


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


WAR in the MIDDLE EAST

^{4, 5 & 6}
[Egypt and Syria, acting out President Sadat's recent appeals to Arab self-reliance with new boldness and determination, are trying to create a basically new situation in the Middle East. So far, their initially strong military showing has enabled them to maintain a presence in territories occupied by Israel in its decisive victory in the Six Day War of June 1967. With Moscow's move in

mid-week to resupply its Arab friends, this latest round of hostilities seems likely to stretch out. Whatever the ultimate military outcome, the new war is sure to result in important changes in the way the combatants regard themselves and their adversaries and how they approach the problem they live with.

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In the Beginning

The well-coordinated air and ground attacks on 6 October by the Syrians into the Golan Heights and by the Egyptians across the Suez Canal into the Sinai clearly proceeded according to an operational plan that was carefully worked out between Presidents Sadat and Asad. The plan appears to have been completed some months ago and to have set, as a major initial objective, seizure of the two key mountain passes in the Sinai about 18 and 20 miles east of the canal. Presidents Sadat and Asad apparently decided around mid-September to strike into the occupied territories soon, partly in angry reaction to the destruction of Syrian warplanes by the Israeli Air Force on 13 September, which world opinion read as one more demonstration of Arab incompetence. They proceeded with a gradual mobilization of Egyptian and Syrian forces under cover of routine maneuvers and training exercises that were already scheduled. Israeli intelligence, im-


pressive in the past, this time did not recognize the threat until just hours before the Arabs moved. Caught off balance on a holy day with its reserves—the sinew of its armed forces—largely unmobilized, the Israeli Government at that point evidently decided it might gain more politically by not firing the first shot than it could hope to gain militarily by attempting a hasty pre-emptive action.

Once aware that a new war was at hand, Tel Aviv mobilized amid general expectation that its forces would quickly launch a decisive counter-attack and bring the fighting to an early conclusion. Within three days, however, Israeli military leaders were preparing their forces and the Israeli public for a longer conflict. The change was induced by heavy losses of both men and materiel from the destructive power of the large Arab arsenal of Soviet-supplied military equipment thrown against them and by a significantly more effective performance from the Arabs than any

SELECTED PRE-WAR FORCES

	Army Personnel	Tanks	SAMS (launchers)	Fighters
Egypt	250,000	2,035	680	446 Supersonic 155 Subsonic 601 Total
Syria	100,000	1,807	124	248 Supersonic 119 Subsonic 367 Total
Iraq	90,000	990	20	187 Supersonic 73 Subsonic 260 Total
Jordan	64,300	535	0	23 Supersonic 32 Subsonic 55 Total
Israel	90,000	1,915	72	173 Supersonic 214 Subsonic 387 Total

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Egyptian forces cross the Suez Canal

the Israelis had experienced. Above all, the Arabs have benefited from a much-strengthened air defense system based on surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery.

A Week of Combat

The fighting has been heavy from the start in both the Golan Heights and the Sinai. The results, as of noon, 11 October, were still indecisive, but had, nevertheless, boosted greatly the pride and self-respect of the Egyptians, the Syrians, and, in fact, all Arabs. On the Sinai front, the Egyptians

succeeded in putting across the canal a formidable force of some 40,000 troops and over 500 tanks. This force gained control of the entire east bank to a depth ranging up to 12 miles.

The Israelis, relying mainly on their superior air power, have repeatedly attacked the pontoon bridges across the canal, but have been unable to prevent the Egyptians from reinforcing and resupplying their forces on the east bank. Israeli planes have hit the Port Said area often and have carried out strikes against airfields and other installations in the interior of Egypt and along the

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Mediterranean coast of Egypt. These raids probably have not caused serious damage to the Egyptian military.

for their artillery. They have probably begun to conserve their stocks.

The Israelis have encountered little opposition from Egyptian aircraft, but have come under heavy fire from SAMs and anti-aircraft guns. The Egyptians, holding the bulk of their air force in reserve, are depending heavily on their SA-6s, which they can move forward with ground forces. Some of the SA-6s probably have been moved across the canal.

Estimated losses of major equipment by the two sides were heavy on both sides. These losses, however, represent a much greater blow to Israel's fighting potential than to that of the Arabs, who had much more of everything at the start. Tel Aviv's air losses, for example, represent about 20 percent of its air force. The Egyptian Air Force, which has not yet really entered the battle, is essentially intact.

In the Golan Heights, where Tel Aviv concentrated its initial counter-effort, the Syrians, after five days of heavy fighting, have yielded almost all of the ground they gained in the first days. The Israelis are continuing to bring heavy pressure on the Syrians and as of noon on the 11th, the Israelis appeared to have broken through into Syria along an eight-mile front in the northern sector of the Golan Heights. The Syrian Army is believed to have put up to 700 tanks, along with some 28,000 infantry and from 10,000 to 15,000 armored troops, into the Golan area. The Syrian Air Force, clearly inferior, suffered heavy losses, but continued on 10 October to engage in numerous dogfights and ground support missions. Damascus may have lost most of its MIG-21s; most of the Syrian airfields were still intact.

The Israeli Reaction

The Israeli Government is being criticized—albeit quietly—by some elements at home for its failure to launch a pre-emptive military strike or at least to mobilize earlier. As knowledge of the high losses in personnel and materiel becomes more widespread, bitterness may well intensify and pressure for deep ground strikes into Egypt

In actions extending beyond the heights, the Syrians by 9 October had fired at least 20 FROG-7 surface-to-surface rockets into civilian settlements in Israel's Upper Galilee area. The Israelis retaliated with an air strike on Damascus and subsequently hit other Syrian targets, including the ports of Latakia and Tartus.

The Supply Factor

With an extended war of attrition at least a possibility, the resupply factor has become increasingly important. Both Egypt and Syria have been expending ammunition and missiles at a very high rate, but they apparently can count on a major resupply effort by the Soviet Union.

The Israelis, on the other hand, may have begun to experience some ammunition shortages

ESTIMATED LOSSES		
	Israel	Arabs
Aircraft	80	170
Tanks	500	900
Personnel	1,500	12,000
Ships (primarily patrol craft)	4	20

Israeli aircraft losses are fairly firm and are based on Israeli admissions. The Arab aircraft losses are based on reported shoot-downs and possible losses as a result of Israeli air strikes on Egyptian and Syrian airfields, as derived from both Israeli claims and Egyptian admissions. The Syrians have made no statements about the number of aircraft lost during the war. It is not possible to ascertain the types of aircraft lost. The tank figures are estimates. Personnel losses are extremely rough estimates of men killed and captured.

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and Syria may grow. In a speech on 10 October designed to reassure the Israeli public about the war effort, Prime Minister Meir claimed the Golan Heights were in Israeli hands and that a "basic change" favorable for Israel had occurred in the Sinai. She said there was no doubt about Israel's ultimate victory, but warned that difficult days were ahead.

Mrs. Meir's speech included a direct appeal to Jordan's King Husayn to be "wise and responsible enough" to keep out of the fighting. Because of Jordan's long common border with Israel, Husayn's entry into the war would force Israel to alter its strategic planning and divert increasingly scarce resources to a new front.

The Arab Reaction

The strong showing of the Egyptians and Syrians has induced other Arab states, including

some that prefer to stay at arms length from hostilities, to move toward involvement in the war. Iraq, with the only significant military forces among these states, has committed air units and is sending ground forces. The Arab press claims that up to 16,000 Iraqi troops and 100 tanks have already entered Syria en route to the northern front.

Other Arab states sending forces are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Kuwait. Libya's support since the outbreak of hostilities has been limited to pledges to bankroll the war, although Mirage aircraft it sent to Egypt last spring presumably are available to Cairo. The support of these states is important more for its political than its military implications. Saudi participation, for example, will be symbolic at best, but will further enhance conservative King Faysal's growing importance in Arab politics. Faysal's actions have also added to the intense



Fighting on the Golan Heights

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pressures on Jordan's King Husayn to join the fight.

So far, Husayn has managed to avoid involvement in the hostilities, but his ability to resist the pressures, which emanate from important domestic elements as well as from the other Arabs, is clearly weakening. The King still hopes that a cease-fire will somehow be arranged soon and rescue him from his dilemma.

Like Husayn, Lebanon's President Franjyah has been hard pressed by Arab opinion to explain his inaction; his position has been made more difficult by Israeli violations of Lebanese territory. These have included ground incursions into southern Lebanon by troops searching for fedayeen engaged in harassing actions from there and an Israeli air strike on a Lebanese Army radar site.

Arabs everywhere are generally elated over the relative success of their combatants, and morale appears particularly high in Egypt. The Arab press is dominated by favorable war news, and such coverage feeds the growing Arab pride and self-confidence. The press has not focused on the US as the enemy's prime supporter, and no anti-American demonstrations have been reported. Some Arab newspapers have criticized the US for "the menacing deployment of the Sixth Fleet" and, particularly, for the US stand in the UN in favor of a cease-fire on the lines that existed before the new fighting began.

As the week wore on and Israeli losses mounted, the Arab press reflected great interest in the US reaction to the fighting and especially in possible US replacement of Israeli equipment losses. Such a move by the US or a sharp downturn in Arab fortunes in the fighting would be certain to trigger much more vigorous criticism of the US throughout the Arab world.)

The Soviet Reaction

^{NO SOURCE!}
(Moscow almost certainly received a general warning of Arab plans to attack shortly before

OIL AND THE WAR

¹⁻³
(The new outbreak of fighting has not yet resulted in politically motivated cutbacks in production, but it is affecting oil exports. The closure of the oil pipeline terminal at Baniyas, Syria, and a 50-percent reduction in the flow through the Arabian-American Oil Company's Tapline have reduced the amount of oil reaching Western Europe through these lines from 1.6 million barrels per day to about 700,000. This reduction is equivalent to about 6 percent of Western Europe's supplies. Moreover, the 350,000 barrels per day of crude oil that Western Europe imports through the Trans-Israeli pipeline almost certainly will not be available because of unwillingness of tankers to enter the area, and Israel's desire to maintain a high level of oil stocks. Although compensating supplies are available in the Persian Gulf, the tanker shortage will delay shipping and cause shortages in Italy and other Mediterranean states.

Egypt and Syria so far are avoiding threats against the West and reportedly are not pressing the producing countries to use oil as a weapon. Even such vocal radicals as Libya's Qadhafi show no signs of reducing oil deliveries. Kuwait has called for an urgent meeting of the Arab oil ministers, which reportedly is to be held on 12 October. Some Western oilmen speculate that the Kuwaiti initiative is a pre-emptive maneuver designed to keep control of any such meeting in the hands of Arab moderates.

If the Arab forces were to suffer sharp defeats, an anti-US or anti-Western embargo would become more likely. A shutdown or severe limitation of the eastern Mediterranean crude oil pipelines for several weeks would have an impact on US oil supplies. The US now depends directly (or indirectly through foreign export refineries) on Arab sources for about a third of its oil imports and 12 percent of oil consumption. Exports of European refined products to the US almost certainly would be curtailed during a prolonged period of crude oil supply uncertainty. Oil prices are certain to increase as a result of the limitation of short-haul oil supplies and intensified competition.

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the outbreak of hostilities. On 4 October, the Soviets hastily began a major effort to evacuate dependents and probably some civilian and military technicians from Egypt and Syria.

The first authoritative Soviet response to the fighting came on 7 October in the form of a government statement pledging general support for the Arab cause and blaming Israel for creating the conditions that led to the fighting. Speaking at a luncheon for visiting Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka on 8 October, Soviet party chief Brezhnev took a relatively mild line, stressing Moscow's willingness to work for peace in the Middle East.

The good showing by Arab forces during the first few days of fighting, however, apparently led Moscow to take a more active hand. Letters from Brezhnev to Arab leaders on 9 October pledged Soviet aid and support and called for a maximum effort by other Arab nations in support of Egypt and Syria. On 10 October, the Soviets launched a resupply effort to Syria.

Soviet officials in Moscow and other capitals have sought opportunities to make the point that the war in the Middle East must not be allowed to affect the general improvement in US-Soviet relations. Soviet behavior thus far indicates that avoidance of a confrontation with the US is still of primary importance. The Soviets are undoubtedly under considerable Arab pressure, however, for additional and immediate help. Sensing the growing Arab support for Egypt and Syria, Moscow appears to have decided that a practical demonstration of support—like the current resupply effort—is necessary to protect its hard-earned position in the Middle East.

The Chinese Reaction

Peking apparently was as surprised as most of the world by the outbreak of war and by the

scale of the Arab's military action. China's official reaction to the war in the Middle East came in a public statement on 8 October by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, who condemned Israeli "aggression" and pledged continued support for the Arabs. Chi's remarks were cautious and contained no hint that China would go beyond the essentially political backing it already was rendering the Arab cause. Rather, he emphasized that the Arabs must fight their own battles. He mentioned neither the US nor the USSR in his statement, but focused on Israeli responsibility for the fighting. Unofficial Chinese commentary, in the form of a *People's Daily* article published on the same day, asserted that Israel's aggression was a result of the policies of the superpowers—US support for Zionism and military aid for Tel Aviv, along with Soviet permission for Russian Jews to emigrate to Israel.

The UN and the War

As hostilities continued with no clear advantage to either side, it became evident that the Security Council would be able to act only after the military positions had stabilized. The Arab states, which are supported by a majority of the council, will apparently try to achieve a UN cease-fire only after they have regained sufficient territory or are threatened by a major setback. A US suggestion for a cease-fire and a return to the positions of 6 October was countered by a Soviet and nonaligned proposal for a cease-fire based on the pre-June 1967 boundaries. The council remained deadlocked.

At the UN, the Soviet Union has maintained the spirit of detente only to the extent of refraining from direct attacks on the US—leaving this to the nonaligned and Arab states. Among the Europeans, only the British have actively pursued compromise.

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NOTICE

TO: RECIPIENTS OF WEEKLY SUMMARY

Attached is a page from the Middle East article which was inadvertently omitted from the Weekly Summary for 12 October. This page, which has been numbered 5a, should be inserted to follow Page 5 of the text.

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