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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

7 June 1974

## MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : WARSAW PACT JOURNAL : Summaries of Warsaw Pact Exercises of 1972

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is one of a series now in preparation based on articles from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of summaries of Warsaw Pact exercises SOYUZ-72, VAL-72, VESNA-72, and ELEKTRON, a joint Soviet-Polish exercise, and East German exercise ATAKA-72.


2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the Codeword .

William E. Nelson Deputy Director for Operations

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## Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT

DATE OF INFO. Late 1972

DATE 7 June 1974

SUBJECT

Summaries of Warsaw Pact Exercises of 1972

SOURCE- Documentary --

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a section from a Soviet SECRET document titled Information Collection of the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces. This section is from Issue No. 4, which was published in Moscow in late 1972. It consists of summaries of Warsaw Pact exercises SOYUZ-72, VAL-72, VESNA-72, and ELEKTRON, a joint Soviet-Polish exercise, and East German exercise ATAKA-72.

End of Summary

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## OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS EXERCISE SOYUZ-72

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In accordance with the joint measures plan of the Combined Armed Forces, an exercise of the operational headquarters of the ground forces, air defense forces, air forces, and navies of the member states of the Warsaw Pact was held in the Polish People's Republic from 25 February to 4 March 1972.

Marshal of the Soviet Union I. I. Yakubovskiy, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, directed the exercise.

Formation commanders and senior officers of the operational headquarters of the Polish Army, East German Army, and the USSR Armed Forces participated in the exercise.

The exercise was conducted in three phases.

During the first phase, exercise participants studied methods of regrouping and deploying allied troops and naval forces while simultaneously repulsing enemy aggression using only conventional means of destruction. They formulated specific decisions and plans for going over to the offensive and worked out problems of conducting front and army offensive operations and also problems in naval combat actions and the organization of air defense.

During this phase, much attention was devoted to studying the organization of an advance by formations and large units of allied forces from the rear area into the zones of combat action.

It was planned that the ground forces would advance by organic means (by marching) and by using rail transport. This permitted units and large units to cover considerable distances in a short period of time and to maintain their combat readiness at the required level. It was envisaged that troops would have the capability to deploy rapidly and go into action from the march while maintaining organizational integrity.

The zones of advance were selected so that the total traffic capacity of the through vehicular roads, even if the enemy should destroy the most important road structures, would allow all forces to maneuver and to arrive at the assigned areas in the prescribed time.

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Since it was planned for the troops to advance to the area of combat actions through the territory of allied countries, provision was made to coordinate the following with the corresponding General Staffs: the zones and routes of troop movement; the organization of a traffic control service the protection of the main groupings, on routes of march and in concentration areas, from enemy air and ground strikes; and measures for the material and technical support of troops, especially at barrier lines.

Problems of covering state borders were also worked out during the first phase of the exercise. To accomplish this task, forces and means were allocated in such numbers as would ensure the firm retention of individual key areas and the infliction of a decisive defeat on the enemy by aggressive offensive actions. Combined arms large units, allocated to cover state borders, were positioned in areas which were prepared, or being prepared, from the engineer aspect.


Provision was made for defensive lines immediately adjacent to the borders on the probable axes of enemy attack. To occupy and hold these lines, one motorized rifle regiment or several reinforced battalions were allocated from each first-echelon division.

The headquarters of allied naval fleets on the Baltic Sea worked out problems of gaining supremacy at sea, of providing support to ground forces attacking on a coastal axis, of the landing and support of the combat actions of amphibious forces, of disrupting enemy maritime communications, and of maintaining an effective operational routine in the naval theater.

Problems of planning and conducting an amphibious landing operation with the employment of airborne landings were worked out within the framework of a front offensive operation. After the main force of the opposing enemy grouping had been routed, the amphibious landing operation was carried out under conditions assuming the use of nuclear weapons. This allowed the enemy's antiairborne defenses to be overcome relatively easily with minimum casualties.

Overall direction of the preparation and disembarkation of the landing forces was provided by the <u>front</u> commander through his deputy and the naval commander. The opinion was expressed at this time that it would be advisable to establish an independent operational command to control an amphibious landing operation. The operation plans made provision for the threat to the amphibious landing forces from enemy aviation, especially during the sea crossing and during the period of combat to establish the landing. To reliably repel the air enemy, the landing was provided with powerful fighter aircraft cover, and close coordination was implemented

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between fighter aircraft of the air defense forces of the allied countries, of the front, and of the fleets, not only with each other, but also with the antiaircraft means of ships and of the forces being landed.

During the second phase of the exercise, problems were worked out dealing with the transition from non-nuclear actions to actions with employment of nuclear weapons. The formation commanders' plans and the combat action plans included measures for the timely discovery of immediate enemy preparation for a nuclear attack and measures to determine the possible enemy preparation time for an initial strike and the scope of this strike.



Оформациие карто решения.

To ensure the continual readiness of the <u>fronts</u> and fleets to employ nuclear weapons, the objectives to be struck and the time schedule for the initial strike were refined. The maximum possible number of launchers and delivery aircraft were to participate in the initial nuclear strike of the <u>front</u> and the fleet.

In anticipation of the transition to actions employing nuclear weapons, tasks were specified for large units and units, and measures were stipulated for the restoration of their combat effectiveneness and to enable them to conduct combat actions to rout the enemy as rapidly as possible.

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
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During the third phase the repulse of a powerful enemy counterstrike and the forced crossing of water barriers were worked out.

The plans adopted by the formation commanders provided for defeating the enemy counterstrike grouping through massive use of nuclear weapons and delivery of strikes on the flanks and rear of the attacking forces. On several axes a portion of the forces of the armies temporarily went over to the defensive.

First to be hit with a massive nuclear strike were enemy nuclear means, aircraft, air defense means, tank large units, and control posts.


With the aim of maintaining high rates of advance and fulfilling the assigned tasks within the prescribed times, forced crossings of wide water barriers were carried out from the march. Fire preparation and fire support of troops during the forced crossing, the organization of antiaircraft defense, and engineer support of the crossing were meticulously planned. Crossing means were distributed ahead of time. Army and front reserves of crossing means were established.



Научение оперативной обстанстви

Summing up the exercise, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. I. Yakubovskiy, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, rated highly the work of the commanders of formations of the armed forces components of headquarters, and of operational groups of the allied armies and fleets which had participated in the exercise. He pointed out that during the


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entire exercise he had noted an atmosphere of great creative enthusiasm, unity of views, and mutual understanding among the commands, staffs, generals, admirals, and officers of the East German Army, Polish Army, Soviet Army, allied fleets, and Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces. This exercise has paved the way for a further rise in the level of operational readiness, the strengthening of combat collaboration among the fraternal armies, and the development of unified views on the most important problems of preparing and conducting <u>front</u> (army) operations and combat actions by air defense troops and allied fleets.



Выработка оперативного решения

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## THE VAL-72 COMMAND-STAFF EXERCISE OF ALLIED FLEETS WITH REPRESENTATIVE FORCES

In April 1972 a command-staff exercise of the navies of the Bulgarian People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, and the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet of the USSR, under the direction of Marshal of the Soviet Union I. I. Yakubovskiy, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, was held in the Black Sea with forces representing the opposing sides. The exercise was named VAL-72.

The command-staff exercise involved the commanders and staffs of the allied fleets, commanders and staffs of large units (units), submarines, surface ships of various types, naval aviation, and shore-based rocket troops and artillery.

Against the background of the combined command-staff exercise, the Bulgarian Navy conducted an exercise in which ground forces, aviation, air defense forces of the country, and ships of the civilian maritime fleet participated.

Submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and helicopters of the alliedfleets, and also aviation units from the ground forces and air defense forces, were allocated to the exercise to represent the forces of the opposing sides.

Direction of the exercise was effected from a mobile command post located on the missile cruiser DZERZHINSKIY.

The exercise comprised primarily the destruction, at the initiation of combat actions, of a naval force grouping of the probable enemy by the forces of the allied fleets and the support of the ground forces of the allied armies.

The principal purposes of the exercise were to improve the skills of the command and staffs in planning and organizing combat actions of allied naval forces, to work out action procedures and coordination of forces during the fulfilment of combined tasks under conditions involving the use of conventional and nuclear means of destruction, and to provide naval staffs and commanders and staffs of large units with practice in the control of forces during combined combat actions under conditions of radio-electronic countermeasures.

In the course of the exercise the following were also worked out: all types of defense and protection of naval bases and fleet and ship installations, the restoration of the combat effectiveness of naval forces

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
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subjected to nuclear strikes, and the elimination of the aftereffects of an enemy nuclear attack.

The problem of planning the landing of an amphibious force in order to support the forced crossing of a wide water barrier by <u>front</u> troops was especially singled out.

Удар морской ракетоносной аниации

Азака подволяой лотки



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Another aspect worked out was the employment of <u>front</u> fighter, fighter-bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft to protect naval forces at sea from air strikes, to find and destroy surface ships, and to neutralize the anti-amphibious defenses of the enemy.

The expansion of combat operations was carried out in accordance with the formation commander's plan, taking into account the situation that had developed and the actual actions of the forces representing the opposing sides.

These forces participated in the development of the principal events of the exercise: the delivery of combined rocket and torpedo strikes against combat ship detachments and amphibious landing detachments, the delivery of submarine strikes against surface targets, the combined search and destruction of enemy submarines by antisubmarine forces from different branches, and operations against minefields.

Submarines, surface ships, and naval aircraft carried out rocket, torpedo, and artillery combat firings as well as the bombing of surface ships and submarines.

During the exercise much attention was devoted to working out coordination among large units, units, and ships of the allied navies. For this purpose, the <u>combat actions included practice in resubordinating a</u> <u>portion of the Bulgarian Navy forces to the Black Sea Fleet, and the</u> <u>reverse, resubordinating a portion of the Black Sea Fleet forces to</u> <u>commanders of Bulgarian Navy large units.</u> Allied fleet headquarters exchanged operating groups with their communications means.

In the work of control agencies, wide use was made of the method of parallel activity between higher and subordinate echelons in organizing and planning combat actions; this was achieved by the timely issuance of warning orders. The planning of naval combat actions was standardized for conditions involving or not involving the use of nuclear weapons. In the process, electronic computer equipment and automated and mechanized means were widely used.

Operational and tactical camouflage measures and radio-electronic countermeasures were planned and implemented, as were also measures to divert the probable enemy's actual reconnaissance away from the area where the exercise was being conducted.

Marshal I. I. Yakubovskiy, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, rated highly the readiness and actions of the staffs and naval forces in the exercise.

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# THE TWO-LEVEL OPERATIONAL COMMAND-STAFF EXERCISE VESNA-72

In March 1972 in Bulgaria a two-level combined operational commandstaff exercise, under the direction of the Minister of Defense, General of the Army D. Dzhurov, was conducted in the field with communications equipment.

Commands and staffs of operational formations of the Bulgarian Army and of Romanian and Soviet Armed Forces, with communications and support units, were involved in the exercise.

In the course of the exercise problems were worked out concerning the concentration and deployment of troop groupings, the protection of national borders, and the conduct of combined combat actions by allied armies in the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations.

Operating groups from ground forces directorates of the Romanian Armed Forces and Soviet Army, with communications means and support and service subunits, moved into Bulgaria by organic means. Communication with them during their advance was carried out from posts organized on the movement routes. The operating group columns were met at the state borders by representatives of the national commands and were escorted to their destinations.

The operational situation throughout the exercise was dynamic and fast-changing, demanding continuous responses from commanders and staffs. During the separate phases, complex crisis situations were set up for the commanders and staffs of the operational formations that forced them to adopt immediate and decisive measures.

To cover the national border, troops from all branches of the armed forces were called upon. Antitank means in high densities and various types of obstacles and demolitions were established on the principal axes, thereby ensuring the repulse of the enemy strike and creating favorable conditions for the concentration of allied army forces in the areas of combat operations.

The main body of enemy forces, which had broken through, was routed by having groupings of allied forces deliver powerful strikes and go over to a general offensive.

In the course of the exercise, the formation commanders and staffs also worked out such important problems as the breakthrough of fortified

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enemy lines by using conventional means of destruction and also nuclear weapons and the forced crossing of water barriers from the march.

Much attention was devoted to combined actions by allied troops, to the organization and support of continuous cooperation, to the achievement of coordination and mutual understanding, and to the implementation of reciprocity in information.

Coordinated efforts of allied troops, air defense forces of the country, and the navy were organized in order to accomplish combined tasks such as the destruction of an enemy that had broken through, the delivery of counterstrikes, and the transition of troops to the offensive; the transition to combat actions using nuclear weapons; the breakthrough of fortified enemy border positions, and the forced crossing of water barriers.

The actions of the troops were coordinated by the commanders and staffs of allied formations and also by the chiefs of arms and services in accordance with the plans adopted for the operation and with changes in the situation.


To implement stable control and coordination, the allied headquarters reciprocally exchanged operating groups. From two to four officers, with communications means, were allocated to each operating group. Each group had documents regarding secure troop control.

The operating groups briefed their headquarters on the operational situation, on the nature of the actions of the formations operating together, on the plans and requests of the command, and also on the location of control posts and the times and axes of their relocation.

The presence of the operating groups in the combined headquarters, as was confirmed by the exercise, was conducive to more stable control and coordination among the allied armies and branches of armed forces.

During the exercise there was further development of the use of computers for performing operational-tactical calculations; computers were employed from the computer centers of the armed forces components of the Bulgarian Army and of allied army operational formations. Thus, up to 30 programs were developed and used, on the basis of which more than 120 complex calculations were performed.


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During the preparation and course of the exercise many diverse political measures were carried out with the aim of strengthening combat solidarity, fraternal friendship, and unity among the soldiers of the three allied countries and the Bulgarian people.

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## COMBINED TACTICAL-SPECIALIZED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT EXERCISE ELEKTRON

In March 1972 a one-sided multi-level tactical-specialized exercise of communications units of the Czech, East German, and Soviet armies was conducted in Czechoslovakia and East Germany under the arbitrary designation ELEKTRON.

The exercise was directed by <u>General-Leytenant</u> Engineer K. Rusov, Chief of the General Staff of the <u>Czechoslovak</u> People's Army and First Deputy to the Minister of National Defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

The exercise was an important measure in training allied communications troops to work together in organizing and providing communications when coalition forces are carrying out combat actions. It contributed to improvement in the practical skills of the personnel of communications units of allied armies in the combined establishment and operation of radio-relay lines and in the integrated utilization of wire, radio, and radio-relay channels to ensure the reliability of secure telephone and telegraph communications.

The tactical-specialized exercise of communications units was conducted on the basis of one of the possible variants of the operational situation in the Western Theater of Military Operations.

The exercise was characterized by great scope. To build up the operational situation, operating groups from the headquarters of formations and large units of the Czech, East German, and Soviet armies were brought into the exercise. All of the operating groups were headed by the chiefs of staff of the formations (large units) that made these groups available.


An extensive system of wire, radio, and radio-relay communications was established during the exercise. A complex network of radio-relay lines, with an overall length of 920 kilometers, was constructed through the combined efforts of communications units of the Czech, East German, and Soviet armies. Wire communications were established for the most part over channels leased from the Czech and East German Ministries of Communications. Radio communications were maintained by means of 24 radio nets and radio links.

The main task of the exercise was to give practice to the communications units of the allied armies in the combined communications support of the command and of coordinated operations, without exchanging special

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communications operating groups, i.e., in providing communications using only the forces and means of their own national communications centers.

Furthermore, during the exercise the headquarters operating groups were also assigned the task of working out basic operational planning documents.

Thus, the exercise conducted was by its very nature similar to a staff exercise with communications means, with emphasis on working out practical problems in communications. This made it possible to give more responsibility to personnel of communications units and to improve the quality of their work, since all of their activities were monitored and evaluated according to their success in handling conversations and information exchanges among the headquarters operating groups.

This exercise conducted was distinguished by a number of other characteristics which deserve attention.


For the first time in exercises, secure radio-telephone communications were established between communications centers, using the R-140 radio set and the T-127 secret coding device. Throughout the exercise these communications operated with stability and supplemented well the secure telephone communications organized on radio-relay channels.

Units of government high-frequency communications also participated actively in the exercise. These units established their own net of radio-relay, tropospheric, and cable communications lines. In the course of the exercise, mutual exchange of telephone channels was carried out between communication lines established by front communication units and links established by government communications units.

The experience of this exercise showed the advisability of including center and line units of government communications in combined tacticalspecialized exercises of communications units of allied armies, since in a real situation these units will jointly carry out the overall task of ensuring troop control.

During the exercise a comprehensive system of allocating the channels of the radio-relay network, established by the communications units of the three allied armies, was planned and implemented. During the second phase of the exercise the radio-relay network was re-established and an intricate allocation of channels was again carried out.

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


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The experience of this exercise has confirmed once again that to efficiently accomplish the task of reorganizing a network of radio-relay lines and of reallocating channels, there must be centralized direction of the network by the superior headquarters.

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## COMBINED TACTICAL EXERCISE OF LARGE UNITS AND UNITS OF THE POLISH ARMY AND THE SOVIET ARMY

In accordance with the joint measures plan of the Combined Armed Forces, a combined tactical exercise of Polish Army and Soviet Army large units was conducted in April 1972 under the direction of the commander of the forces of the Silesian Military District.

The theme of the exercise was "The organization and conduct of defensive combat by a tank division, with subsequent transition to the offensive. The encirclement and destruction of the enemy, the advance of a division to the second echelon of an army and its commitment to combat, and the conduct of an attack in wooded mountainous terrain."

The purposes of the exercise were to improve the field skills of troops and staffs and to work out, through actual practice, problems of control and coordination among units of the Polish Army and the Soviet Army when organizing and conducting defensive and offensive combat with the use of conventional means of destruction and with the employment of nuclear weapons.

The exercise participants included, from the Polish Army: a tank division at reduced complement; staffs, units, and subunits subordinate to the military district; three fighter-bomber squadrons; and one reconnaissance aviation squadron; and from the Soviet Army: one tank regiment.


During the first phase of the exercise these problems were worked out: bringing the division up to combat readiness, moving to the concentration area, regrouping divisional units, advancing to and occupying the defenses, and conducting defensive combat.

Over a 24-hour period, units of the division constructed engineer works in the defense zone, organized the system of fire, and conducted defensive combat against advancing enemy units.

The combat disposition of the division was in two echelons. Two tank regiments and one mechanized regiment operated in the first echelon and one tank regiment operated in the second echelon.

During this phase of the exercise, in accordance with the target situation at the firing range, bombing was carried out by the three fighter-bomber squadrons and field firing was conducted by a single battery of a tank-destroyer artillery regiment against a group of attacking enemy tanks.

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After repulsing the enemy attacks by fire from all types of weapons and by counterattacks of the second echelons, the division was assigned to go over to the offensive in coordination with two large units brought up from deep in the rear area.

The second phase of the exercise began with the preparation of divisional units to attack within a brief period of time. Units and subunits of the Polish Army tank division and the Soviet Army tank regiment, after a 20-minute fire preparation and the delivery of aircraft bombing strikes, went over to the offensive with the objectives of smashing forward enemy units and, in coordination with the division attacking on the right flank, encircling and destroying the opposing enemy grouping.

A distinctive feature of the attack was that the Soviet tank regiment, upon receiving the signal to attack while located deep in the area of the defending troops, advanced through the combat dispositions of the defending Polish Army mechanized regiment, and then both regiments together aggressively attacked the enemy. Before going over to the offensive, the commanders and staffs of the division and the regiment did much work on organizing coordination between the regiments of the two allied armies.

During the fire preparation period, practice was obtained through the launching of one tactical rocket and through field firings by an artillery battalion, a mortar battery, an antitank guided missile platoon, and an SPG-9 antitank grenade launcher platoon, all of the Polish Army division, and field firings by one Soviet Army tank company.


In the course of the attack, a practical problem was worked out involving the joint repulse of an enemy tank counterattack by the forces of one battalion of the Soviet Army tank regiment and the antitank reserve of the Polish Army division supported by fighter-bomber aircraft.

During the third phase of the exercise, the tank division, in accordance with the army commander's plan, was advanced to the army's second echelon for the subsequent attack in wooded mountainous terrain.

During the advance of the divisional units, both sides used nuclear weapons.

The aftereffects of "enemy" nuclear strikes were eliminated in the Polish Army mechanized regiment and in the Soviet Army tank regiment. For practice, two special treatment posts were organized. In these posts, combat equipment, weapons, and personnel were decontaminated.

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After its combat readiness was restored, the division proceeded to fulfil its assigned task.

The combined tactical exercise of the Polish and Soviet army large units and units was conducted instructively, on a high organizational and methodological level.

Throughout the exercise, the division commander, the unit commanders, and their staffs devoted a great deal of attention to problems of controlling troops and organizing coordinated activity, particularly when regiments of the two allied armies were accomplishing a combined task.

The staffs had good field equipment, took up dispersed positions, set up personnel and equipment shelters, organized cover from the air, and set up camouflage. Communications worked with stability.

During the exercise the personnel of the units and subunits exerted themselves to the utmost to fulfil the tasks set before them.

Purposeful party-political work, directed toward further improving the field skills of the troops and to strengthening combat collaboration among the soldiers of the Polish Army and Soviet Army, contributed significantly to the success of the exercise.

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#### EAST GERMAN ARMY TACTICAL EXERCISES ATAKA-72

In March 1972 a tactical field exercise, under the arbitrary name of ATAKA-72, was conducted in the East German Army under the direction of the commander of the forces of a military district.


A motorized rifle division at full strength and artillery, engineersapper, chemical, and intelligence units and subunits subordinate to the military district and to central headquarters participated in the exercise. Aviation units and subunits were pulled in to support ground force actions and to work out coordination between ground and air forces. Units and subunits from one of the divisions of this same military district represented the enemy.

The exercise was preceded by extensive preparation of commanders, staffs, personnel of units and subunits, combat equipment, automotive transport, and organs of the rear services, all carried out according to plan as part of the preparation for combat. Special commanders' courses, training sessions with officers of all categories, staff and radio training, combat readiness training, and sessions on fire control were held. Tactical-drill-exercises and tactical-exercises-were conducted withthe subunits, and command-staff exercises were held with two regiments. Tank mechanic-drivers and vehicle drivers were given special courses in driving in column formation in daylight or at night.

The concept of the exercise provided for working out problems of organizing and conducting combat actions characteristic of current conditions in the Western Theater of Military Operations: the advance of a motorized rifle division, an attack to overcome the enemy security zone, the breakthrough of a prepared defense, and the development of an in-depth offensive from the march, including the repulse of counterattacks. Combat actions were worked out both with the use of conventional means of destruction and with the use of nuclear weapons.

The exercise began by placing a division on combat alert and advancing its units out from their permanent stations to the concentration areas. In the concentration area the division's move to the exercise area was planned in conformity with the task assigned. The move was made by the combined method: by rail for a distance of 350 to 400 kilometers and by organic means for a distance of 250 kilometers on a route with an average march speed of 35 to 40 kilometers per hour. Simultaneously with the advance of the division's main body, and its preparation to go over to the offensive in order to repulse a surprise enemy attack, cover of the national borders was organized. This task was given to a reinforced motorized rifle regiment which was to operate in a zone up to 20 kilometers wide.

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Troop combat actions were initiated by conducting a fire preparation with field firing by the artillery and by the division's transition to the offensive. First-echelon regiments, having sent out their forward detachments made up of reinforced battalions, crossed the obstacle and demolition zone at night and advanced to the forward edge of the enemy defense. After a short preparation, the divisional units proceeded to break through the defense under the conditions of the use of nuclear weapons by both sides. During this phase of the exercise several motorized rifle, tank, and artillery submits attacked with field firing.

In subsequent phases of the exercise problems of committing second echelons to combat, of pursuing a withdrawing enemy, of breaking through defensive lines from the march, of forcing water barriers, and of repulsing counterattacks were worked out.

The exercise was planned in such a way that, with an overall depth of  $\leq$  250 kilometers and with aggressive combat actions being conducted on five firing ranges, all regiments had the opportunity to practice working out the assigned training tasks, several of which were accomplished with field firing of artillery.

In breaking through an intermediate defense line and making a forced river crossing, tactical airborne assault landings, made up of a motorized rifle battalion transported by helicopters, were employed. Fighter-bombers supported the actions of the divisional units. This afforded the division commander and his staff an opportunity to obtain practice in organizing coordination with aviation.

Problems of contending with enemy radio-electronic means and of controlling troops under conditions of strong radio-electronic countermeasures were realistically worked out. Measures were carried out to eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy use of means of mass destruction. In the course of the exercise, all regiments carried out complete decontamination of personnel, radioactive decontamination of combat equipment and automotive transport, and evacuation and restoration of damaged equipment.

Problems of rear service, medical, and technical support of division combat actions were worked out during the exercise. Approximately 1200 tons of POL, 400 tons of ammunition, 320 tons of food, 2000 cubic meters of drinking water, and a large amount of other supplies and material, were delivered. Medical establishments took in 850 wounded and injured men. Repair units and subunits obtained extensive practice in the repair and servicing of tanks, motor vehicles, weapons, engineer vehicles, and other equipment. The refueling of a tank regiment was effected by issuing fuel

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through a pipeline extended from the railroad station to the regiment's concentration area.

The ATAKA-72 exercise showed a rising level of operational-tactical and combat readiness of the commanders, staffs, and entire personnel of the units and subunits that participated in it.

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