengths vary considerably, probably ranging from about one-quarter to one-half of GSFG levels. These divisions could be filled up with reservists, augmented with up to 1,300 civilian vehicles, and deployed within several days to a week. These we designate Category II.

19. There are some Soviet divisions with even less equipment than Category II divisions. They probably contain about 1,000 men each, primarily an officer cadre and enlisted caretaker elements. They appear to be intended for later mobilization, and probably could not be equipped like other Soviet divisions without increased new production. These we designate Category III or cadre divisions.

20. There are 7-9 divisions along the Sino-Soviet border which we cannot as yet assign to a category. When the build-up is completed, these developing divisions will probably be Category I or II.

Division Equipment

21. The Soviet motorized rifle division (MRD) at full strength has about 10,000 men and about 2,450 major items of equipment.⁴ The equipment includes 186 medium tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 72 artillery pieces. The Soviet tank division at full strength has about 8,000 men and 2,300 major items of equipment, including 310 medium tanks, 80 APCs, and 60 artillery pieces. Soviet airborne divisions have about 6,000 men and 1,000 major items of equipment. We have previously carried a small number of tank divisions as "heavy" tank divisions. These were smaller (lacking a motorized rifle regiment) and contained heavy tanks (T-10, JS-3). Heavy tanks are still observed in some tank divisions, but we are not certain that a "heavy" tank division now exists as a separate type.

22. Soviet divisions inside the USSR, with the exception of those along the Sino-Soviet border, are probably not as generously equipped with new model equipment as those in GSFG. There is, however, no apparent uniform distribution of new equipment. New models of armored vehicles have been detected in some divisions of each category, but a Carpathian MD Category I division which participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia lacked antitank guided missiles and was short of APCs. (After it became part of the occupation force, these deficiencies were corrected.) Two Category II divisions mobilized at the time

⁴These increases of about 100 major items of equipment per division over last year's estimate result primarily from increases in artillery. See paragraph 28.

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of the invasion had few or no APCs. On the other hand, one division from the Baltic MD was fully equipped with the newest Soviet medium tank, the T-62.

Armored Vehicles

23. By far the predominant feature of Soviet ground force equipment is the tank. The Soviets would require over 34,000 medium tanks to fully equip all categories of divisions; even a modest estimate of tanks not in divisions would raise this number to over 35,000. Large scale and continuous peacetime tank production would be required to meet these requirements and to maintain a modernization program. We believe that the annual production of T-54 and T-55 model medium tanks through 1968 was adequate to provide a current inventory of about 24,000 of these tanks and to account for Soviet exports to other countries. The newest medium tank, the T-62, has been produced at a more moderate pace; about 6,500 are probably now in inventory. The remaining requirement (about 4,500 tanks) appears to have been met at least to some extent by the use of older model tanks and assault guns. We believe that there are no large reserves of Soviet tanks.

24. The Soviets have placed considerable emphasis on gun stabilization in their tank development; the T-62, the T-55, and some of the T-54 tanks have gun stabilization in both the vertical and horizontal planes. The Soviets have not, however, equipped their tanks with stereoscopic range finders.

25. Soviet tactical doctrine calls for the mounting of all infantry in amphibious APCs, preferably on the basis of one per squad—this would require about 37,000 vehicles. In order to equip all Soviet forces with APCs on the lesser scale evident in GSFG, the Soviets would require an inventory of about 26,000 such vehicles. Our analysis indicates that there are about 16,000 APCs in inventory, fewer than half of which are new amphibious models (BTR-50 and BTR-60); the rest are old model BTR-152s and BTR-40s which are essentially non-amphibious armored trucks with relatively poor cross-country mobility. Some APCs are found in divisions at all levels of readiness, but in general Category I divisions in the USSR probably have fewer APCs (and older models) than found in GSFG divisions. Many Category II divisions probably depend primarily on using mobilized civilian trucks for personnel carriers.

26. A new infantry fighting vehicle has begun to enter inventory in Soviet ground forces. It is a low silhouette, tracked amphibious squad carrier with a turret-mounted 76 mm gun and an antitank guided missile. This vehicle is well-suited to Soviet tactical doctrine; it is not well-suited for transport of infantry over long distances since the troop compartment is very small. The vehicle has been sighted in parades and in limited numbers with Soviet units.

Artillery Support

27. A high density of tanks provides Soviet ground forces with very heavy direct fire support. Soviet capabilities to provide continuous indirect fire support are less impressive. One common Soviet practice designed to compensate for

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this is the employment of tanks to provide indirect fire support from defilade positions. The emphasis on tank fire is fully consistent with Soviet concepts of ground force operations in the nuclear environment.

28. Recent changes in Soviet artillery strength in GSFG have resulted in an overall increase of 480 in the number of guns available. In addition, there has been a 50 percent increase in the number of multiple rocket launchers. These increases have probably also occurred in some of the forces along the Sino-Soviet border, but we do not have evidence of them in other ground forces elsewhere within the USSR. These developments improve the capabilities of the ground forces for conventional operations. All Soviet tube artillery is towed rather than self-propelled; it is generally lighter in caliber than NATO artillery and is out-ranged by some. Soviet techniques for the employment of artillery are not up to those of the US. There is a strong tendency for Soviet artillery to rely on rigid prior planning. The Soviets do not practice many of the modern techniques for the massing of fires. Much of the recent increase in Soviet field artillery results from increased organic artillery in motorized infantry regiments.

Missile Support

29. The general support tactical ballistic missile is the Scud, which is allocated to army and *front* echelons of organization. We believe there are about 40 Scud brigades in the USSR and in the GSFG. In the GSFG, each army is believed to have one 9-launcher brigade and there are probably two larger brigades (up to 12 launchers) subordinate to GSFG Headquarters. Ground forces in the USSR probably have about the same level of Scud support as in the GSFG.

30. Soviet divisions deployed in Eastern Europe have Frog (free rocket over ground) battalions probably with four launchers each. We believe that Category I and II divisions within the USSR have three Frog launchers; Category III divisions may have two launchers each.

31. Soviet ground commanders have long complained of the lack of a tactical missile system with the range and mobility suited to the needs of the *front*. The Soviets have developed a missile, the SS-12 which can meet these needs: we estimate that it is capable of carrying a 1,500 pound warhead to a range of 500 n.m. We have no evidence that the SS-12 missile is deployed with the ground forces. We believe, however, that the SS-12 is carried by the Scaleboard transporter-erector-launcher. Scaleboard units are probably under the control of the Strategic Rocket Forces rather than the ground forces. It is likely however, that Scaleboard would be used in support of theater operations if required. This is especially true in the Sino-Soviet border area, where Soviet ground forces cannot call upon the heavy missile support from medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) available in the west. We believe there are also some mobile Shaddock cruise-missile units which could provide additional *front* level support.

32. The Soviets have conventional high explosive warheads for Frogs and Scuds, but there is little evidence indicating the numbers of such warheads avail-

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able or their tactical use. These warheads probably now include some of the high fragmentation, improved conventional munitions type. This type of warhead for Frogs and Scuds would greatly improve their effectiveness for non-nuclear operations.

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons

33. The Soviets have developed and stockpiled a variety of nuclear weapons for delivery by Frogs, tactical ballistic missiles, and aircraft. For reasons of tactical readiness and efficiency we would expect nuclear weapons to be stored in some Soviet depots in the forward area. We have identified some sites immediately adjacent to Soviet-controlled airfields in Eastern Europe which appear to be intended for such storage. We believe that nuclear weapons are not normally stored in the forward area. We do believe, however, that the Soviets could react quickly to provide nuclear weapons to the using units of theater forces. They almost certainly have not entrusted any nuclear weapons to their East European allies, nor do we believe they will in peacetime. Even in wartime, they would retain close control over any weapons allocated to the East Europeans.

34. The Soviets have developed all types of toxic chemical agents including nerve gases. We believe that the Soviets have almost certainly developed toxic chemical warheads for Frogs, tactical ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. Toxic chemical artillery shells and multiple rockets are available to Soviet ground forces.

35. Available evidence indicates that the Soviets plan for the use of a large number of chemical warheads in addition to nuclear weapons in theater nuclear warfare. [

]Soviet theater forces are well organized, equipped, and trained for defensive chemical warfare. Defensive equipment includes new detector kits, but these do not provide timely warning against nerve agents.

36. Although the Soviets are conducting research activity applicable to biological warfare, we have no evidence indicating that they have produced biological weapons for tactical uses. There is some evidence, however, that such weapons might be used in circumstances in which Warsaw Pact forces were being forced to withdraw.

III. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT AND THEATER AIR DEFENSE⁶

37. The mission of Soviet Tactical Aviation, which the Soviets call "Aviation of the *Front*," is to support the theater/*front* commander. The functions of Tactical Aviation include air superiority operations, close air support and interdiction in conjunction with ground force operations, strikes against targets of strategic importance to the *front*, and air defense of the theater of operations. Tactical Avia-

⁶For numbers and deployment of Soviet tactical aircraft, see Tables II and III.

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tion also provides reconnaissance support for ground and air operations, and some air transportation. The air elements to perform these functions are organized into Tactical Air Armies (TAAs) which in wartime are assigned to *fronts*.

38. Soviet Tactical Aviation is organized into 14 identified TAAs. These air armies vary greatly in size and composition. The largest is the 24th TAA, deployed in East Germany. It has about 720 combat aircraft, 10 percent fewer than estimated last year. This reduction is due to last year's withdrawal of Brewer-equipped light bomber units to the USSR. A new air army has probably been created in the Transbaykal-Mongolia area since 1966; it now contains about 310 combat aircraft. The other air armies in the Far East have been strengthened also. The additional aircraft were drawn primarily from reserves.

39. Tactical Aviation is now composed largely of fighter aircraft. We estimate that there are now about 1,600 fighters in regiments whose primary mission is air defense and 1,100 in regiments whose primary mission is ground attack. In addition there are about 390 light bombers in strike units and about 600 fighter and light bomber types in reconnaissance and strike reconnaissance units.

40. There are an additional 200-300 older model tactical aircraft collocated at Tactical Aviation bases. There is some evidence indicating that ground attack regiments have 48 fighters instead of the 36 currently estimated. If so, this would indicate that about half of the collocated aircraft are in fact assigned to Tactical Aviation. The Soviets continue to maintain a reserve of older aircraft which has been used to equip new Tactical Aviation units along the Sino-Soviet border and for deliveries to other nations, particularly the Arab states. We believe that some of these aircraft have gone to the Soviet air training establishment which has been substantially increased.

Ground Attack

41. There are about 1,500 fighters and light bombers in Tactical Aviation whose primary function is to perform close air support, air strike, and interdiction missions. The capabilities of this force were improved in recent years through re-equipping of fighter units with the SU-7 Fitter and light bomber units with the Yak-28 Brewer. However this re-equipment program ceased a year or so ago, leaving over half the ground attack/tactical strike force still equipped with the obsolescent Mig-17 Frescos and IL-28 Beagles.

42. Both the Fresco and the Fitter were designed as interceptors; their performance in ground attack roles is characterized by short combat radii and small payloads. However, their design and rugged construction make them well-suited for operations from unimproved or improvised airfields. Soviet tactical air doctrine indicates that ground attack fighters would be rather widely dispersed on unimproved fields and suitable highway sections 70 to 100 kilometers behind the front lines. Bomber and reconnaissance regiments would apparently be deployed 200 to 300 kilometers behind the front lines.

43. Since Soviet tactical aircraft use light loads of fuel and ordnance, they can theoretically sustain a high sortie rate, e.g., 4 or 5 sorties per day. However,

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actual sortie rates for a Soviet ground attack unit are more a function of pilot stamina and logistic support than of aircraft characteristics. The pilot to aircraft ratio in ground attack regiments is probably about 1.3 to 1. Logistic support at permanent, improved bases of Tactical Aviation could probably support high sortie rates for at least a few days, but sortie rates of such units operating from dispersed and unimproved airfields would probably be quite low.

44. We believe that the Soviets do not rely heavily on forward air controllers with ground units to coordinate close-in ground attack operations. Ground controlled intercept equipment with major ground formations is used to vector attack aircraft into the target area after which aircrews identify specific targets visually. While Soviet doctrine stresses attack of targets of opportunity, Soviet ground support tactical air exercises predominantly involve preplanned targets. Soviet tactical air strike doctrine and training concentrate heavily on attacks against the nuclear delivery means, logistic installations, and command posts in the opponent's immediate rear area. Close-in support of front line ground forces has received far less attention, but Soviet military writings indicate a growing concern for improvement in this area, particularly for non-nuclear contingencies.

Reconnaissance

45. Reconnaissance units of Soviet Tactical Aviation have been improved significantly in recent years through the continued introduction of the Brewer D, and more recently through the replacement of most Frescos with the Fishbed H. The latter aircraft has considerably improved range capabilities over other new Soviet fighters. A Fishbed H variant has appeared, recent evidence raises the possibility that it could be assigned ground attack rather than reconnaissance missions. All reconnaissance units could be used in a strike role.

Pilot Training

46. The recent growth in the numbers of Tactical Aviation units has increased the requirements for aircrew personnel. This, plus Soviet programs for training aircrews for other countries, has increased the size of the air training establishment. We believe that about 1,500 combat-type aircraft are used for training. This training establishment supports Tactical Aviation as well as other types of air forces; its growth indicates that the Soviets will have sufficient aircrews to maintain the size of Tactical Aviation or, if need be, to increase it.

47. Soviet tactical fighter regiments concentrate their training on their primary mission. However, the mandatory flying schedule for tactical aviation pilots (100-110 hours per year) includes about 10 percent cross-training in other missions. This provides the Soviet air commanders with at least a minimal capability to use ground attack regiments in the air defense role and vice versa. The total flying time for Soviet tactical aircrews probably averages some 125-150 hours per year. The Soviets have an intensive ground training program for aircrews.

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Air Munitions

48. The Soviet nuclear stockpile includes bombs for delivery by tactical aircraft. Soviet Tactical Aviation can deliver nuclear bombs with both fighters and light bombers; ground attack fighter regiments are trained in sophisticated bombing techniques. The Soviets also have toxic chemical bombs available for tactical use and some aircrews specially trained for their delivery. We have no evidence of Soviet use of tactical aircraft for spray dissemination of chemical warfare (CW) agents, but a capability to employ this technique cannot be ruled out. The Soviets have a variety of conventional munitions for delivery by Tactical Aviation, including bombs weighing 550, 1,100, and 2,200 pounds.

Air Defense Fighters

49. Since 1960 the Soviets have made a substantial qualitative improvement in the air defense elements of Tactical Aviation. Most of the aircraft delivered to the force in recent years have been late model, all-weather, Mig-21 Fishbeds, which now constitute more than 95 percent of the aircraft in air defense regiments. The Fishbed, a light-weight, ruggedly designed, Mach 2, all-weather interceptor, can also perform the air superiority mission. This aircraft can and has operated for sustained periods from unimproved airfields. It has been produced in eight, possibly nine, variants. The latest variant, identified in East Germany, has improved payload capabilities and improved air intercept radar.

50. As in the case of tactical air support aircraft, Soviet tactical air defense fighters can theoretically sustain a flying rate of four or five sorties per day. The principal constraint on sortie rates is pilot fatigue and logistic support. The pilot to aircraft ratio in air defense regiments is about 1.5 to 1; the logistic support at permanent improved airfields could support a sortie rate of 4-5 per day for at least a few days. Soviet tactical air defense aircraft were designed to operate under the austere conditions of a battlefield environment. The sortie rates of units operating from unimproved airfields would probably be low.

Warning and Control

51. Soviet theater force air defenses in Eastern Europe are coordinated with the national air defenses of the other Warsaw Pact countries and with the air defenses of the USSR (PVOS). Air defenses of all theater forces would probably act in accordance with the general plans of the commander of PVOS until those forces were committed to ground operations; at that time, control would probably be maintained by the Deputies for Air Defense of the major force commanders.

52. During the past year, the Soviets have continued to exhibit major concern for improving their air defense posture in the forward area, particularly against low altitude attack. The Soviets have approximately 60 radar stations in Eastern Europe, and are continuing to deploy the tower-mounted Squat-Eye radar at those stations. This radar, first observed in 1966, is improving the low altitude surveillance and tracking capability down to 200-300 feet. It is possible that where the terrain is suitable this capability is better—perhaps as low as 100 feet. Since 1968 a track-mounted air surveillance radar, Long Track, has also been deployed

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in Eastern Europe at Soviet radar stations. Data transmission systems for rapid reporting of tracking information and for ground control of interceptors have probably been widely deployed with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

Surface-to-Air Missiles and Anti-Aircraft Artillery

53. Soviet forces in Eastern Europe have about 40 SA-2 battalions. An SA-2 regiment, which usually consists of three battalions, is deployed with the Groups of Soviet Forces in Poland, Hungary, and probably Czechoslovakia. In East Germany there are 10 SA-2 regiments deployed for defense of CSFG. In the USSR, there are probably 45 to 65 additional SA-2 battalions manned by air defense troops of the ground forces. The SA-2 system deployed with theater forces has a capability to intercept targets at medium to high altitude at ranges of 24 to 27 n.m. and some capability down to 1,000 feet. It is used primarily for defense of relatively static rear area installations, as it is not mobile enough to provide continuous support to maneuvering troops.

54. The SA-3 has been deployed in East Europe to provide low altitude point defense of Soviet tactical airfields in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. Under favorable conditions, including optimum acquisition, this system can intercept aircraft at about 500 feet at a range of 2-7 n.m. Depending on the conditions of weather, site masking, elevation of the fire control radar, speed and reflective area of the target, the minimum altitude could be as low as 300 feet at ranges of 2-4 n.m.

55. The Soviets are now deploying the track-mounted SA-4 system into the theater forces. The SA-4 has been identified at training sites in East Germany. The SA-4 has a range of 25-30 n.m., and we estimate that it can engage targets down to about 2,000 feet at lesser ranges.

56. The Soviets rely heavily on light anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) for air defense of ground forces. They have introduced a new radar-controlled, quad-mounted, 23 mm weapon, which is carried on a tracked chassis which also mounts the AAA fire control radar Gun Dish. Both the Gun Dish and the Flap Wheel (used with 57 mm and lower caliber) operate in the X-band. The older Fire Can radar is also still in use with AAA guns.

57. In addition to the improvement of their active defenses, the Soviets have, since mid-1967, engaged in a program to improve the survivability of their forces, especially in Eastern Europe. Revetments and/or hard shelters have been constructed at Soviet radar, command and control, ground and air installations to protect those resources. Camouflaging has been identified at radar sites and airfields.

Electronic Warfare

58. The Soviets have the capability to jam airborne radar bombsights, to screen headquarters facilities, troop concentrations, and other critical targets in conjunction with air defense weapons systems operations in the field. There is no evidence to indicate a Soviet capability to jam terrain-following or side-looking radar equipment. Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) capa-

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bilities probably have been incorporated into the Gun Dish and Flap Wheel AAA radars.

59. Use of ECM by the Soviets to protect their tactical aircraft has been of rather limited nature. Generally they use specially fitted ECM aircraft for protection of tactical strike light bombers against enemy ground-based radar and weapons; active noise jammers and chaff, including the rocket-fired variety, constitute the bulk of their ECM equipment. The strike aircraft have ECM equipment designed to defend against enemy fighters. This equipment includes an AI radar threat-warning system and chaff dispensers, and possibly jammers. Ground attack fighters may have cannon shell chaff for use against ground-based fire control radars.

Transport Aviation and Helicopters

60. Soviet Tactical Aviation units provide light troop transport and utility support to the ground forces with about 250 light and medium transports such as Cab, Crate, and Camp and about 850 helicopters, primarily Hound and Hook. Most of the TAAs have one or more regiments equipped with helicopters; over half of the regiments have 10-15 heavy and 25-30 medium helicopters. The Soviets continue to demonstrate a growing appreciation for the tactical employment of armed helicopters, but there is no evidence that the Soviets have developed a helicopter intended specifically for armed missions. Light and medium helicopters have been observed armed with a variety of weapons such as machine guns, rockets, and antitank guided missiles.

IV. SERVICE SUPPORT OF THEATER FORCES

61. The Soviet system of supply and maintenance support was designed to support theater forces in the context of a brief nuclear war. Mobile stocks of conventional ammunition and fuel at division and army level are adequate for about five days of combat. Little is known of the availability of supplies at *front-level*. The Soviet resupply system down to *front-levels* remains heavily dependent on the railways. The Soviet maintenance system is apparently based in large part on minimum peacetime use of essential items of equipment. This equipment is retained as much as possible in covered storage, with wheeled vehicles often up on blocks, combat loaded. Unit maintenance organizations at all levels are small. The Soviet system would probably be adequate for a brief nuclear war, but it appears less well-suited for major conventional operations of long duration.

62. The rear services of the *front* are responsible for the resupply of tactical air armies as well as the ground armies. Supply levels at permanent bases of TAAs are probably adequate to support sustained combat by air units for about the same duration as is the case with ground armies—i.e., about five days. Resupply after this period would be restricted somewhat by the limited availability of transport, particularly fuel trucks and pipeline equipment, at both *front* and air army levels. The extensive logistical support system which would be required for sustained air operations from dispersed unimproved airfields does not appear to be available in Soviet forces in East Germany.

63. The general austerity of rear service support has been sharply criticized by Soviet logisticians over the past several years, and some efforts have been made to remedy the situation. The fuel supply system has been improved through the introduction of collapsible portable storage tanks and pipeline units. The carrying capacity of general purpose transport has been increased through the introduction of new heavy duty trucks with four-wheeled trailers. The logistics load on the railroads has been reduced somewhat by the introduction of tank transporters, and by the expansion of the capabilities of transport aviation. The growing number and improved load-carrying capability of helicopters in theater forces is ameliorating to some extent the chronic problem of limited truck transport in ground units.

V. GENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES

64. The principal missions of the Soviet general purpose naval forces are: defense against seaborne attack, interdiction of sea lines of communication, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and support of operations ashore. The navy is also being used increasingly for political purposes abroad. In the past year the Soviets have strengthened their Mediterranean Squadron and conducted naval operations in the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean. Naval programs are emphasizing improved ASW and air defense capabilities. New construction includes several new classes of attack submarines, and surface ships better equipped for long-range operations.

Present Forces

65. *Submarines.* Our estimate of the strength and composition of the Soviet general purpose submarine force over the next two years is as follows:

TYPE	1 OCTOBER		
	1969	Mid-1970	Mid-1971
Cruise-Missile			
Nuclear (6-8 launchers)*	33	32	30
Diesel (most with 4 launchers)	28	27	26
Attack			
Nuclear ^b	24	27-28	33-37
Long-Range Diesel ^c	66	68	70
Medium-Range Diesel ^d	153	131	119
Short-Range Diesel	11	10	10
Unknown ^e			
A-Class	0-1	1-2	3
Undesignated	0	1	2
TOTAL	315-316	297-299	293-297

* See paragraph 67.

^b Includes new V-class and C-class submarines.

^c Increases are a result of the inclusion of Z-conversion units which have had their ballistic missile tubes removed.

^d Includes the new B-class.

^e The reduction in diesel-powered submarines results from estimated retirements and transfers to other countries.

^f The propulsion and weapons systems in these classes have not been determined.

66. The Soviets, having emphasized quantity in the past, are now pursuing construction programs designed to improve the quality of their submarines and thus enhance their submarine warfare capabilities. At least four new classes of general purpose submarines are probably now in series production. The nuclear-powered V and C classes are quieter than earlier Soviet nuclear submarines, are capable of high submerged speeds, and have new lower frequency, active sonars. The C-class is equipped with eight short-range (up to 40 n.m.) missiles (SSN-X-4) which are probably antiship weapons although the possibility of an anti-submarine role cannot be excluded at this time. The small B-class has been determined to have diesel propulsion for surface operations. Its submerged propulsion is unknown; it may be closed cycle diesel or fuel cell. We have no good evidence on the characteristics of the A-class. There is some evidence that the Soviets have been developing a submerged launch antisubmarine missile which may appear in one or more of the new classes.

67. Construction of earlier classes of cruise-missile submarines appears to have ended with the delivery during the past year of the last unit of the diesel-powered J-class. E-I nuclear-powered boats are being modified by removing their cruise-missile launchers, streamlining their hulls, and installing new bow sonars.

68. *Surface Forces.* We estimate the numbers and types of Soviet major combatant ships over the next two years as follows:

TYPE	1 OCTOBER	Mid-1970	Mid-1971
	1969		
Operational Surface Ships			
SAM/SSM Light Cruisers	9	11-12	14-15
SAM Light Cruisers	1	2	2-3
Helicopter Ships	2	2	2
SSM Destroyers	10	9	8
SAM Destroyers	23	29-30	34-35
Cruisers	11	10	9-8
Destroyers	53	48	43
Escorts	108	110	107
TOTALS	217	221-223	219-221

Four additional cruisers, 14 destroyers, and 10 escorts are in a reserve status; the time required to make them ready for sea is uncertain. The navy also has a large number of minor combatants and auxiliaries, including submarine chasers, landing ships, mine warfare ships, and some 160 patrol boats equipped with short-range cruise missiles.

69. The Soviets continue to improve the capabilities of their surface forces. The sixth unit of the Kresta-class light cruiser, now nearing completion, has new SSM launchers, smaller than those for the SS-N-3 installed in earlier ships of this class. It also carries the new SAM first seen on the helicopter ship Moskva. Future Krestas will probably be similarly armed. The second of the two Moskva-class helicopter ships has probably become operational; both are equipped with the new SAM system and a new missile launcher which is probably for an anti-

submarine weapon but which might also be designed to accommodate an SSM. Over the next several years conversions and new construction programs will probably add some 8-12 missile armed ships to the fleet each year. In addition, the Soviets are constructing a new class of patrol boats armed with a new short-range cruise missile.

70. *Naval Aviation.* Our estimate of the strength and composition of Soviet Naval Aviation for the next two years is as follows:

	1 OCTOBER 1969	MID-1970	MID-1971
Heavy Bombers			
Bear D (Reconnaissance)	45	50-55	59-55
Medium Bombers	545	500-560	480-540
Badger A ^a	(195)	(180-190)	(170-180)
Badger C ^b	(105)	(90-110)	(90-110)
Badger C ^c	(180)	(170-190)	(160-180)
Blinder	(65)	(60-70)	(60-70)
Light Bombers			
Beagle	60	40-60	30-60
Patrol/ASW Aircraft	100	110-135	120-150
Madge	(35)	(25-15)	(5-0)
Mail	(50)	(60-85)	(80-100)
May	(15)	(25-35)	(35-50)
ASW Helicopters	190	200-280	220-300
Hound	(140)	(110-140)	(100-130)
Hormone	(50)	(90-140)	(120-170)

^a Includes about 75 tankers, 55 reconnaissance, 15 configured for ASW, and 50 conventional bombers.

^b Configured to carry the AS-5 Kelt ASM.

^c Configured to carry the AS-2 Kipper ASM.

Except for shipborne Hormone ASW helicopters, Soviet Naval Aviation is land-based. The total number of naval aircraft has risen slightly over the past year due to increases in the numbers of ASW patrol aircraft and ASW helicopters. In recent years the emphasis in Naval Aviation has been on ASW and on improving reconnaissance and strike capabilities against surface ships. Long Range Aviation (LRA) aircraft continue to support naval air forces.

71. *Coast Defense.* Near the approaches to Soviet naval bases are some 25 to 35 naval coast defense sites which employ the Samlet (SSC-2b) cruise missile; the effective range of the Samlet varies from 25 to 45 n.m. depending on the location of the guidance radar. In addition, we believe that the Shaddock (SSC-1b), a mobile coast defense cruise missile, is operational and is gradually replacing the Samlet.

Recent Operational Activity

72. The past year saw an intensification of Soviet efforts to improve naval capabilities to counter the threat posed by Western navies. Task force exercises involving surface combatants, submarines, aircraft, and auxiliaries increased in

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number and complexity; some were anticarrier, while others were ASW-oriented. At the same time, the Soviets made increased use of their growing capability to deploy small naval task groups in distant waters on "show-the-flag" cruises. Open ocean activities have increased in tempo as the Soviets experiment with newly developed equipment, tactics, and organizational concepts.

73. The almost constant watch off Polaris bases, as well as Soviet writings indicate the gravity of Soviet concern regarding the Polaris threat to the Soviet homeland. Soviet intelligence collection ships have used harassment tactics against Polaris submarines entering or leaving port. On occasion the Soviets have used diesel-powered submarines in the central Mediterranean in a "lying in wait" role in restricted passages on submarine transit routes.

74. Much of the increased activity is directed to improving ASW capabilities with an emphasis in areas which are of especial interest to the US Navy for operations of Polaris and attack submarines—the Norwegian Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. In the Norwegian Sea the Soviets are increasing the deployment of submarines and surface ships and are using new land-based ASW aircraft in an effort to improve ASW defenses. In the Mediterranean a task group composed of a Moskva-class helicopter ship, several other modern ASW ships, attack submarines, and ASW patrol aircraft based in the UAR conducted antisubmarine exercises in late 1968 and again in 1969. In the Pacific, submarines, ships, and long-range aircraft operate from time to time over a wide area east and south-east of Japan.

75. Patrols by Soviet attack submarines generally followed the pattern of previous years with a few notable exceptions, including the first out-of-area deployment of C-class and V-class nuclear-powered submarines. Out-of-area deployments of J-class diesel-powered, cruise-missile submarines resumed in 1969, after a two year confinement to home waters. For the past year or so E-II nuclear-powered, cruise-missile submarines have not been sighted in the western Atlantic; but, one was detected recently off the Bahamas. An N-class torpedo attack submarine was sighted recently in the Gulf of Mexico, the first known deployment of a Soviet nuclear submarine to this area. The Soviets appear to be experimenting with longer patrols by diesel submarines; in the Mediterranean they apparently deploy for periods of four to six months, with considerable time spent in port. Early this year two submarines supported by a tender spent four and a half months in the Indian Ocean.

76. Amphibious forces of the Mediterranean Squadron recently conducted the largest landing exercise ever held outside Warsaw Pact waters. Seven Soviet landing ships participated in a landing exercise on the UAR coast with seaward screening by Soviet, and perhaps Syrian, and Egyptian naval forces. During the UAR landing, the helicopter ship, Moskva, conducted ASW exercises in the eastern Mediterranean. For the past two years 2-4 Soviet landing ships have been in the Mediterranean almost continuously.

77. Thus far in 1969 the Soviet Navy has visited two new areas as part of its expanding role of showing the flag. A task group of two destroyers, a submarine,

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and an oiler made the first visit to Guinea and Nigeria. In addition, the task group operated off Ghana in what appeared to be old-fashioned gun-boat diplomacy intended to speed release of Soviet trawlers the Ghanaians had previously seized. In June and July a force composed of three missile-equipped ships, two submarines, and several support ships cruised the US east coast, and, after visiting Havana and other Caribbean ports, operated in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Soviet naval units are continuing to make visits in east African and other Indian Ocean ports.

Capabilities Against Submarines

78. Soviet emphasis on ASW was intensified by Moscow's recognition that Western nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) have replaced aircraft carriers as the primary seaborne strategic threat, and that Western torpedo attack submarines must be neutralized if the Soviet Navy is to gain access to and operate in the open ocean in wartime. Attack submarines probably offer the Soviets the greatest promise in ASW, although the nuclear-powered N-class and the diesel-powered classes are not considered to be particularly effective because of their noisiness. The antisubmarine capabilities of the new classes of nuclear-powered attack submarines are clearly better than those of the N-class, but we cannot yet determine the extent of improvement. We believe all will have new or improved antiship or antisubmarine weapons and new sonars with increased range. One or more of the new classes will probably have a primary antisubmarine mission.

79. All major surface ships have sonar and some type of ASW weapon, but the Soviets designate certain classes specifically as antisubmarine. These include their most modern ships—the Moskva, Kresta, Kashin, and Kanin classes; all have SAMs for operations at sea without air cover and are equipped in varying degrees to operate ASW helicopters. Introduction of the Hormone helicopter has provided a detection and delivery system with increased range and quicker reaction capabilities. In addition, the Moskva class has new sonars with increased detection capabilities and probably a new ASW rocket weapon. These improved detection and weapons systems probably will appear on new ships; some older classes are expected to undergo retrofit.

80. Until recently, Soviet antisubmarine, shore-based, passive acoustic detection systems have been close inshore surveillance devices. Their capability to develop long-range systems is limited by hydrogeographic conditions and their technology in this field lags well behind that of the US. Lack of ready access to deep water with favorable acoustic characteristics for long-range sound propagation inhibits Soviet deployment of fixed, long-range shore-based systems. [

]Based upon the limited evidence available and the limitations imposed by geography, we consider it highly unlikely that the Soviets will soon achieve capabilities in

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this field comparable to those of the US. Our analysis of the Soviet systems leads us to believe that they would not be effective against quiet-running submarines.

81. Despite continuing improvement in equipment and training, we believe that current Soviet ability to detect, localize, and classify submerged submarines in the open ocean continues to be limited. However, detection potential and the capability to maintain contact increase appreciably within coastal areas contiguous to Soviet naval bases. Capabilities to classify and destroy submarines detected within range of an ASW platform are considered good.

Capabilities Against Naval Task Forces and Sea Lines of Communication

82. Soviet capabilities to combat naval task forces and to interdict sea lines of communication are based primarily upon missile-equipped medium bombers and submarines, and to a lesser extent on SSM equipped surface ships. These capabilities could be particularly effective in confined seas, such as the Mediterranean. Long-range Bear reconnaissance aircraft are assigned the mission of providing target data to these platforms.

83. Soviet capabilities against sea communications are greatest in the northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific. Of the some 130 general purpose (torpedo attack and cruise-missile) submarines in the Northern Fleet, we estimate that a third could be maintained continuously on station in the Atlantic approaches to Europe. In the Pacific about one-third of the 95 general purpose submarines could be kept on station in the northwest Pacific and the approaches to the Sea of Japan. Only a relatively small number could be maintained continuously on patrol off the US mainland for any length of time; we estimate this number at about 15 general purpose submarines in the western Atlantic and about half as many off the US west coast. As more nuclear-powered units enter service, these numbers will increase.

84. During 1967 the Soviets experimented with an afloat logistic support group for submarines in the mid-Atlantic. In the summer of 1969 the Soviets again carried out a limited support and replenishment operation in the western Atlantic in connection with the naval visit to Cuba. Use of such a support group would allow a considerable increase in the number of submarines which could be maintained on station and would extend the area of patrol activity, but such support groups would be highly vulnerable in time of war.

Capabilities for Sustained Long-Range Operations

85. Soviet efforts to expand and improve the capabilities of the navy to conduct sustained long-range operations are continuing. They are constructing more seaworthy, longer range combatants and new types of auxiliaries, and they are gaining valuable operational experience by more frequent "show-the-flag" cruises and open ocean exercises. The Soviets continue to employ a mix of naval auxiliaries and merchant ships to support naval forces at sea. They have however, transferred some merchant ships to the navy and have recently done so with one

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of their largest merchant tankers. The submarine force generally has been adequately provided with specialized support ships to meet operational requirements. Surface forces, in contrast, have operational limitations because of inadequate afloat support, particularly in terms of specialized repair ships, thus somewhat limiting the size of a force that can be deployed at a distance from the USSR and the length of time such a force can maintain a combat capability.

86. Although the Soviets have not constructed large numbers of specialized auxiliaries in the past, they may now be developing new and larger logistic support ships. However, until new logistic ships are available in quantity, the Soviets probably will continue to press for the use of shore facilities such as those made available by the UAR and Syria. We continue to believe that with their present resources the Soviets can support only limited surface naval operations on the high seas for extended periods of time, or larger operations for a few weeks. Without overseas naval shore support facilities any major increase in long-range surface operations would require augmentation of existing auxiliary forces, not only with oilers and cargo ships from the merchant fleet, but also with ships designed to provide specialized technical support to naval forces at sea.

Capabilities for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Warfare

87. *Weapons.* We believe that nuclear weapons have been allocated to the general purpose naval forces. Nuclear weapons in a variety of types and yields are available for delivery by air- and surface-launched cruise missiles and probably a small number of torpedoes and depth bombs. Soviet naval cruise missiles could carry chemical warheads. The most likely candidates for such warheads are those cruise missiles used by naval coastal defense units. Chemical shells for naval guns mounted on destroyers and cruisers are probably also available; such shells are stored in port and placed on ships only during major exercises or in wartime.

88. *Defense.* The Soviets continue to construct ships with water washdown systems, hermetically sealed compartments, filtered ventilation systems, and decontamination stations that would enable those ships to carry out their assigned missions in a toxic chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) environment. Extensive training is provided for the maintenance of a permanent, high level of CBR readiness for the various naval units.

VI. AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT

Airlift and Air Assault Capabilities

89. We believe the Soviets are organizing airmobile units of battalion or regimental size. They are probably structured and armed along the lines of airborne units but with enough organic helicopters to lift the entire unit.

90. The Soviets continue to add to their military air transport capabilities. There are now as many as 975 medium transports assigned to military transport

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units, of which about 800 are AN-12 Cubs. Some 725-750 of the latter provide the main intertheater lift for theater forces and have as a main mission the support of airborne troops. These could lift assault elements of two airborne divisions for airdrop to a radius of about 950 n.m. Some Cubs have improved range and weight-carrying capabilities; 350 of these could lift about 5,000 paratroops with supporting equipment to a radius of about 1,500 n.m., or a maximum range of 2,800 n.m. In an emergency, this lift capability could be augmented by other military transport and by medium- and long-range aircraft in the Soviet Civil Air Fleet.

91. The range and payload limitations of the AN-12 underscore the importance of the new AN-22 heavy transport, which can carry nearly 100,000 pounds of cargo or 175 troops to a radius of some 2,800 n.m. or a range of 5,100 n.m. The first few of these aircraft are now in service; some 25 could be operational by mid-1971. With the AN-22 the Soviets would be able to airlift all types of equipment assigned to a motorized rifle division.

Amphibious Assault and Sealift

92. We estimate there are currently about 12,000 men in the naval infantry, organized into brigade-size units, with two brigades located in the Baltic Fleet, two brigades in the Black Sea Fleet, one brigade in the Pacific Ocean Fleet, and one brigade in the Northern Fleet. The naval infantry's missions are apparently to assist in seizing critical beachheads and to conduct diversionary operations on the seaward flank. A small force of naval infantry has been present from time to time in the Mediterranean since June 1967; they have conducted several landing exercises, suggesting that the Soviets may intend to use the naval infantry as a token intervention force.

93. The current small number of landing ships in each of the fleet areas restricts the landing force to battalion- or brigade-size. New landing ships with greater speed, operating range, and capacity are being built, however, and there will probably be an increase in the strength of the naval infantry.

94. In addition to their military sealift capability, the Soviets have a large merchant fleet of over 1,000 cargo ships capable of transporting substantial quantities of military equipment and supplies. However, sealift by merchant ships in most cases would require the use of ports. Considerable time might be required to gather suitable merchant shipping for a major effort, since about 45 percent of active Soviet merchant ships are normally outside Communist waters.

VII. THE CONTRIBUTION OF EAST EUROPEAN FORCES

General Considerations

95. About 10 years ago the Soviets adopted a military policy which sought to create East European theater forces of sufficient size and quality to meet in large measure their requirements for combat-ready units in place opposite NATO. This policy provided for about 60 East European divisions and some 2,600 combat

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aircraft deployed from the Black Sea to the Baltic. Along with the 26 Soviet divisions and about 1,300 Soviet aircraft then stationed in East Europe, these forces would bear the initial brunt of war with NATO.

96. This policy was probably attractive to economy-minded Soviet political leaders, since it reduced the peacetime requirement for combat-ready Soviet forces. The cost of the large national forces was to be borne by the East Europeans themselves, who were expected to purchase most of their arms from the USSR. It was probably much less attractive to those Soviet military leaders who would have preferred to rely on their own forces rather than on allies. There was no integrated Warsaw Pact command and staff structure; command of the East European forces was vested in the various national Ministers of Defense. Under this arrangement, which still largely persists, the military viability of the new policy rested squarely on the political reliability of the East European regimes. Soviet marshals may have considered that the examples of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Hungary put in question the reliability of such regimes, but would have found it awkward to argue the point.

97. By 1965 strong military forces had been created in most of the East European countries, but strong currents of nationalism were straining the political solidarity of the East Europeans with Moscow. The Czech crisis of 1968 is but the latest in a series of developments putting in question the reliability of East European forces—the Hungarian insurrection, Romanian insubordination, the abortive Bulgarian coup, and Polish military disgruntlement at involvement in the Middle East crisis of 1967. Only the Ulbricht regime in East Germany remained relatively free from signs of unreliability.

98. Ironically, the Warsaw Pact's first real military operation was directed against a member country, Czechoslovakia, in order to suppress a domestic political tendency that had alarmed the East German, Polish, and Soviet regimes, but had been encouraged by Hungary and Romania (and Yugoslavia). The repercussions of this event have been unsettling in Eastern as well as Western Europe; it not only stimulated anti-Soviet popular sentiment, but also caused dissension within the Polish and Hungarian parties and governments. Although the fate of Czechoslovakia is likely to discourage any East European regime from asserting its national independence in opposition to Soviet interests for some time to come, the Soviets have reason to question the political reliability of those regimes and their armed forces.

Ground Forces⁶

99. East European line divisions are generally patterned on the Soviet model, although there are substantial variations in some countries. In general, East European field armies do not exist as separate entities in peacetime, but East European ground forces conduct army-level exercises, and some *front*-level elements probably exist in peacetime. In wartime, armies would be formed during

⁶For numbers and readiness levels of East European ground divisions, see Table V.

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mobilization from staff elements and units of the territorial military commands; they would contain from three to five divisions and combat and service support units, and would be similar to the Soviet combined arms armies.

100. Few, if any, of the East European divisions are maintained at full strength during peacetime. The best of these would contain from 10-20 percent reservists after mobilization. Some of the lower strength and newly activated units would require 50-80 percent reservists as fillers. Like the Soviets, the East Europeans would require significant numbers of reservists in order to form army- and front-level units.

Air Forces⁷

101. Judged in the light of equipment, training, and normal operations, East European air forces are largely for national air defense. Of about 2,500 combat aircraft, almost all are interceptors. The proportion of new model aircraft in East European air forces has increased from one-quarter last year to one-third now through the delivery of new fighters. Almost all aircraft delivered to the East Europeans during the past two years have been all-weather Mig-21 (Fishbed) interceptors.

102. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria have ground attack air regiments, but only the Czechs have a significant number of new model ground attack fighters (SU-7). The Poles have mostly older models in the ground attack roles; the Bulgarians have two regiments of Mig-17s. All East European fighter regiments, however, are cross-trained, probably to about the same extent as in Soviet tactical air units.

103. There are about 350 East European radar stations. These stations are equipped with the same types of radars employed by Soviet forces. Each nation operates its own air warning and control system. We do not know how warning and control information is coordinated among the several East European systems and those of the Soviet theater forces, but such coordination almost certainly exists.

Naval Forces⁸

104. East German and Polish naval capabilities continue to improve with the acquisition of more modern equipment and the broadening of operational experience, while those of Romania and Bulgaria have lagged. Warsaw Pact interfleet coordination has increased and East European navies may be playing a greater role. The East German and Polish Navies have prime responsibility for surveillance of the Danish Straits. Polish submarines and surface forces have operated both independently and with Soviet units in the North and Norwegian Seas and in the waters west of the British Isles; Bulgarian units have operated with the Soviets in the Mediterranean.

⁷ For numbers and types of East European combat aircraft, see Table VI.

⁸ For numbers and types of East European naval units, see Table VII.

VIII. THEATER WARFARE CAPABILITIES

Mobilization

105. The Soviets continue to place heavy reliance on large-scale mobilization in their theater warfare planning. Some Soviet military spokesmen did argue that mass mobilization and reinforcement are infeasible under general nuclear war conditions, but their views have not prevailed. The Soviets have assumed a period of tension prior to any major war which would provide time for mobilization. They have stressed speed of mobilization and reduced the heavy dependence on railroads for deployment.

106. The Soviet conscription and reserve system provides more than adequate total numbers of relatively young reservists to flesh out all divisions. However, in the interests of speed of mobilization, the combat units draw their reservists from the civilian population in the immediate vicinity of their peacetime garrisons. These reservists are designated by name by the local *voyenkomats* (military committees). As a result, quickly mobilized Soviet units would probably contain some enlisted reservists in older age groups.

107. The Soviet reserve system calls for frequent mobilization exercises and periods of active duty for reservists. If the practice in one Category I division is typical, however, it appears that such exercises are infrequent and reservist training probably consists of lectures to reserve officers. There is some evidence that lessons learned from mobilization for the invasion of Czechoslovakia have prompted new emphasis on practice mobilization and reserve training.

108. The Soviet mobilization system can probably flesh out all divisions except Category III within a few days of a mobilization order and have them ready to move. In situations where speed of reinforcement is the overriding factor, mobilized divisions would be deployed regardless of their equipment status.

109. The Soviets rely on a well-organized system for mobilizing civilian motor transport to offset the shortage of general purpose trucks in the ground forces. Portions of Soviet city motor pools are earmarked for military use. Trucks and buses manned by reservists are formed into military transport columns which report to nearby divisions upon mobilization, where they are reassigned to various units. Most of these trucks probably serve as logistic support vehicles, but some are used in place of APCs. Army- and *front*-level truck transport units are probably mobilized similarly. The biggest drawback to this system is that, on the whole, the mobilized trucks are not well-suited for military use, particularly with regard to off-road mobility.

110. The Soviets also plan to draw directly from the civilian economy other types of supporting units, e.g., engineer construction, railroad, signal, and medical units. They apparently do not count on quick mobilization of new units requiring a high degree of specialized military training, such as Tactical Aviation and missile units, although there is probably a fairly large pool of trained personnel to serve as fillers and replacements for standing units.

111. Soviet efforts to avoid over-reliance on railroads for deployment are evident in the formation of several military district-level tank transporter units. Tank transporters were used to move tracked vehicles into Eastern Europe during the invasion of Czechoslovakia. There are probably enough now available in the western USSR to carry the tanks of three or four tank divisions.

112. In a partial mobilization, time permitting, the Soviets would probably reassign major items of equipment from units not being mobilized to fill shortages in other units. Such redistribution of equipment occurred during the partial mobilization for the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

113. The Soviets apparently base at least part of their longer term mobilization planning on the Category III or "cadre" divisions. These divisions would probably be filled up with a combination of reservists and new conscripts, but would remain partially equipped and would generally contain older equipment pending new wartime production.

Against Europe

114. [] the prime contingency underlying Warsaw Pact force posture in Eastern Europe and the western USSR has been a NATO attack. Warsaw Pact forces were to blunt this attack and then destroy NATO forces with a massive counterattack using quickly mobilized reserves. Prior to the early 1960's, the Soviets assumed that any war with NATO would be nuclear from the outset, and they fielded theater forces designed to survive and fight in the wake of nuclear holocaust. In recent years, however, [] an assumption that the NATO attack would, at least initially, be non-nuclear.

115. Soviet theater force strength in Europe is concentrated opposite the Central Region of NATO. In East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, the Soviets maintain 27 combat ready divisions and about 1,100 combat aircraft. The East Germans, Poles, and Czechs can provide an additional 25 full strength divisions within a day or so of a mobilization order and 1,750 combat aircraft immediately.

116. The Soviets apparently consider remote the likelihood of a sudden outbreak of hostilities requiring the Warsaw Pact to fight without reinforcement. They base their planning on the assumption of a period of pre-hostilities tension and mobilization on both sides, and maintain a large number of divisions in the border MDs of the USSR which can be mobilized and readied to move westward quickly. The East Europeans model their mobilization system after the Soviet example.

117. We have good evidence from documents and defectors about Warsaw Pact goals for the scope and speed of reinforcement in Central Europe. According to this evidence, the Warsaw Pact would seek to confront NATO with a large force at the outset of hostilities. We have no direct evidence as to the total size of such a force, but on the basis of availability of forces we believe it would probably consist of 80-90 divisions organized into 20 or more armies and five *fronts*. They

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would wish to assemble such a force and have it prepared for combat in about two weeks after a mobilization order. The Soviets and some of their East European allies have vigorously attempted to achieve the Warsaw Pact mobilization and reinforcement goal despite limitations on resources available and the political struggles in Eastern Europe; by early 1968 they had come close to reaching that goal.

118. Prior to the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968, the Warsaw planning probably called for the deployment of three key first echelon *fronts* opposite NATO in a matter of a few days. These *fronts* would have contained 22 Soviet and 26 East European combat-ready divisions. The central *front* (the main effort) consisting of GSFC and some East German formations would have been complete. The northern and southern *fronts* composed primarily of Polish and Czech forces would have lagged behind the central *front* in the readiness of army- and *front*-level support because of the requirement for mobilization. Within about 10 days, up to 30 additional divisions drawn from the USSR could have been assembled with minimum essential army- and *front*-level support in eastern Poland and Czechoslovakia. These forces would have constituted the two *fronts* of a second strategic echelon. Tactical air reinforcement from the western USSR would require little if any mobilization, and could be deployed into Eastern Europe within a matter of hours.

119. The situation which has evolved since the invasion of Czechoslovakia has probably altered Warsaw Pact reinforcement planning with respect to the Czech *front*. For the near term, the Soviets probably do not count on the Czechs to form an effective and reliable *front*, although they have not disposed their divisions to take over Czech positions opposite NATO. Moreover, the Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia are not large enough to constitute a *front*; in particular, army- and *front*-level support is minimal and combat air support consists of only 85 fighters. In the event of a sudden military confrontation with NATO the Soviets would have to rely on the Czechs backed up by the Central Group of Forces. If the Soviets were to anticipate a serious military confrontation with NATO they would probably expedite the forward movement of the *front* from the Carpathian MD to reinforce or take over the southern *front*.

120. In current circumstances, and with speed the primary requirement, the Warsaw Pact could in about two weeks assemble the key combat elements of five *fronts* (including the Czechs) opposing NATO—three in the first echelon and two in the second. The complete integration of divisions into effective armies and *fronts* would require more time. In a situation where offensive capability against NATO (rather than maximum speed) was the prime consideration, the Soviets would almost certainly take at least three weeks to complete mobilization and forward deployment to concentration areas in Eastern Europe.

121. This force when assembled would probably contain about 1,290,000 men (60 percent of them Soviet), 20,000 tanks, 4,900 conventional artillery pieces, 3,700 combat aircraft (2,050 in air defense regiments and 1,650 in ground attack or reconnaissance regiments) and up to 350 nuclear capable tactical missile

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and rocket launchers.* (See Table VIII.) In the event of nuclear theater warfare, Warsaw Pact forces opposing NATO could be supported by the massive MRBM/IRBM missile forces and the medium bombers of LRA located in the western USSR. In non-nuclear warfare, the medium bombers would probably provide conventional bombing support. These forces would possess formidable capabilities for nuclear and non-nuclear offensive or defensive theater warfare. They would be best suited for nuclear warfare for which they are basically designed. The force would be less effective for sustained conventional operations.

122. Should the Soviets elect to execute the above described build-up against NATO, they would probably also mobilize their forces opposite Scandinavia and the southern flank of NATO for contingencies in those areas. In the latter area, only the Bulgarians are likely to contribute to offensive action; supported by the Soviet theater forces from the Odessa MD, they could launch an offensive against Greece and European Turkey.

123. We have reason to believe that the Soviets would establish a forward theater of operations headquarters somewhere in Eastern Europe and a main theater headquarters in one of the border MDs of the USSR. We believe that the theater commander would direct all operations against NATO Europe; he would probably have in strategic reserve Soviet theater forces from the Kiev and Moscow MDs.

Against China

124. Until recent years, the development of capabilities to cope with European military contingencies held overriding priority in Soviet theater forces. However, since 1965 the Soviets have been building up strong theater forces along the Sino-Soviet border. By the end of 1968, there were about 26 divisions stationed near the Chinese border; about 10 of them were probably combat ready. Further, the ground forces in the Far East and the Transbaykal MDs were acquiring army- and front-level artillery support on a scale which exceeded that provided Soviet forces in East Germany. Tactical air support had about doubled; there are now about 750 combat aircraft in the TAAs.

125. During 1969, the vigorous military build-up opposite China was continued, including the construction of airfields and ground force installations. We have evidence of one new division and additional ground force elements which, if all were associated with divisions, would increase the total to 30. We believe that at least 13 of the divisions are now in a combat ready status. As further evidence of the build-up, the Soviets have carved out a new Central Asian MD from the Turkestan MD.

126. In Turkestan and in the Siberian, Transbaykal, and Far East MDs there are 15 additional divisions at varying degrees of readiness. The Soviets could use reinforcing units from the western USSR against China. Border guard units

*The above described force includes Czech air and ground forces. It does not include Warsaw Pact forces in Hungary.

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opposite China add considerable combat potential. They number about 70,000 men, and some are equipped as well or better than regular units. There are six Mongolian divisions which would support Soviet theater forces in any major conflict with China. At least one theater of operations headquarters would probably be established in the event of major hostilities with China.

127. The Soviet forces deployed against China provide the capability for either nuclear or non-nuclear warfare in Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia, and Manchuria. They do not provide the capability for a sustained conventional war deep inside China. The heavy tactical nuclear missile support provided these forces suggests a Soviet readiness to resort to nuclear weapons in a major conflict with China.

IX. TRENDS TO 1979

Theater Forces

128. There is currently an unusual degree of uncertainty in estimating future trends in Soviet theater forces. The extent of Soviet concern for the possibility of conflict with China could have far-reaching effects on all Soviet theater forces. Soviet views of the prospects for and probable nature of war in Europe are also unclear. The cost of theater forces has increased sharply in recent years. The build-up of forces in the remote areas along the Sino-Soviet border is especially costly. The paucity of reserves in those areas necessitates high peacetime unit strengths; the distances from industrial centers necessitate expensive long haul logistics operations. Moreover, in allocating resources to theater forces, the Soviets must consider the competing demands of their strategic forces. And this competition for resources between theater forces and strategic forces claimants might intensify or diminish, according to the fate of the arms control negotiations and the development of political relationships in the world generally.

129. The current trend in Soviet theater forces toward improved capabilities for non-nuclear warfare will probably continue. Higher scales of artillery support will probably be provided to at least some of the reinforcing armies and divisions inside the USSR. Further Soviet emphasis on conventional capabilities would probably result in a substantial increase in the ground force logistics structure (more and better truck transport, more logistics support personnel, heavier maintenance support), a higher ratio of infantry to tanks in divisions, and larger ground reconnaissance units. Tactical Aviation would probably acquire aircraft capable of delivering much more weight of conventional ordnance to greater ranges. The logistics support and maintenance elements of Tactical Aviation would probably be enlarged and stockpiles of conventional air ordnance would be sharply increased.

Deployments

130. We have no evidence to suggest any change in Soviet theater forces deployed in Eastern Europe. Even if the Soviets should conclude that the likelihood of war in Europe is no longer great enough to rationalize their current

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deployments, they would retain sizable forces in Eastern Europe to enforce their hegemony in the area.

131. Present evidence suggests that at least 30 Category I and II divisions will be maintained in the immediate Sino-Soviet border area. Tactical Aviation strength opposite China will probably continue to grow and 100 or so more fighters and light bombers may be added over the next year or so. Most of these aircraft will probably be reactivated older models, although there may be additional transfers of tactical air units from the western USSR and the delivery of more new model aircraft. The total ground forces may grow either in terms of divisions or supporting units.

Ground Force Equipment

132. The Soviets probably will continue the production of the T-62 medium tank, with probable modifications, at least through the mid-1970's. A new model medium tank may then begin entering the forces. By 1979 the Soviet tank park will probably consist of roughly two-thirds T-62s and one-third T-54/T-55s. If a new model tank is produced, it could by that time make up 5 to 10 percent of the inventory.

133. The Soviets will probably gradually equip infantry units in at least some of the Category I divisions with the new AAICV on the basis of one per squad. They will probably enter inventory at the rate of about 1,000 per year. If the AAICV enters inventory on a wide scale, it will increase the firepower of motorized rifle units significantly. It will also probably cause broad changes in the Soviet ground force logistics and maintenance support structure. By 1975 most, if not all, old BTR-152 and BTR-40 APCs will be out of inventory. Reduced strength divisions will probably be equipped primarily with a combination of BTR-50, BTR-60p, and general purpose trucks as personnel carriers for the period of this estimate.

134. The Soviets are almost certainly experimenting with improved (high fragmentation) conventional weapons. Some munitions of this type are probably now in inventory; within two or three years the Soviets could have sizable operational inventories of improved conventional artillery shells, bombs, and missile warheads in theater force units.

135. We believe that the Soviets will retain their current family of tactical missiles and that the number of tactical launchers will continue to grow. Earlier model Scud launchers will be replaced with the new, wheeled version. The Scaleboard will probably be deployed in the areas of all major potential *fronts*. All potential *fronts* may be assigned Shaddock cruise missiles.

Tactical Aviation and Air Defense Equipment

136. There will probably be further increases in Tactical Aviation over the next few years through deployments along the Chinese border and/or the activation of new tactical air regiments in the low strength TAAs in the western USSR.

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Over the longer term the total inventory of Soviet tactical aircraft is dependent in part upon the level of non-nuclear capability they wish to attain and upon the aircraft developed to meet that requirement. We believe that by mid-1979 there will be about 3,000-3,400 combat aircraft in Tactical Aviation.

137. The primary requirement for new aircraft for Tactical Aviation is replacement of the obsolescent ground attack fighter and light bomber force. The Soviets have several new aircraft under development which could satisfy these requirements. One of these, Flogger, is a variable sweep-wing aircraft which offers speed, range, and dispersal advantages over current fighters with a similar payload; it could have an all-weather intercept as well as a ground attack capability. Flogger may become operational in Tactical Aviation units in 1972-1973. The extensive V/STOL development programs are evidence of a Soviet requirement for an aircraft with improved take-off and landing performance. Flagon B could be introduced into Tactical Aviation by 1972 to meet this requirement, although its payload and radius of operation are very limited. If, as is more likely, the Soviets elect to defer deployment of a STOL fighter pending development of one with improved performance, such an aircraft will probably not enter operational inventory until 1973-1974. The all-weather Mig-21 (Fishbed) interceptor is expected to be the mainstay of tactical air defense units for the period of this estimate.

138. Another new aircraft, the Foxbat could significantly improve the range and load-carrying capabilities of Tactical Aviation. Although it will almost certainly be deployed with strategic defense forces as an interceptor, variants of the Foxbat may be developed as tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft as well, replacing some Beagles and Brewers. If such development is pursued, Foxbat could begin to enter the inventory of Tactical Aviation in 2 or 3 years. The Foxbat is one of the largest and clearly the most expensive interceptor thus far developed by the Soviets. Therefore we believe that the rate of delivery to Tactical Aviation would be slower than with previous models.

139. The Soviets will continue to expand and improve their theater air defense command and control systems and will attempt to overcome the problems posed by the language barriers within the Warsaw Pact and the vulnerability of current systems to saturation. Developments will probably include expansion of data transmission systems, computerization of control of manned interceptors, and better coordination between SAM and interceptor defenses.

140. Theater air defenses will continue to improve through the deployment of new missile systems. We believe that deployment of the SA-4 will continue for 2 to 4 more years. In the early 1970's, most of the Soviet armies will have at least one SA-4 regiment with 9 dual launchers and some armies in East Germany may have 2 regiments. Deployment of the SA-4 will probably not extend to echelons below the army level.

141. The low altitude SA-6 system probably will enter service within the next two or three years. More mobile than the cumbersome SA-4, it probably possesses significantly improved low-altitude intercept capabilities, possibly be-

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low 500 feet. It will probably be deployed along with the SA-4 for the defense of the army and its divisions.

142. The Soviets will probably continue to work on the low altitude tactical air defense problem. At present, they rely on light AAA, some of it radar directed, for intercept of targets below 200 or 300 feet. We believe they are capable of developing a light, short-range SAM, possibly employing intermediate-range homing guidance, for low-altitude defense. Such a system probably would not be available before the 1971-1972 time period.

143. The deployment of the SA-4 and SA-6 systems will strengthen considerably the air defenses of the theater forces. The SA-4 and SA-6, which together provide a capability to intercept targets below 500 feet at very short ranges (perhaps on the order of 1 to 2 n.m.) up to over 60,000 feet at 25-30 n.m., represent a significant improvement in mobility over the SA-2 and SA-3 systems.

Naval Forces

144. We believe that the Soviet Navy will continue to improve its capabilities with emphasis on the role of the submarine and that its operation on the high seas will increase but that there will be no appreciable change in the character of its missions. Beyond this, however, the Soviets probably foresee politico-military situations wherein the navy can assist state interests without inviting large-scale conflict. In such situations, a small Soviet naval presence could exert an influence far beyond that warranted by its intrinsic military capabilities. We thus expect more frequent Soviet naval visits to ports and harbors of the Third World. Soviet policy will also derive considerable support from the capacity to establish a military presence in some areas, sometimes in circumstances which could have a deterrent effect on the will of others, including the US, to attempt intervention. On the other hand, a Soviet decision to develop balanced naval forces for sustained, long-range operations against substantial opposition would represent a major change in the role of the Soviet Navy and would cause great changes in its composition. It would involve the addition of substantial forces to provide logistic and combat support, particularly air cover; it would confront Moscow with a wholly new spectrum of military and technical problems; it would be very expensive. For these reasons, we think it unlikely that the Soviets will develop any significant capabilities of this kind during the 1970's.

145. In the mid-1970's we believe the force of major surface combatants will be about the same size as it is now. However, the percentage of missile ships will probably double to an estimated 40-45 percent in 1975 by retirement of some older ships, conversion of others to missile ships, and new construction. Although no helicopter ships are known to be under construction, the Soviets, after thoroughly evaluating the Moskva class, may construct additional helicopter-carrying ships for ASW. If the Soviets plan to build additional ships of this type the next unit could not be operational before 1972.

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146. Attack submarine programs will probably continue to emphasize improved ASW capabilities and nuclear propulsion. We estimate that the annual construction of attack submarines will reach some 10-14 units (at least 6-9 of which will be nuclear-powered) by the early 1970's. One or more new classes will probably appear by 1979. The addition of new attack submarines will be more than offset by the retirement of the numerous medium-range units; thus, the number of attack submarines will probably decline by about 30 percent by 1979 but the proportion of nuclear and long-range diesel units will increase substantially.

147. The problem of ASW obviously looms large to the Soviets. During the next decade they will continue and probably expand their efforts to develop organizational concepts, weapons, and techniques to counter the threat posed by US submarines, particularly Polaris. Their capabilities will improve substantially, as new detection and weapon systems are installed more widely throughout the navy (see paragraphs 78 and 79, above), and as the number of their attack submarines with improved ASW capabilities grows.

148. These developments will not solve the main problem, however, which is to acquire a dependable capability to detect, localize, and classify submarines operating in the open ocean. The Soviets do not possess the large number of ships and long-range ASW aircraft which, if properly equipped, might conduct continuous surveillance over great areas of the sea. With respect to a fixed long-range detection system like that employed by the US, the Soviets at present not only lag behind the US in technology but labor under certain geographic disadvantages which make such a system less workable for them than for the US (see paragraph 80, above.) Accordingly, it seems likely that any basic improvement in Soviet ASW capabilities—such an improvement as would gravely impair the value of Polaris as a strategic weapon—can arise only from technological innovation, concerning which we cannot make a useful estimate.

149. Short of more complete success, however, we believe that by 1975 the Soviets will probably have the capability to detect and track some nuclear submarines; this capability will be greatest in the vicinity of narrow or restricted passages such as are found in the Mediterranean and Norwegian Seas where anti-submarine capabilities may be concentrated. Detection in the open ocean would result almost entirely from chance encounters, which will nevertheless become more probable because of the increase in Soviet naval operations generally.

East European Forces

150. There will be qualitative improvements in East European general purpose forces over the next decade, but we see no trends which indicate substantial changes in their contribution to Warsaw Pact capabilities. Barring disruptive political developments, we believe that the Soviets will continue to place heavy emphasis on East European forces opposing NATO, particularly in the Central Region.

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
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- TABLE I : DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET GROUND DIVISIONS BY TYPE
- TABLE II : ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS, BY LOCATION AND TYPE AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1969
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- TABLE VIII: WARSAW PACT GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES AVAILABLE FOR EARLY COMMITMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE

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TABLE I

DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET GROUND DIVISIONS BY TYPE *

AREA	Category I				Category II			Category III			Developing			Total			
	MRD	TK	ABN	TOTAL	MRD	TK	TOTAL	MRD	TK	TOTAL	MRD	TK	TOTAL	MRD	TK	ABN	TOTAL
East Germany.....	10	10	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10	0	20
Poland.....	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
Hungary.....	2	2	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	4
Czechoslovakia.....	3	2	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	5
Baltic MD.....	0	1(1) ^b	1	2(1)	3	2	5	1-3	0	1-3	0	0	0	4-6	3	1	8-10
Belorussian MD.....	1(1)	0	1	2(1)	1	8	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	8	1	11
Carpathian MD.....	2(2)	2(2)	0	4(4)	5	1	6	1	0-1	1-2	0	0	0	8	3-4	0	11-12
Kiev MD.....	0	0	0	0	3	7	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7	0	10
Moscow MD.....	0	0	1	1	2	3	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	1	6
Odessa MD.....	0	0	0	0	3	1	4	2	0	2	0	0	0	5	1	0	6
Leningrad MD.....	2(2)	0	1	3(2)	2	1	3	4	0	4	0	0	0	8	1	1	10
North Caucasus MD.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5-6	0	5-6	0	0	0	5-6	0	0	5-6
Transcaucasus MD.....	1(1)	1(1)	1	3(2)	7	0	7	2	0	2	0	0	0	10	1	1	12
Ural MD.....	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	2	0	0	0	2	1	0	3
Volga MD.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
Turkestan MD *.....	1(1)	0	1	2(1)	5	1	6	2	0	2	3	0	3	11	1	1	13
Siberian MD *.....	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	2	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
Transbaykal MD *.....	1	4	0	5	1	0	1	2	0	2	0-1	0	0-1	4-5	4	0	8-9
Far East MD *.....	3	2	1	6	4	1	5	1-2	0	1-2	2-3	1	3-4	10-12	4	1	15-17
Mongolia *.....	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	2
TOTALS.....	27(7) ^b	28(4) ^b	7	60(11) ^b	37	26	63	27-31	0-1	27-32	6-8	1	7-9	97-103	53-54	7	157-164

* Types of divisions are designated thus: motorized rifle (MRD); tank (TK); and airborne (ABN).

^b Numbers in parentheses are those Category I divisions requiring mobilization (See paragraph 17).

* Status of divisions along the Sino-Soviet border is uncertain; more of them may have been fleshed out during the past summer than indicated by these figures.

TABLE II

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS,
BY LOCATION AND TYPE AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1969 ^{a, b}

	MIG-17 FRESCO	MIG-19 FARMER	MIG-21 FISHBED D/F/H	YAK-28p FIREBAR	SU-7 FITZER	IL-28 BEAGLE	YAK-28 BREWER, B, C	YAK-27/28 MANGROVE, BREWER D ^c	TOTAL
East Germany.....	87	12	333	23	157	66	..	48	726
Poland.....	82	..	123	..	37	10	..	30	282
Hungary.....	127	..	37	52	12	..	228
Czechoslovakia.....	86	86
Baltic MD.....	49	..	90	40	96	..	275
Belorussian MD.....	99	12	74	..	37	32	254
Carpathian MD.....	89	37	74	..	37	32	32	32	333
Moscow MD.....	74	..	37	32	143
Leningrad MD.....	37	..	16	..	37	44	134
Kiev MD.....	74	74
Odessa MD.....	12	..	111	..	37	25	..	32	217
Transcaucasus MD.....	111	..	37	32	32	..	212
Turkestan MD.....	90	..	90	20	200
Far East MD.....	37	..	130	..	37	32	236
Transbaykal MD.....	222	..	16	65	..	8	311
TOTAL.....	804	61	1,529	23	490	450	172	182	3,711
Mid-1970.....	825-775	25-0	1,550-1,650	0-25	475-500	450-425	150-200	175-225	3,650-3,800
Mid-1971.....	800-725	-0-	1,550-1,700	0-25	475-500	425-390	150-200	200-250	3,600-3,800 ^d

^a There are also some 1,000-1,100 older model aircraft in reserve, and an additional 1,500 combat-type aircraft in training establishments.

^b There were also, as of 1 October 1969, some 200-300 older model aircraft collocated with tactical units. The majority of these may be operationally assigned to TAF ground attack units.

^c Brewer D is used for reconnaissance only, and has no combat capability. For this reason it is included with the Yak-27 Mangrove totals rather than with the Brewer B and C light bomber variants of the Yak-28.

^d This total includes an allowance for 0-10 Foxbat which may enter inventory in 1971.

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TABLE III
ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
(AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1969)

MISSION	TOTAL	MIG-17	MIG-19	MIG-21	SU-7	YAK-28p	IL-28	YAK-28	YAK-27/28
Air Defense *	1,619	151	61	1,384	..	23
Ground Attack *	1,095	605	490
Light Bomber	389	217	172	..
Reconnaissance and Recon- naissance Strike	608	48	..	145	233	..	182
TOTAL	3,711	804	61	1,529	490	23	450	172	182

* See paragraph 47 of text for discussion of cross-training of Tactical Aviation units.

TABLE IV
ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET GENERAL
PURPOSE SHIPS AND SUBMARINES BY TYPE,
1 OCTOBER 1969 - BY FLEET

TYPE	NORTH	BALTIC	BLACK	PACIFIC	TOTAL
Cruise-Missile Submarines					
Nuclear (6-8 launchers)	14	0	0	19	33
Diesel (most with 4 launchers)	14	3	5	6	28
Attack Submarines					
Nuclear	19	0	0	5	24
Long-Range Diesel	33	7	0	26	66
Medium-Range Diesel	50	37	27	39	153
Short-Range Diesel	0	6	5	0	11
Unknown					
A-class	0-1	0	0	0	0-1
TOTAL	130-131	53	37	95	315-316
Operational Surface Ships					
SAM/SSM Light Cruisers	2	2	3	2	9
SAM Light Cruisers	0	0	1	0	1
Helicopter Ships	0	0	2	0	2
SSM Destroyers	0	2	4	4	10
SAM Destroyers	4	5	11	3	23
Cruisers	1	4	3	3	11
Destroyers	8	11	15	19	53
Escorts	29	29	26	24	108
TOTAL	44	53	65	55	217
Reserve Surface Ships					
Cruisers	1	1	1	1	4
Destroyers	4	3	4	3	14
Escorts	1	4	3	2	10
TOTAL	6	8	8	6	28

* Includes three in the Caspian Sea.

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TABLE V
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND READINESS OF
EAST EUROPEAN GROUND DIVISIONS

	STRENGTH	TOTAL DIVISIONS	Readily Available				Low- strength	
			MRD	TK	ABN	ASLT	MRD	TK
East Germany.....	90,000	6	4	2
Poland.....	200,000	15	5	5	1	1	3	..
Czechoslovakia.....	154,000	10	4	3	1	2
Hungary.....	90,000	6	3	1	1	1
Romania.....	170,000	9	5	2	2	..
Bulgaria.....	125,000	12	5	3	3	1
TOTAL.....	829,000	58	26	16	1	1	10	4

TABLE VI
ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF OPERATIONAL EAST EUROPEAN COMBAT AIRCRAFT
OCTOBER 1969 AND PROJECTIONS FOR 1970 AND 1971

	MIG-21 FISHBED D/F	SU-7 FITTER	MIG-21 FISHBED C/E	MIG-19 FARMER	MIG-17 FRESCO	IL-28 BEAGLE	TOTAL
Bulgaria.....	25	..	15	75	180	10	300
Czechoslovakia.....	115	85	50	70	210	25	555
East Germany.....	205	..	40	10	50	..	305
Hungary.....	45	..	60	10	30	..	145
Poland.....	165	20	20	15	605	60	885
Romania.....	70	..	40	20	135	10	275
October 1969.....	625	105	225	200	1,210	105	2,470
Mid-1970.....	630-725	120-150	210-220	160-190	1,075-1,200	95-100	2,290-2,585
Mid-1971.....	675-775	120-175	190-210	130-150	1,000-1,100	80- 90	2,190-2,500

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TABLE VII
ESTIMATED NUMBER AND DEPLOYMENT OF EAST
EUROPEAN NAVAL VESSELS BY TYPE,
1 OCTOBER 1969, BY COUNTRY

	Baltic Sea Area		Black Sea Area	
	EAST GERMANY	POLAND *	BULGARIA	ROMANIA
Destroyer Types.....	3	3	2	..
Submarines.....	..	7	2	..
Guided Missile Patrol Boats.....	12	12	..	5
Motor Torpedo Boats.....	66	28	8	13
Submarine Chasers.....	26	S(18)	8	3
Miscellaneous Patrol Boats.....	60	.. (28)	..	3
Fleet Minesweepers.....	19	24	2	4
Small Minesweepers.....	28	35	18	28
Amphibious Ships.....	6	21
Amphibious Craft.....	12	23	11	8
TOTAL.....	232	161(46)	51	64

* Figures in parentheses are augmenting coast guard units, which now operate in close coordination with the Navy.

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TABLE VIII

WARSAW PACT GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES AVAILABLE
FOR EARLY COMMITMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE

CURRENTLY AVAILABLE FORCES	Armies				Estimated Wartime Strength			
	COMBINED		TACTICAL	DIVISIONS	MEN	TANKS	AIRCRAFT	
	ARMS	TANK	AIR				GROUND ATTACK AND RECONNAIS- SANCE ^a	AIR DEFENSE ^b
GSFG and East German Army.....	5	2	1	28	405,000	6,500	400	640
Czechoslovak <i>Front</i>	3	..	1	12 ^a	180,000	3,000	260	300
Carpathian <i>Front</i> ^d	2-3	1	1	15	230,000	3,400	210	200
Polish <i>Front</i>	3	..	1	15 ^a	215,000	2,800	260	620
Northern Group of Forces in Poland..	1	2	35,000	600	170	110
Belorussian <i>Front</i>	1	2	1	11 ^e	165,000	2,800	150	110
Baltic MD.....	1	..	1	5 ^e	60,000	1,000	200	70
TOTAL.....	15-16	5	7	86	1,290,000	20,100	1,650	2,050

^a Includes fighter-bombers, light bombers, and aircraft with a reconnaissance mission.

^b Fighters having a primary mission of air defense which are in Soviet tactical air armies would probably operate primarily in support of Soviet ground forces. Air defense units of the East European members of the Warsaw Pact are responsible primarily for air defense of national territory, but would probably also fly missions in support of battlefield operations.

^d Includes the Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia, which approximates a field army.

^e Includes an airborne division and an amphibious assault division.

^f Includes an airborne division. Employment centrally controlled by Moscow.

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