

HR70-14

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

27 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence



FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combat Actions
by a Tank Division Separated from the Main
Forces of a Combined-Arms Army

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article, based on East German experience, explores actions peculiar to a tank division which has separated from a combined-arms army to penetrate farther into the depth of an offensive. Rapid marches and prolonged actions require maintaining combat effectiveness through advance planning, support and provision for cooperation with other army elements such as the rocket troops, aviation and landing forces. The author outlines the tasks of the tank division, the numbers of nuclear warheads required and how they should be supplied, and the special problems of air defense, reconnaissance, protection against mass destruction weapons, materiel supply, and control. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (76) for 1965.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

William W. Wells



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
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Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 17 Pages

COUNTRY USSR



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SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combat Actions by a Tank Division Separated from the Main Forces of a Combined-Arms Army


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
Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (76) for 1965 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. The author of this article is General-Mayor G. Khaych. This article, based on East German experience, explores actions peculiar to a tank division which has separated from a combined-arms army to penetrate farther into the depth of an offensive. Rapid marches and prolonged actions require maintaining combat effectiveness through advance planning, support and provision for cooperation with other army elements such as the rocket troops, aviation and landing forces. The author outlines the tasks of the tank division, the numbers of nuclear warheads required and how they should be supplied, and the special problems of air defense, reconnaissance, protection against mass destruction weapons, materiel supply, and control. End of Summary

Comment:

The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.





Combat Actions by a Tank Division Separated from
the Main Forces of a Combined-Arms Army
by
General-Mayor G. Khaych

The need to develop methods for combat actions by a tank division separated from the rest of the forces of a combined-arms army is explained by the fundamental changes that have taken place in the development of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic and by the tasks that it must carry out in the event of war.

It is impossible to examine fully within one article all the questions connected with this subject. Therefore, we have presented only some of our own views.

* * * *

The modern army offensive operation is characterized primarily by its fluidity and the increased area it covers both in frontage and in depth. These characteristics are determined, on the one hand, by the availability of powerful means of mass destruction -- primarily nuclear weapons and long-range means of delivering them to a great depth -- and the high combat and maneuvering capabilities of the troops; and, on the other hand, by the fact that for the defense of its forces and means, it is necessary to echelon groupings of ground forces in depth and to deploy nuclear means of attack over a large area.

Thus, the objectives of an offensive operation require the destruction of the enemy to as great a depth as possible. The very nature of a nuclear war creates favorable conditions for doing so, and correspondingly determines the nature of combat actions by the troops.

Combat actions by army troops will develop unevenly along the individual axes, with different rates of advance. On axes where the greatest number of nuclear and other means are employed, it is advisable to have tank divisions, which possess great mobility and striking power, the ability to effectively exploit the results of nuclear strikes, and a high degree of protection against and resistance to nuclear weapons. Clearly, favorable conditions arise for these divisions to advance at a rate higher





than that for large units operating on other axes and having lower combat capabilities.

It is precisely the tank divisions operating on an army's main axes that are called upon to exploit to the maximum extent the results of their own nuclear strikes, penetrate swiftly far into the depth of the enemy's territory, and thus carry out an offensive while separated from the other large units of the army.

A tank division equipped with modern combat equipment and weapons is capable of independently conducting separate combat actions. In the course of a day, it can cover, using its own transport, a distance of up to 300 kilometers and more, averaging as much as 30 kilometers an hour. While marching great distances, the division is still able to conduct an offensive having decisive objectives.

Equipped with more than 300 tanks, tactical missiles and rocket artillery, a tank division possesses great striking power and fire power, which enables it to successfully defeat strong enemy groupings. Since the division personnel are in tanks, they are effectively protected against the effects of the casualty-producing elements of nuclear weapons; and, as a result, the combat effectiveness of the units is maintained even during actions in zones of radioactive contamination. In order to employ a tank division correctly in an army offensive operation, maximum use must be made of its combat capabilities and the specific conditions of the situation must be taken into account. In planning an operation, it is necessary to establish close cooperation between the division and the rocket troops, aviation, and airborne landing forces; and on coastal axes, also between the division and amphibious landing forces.

A tank division operating within a combined-arms army, depending on the depth and time of its commitment to an engagement, will often be forced to battle enemy reserves and successively defeat them. To successfully accomplish this task requires the timely massed employment of nuclear weapons by army and front means for the purpose of inflicting heavy losses on enemy reserves; with their rout being completed through swift attacks by tank units. Should army means also destroy the enemy nuclear means detected that could operate against a tank division advancing separately, the tank division, when tactical missiles are available in it and are skilfully employed, can then successfully rout enemy reserves up to one division in strength. For subsequent actions, it must receive the necessary number of nuclear warheads on a timely basis.



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Page 6 of 17 Pages

Combat actions by a separated tank division will have their own special features, these being determined by the tasks it is to fulfil. Specifically, the division will have to carry out rapid marches to meet enemy reserve groupings that are either advancing or taking up a hasty defense; and it will also have to deliver preemptive nuclear and fire strikes, both independently with its own means and also in cooperation with army means. It will have to deploy quickly and, with a rapid attack, complete the destruction of the enemy. Its daily rate of advance may reach 100 kilometers and more, and uninterrupted combat actions may be carried out by the troops for 10 to 12 hours a day (of this time, up to six to seven hours might be used in moving forward, up to two hours in deploying and attacking, and up to four hours in defeating the enemy). The remainder of the day may be used for resting personnel and restoring the combat effectiveness of the units.

Taking into account the maneuvering by a tank division in the course of a battle, 1.8 to two refuelings of fuel in tanks and mobile reserves permit it to conduct combat actions to a depth of up to 220 to 240 kilometers. If it receives up to an additional 1.5 to two refuelings during the battle, it can conduct actions throughout the entire depth of the army operation.

The dependability of operation of the main assemblies of a tank is quite sufficient to allow the employment of a division into the depth of not only one, but also a subsequent army operation.

The amount and tactical characteristics and specifications of the radio and radio-relay means available in a combined-arms army and tank division allow communications to be maintained at the army-division level, and also at the division-regiment level, via at least two channels.

* * * *

Successful actions by a tank division separated from the rest of the army forces are possible if it maintains its combat effectiveness, does not expend its nuclear warheads prematurely, avoids losses when moving into the area for its commitment to an engagement, and does not get involved in battles with opposing enemy groupings in the immediate tactical depth, and if, on the axis of its offensive, the enemy's ability to resist is reduced to a minimum as a result of nuclear strikes by army and front means.

It is especially important to maintain the combat effectiveness of a division when there is a surprise nuclear attack by the enemy. Therefore,

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Page 7 of 17 Pages

its units must be moved out at the proper time from their garrison areas, be prepared for actions, and go over to the offensive at the same time as the first nuclear strike is delivered against the enemy.


A tank division will move into the area for its commitment to an engagement under conditions in which enemy aviation is highly active and the enemy is delivering strikes with nuclear means. There will also be large areas of destruction and radioactive contamination on its lines of march. The division must be broken down into approach march formations at a distance of up to 20 kilometers from the enemy's forward units; that is, beyond where the massed employment by the enemy of tactical nuclear means, which he has in great quantity, is most probable.

Thus, the commander and staff of a combined-arms army must not count on the natural development of events. They must plan measures in advance, and in the course of combat actions carry them out, to ensure the high combat readiness of all forces and means, particularly the rocket troops and tank divisions. Plans should be made in advance for actions by the latter while separated from the rest of the army forces, and all measures should be taken to provide them with complete support. A tank division must be able under all conditions to enter into an engagement from the march, carry out a decisive, deep attack, and continue to conduct combat actions separately from the rest of the forces, as well as in cooperation with operational landing forces, exploiting the results of army and front nuclear strikes.

The task of attacking to a great depth and conducting actions separately from the rest of the army forces is assigned to a tank division by the army commander while the operation is still under preparation. For this reason, these actions by the division will be carried out not in an improvised manner, but according to a single concept for the operation and in support of the operation; i.e., in close cooperation with all the forces and means of the army.

In setting up the grouping of army troops for an offensive, a tank division, depending on the concept of the army commander, may be included in either the first or the second echelon of army troops. This will depend primarily on the task that a given division is to carry out, and also on the enemy grouping and the nature of his actions. Usually, the tank divisions of a combined-arms army operate in the first echelon, which makes it possible to exploit the results of the first nuclear strike more effectively, and to develop the offensive at high speeds. In the event, however, that heavy losses were not inflicted on the enemy grouping, the

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


tank divisions may be used in the second echelon of the army. This may also occur when a tank division takes its place in an army during the course of an offensive already under way. But in all cases, each tank division should be assigned tasks throughout the entire depth of the army operation.

The decision of the army commander should detail matters concerning cooperation (according to tasks, time, and place) between the tank division and army rocket troops, supporting aviation, motorized rifle divisions and, when necessary, separately operating divisions of adjacent armies, airborne landing forces dropped on the axis of the division's offensive, and under certain conditions, also a tank army of the front. If this army has plans for several of its tank divisions to operate separately, then, of course, cooperation is established among them as well.

When cooperation is established with the rocket troops, the division commander must be informed about nuclear strikes being delivered by army and front means on the axis of the division's offensive. Moreover, the army commander determines the number of nuclear means that have to be employed in order to fulfil the division's task, as well as the order of delivery of the nuclear strikes. It is possible that the commander of a division operating separately will maintain direct communications with the army missile brigade or one of its battalions, and will be given the right to directly assign tasks of delivering nuclear strikes with a specified number of army missiles. In all instances, it is desirable to have present at the division command post a representative of the army missile brigade along with means of communications. It is also advisable to have present at the division command post a representative of the front air army so as to maintain cooperation with fighter-bomber and bomber aviation. He should be able to inform the division commander about the air situation, pass on timely air reconnaissance data, report on the situation to the chief of the operations group of the air army, pass on to him requests from the division for air support and ensure that this support is provided.

In order to cooperate with airborne landing forces, the division commander should be acquainted with the instructions of the army commander regarding: the tasks, time of landing, and the area of operations of the airborne landing force; the tasks the division is to carry out in conjunction with the landing force; and from which line and with which forces and means the actions of the landing force are to be supported, and the order of combat actions after joining with it.



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Page 9 of 17 Pages

When operating separately, a tank division -- in cooperation with adjacent large units, rocket troops, aviation and airborne landing forces, and under certain conditions, independently -- will have to complete the destruction of an opposing enemy grouping in the tactical depth, conduct meeting engagements against reserves moving from the depth, and, if successful, pursue them, negotiate a hastily occupied defense, and make assault crossings of water obstacles. In a number of instances, the division will have to hold on to areas it has seized until the arrival of the rest of the army forces, negotiate wide zones of radioactive contamination and areas of destruction, and, after arriving at the seacoast, hold on to sections which have been occupied while organizing an antilanding defense to prevent large enemy landing forces from landing on the coast. The most important tasks of the division must be considered to be the destruction of enemy nuclear means of attack, control posts and special weapons depots, and the seizure of airfields, etc.

It seems to us that it is advisable on the first day of an operation, to indicate to the division assigned to carry out a deep attack and actions when separated from the rest of the army forces, the immediate task, the axis of the subsequent offensive and the task of the day. On the following days of the operation, the division commander must be familiarized with the concept for the operation and its final objective, since in a number of instances he will have been given only an approximate idea of the possible tasks.

If a tank division does not expend its forces and means to defeat an opposing enemy grouping in the immediate tactical depth, rather the efforts of the army rocket troops and supporting aviation are concentrated on the axis of its operations to the maximum extent, it will be able to advance at an average rate of 100 to 120 kilometers a day. The gap between the tank division and the rest of the army forces, which are advancing at a rate of 50 to 80 kilometers a day, may reach 120 to 150 kilometers by the end of the operation.

When a tank division is on the offensive throughout the entire depth of an army operation, it will have to fulfil a whole series of complex intermediate tasks. Specifically, when the division is operating separately, and depending on the possible grouping of enemy forces and means, it may be forced to defeat as many as two enemy divisions from the reserves of a field army and army group, negotiate one or two lines of a hastily organized defense, and also make an assault crossing of one or two water obstacles from the march.

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Page 10 of 17 Pages

In order to put out of action 60 to 70 percent of the personnel and combat equipment of one enemy division, it is necessary to deliver a strike using five or six nuclear warheads of small and medium yields, and then complete its destruction with an attack by tank units. Ten to 12 nuclear warheads will be required to destroy two enemy divisions. Consequently, the most important problem during actions by a separated tank division is the timely replenishment of the nuclear warheads it has expended. It seems to us that the best solution to this problem is to already have increased the number of missiles in the division by the time it is committed to an engagement. This will enable it to have ready missiles on hand, without having to wait for them to be delivered during the course of combat actions it is conducting separately from the rest of the army forces. This is very important under these conditions.

The negotiation of hastily occupied lines and water obstacles will require in each case the employment of one or two nuclear warheads on the axis of operations of the forward detachment of the division. If there are two or three such lines in the path of the division, two to four nuclear warheads will be needed. Thus, for a division operating separately from the rest of the forces, it is necessary to plan to employ a total of 12 to 18 nuclear warheads. Moreover, it is desirable to have at least two warheads in reserve in order to carry out suddenly arising tasks. In a separate missile battalion there are six nuclear warheads. The remaining eight to 14 warheads must be employed by army means or, as we have already said, supplied to the division when it is committed to an engagement.

True, there can be cases when even under these conditions the division will have to be supplied with nuclear warheads during its separate offensive. It is best to do this with helicopters. When doing this, four to six ready missiles must be supplied, not when the division is expending the ones on hand, but at the first opportunity. In this case, the division commander will have at his disposal 10 to 12 tactical missiles, and will have a greater opportunity to employ them on his own initiative.

Thus, no more than eight nuclear warheads will have to be employed by army means in support of the division. These figures should not, of course, be considered acceptable for all cases. Depending on the situation, there could be other variants. But one thing is clear, the greater the number of nuclear warheads at the disposal of a tank division when it is operating separately from the rest of the forces of the combined-arms army, the more successfully it will fulfil the tasks assigned to it under these difficult conditions.

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The reinforcement of a division with forces and means from other branch arms is determined in each individual case by the specific situation. However, under any conditions, the division must not be overburdened and its maneuvering capabilities decreased.

For example, the reinforcement of a division with conventional artillery in all probability is unnecessary, since each tank is armed with a gun. As far as possible, it is advisable to attach to the division a battalion of rocket artillery and antitank means. To ensure the assault crossing of water obstacles from the march, a division must be reinforced with a pontoon bridge set and a company of tracked self-propelled ferries. To ensure mobility and high rates of advance when there are areas of extensive destruction, it must be reinforced with one engineer road construction and repair battalion.

The organization of air defense for a division conducting actions separately from the rest of the army forces presents great difficulty. Its battle formations during an offensive can occupy an area of up to 600 to 800 square kilometers, while the organic antiaircraft artillery means available are able to cover battle formations over an area of only up to 100 square kilometers. Reinforcement with one battalion of light antiaircraft artillery from an army antiaircraft brigade permits the area covered to be extended to up to 150 square kilometers. But this does not ensure reliable cover for the battle formations of the division, either. Therefore, with the means on hand, cover is set up for the division command post and missile battalion on the march and in launch areas. For reliable air cover of all division battle formations, it is necessary to allocate a sufficient number of fighter aircraft. This is done according to the plan of the air army of the front.

Supporting fighter-bomber and bomber aviation are usually allocated for one to two days and are intended for fulfilling tasks in support of the offensive operation as a whole, mainly for combating enemy nuclear means of attack and for destroying moving and small targets. For this reason, the expenditure of flight resources in support of a division conducting actions separately from the rest of the army forces will be made by decision of the commander of the army. Only in some instances will it be advisable to place part of the supporting aviation forces at the disposal of the commander of a tank division. This might occur most often when the division is conducting actions at a considerable distance away and when it is conducting its combat actions under very difficult and unfavorable conditions.



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Page 12 of 17 Pages

The successful fulfilment of tasks by a division conducting operations separately depends to a great extent on how effectively the enemy and the terrain are reconnoitered. The army commander determines the reconnaissance tasks for an operation, but it is the army staff, back at the time of the preparation for the operation, which plans the use of reconnaissance forces and means and outlines specific tasks for the army reconnaissance organs. In addition, part of the army's reconnaissance forces and means will be employed in support of the tank division. Reconnaissance by division means under these conditions must be carried out particularly intensively, so as to promptly parry any countermeasures taken by the enemy. This primarily pertains to his nuclear means, aviation, and operational reserves, with which he undoubtedly will try to destroy the division and disrupt the operational plans of our command.

However, according to the existing organization, a tank division in the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic includes a reconnaissance company only, which, of course, is insufficient to fulfil reconnaissance tasks to the desired depth. The division does not have the capability to conduct deep radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance. When conducting actions while separated from the rest of the army forces, a division will have to conduct deeper reconnaissance in front of itself, on the flanks, and in the rear, so as to avoid the danger of unexpected attacks by the enemy from any direction. However, there are already absolutely not enough reconnaissance forces and means to do this. Moreover, it is necessary to carry out radiation, chemical, and engineer reconnaissance, for which there also are no forces and means in the division. Therefore, a special concern of the commander and staff of the army is the timely provision of necessary data on the enemy to the commander of the division advancing on the main axis and fulfilling an important task in support of the entire operation. Even while reconnaissance is being organized, the army staff must furnish the division commander with data of interest to him (air reconnaissance data and information coming in from the front staff and from adjacent units), covering a depth of at least 200 kilometers. The need to know the situation to this depth is occasioned by the conditions and nature of the combat actions of a separated division, when the division commander often has to show initiative and independently make decisions.

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Since the units of a division advancing at a considerable distance from the rest of the army forces will be the first to be subjected to enemy action, including nuclear weapons, great attention will have to be given to

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Page 13 of 17 Pages

measures to protect the troops. These measures will not differ in basic content from those carried out in a tank division under normal offensive conditions (when not operating separately). However, the volume of work and the difficulty in carrying out measures to protect the troops will be different. First of all, when separated, the division will have to carry out all protective measures using only its own forces. It will be more difficult to organize and conduct radiation and chemical reconnaissance in order to detect zones of radioactive and chemical contamination of the terrain, particularly in those areas where there have been nuclear bursts as a result of its own strikes. Even forecasting the radiation situation becomes complicated under these conditions. Negotiating zones of radioactive contamination during independent actions conducted separately by a division will become difficult. Frequently it will be unable to wait until the high levels of radiation drop and will have to wage a battle in contaminated zones. Moreover, the division will have to allocate a considerable number of forces to secure its completely open flanks and rear. This will not always permit the timely replacement of units whose personnel receive high doses of radiation. Almost completely out of the question also is the building and employment of engineer structures to protect the troops against nuclear weapons.

When the offensive is being conducted separately by a division, the elimination of the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes will inevitably be less effective than under normal conditions. In a number of instances, evacuation, the complete decontamination of personnel, the replacement of uniforms, etc., are completely out of the question. When the enemy employs bacteriological weapons, such measures as the isolation of the sick, aid to them, and the setting up of quarantines, will meet with great difficulties and cannot always be carried out completely.

When a division is conducting actions at a great distance from the rest of the army forces, there are considerably fewer possibilities for supplying it with chemical equipment, protective means, clothing and rations to replace the materiel contaminated by radioactive and toxic substances.

From what has been said, it follows that during the preparation for an operation and the planning for the separation of a division from the rest of the army forces, this division should additionally be reinforced with chemical and radiation reconnaissance subunits, decontamination means, and medical subunits. It should also have increased supplies of individual means for protection and chemical decontamination, as well as reconnaissance instruments and clothing.

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Page 14 of 17 Pages

The size of the increase in the norms for supplying individual types of equipment are determined by the specific conditions of the situation and the tasks which the division has to fulfil. In determining this, the extensive employment of captured and local means also takes on great significance.

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Supplying a tank division which is operating separately from the rest of the army forces during an operation with basic types of materiel supplies should be discussed in greater detail. The point is that the division will have to expend a considerable amount of supplies. Therefore, these supplies should be systematically replenished, which is very hard to do when units are a great distance away from the army's supply bases, when ground lines of communication are disrupted, and when there is a complex ground and air situation. Using as a base the average expenditure norms, to cover an army offensive operation to a depth of 400 to 500 kilometers, a tank division will have to be additionally supplied with a minimum of 1.5 to two refuelings of diesel fuel; up to 0.5 refuelings of gasoline, four to six tactical missiles, up to 0.5 units of fire of tank, rocket artillery, and antiaircraft artillery ammunition, as well as many other types of cargoes. To ensure their delivery, it is necessary every day to plan for a minimum of one regimental flight of MI-6 helicopters. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that when a division enters the area of the final objective of the operation, all materiel supplies must again be replenished up to the norm.

It is obvious that the conditions of the situation and the location of a division complicate the evacuation of the sick and wounded. The separation of a tank division, and especially several divisions, from the rest of the army forces obviously will exert a substantial influence on the disposition of army rear services organs, the echeloning of supplies, and the order of their delivery. In particular, it may turn out to be advisable to move several forward army supply bases closer to the front line, and to place separate hospitals closer to the troops. Transport aviation will have to be employed extensively to deliver materiel to the division. The army, as well, will require increased norms of various supplies under these conditions.

The technical support of divisions during the conditions under consideration will also have its own characteristics. Combat equipment can be repaired and rehabilitated only in minimal amounts, determined by the capacities of the repair subunits in the battalions, regiments, and

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division. Basically this amounts to carrying out running repair, which does not require a great expenditure of time. The evacuation of damaged equipment is completely out of the question until the arrival of the rest of the army forces. Only a partial collection of damaged vehicles and combat equipment in certain sheltered areas can be carried out. But this will not always be advisable. It might turn out instead to be necessary to destroy our own damaged equipment so that the enemy cannot make use of it. Replenishing a division with tanks, vehicles, and other combat equipment, as a rule, will be impossible.

All these and many other special features have to be taken into account when organizing and planning an army offensive operation and actions by a division separated from the rest of the forces.

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The complicated and extremely intense nature of combat actions by a tank division separated from the rest of the army forces requires that the commander and staff of the division react swiftly to changes occurring in the situation, and that they cut down considerably on the time used to collect and summarize the situational data needed to make a decision, transmit it to those who are to carry it out, and organize combat actions. This places special demands on the operating methods used by commanders and staffs in controlling troops, and predetermines the need for stable and reliable communications ensuring the rapid exchange of information among the units, the division staff, and the army.

The control of troops under these circumstances will be carried out, as a rule, using radio means. In certain periods, radio-relay communications may be established between the army staff and the division staff, and liaison helicopters and aircraft should also be used extensively.

When actions are conducted separately, reliable and continuous troop control will depend to a great extent on the setting up of control posts and communications centers, on the timely and well-organized relocation of them, and on the establishment of a well planned system of communications among the control posts. When the rates of advance are high, both the division command post and the army command post will be relocated more frequently than under normal conditions, and their stops in each location will be considerably briefer. Therefore, one of the basic requirements is to maintain continuous communications while troops and the control posts themselves are being moved.



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Page 16 of 17 Pages

Considering that radio means have a greater range of operation when stationary and their operation is more stable, it is necessary to carefully coordinate, as to time and lines, the relocation of control posts in the units, the division, and the army, so as to make maximum use of these advantages during brief stops.

In a division separated from the other army forces, it is advisable to have a main command post and a rear control post which under these conditions should be placed as close as possible to the troops. This ensures more reliable protection of the control posts. A forward command post, in our view, is not necessary here, since this leads only to the scattering of the staff and means of communications, which weakens control as a whole. Personal contacts between the army commander and the division commander will hardly be possible under these conditions. The allocation of tasks during the operation, as a rule, will be carried out according to a map with the use of technical means of communications, and through army staff officers coming to the division in liaison aircraft and helicopters.

* * * *

We have considered only some of the problems connected with actions by a tank division separated from the rest of the forces of a combined-arms army. Again let us stress that such actions must be taken into account when an army commander is making the decision for an operation, and they must be planned in detail by the army staff. However, this does not exclude, under certain favorable conditions, the possibility of an unplanned separation of a motorized rifle division also during the course of an operation. The organization and support of actions by a tank division in this instance involve even greater difficulties. However, the successful fulfilment of tasks by separated divisions always requires of their commanders a profound understanding of the nature of modern offensive operations, operational and tactical foresight, initiative, the ability to make a quick decision in the specific situation which has developed and carry it out, and also great skill in troop control.


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Page 17 of 17 Pages

This subject has already been partially reflected in the practice of training staffs and troops, and also in the military science work of our army. The pressing nature of this subject obligates us to keep it always in mind in combat training and operational training, and to continue the further search for the most advisable solution to all the problems connected with actions by troops separated from the main forces.



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