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| | APPROVED FOR RELEASE - CIA INFO DATE: 29-Aug-2012 |
| | ISRAEL-EGYPT-SYRIA: Both the Israelis and the |
| | Arabs are becoming increasingly concerned about the |
| | military activities of the other, although neither |
| • | side appears to be bent on initiating hostilities. |
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| | At least four more IL-18s and two AN-22s, the Soviets' heaviest military transport, flew to Damascus yesterday. The flight of the AN-22s indicates that they are carrying equipment either into or out of |
| | Syria. In addition, a Soviet jet transport normally used to carry VIPs flew two round-trip missions over the last two days between Cairo and the USSR. (Another Soviet IL-18 arrived in Cairo yesterday, and the airlift between Egypt and the USSR is continuing today.) |
| | used to carry VIPs flew two round-trip missions over the last two days between Cairo and the USSR. (Another Soviet IL-18 arrived in Cairo yesterday, and the airlift between Egypt and the USSR is continuing today.) Most of these flights probably are being used to evacuate Soviet dependents from Egypt and Syria. |
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| | wised to carry VIPs flew two round-trip missions over the last two days between Cairo and the USSR. Another Soviet IL-18 arrived in Cairo yesterday, and the airlift between Egypt and the USSR is continuing today. Most of these flights probably are being used to evacuate Soviet dependents from Egypt and Syria. Soviets began evacuating dependents of civilian technicians from Egypt on 3 October, and by 5 October about 1,000 had left. two reasons for the evacuation: fear of an outbreak of hostilities or a further deterioration of Soviet-Egyptian relations. Soviets might be using the excuse of rising tensions to reduce their presence without further an- |

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| | In any case, Soviet attention to the Middle East |
| 4 | has risen sharply in the last few days. |
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| , | Exercise and alert activities in Egypt are con- |
| | tinuing, but elements of the air force and navy ap- |
| 4 | pear to be conducting normal training activity. |
| 1 | a build-up of tanks and artillery along the Suez Canal, this cannot be con- |
| | firmed. The Egyptians usually conduct such exercises |
| | in the fall and spring, but the current exercise is more realistic in that it includes the movement of |
| • | troops and the mobilization of more reservists. |
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| ı | Syrian air activity appears to be normal, but there have been a number of reports, |
| | that Damascus is redeploying |
| | some of its ground forces in the Golan Heights area. |
| | The Israeli attitude toward these developments |
| | has changed considerably since 1 October, when they |
| | viewed the activity in Egypt as normal and that in Syria as defensive in nature. During the past few |
| · | days, the Israelis have conducted air reconnaissance |
| | of both the Suez Canal and Golan Heights areas. |
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| | efforts to buil | ld a united Arab | political f | ront, par- | |
| | ticularly among | g the less milit | tant, oil-ric | h states. | |
| | For the no | ormally cautious | - Curian Dres | ident a | |
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| | said so. Far f | rom seeking rev | venge for the | loss of | |
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