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COLLECTION DIVISION  
DATE: 06-18-2012

HR70-14

[Redacted]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

4 May 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : William E. Nelson  
Deputy Director for Operations  
SUBJECT : [Redacted]

1. Enclosed is a [Redacted] report. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword [Redacted] has been assigned to the product of certain extremely sensitive agent sources of CIA's Directorate of Operations. The word [Redacted] is classified [Redacted] and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

2. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this report in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

[Redacted]

William E. Nelson

[Redacted]


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### Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Poland/Warsaw Pact

[Redacted]

DATE OF INFO. 1975

DATE 4 May 1976

SUBJECT

- 1. Polish Peacetime and Wartime Troop Strengths
- 2. Deployment of Polish Forces in Wartime

SOURCE

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

1. The 1976-1980 five-year plan for development of the Polish Armed Forces calls for personnel strengths of 414,000 soldiers in peacetime, including 188,000 operational troops, and 900,000 soldiers in wartime, including 523,000 operational troops. These levels represent a 2.6 percent increase over the troop strengths provided for in the previous five-year plan.

2. In the event of a sudden outbreak of hostilities, the initial action to repel a massive first strike (or counterstrike) against Poland would be undertaken by the National Territorial Defense (OTK), while operational troops would regroup and advance to assembly areas in East Germany for action on the external front.

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3. In the event of a gradually increasing threat, or a conflict initiated by the Warsaw Pact nations, at least the first echelon of Polish operational troops would attain full combat readiness in their existing locations or temporary areas, and only then would the operational forces of the front be regrouped in western and northwestern Poland. In this phase, operational deployment of the front would be under the command of the Polish General Staff. Subsequently the High Command of the Unified Armed Forces and the command of the front would take over, maintaining all the while the appearance of a military exercise. Since the Unified Armed Forces High Command is in fact an auxiliary organ of the Soviet General Staff, and since the wartime front commander, General Molczyk, would be subordinate to the Soviet theater commander, the order to implement the wartime operational plan of the Polish Army could come only from the General Staff of the Soviet Army.

4. The question has been raised whether Polish forces should proceed, even before the outbreak of hostilities, to occupy and prepare assembly areas near the East German border. The question will be studied in a future NATO military exercise, but there will probably be no change in the current guidelines.

5. Polish participation in exercises in East Germany is generally limited to one division at reduced strength, plus various staff elements, and it is generally believed that the deployment of several Polish divisions onto East German territory would seriously risk provoking a conflict. Therefore, if several Polish combat divisions, plus small detachments of communications, chemical and engineer troops, were moved into East Germany, this would indicate the intention to go to war, or at least to conduct operations similar to the 1968 occupation of Czechoslovakia. In every military game conducted so far, the scenario has involved deployment of major Polish forces in East Germany in a final resolve to employ them for war.

6. Another reliable indicator of the imminence of hostilities would be the introduction into East Germany

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of R-300 (SCUD B) operational-tactical missiles from Poland. These missiles are never used in exercises conducted in East Germany.

7. In the event of war, if there is a threat to the northern flank, the 15th Mechanized Division will be used to protect the sea coast. This division, formerly headquartered in Olsztyn and assigned to the Warsaw Military District, has been reassigned to the Pomeranian Military District, which is responsible for defense of the coast. The 15th Division, like the 7th Assault Landing Division, has been trained in amphibious operations. ( [redacted] )

Comment: Source also reported that the 15th Division would be used to protect nuclear weapons transports from the USSR to Poland.)

8. Since the recent changes in military districts, the Warsaw Military District has only the 1st Mechanized Division in Warsaw, the 3rd Mechanized Division in Lublin, the 9th Mechanized Division in Rzeszow and the 6th Airborne Division. However, the latter is a front reserve division and does not really belong to the Warsaw Military District.

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



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : William W. Wells  
Deputy Director for Operations  
SUBJECT :  Report

1. Enclosed is a  report. For convenience of reference by NFIB agencies, the codeword  has been assigned to the product of certain extremely sensitive agent sources of CIA's Directorate of Operations. The word  is classified  and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

2. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this report in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.



William W. Wells



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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Poland/Warsaw Pact

[REDACTED]  
(CORRECT)

DATE OF INFO. 1975

DATE 2 March 1977

SUBJECT

1. Polish Peacetime and Wartime Troop Strengths
2. Deployment of Polish Forces in Wartime

SOURCE [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED] Intelligence Information Special Report with the above heading and report number was issued on 4 May 1976. There was a typographical error in the figure for the wartime strength of the Polish operational troops as stated in Paragraph 1. The figure "423,000" should be corrected to read "523,000".

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