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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
20 October 1973

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

MIDDLE EAST

Situation Report Number 59
(As of 1130 EDT)

THE MILITARY SITUATION

GENERAL

1. [redacted]
that fighting continued on both sides of the Suez Canal and claimed that Israeli forces were expanding their areas of operation. The Syrian front is described as relatively quiet by Tel Aviv.

[redacted]
in Cairo, high Egyptian officials have given no indication that they believe the military situation is deteriorating. No details on the ground war on either front are available from other sources.

2. [redacted] extensive Israeli air activity over the canal front, but only moderate activity over the Syrian battlefield. Israeli air strikes on the canal front are concentrated in the central sector near Deversoir. A Syrian claim that its aircraft bombed an Israeli oil refinery near Haifa today has not been confirmed.

EGYPTIAN FRONT

3. [redacted]
fighting was continuing in the central sector on both sides of the Suez Canal and claimed that Israeli forces were expanding their area of operations. Cairo claims to have

[redacted]
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destroyed 15 Israeli aircraft, 85 tanks, and 56 half-tracks today. No information from other sources is available on the ground war, but a large number of Israeli aircraft are continuing to strike Egyptian ground targets in the central sector of the front. Israeli aircraft also are active over the west bank in support of the Israeli forces operating behind Egyptian lines.

4. Egyptian officials yesterday gave no indication that they thought the military situation was deteriorating. that this could be interpreted to mean that either Cairo is deliberately trying to convey a calm image or that the Egyptian military is not providing the government leadership with an accurate assessment of the situation. the Egyptian military command told the Ministry of Interior that yesterday's action involved only 50 Israeli tanks, which had been surrounded by nightfall. This assessment grossly understates the size of Israeli forces operating on the west bank.

SYRIAN FRONT

5. Tel Aviv has denied claims by Damascus that Syrian aircraft bombed Israel's largest oil refinery near Haifa today.

press reports from Israel indicate that the Israelis shot down one of two Syrian MIGs observed over the Haifa area. A Syrian military spokesman stated that the raid on the refinery was in retaliation for the Israeli attacks on Syrian economic targets last week.

6. Ground activity on the Syrian front is relatively low today after the heavy fighting of yesterday. Israelis and Syrians are exchanging artillery fire near Tell Aantar, but no major tank engagements appear to be under way. Israeli air activity on the front is also moderate today.

7. The Jordanian 40th armored brigade pulled back to Al Harrah this morning. this move was necessary because neither the Iraqi nor Syrian troops were able to hold ground to protect the flanks of the Jordanian unit. The brigade is now in defensive posture awaiting further orders.

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[redacted] the Iraqi 12th brigade may be withdrawn from the Syrian front as a result of heavy losses suffered in yesterday's fighting. APPROVED FOR RELEASE - CIA INFO DATE: 29-Aug-2012

DIFFICULTIES IN THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IN EGYPT

9. The Iraqi Air Force unit in Egypt evidently suffered heavy losses, some of which were attributed to Egyptian air defenses during the first week of the war. [redacted] requested that the Iraqi pilot contingent in Egypt--originally numbering about 20--be returned to Baghdad on 14 October because the severe losses it had taken were causing a decline in morale. [redacted]

[redacted] requested that the Iraqi pilots stop flying because some of their planes were being hit by Egyptian fire. If this latter is true, the Iraqi Hawker Hunters probably had faulty electronic equipment designed to identify friendly aircraft to Egyptian air defense units.

10. Egyptian aircraft have been encountering similar problems. Egyptian air defense units have equipment designed to distinguish between friendly and enemy aircraft, but this system also depends on equipment installed in the aircraft. Improper maintenance of this equipment by Egyptian ground crews resulted in incorrect identification of about half of the Arab planes flying during a recent two day period.


SOVIET POLITICAL REACTION

11. Press coverage on 19 and 20 October focused more sharply on the US resupply effort to Israel. Quoting US press stories, today's Pravda cites the shipment of sophisticated weapons, and carries a Pentagon acknowledgment that US military personnel are in Israel to service the supply flights. Izvestia draws on western press coverage of the energy shortage to note that Arab willingness to use oil as a weapon is causing strains in US relations with the West European countries and Japan.

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12. Soviet media continue to refrain from direct reference to the USSR's resupply effort. They have, however, reported US statements that its shipments are aimed at preserving the military balance in the area and quoted western sources on the effectiveness of Soviet weapons in the war.

14. Thus far, the press has carried only the TASS announcement of Kosygin's visit to Cairo. Radio Moscow carried the White House announcement of Secretary of State Kissinger's trip to Moscow, but added no comment.



JORDAN: REACTION TO US RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL

17. Resentment over the US resupply of Israel is growing within the Jordanian Army [redacted]. Officers reportedly are incensed that Israel is now receiving equipment that the Jordanians had been told was not available or too expensive for them. In particular,



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the Jordanians are disappointed at reports that Israel is receiving surface-to-air missiles from the US. [redacted] the Jordanians intend to request surface-to-air missiles from the US once the present fighting is over. If this request is denied, some officers think Jordan ought to seek the missiles elsewhere, possibly from the Soviet Union.

18. [redacted] the Jordanian officers believe that the US action has served to enhance the position of radical Arab states and of Egypt and Syria, which have already improved their image by their military accomplishments. [redacted] US policy has alienated the moderate Arab states, particular Saudi Arabia.

MIDDLE EAST FORCES STATIONING AGREEMENT ENDED BY BAHRAIN

19. Bahrain formally served notice on the US today of the termination of the MIDEASTFOR stationing agreement. The Foreign Minister confirmed Bahrain's intention to honor the provision requiring one year's notice from 20 October 1973 and stressed that the move in no way affects diplomatic or other ties to the US. He commented, however, that Bahrain would prefer an earlier departure of the US navy, if feasible.

20. The Foreign Minister stated that Bahrain's action was prompted by President Nixon's submission to Congress of "the large emergency security assistance bill." He added, moreover, that the announcement of the Arab oil cut-back brought pressure to bear on Bahrain, which has no significant oil leverage, to impose some other sanction against the US.

Editor's note: The first several lines of paragraph 17, Situation Report Number 58 (as of 0630 EDT, 20 October), should have read: [redacted] the Arab foreign ministers with the exception of those from Libya, Iraq, Yemen (Aden), Bahrain and Qatar met in New York on 18 October...."


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
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ANNEX I



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
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
ANNEX II

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
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
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ANNEX IV

Libya's Position in the Middle East Conflict

1. President Qadhafi--the Arab leader most closely associated with a military solution to the Middle East dispute--has been conspicuously unenthusiastic about the current round of hostilities. Although Libya has dutifully thrown its considerable financial and material support behind the Arab combatants, Qadhafi has made it very clear that he has serious reservations regarding the ultimate objectives of the Syrians and Egyptians and the wisdom of their offensive.

2. Qadhafi sees the war as a risky military venture being waged solely for the political and territorial gains of Cairo and Damascus rather than for the restoration of Arab Palestine. Qadhafi has long suspected that both Sadat and Asad would eventually forsake the Palestinians in an effort to regain their own territory lost in the 1967 war, and now he is no doubt convinced that Sadat--who made no mention of the Palestinians' territorial claims in his speech earlier this week--is prepared to accept the boundaries of pre-1967 Israel.

3. The strained relationship between Sadat and Qadhafi has also colored the Libyan leader's attitude toward the war. There is considerable evidence that the Libyans were given at best an "eleventh hour" warning or perhaps no advanced notice at all of the Arab offensive. Qadhafi was infuriated by his exclusion from the war plans of his confederation partners and vowed that he would not commit Libyan troops to what he predicted would be another humiliating Arab disaster on the battlefield.

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4. Despite Qadhafi's personal feelings, the initial successes of the Arab armies have on the one hand been a pleasant surprise to the Libyans and on the other have dictated that Qadhafi participate in the Arab effort on Egyptian terms. [redacted] Sadat has instructed Libya to serve as a financial and logistics base for the supply of arms and material needed on both fronts. Since the outbreak of hostilities, the Libyans have contributed:

-- at least four and possibly more Mirage aircraft and pilots to supplement the Mirage squadron transferred to Egypt earlier this year.

-- over \$200 million to the Egyptians and some \$20 million to the Syrians.

-- port and air facilities for the reception of military equipment being sent to Egypt by the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, and others.

-- petroleum products, foodstuffs, and other consumer items to replenish shortages, particularly in Egypt.

-- military equipment and medical teams to both combatants.

5. Libya has also advocated radical measures for using oil as a weapon against Israel and the US. According to the press, the following proposals were presented by the Libyan representative to the emergency session of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) held in Kuwait earlier this week:

-- the withdrawal of Arab deposits from US banks.

-- the exchange of all Arab dollar holdings to other currencies.

-- the complete stoppage of oil shipments to the US.

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Although the proposals were not accepted, the Libyans are likely to continue pressing for stronger measures than the 5% per month production cutbacks adopted by OAPEC.

6. Despite several recent reports that Qadhafi has changed his mind about sending ground troops to the Egyptian front, there is no evidence that he is prepared to do so. Since the outbreak of hostilities, the Libyans have become increasingly fearful that the US is preparing to move against their country in retaliation for Libya's direct challenges to US oil interests. This fear, in and of itself, is probably the primary reason for Qadhafi's reluctance to deploy even token ground forces outside his country.

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