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•	Continuing Strains in Sovie	et-Egyptian Relations	3
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	Continuing differences have been highlighted by a between Brezhnev and Sadat	reported exchange of	
•	Recent indications of	strains include:	
	friction over arms. last week, Sadat indirectly failing to give Egypt up-t		for
	last month seeking to purchast for hard currency.		
	detente. Sadat complained	1	_
•	trying to collaborate and		st prob-
	lem in its present form. Some greater bitterness over Some		ressed
	Jewish immigration.	isiand Tavish immissa	2+100
	indual ViuorousiV CEIE	TELZEO JEWISH TAMILOTA	9 1. () (

from the USSR to Israel

--Soviet economic support. Soviet officials in Cairo have indicated that Deputy Prime Minister Hijazi's visit to Moscow earlier this month may not have gone as easily as indicated by a Soviet official in Moscow (see Soviet Developments of 10 September). They say that Moscow dragged its feet in responding to Hijazi's bid for an easing of the Egyptian debt burden. Soviet press coverage of Hijazi's visit had been distinctly cool, suggesting that he may indeed have encountered some difficulties.

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Egypt's economic policy. Soviet officials in			
Cairo have been openly voicing displeasure with Egyp-			
tian moves toward increasing the role of the private			
sector and attracting private Western capital.			
reportedly complained that the Egyp-			
tians had not even discussed these new policies with			
Moscow.			

Against this familiar catalogue of strains, press reports of an exchange of letters between Sadat and Brezhnev seem quite plausible. The Egyptians yesterday publicized the existence of the exchange. UPI reports that "political sources" in Cairo state that Brezhnev had reassured Sadat on detente, but expressed concern over Egypt's rightward drift on economic questions. In his reply, Sadat allegedly complained that the Soviets are limiting arms deliveries and chided Moscow for inadequate political support for the Arabs.

There has been no clear indication that this friction will lead to any dramatic development in Soviet-Egyptian relations. Sadat continues to say that he really has no alternative to maintaining the ties that presently exist with Moscow, and the Soviets likewise seem resigned to the present situation. The Brezhnev-Sadat correspondence may lead to further visits by officials of both countries in an effort to sort out present problems. It is doubtful, however, that Brezhnev will be encouraged by the present climate to accept the long-standing Egyptian invitation to visit Cairo.

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