

CD 98/1
7A~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS~~SUMMARY OF POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING
ON MIDDLE EASTJuly 12, 1977, 4:00 - 5:30 p. m.
Situation Room, White HousePARTICIPANTS:State:Secretary Cyrus Vance (Chairman)
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.CIA:Admiral Stansfield Turner
Robert BowieDefense:Secretary Harold Brown
David E. Mc GiffertNSCZbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron
William QuandtJCS:General George S. Brown
Lt. General William Y. Smith

1. Chariot Tank. The group agreed that we should allow Israel to use \$107 million in FMS credits to expand the production line on the Chariot tank, but this decision should be included in a post-Begin visit arms package. Secretary Vance will meet with the Humphrey sub-committee this week on the non-lethal items for Egypt and on F-15s for Iran. If asked about Chariots, he will say that he is inclined to recommend in favor of the request, provided that the question of future Israeli exports can be resolved. 2

2. Begin Visit. It was the PRC's consensus that the President should open the meeting with Prime Minister Begin with a broad overview of our strategic assessment and of the basic elements of our policy. It should be made clear that we are not trying to impose these views, but that they represent our best judgment on the likely outcome of comprehensive peace negotiations, and are also in our judgment fair to all parties. If Israel can do better in negotiations, we will not be an obstacle. The President should anticipate that Begin may argue against any preconditions for Geneva and may propose an alternative approach of limited agreements in Sinai and Golan, plus a refugee settlement. Concerning the idea of a US-Israel security treaty, the group generally felt that it was premature to raise this with Begin, but that it might be desirable at a later stage.

XGDS of E. O. 11652, by authority
of Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski; Exemption
Category Section 5(B)(3).

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS~~

Classified by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

Approved for Release by CIA
13 NOV 12

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS~~

CD48/2

3. Principles. The PRC agreed that Secretary Vance should discuss the attached list of draft principles with Begin. On each point, he would be prepared to expand orally upon our views, but the object of the written list as it stands would be to try to get Israeli and Arab acceptance of these principles as a common framework for negotiations. We should tell Begin that we will be discussing the same list with the Arab leaders during Secretary Vance's upcoming trip. The principles do not mention the 1967 lines or a link of a Palestinian entity to Jordan, but Vance would discuss our position on these issues with each of the leaders. If Begin accepts the points, or agrees to consider them, then we will work on gaining Arab acceptance. If he completely refuses the idea of agreed principles, we will nonetheless take them to the Arab leaders, as we promised we would do. This could, however, become politically controversial if it results in the appearance of the US and the Arabs lining up against Israel before Geneva. 3

4. Palestinian Representation. While none of the options in the attached paper is fully satisfactory, it was felt that we should discuss them with Begin and get his views. We would hope to resolve this in pre-Geneva procedural talks. 4

5. Pre-Geneva Process. Regardless of how the discussion of draft principles goes, we should raise with Begin, and later with the Arab leaders, the idea of some form of pre-Geneva talks, ostensibly to discuss procedures, but also to develop common ground on substance. One possibility would be for the Foreign Ministers to come to Washington in September before the UN General Assembly session.

6. AWACs for Iran. In view of Congressional criticism of the sale of 7 AWACs to Iran, a working group should develop guidance for use by Administration officials in testimony or in answering questions. In brief, the AWACs will contribute to Iran's defensive capability; Iran is in a sensitive area of the world; and the alternative of a ground-based radar system would be both more expensive and require more US technicians. The sale will be treated as an exception to PD-13. 5

7. Follow-on actions.

(1) State will prepare the basic briefing paper for the Begin visit in line with today's discussion.

(2) State in coordination with the NSC staff, will prepare a paper on how to amplify orally each of the draft principles.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS~~

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS

CD48/-3-

(3) State, in coordination with the NSC Staff, will prepare a paper on pre-Geneva procedural talks.

(4) A working group from State, Defense and NSC will develop guidance on the reasons for the sale of 7 AWACs to Iran.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS