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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

9 June 1976



MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Organization
of the Cooperation of Civil Defense Organs
with the Troops of a Military District

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the ~~SECRET~~ USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article is a summary of civil defense organization and cooperation procedures based on the experience of the Volga Military District. The cooperation plan, covering the activities of the military district staff, the directorate of the civil defense operational zone, oblast civil defense staffs and local military commissariats, as well as the allocation of military and civil defense forces, was tested in various training exercises. The problems uncovered included the organization, maintenance and restoration of communications, for which the civil defense organs have insufficient equipment and personnel. The organization of rail shipments was found to be inefficient, and civil defense training inadequate. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (91) for 1970.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

William W. Wells

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
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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF INFO. Late 1970

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DATE 9 June 1976

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Organization of the Cooperation of Civil Defense Organs with the Troops of a Military District

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (91) for 1970 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of this article are General-Major A. Yevdan and Captain Third Rank G. Kotov. This article is a summary of civil defense organization and cooperation procedures based on the experience of the Volga Military District. The cooperation plan, covering the activities of the military district staff, the directorate of the civil defense operational zone, oblast civil defense staffs and local military commissariats, as well as the allocation of military and civil defense forces, was tested in various training exercises, which are noted briefly. The problems uncovered included the organization, maintenance and restoration of communications, for which the civil defense organs have insufficient equipment and personnel. The organization of rail shipments was found to be inefficient, and civil defense training inadequate. The parallel organization of civil defense in the district is explained and its advantages in terms of flexibility and efficiency are pointed out.

End of Summary

[Redacted] Comment:

General-Major Andrey Alekseyevich Yevdan was identified in 1964 as a Deputy Commander of the Transbaykal Military District. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

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The Organization of the Cooperation of Civil Defense
Organs with the Troops of a Military District
(From the Experience of the Volga Military District)

by
General-Major A. Yevdan
Captain Third Rank G. Kotov

An article by General-Major Narkhodzhaev entitled "The Cooperation of the Troops of a Military District and Civil Defense" was published in the Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" No. 3 for 1969. The questions raised in this article are quite timely and require further research. We therefore would like to share our thoughts on this subject, with due regard for our experience in solving such problems under the conditions existing in the Volga Military District.

To begin with, it should be noted that the staff of the Volga Military District and the Directorate of the Volga Civil Defense Operational Zone have acquired a certain amount of experience in organizing cooperation when carrying out essential measures during the "Special Period" and in conducting rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations in centers of mass destruction. During operational training and combat training, a number of highly important operational documents were drawn up relating to the organization of cooperation within the territory of the district (zone) between the staffs and troops of the Soviet Army and the staffs and subunits of the civil defense.

The key document among these is the plan for the cooperation of the civil defense organs of the zone with the military units and facilities of the Volga Military District. It fully reflects all the basic factors that should be considered when planning cooperation between the Directorate of the Operational Zone and the military district staff and between the civil defense staffs of the oblasts (ASSR) and the local district and oblast (republic) military commissariats.*

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A number of attachments to this basic document were worked out, in particular: a plan or diagram for the cooperation of the civil defense organs with the units of the Volga Military District; a plan for allocating forces and means from the military district troops to carry out civil defense tasks during the "Special Period"; a plan for allocating oblast (ASSR) civil defense contingents to render assistance to installations of the Ministry of Defense; and a diagram of the system to be used by the military units of the Air Defense of the Country within the borders of the Volga Operational Zone for warning the oblast (ASSR) civil defense staffs.

The documents drawn up were checked out and repeatedly revised both during the command-staff exercises, war games and staff training practices conducted in 1969, and during operational training and combat training.

In our opinion, the command-staff research game conducted by the Volga Military District on the theme The Control of Mass Military District and Transit Troop Movements During the Prewar Period and at the Beginning of War when Transportation Lines Have Been Severely Disrupted was very instructive and useful, as was the command-staff exercise of the Volga Operational Zone, conducted by the civil defense staff of the RSFSR (in 1969), on the theme Work Performed by the Chiefs of the Zone Directorate and of the Staffs and Services of Kirybyshev Oblast and the Tatar ASSR to Organize and Implement Civil Defense Measures during the "Special Period" and when Conducting Rescue Operations in Centers of Destruction.

The Commander of the Volga Military District, Colonel General A. M. Parshikov, directed the research game, and operations groups from the territorial directorates and agencies were allocated to participate. Among the civil defense organs that took part in the game were operations groups of the Directorate of the Volga Operational Zone and all the civil defense staffs of the oblasts and the zone of the ASSR.

Among the problems of the organization of cooperation, the participants concentrated primarily on the control of transport, road support, and the rendering of mutual assistance by the civil defense forces and military units not only during the "Special Period" and the declaration of mobilization, but also during the conduct of rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations in centers of nuclear destruction.

During the part of the war game concerned with the organization of cooperation with the civil defense organs, it was demonstrated that the cooperating staffs, facilities, and organizations both of the military district and of the civil defense on the whole are correctly solving these

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problems and are profoundly aware of the importance and necessity of close cooperation for the purpose of achieving the assigned objectives. At the same time, several unresolved problems were discovered during the game, and we would like to dwell on them.

The exercises demonstrated that it is advisable to solve these problems by organizing the mutual use of individual radio nets and wire communications channels by: the staffs of the military districts and the directorates of the operational zones; the command posts of the oblast (ASSR) civil defense staffs; the control posts of Soviet and Party organs; and the control posts of the oblast (republic) military commissariats. To accomplish this, in our opinion it is necessary in peacetime to connect the non-urban command posts of the staffs of the military districts, the directorates of the operational zones, the civil defense staffs of the oblasts (ASSR), and the control posts of the oblast (republic) military commissariats using direct, secure wire communications channels, bypassing integrated cities.

It is no less important to allocate the special radio nets and radio links among the military and civilian control organs, such as the directorates and sections of the railroads, steamship companies, power systems, and civil aviation, on which the successful fulfillment of the tasks of the military districts and civil defense organs during the "Special Period" and during a war largely depend.

When organizing communications between non-urban control posts, special attention must be given to linking up inter-oblast communications channels, which at the present time constitute the weakest part of the organization of communications.

To maintain the stability of communications and provide for prompt and swift restoration of damaged communications lines (especially main lines), in our opinion it is advisable to have the necessary contingents equipped with essential repair materials and mobile radio-relay sets subordinate to the oblast (republic) communications directorates and to the directorates of the main cable lines. This would ensure the insertion of radio-relay sets in damaged sectors of communications main lines and would substantially increase the reliability and stability of communications and of control by the military district and civil defense staffs.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of communications organs, equipment, and specialists to the accomplishment of the tasks assigned to the operational rear during a future war. This, undoubtedly,

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also applies to the civil defense organs. But unfortunately the civil defense organs at present do not have an adequate amount of this equipment, and qualified engineer-technical personnel are called up to a considerable extent during mobilization.

This kind of situation endangers the establishment and equipping of communications centers during the "Special Period" in the territory of the zone (military district), and particularly endangers the rebuilding of these centers after the delivery of nuclear strikes by the enemy. To solve this problem, we consider it necessary that the oblast (republic) military commissariats in coordination with the territorial communications facilities detach from the mobilization program a quantity of unimportant, minimally essential engineer-technical personnel, keeping in mind the requirements of setting up and servicing communications centers.

During exercises and a war game conducted in the military district, we ran into similar difficulties when the railroads were not able to cope with the total volume of shipments resulting from combining the schedules for military shipments during the mobilization period with the taking of measures to evacuate and disperse the population and materiel supplies during the "Special Period".

This indicates that individual aspects of the plans for military shipments and for civil defense shipments have not been coordinated with sufficient precision.

The following example can be given to confirm the above assumption. The Penza Railroad Section operational plan for civil defense and the railroad schedule provided for the movement of 22 paired trains for civil defense purposes on the Penza - Pamyatka segment. However, during the war game, when it was engaged simultaneously in military shipments and measures relating to the "Special Period", the railroad section was able to move a total of only ten paired trains.

As a result, the plan of measures to evacuate and disperse the population of the city of Penza was not carried out within the prescribed period of time.

The conclusion suggests itself that it is essential that the staff of the military district, the directorate of the operational zone, and the oblast (ASSR) civil defense staffs, with the participation of authorized representatives of the railroad directorate (section), fully coordinate matters relating to the provision of transport when military shipments and

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civil defense measures are being carried out simultaneously during the "Special Period".

A no less important problem is the question as to the subordination of individual railroad segments. For example, it is known that the Orenburg Oblast geographically and economically gravitates more toward the economic structure of the Middle Volga. However, the Orenburg Railroad Section at present is part of the South Ural Railroad Directorate, whereas a segment of the Orenburg Railroad Section that begins literally 35 kilometers east of the city of Kuybyshev and crosses the eastern portion of Kuybyshev Oblast and all of Orenburg Oblast, has its directorate located in Chelyabinsk.

From the point of view of the military district command and of the Directorate of the Volga Civil Defense Operational Zone, it would be more advantageous to include the Orenburg Railroad Section under the Kuybyshev Railroad Directorate. This would make it possible to better and more efficiently plan both military and civil defense shipments on that segment.

In addition, it would be desirable that one of the railroad directorates be the chief one in the military district (zone) territory in the "Special Period". Then it could efficiently coordinate the movement of trains throughout the territory of the military district (zone). The Kuybyshev Railroad Directorate could be made such a directorate in the territory of the Volga Military District (Zone).

Concerning road support, it must be said that it is equally necessary to have in the military district and in the zone a unified plan for road use and a coordinated plan for organizing the provost traffic control service on the movement routes and for laying and using crossings over water obstacles.

An important element in the organization of close cooperation between the military district and the civil defense consists of the problems involved in correctly situating command posts, the full mobilization areas of troops, depots, bases, and other installations with regard to: the boundaries of possible zones of destruction of integrated cities; disastrous flooding; damage caused by potent toxic agents following accidents or the destruction of enterprises that store or produce these agents; and areas of possible leakage of petroleum and gas.

The disposition of the above installations, both those belonging to the civilian ministries and agencies and those of the Ministry of Defense,

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should be made to allow for changes in the economic map of our native land and at the same time should strictly conform to the requirements of the Norms for Planning Engineer-Technical Civil Defense Measures for 1966, approved by an order of the USSR State Committee for Construction, the USSR State Planning Committee, and the Chief of Civil Defense, USSR, implementing Decree No. 576-181 of 23 July 1966 of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Observation of these norms will increase the survivability of installations of the national economy and other important installations, and will ensure steady operation of them during the "Special Period" and during wartime.

The most important question in the cooperation of the military district troops and the civil defense contingents is the rendering of mutual assistance when conducting rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations after the delivery of nuclear strikes by the enemy. The Staff of the Volga Military District and the Directorate of the Operational Zone have already established the bases for such mutual assistance -- i.e. they have worked out and sent to the executors the plan for assigning forces and means.

However, it must be said that the matter of working out the cooperation of the military units with the civil defense contingents has not yet proceeded any further. The civil defense training of the military staffs and the personnel of the Soviet Army subunits at present is conducted sporadically, when the initiative is taken locally, and many officers do not have a clear understanding of civil defense.

We believe that to eliminate this shortcoming it is first necessary to include a minimum number of civil defense problems in the troop combat training program. In addition, a civil defense training course has to be developed for military units, intermediate and higher military educational institutions, and civil defense training introduced as a special subject for servicemen in military units and students in educational institutions.

In our opinion, at the present time it is essential that individual sections of the regulations and manuals of the Soviet Army reflect the problems of the cooperation of the staffs and troops of the Soviet Army with the civil defense staffs, troops, and contingents. These sections should set forth the fundamentals of cooperation on the basis of which the staffs of the military districts and local garrisons in conjunction with the civil defense staffs could work out all problems in detail, with due regard for local conditions.

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It is especially necessary to focus on the role and place of the directorates of the operational zones and the civil defense departments in those military districts where the operational zones coincide with the boundaries of the military districts.

At the Volga Military District military science conference held in 1969, doubt was expressed as to the necessity of having two parallel civil defense organs within the territory of the military district -- the Directorate of the Operational Zone and the civil defense department of the military district -- and it was proposed that they be combined under the control of the commander of the military district.

We would like to express our opinion on the above question.

First of all, it must be noted that these two organs within the territory of the military district in no way parallel or duplicate each other. As is known, the civil defense department of the military district staff, according to the table of organization, is called the department for combat training and mobilization training of civil defense troops, and the assistant commander is called the assistant commander of the military district for combat training and mobilization training of civil defense troops. This department is supposed to handle and does handle the full mobilization and training of civil defense troops during both peacetime and wartime; these troops are subsequently resubordinated to the civil defense chiefs of the oblasts (ASSR) and operational axes.

As regards the directorates of the operational zones, they handle the planning of civil defense measures within the territory of the zone and the training of the civil defense command personnel of the civil defense staffs, contingents, and the entire population, and they supervise the carrying out of civil defense measures within the territory of the zone during both peacetime and wartime.

Thus, the proposal that the entire civil defense system within the territory of the military district be made subordinate to the commander of the military district is fundamentally incorrect. The military district commander and his staff are certainly not capable during peacetime, and even less during wartime, of handling all the problems involved in the control and organization of civil defense within the territory of the military district in addition to their own immediate responsibilities. The truth and necessity of this are corroborated by the experience of the directorates of the operational zones, which have existed for five years. In the RSFSR there are 72 oblasts and autonomous republics with major

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economic and administrative centers. It is quite obvious that the civil defense staff of the RSFSR is not able to organize the entire civil defense system for so enormous a territory and control it in peacetime, much less in wartime, without intermediate control organs. The directorates of the operational zones also are these intermediate control organs within the territory of the republic in peacetime.



In wartime, the authority of the directorates of the zones may expand even further. In the event that communications with the civil defense staff of the RSFSR are severed, the directorates must be prepared to assume complete control of civil defense measures within the territory of their zones. We therefore consider correct the idea of the Civil Defense Staff of the USSR that during the "Special Period" a staff of the senior chief of the civil defense operational zone should be formed on the basis of the existing directorates of the zone and the department for combat training and mobilization training of civil defense troops of the military district staff.

Such a staff would provide the senior chief of the civil defense operational zone with reliable and efficient control over civil defense measures. This was specifically confirmed by the 1969 command-staff exercise conducted in the Volga Operational Zone by the RSFSR civil defense staff, during which the training table of organization of this type of staff was tested.


The manning of the operational zone staff according to this table of organization was based on the peacetime table of organization of the directorate of the zone and of the department for combat training and mobilization training of civil defense troops of the military district staff. In our opinion, this solution of the problem proved successful. The existence of two directorates within the operational zone staff -- the Directorate of the Operational Zone and the Directorate of the Troops -- working, so to speak, hand in hand under a single command and at one command post, best meets the requirements for flexibility and efficiency of control both of the troops and of the civil defense contingents during their deployment, training, and conduct of rescue operations in centers of nuclear destruction.

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