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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

29 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LECTURES: The Defensive Operation of an Army

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of seven lectures, classified SECRET, prepared by the General Staff Academy for publication by the First Directorate (Operations) of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR in October 1969. This report is the translation of a lecture representing Soviet doctrine on the fundamentals of an army's defensive operation, including the objective and nature of defense, preparation and planning procedures, and the disposition of a defense. The section on the conduct of the defense includes nuclear strike tactics, the counterpreparation and counterattack, repulsing enemy attacks, defense in mountain areas, and operations with conventional weapons. This lecture was prepared in 1969. The Russian text was disseminated as FIRDB-312/00321-76.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

HR70-14

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY USSR

FIRDB - 312/01858-77

DATE OF INFO. 1969

DATE 29 August 1977

SUBJECT

USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LECTURES: The Defensive Operation of an Army

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lecture, classified SECRET, prepared by General-Leytenant A. N. Kolominov. The lecture covers the fundamentals of an army's defensive operation, including the objective and nature of defense, preparation and planning procedures, and the disposition of a defense. The section dealing with the conduct of a defense includes nuclear strikes, the counterpreparation and counterattack, repulsing enemy attacks, defense in mountain areas, and operations with conventional weapons.

End of Summary

[redacted] Comment:

General-Leytenant Aleksandr Nikolayevich Kolominov was identified as a former Chief of Staff of the Siberian Military District and also as a reserve officer as of 14 May 1974. The Russian-language version of this lecture was disseminated as FIRDB-312/00321-76.

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THE DEFENSIVE OPERATION OF AN ARMY

by

General-Leytenant A. N. Kolominov

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In accordance with modern requirements, the study of offensive actions using all modern means of destruction forms the basis of the training of our armed forces. These requirements stem from the proposition that only by a decisive offensive following nuclear strikes by strategic and operational-tactical means is it possible to inflict decisive losses on the enemy, utterly rout him, and achieve the objectives of a strategic operation in a theater of military operations within a short period of time.

During the course of combat actions, however, the enemy will also be attempting to establish superiority in forces and means, deliver massed surprise nuclear strikes, and go over to a decisive offensive. As a result, drastic changes will occur in the situation, and on certain axes an unfavorable balance of forces and means may develop, thus making it impossible to conduct (or continue) the offensive. Therefore, along with studying offense as the chief form of combat actions, we must continually study and master the methods of preparing and conducting defensive operations.

The historical experience of past wars -- especially the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War -- attests to the fact that defense as a form of combat actions appeared and developed at the same time as offense. V. I. Lenin pointed out that, "Wars that begin and end with an uninterrupted victorious offensive have never occurred in all of world history, or if they have they were an exception." He therefore called for the mastery of all known ways, methods, and forms of destroying the enemy.

The theory of Soviet operational art has always regarded and continues to regard defensive operations as a possible and natural -- but at the same time temporary and forced -- form of combat actions by troops. This is based on the consideration that in the event of an unfavorable balance of forces and means on one axis or another, the defending troops, taking advantage of favorable conditions of terrain and its engineer preparation, will be able, in cooperation with other forces and means, to successfully withstand an offensive by an enemy grouping that is clearly superior in strength to the defending side, and inflict heavy casualties on this grouping and lay the groundwork for his conclusive rout during a subsequent offensive.

The purpose of this lecture is to set forth: the fundamentals of the defensive operation of an army, the sequence of preparing it, and the methods of conducting it, both with the use of nuclear weapons and using only conventional means of destruction.

FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEFENSIVE OPERATION OF AN ARMY

Possible Conditions for the Preparation and Conduct of an Army Defensive Operation

The conditions for the preparation and conduct of a defensive operation by an army may be extremely varied. They will be governed by the specific situation, especially by the balance of forces that develops both in the zone of the army and on adjacent axes; by the make-up, combat capabilities, and nature of operations of our troops and of the enemy; by the importance of the axis being defended and of adjacent axes, their physical and geographic features, and time available to prepare the defense; by the boundless devotion of personnel to their motherland, to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and to the Soviet government, by their bravery and unmatched steadfastness in battle, and belief in victory, in one's commander, and in one's weapons.

A defensive operation may be conducted in a front offensive operation: as it begins, develops, or is being completed. It may also be a component part of a front defensive operation if carrying it out proves unavoidable at the beginning of or during a strategic operation in a theater of military operations. What is considered most typical for a main theater of military operations is the going over to and conduct of defense by an army in a front offensive operation, and it is to this that we shall devote most of our attention in this lecture.

As is known, during the Great Patriotic War when the Soviet armed forces were conducting a strategic offensive, army defensive operations were often carried out during or in the concluding stage of a front offensive operation. The typical conditions during the conduct of the operation were that the enemy was delivering counterattacks or was going over to a counteroffensive in order to halt the advance of our troops or recover a lost position in one sector or another of the front.

As an example we might take the defensive operation by the 51st Army of the First Baltic Front in the area of Siauliai in August 1944 and the defensive operation of the 4th Guards Army of the Third Ukrainian Front in January 1945. The latter was organized at the concluding stage of the Budapest offensive operation, when the enemy went over to a counteroffensive in order to recover a lost position on the right bank of the Danube.

At the very height of the Berlin operation in April 1945, despite the fact that the main grouping of forces of the First Ukrainian Front was already advancing toward Berlin and the Elbe, troops of the 52nd Army were forced to wage a defensive operation on the left flank of the front -- on the Dresden axis -- in order to repulse a powerful counterattack by enemy tank groupings from the direction of Görlitz. By waging continuous and intense defensive battles lasting a week, our troops succeeded in skilfully repulsing the offensive of the Görlitz grouping of Germans, which had attempted to break out into the rear of the strike grouping of the front. As a result, the main forces of the front were able to accomplish the main task of routing the enemy's Berlin grouping in cooperation with the troops of the First Belorussian Front.

In other cases army defensive operations were conducted for the purpose of holding bridgeheads (the 13th Army of the First Ukrainian Front in September 1944 defending the Sandomierz bridgehead on the Vistula), and repulsing enemy attacks on the outer front of the encirclement of his groupings (the 40th Army of the same front in the Korsun-Shevchenkovo operation of February 1944), etc.

Under modern conditions a going over to the defense by an army at the beginning of a front offensive operation is a possibility in the event the enemy is able, either by a surprise nuclear attack or massive air strikes, to inflict heavy losses on the army's troops and begin to break into its zone with superior forces.

During a front offensive operation an army may be forced to go over to the defense as a result of an unsuccessful meeting engagement, or in those cases where it was unable to disrupt in time a counterattack being prepared by a major enemy grouping, as well as under conditions when its troops are subjected to the powerful effect of enemy nuclear weapons and sustain heavy losses, thus making it impossible to continue the offensive. This also applies to the situation where during an offensive by us, begun without the use of nuclear weapons, the enemy on one axis or another preempts us in the delivery of an initial nuclear strike with operational-tactical and tactical means, and following this launches a counterattack. An army may also go over to the defense when reaching a seacoast.

Under all these conditions the going over to the defense by an army will usually be carried out in a limited amount of time and, as a rule, under strong pressure of the enemy, who either has already gone over or is going over to the offensive. The preparation and conduct of the defensive operation will be carried out in an extremely complex and rapidly changing

situation, under the attacks of his nuclear and chemical weapons, aviation, and clearly superior ground force groupings, and on a coastal axis, of his naval forces as well, with heavy troop losses and great destruction. A defensive operation will most often begin with the immediate repulsing by unequal forces of the enemy offensive.

The going over to the defense in such a situation will be carried out simultaneously with the elimination of the aftereffects of enemy nuclear, chemical, and air strikes, in order to restore the combat effectiveness of army troops, and with combat operations against penetrating tank groupings and airborne landing forces dropped in the rear area.

If an army is given the task of conducting a defensive operation after the enemy has delivered by surprise the first massive nuclear strike at the beginning of a war, then the preparation of such an operation may proceed simultaneously with the repulsing of the enemy offensive on a number of axes by units and large units that have survived.

When going over to the defense during an offensive, a typical procedure might be to take up the defense at various times and on various axes. The first large units and units to go over to the defense will be those for whom the situation has become clearly unfavorable as a result of the nuclear, chemical, and air strikes delivered against them and the attack of superior enemy forces. Certain groupings during this period may still continue the offensive in order to disrupt the enemy offensive or to capture advantageous areas and lines whose mastery would improve the operational situation of the army.

Under certain conditions -- for example, when enemy preparation for a strike is discovered in time, but forces and means are inadequate to rout his groupings by an offensive -- an army may go over to the defense in advance. Nor is such a going over to the defense impossible before the initiation of military operations (during the period of threat), should there temporarily develop on a certain axis a situation which is unfavorable for a going over to the offensive.

An early and even a planned going over to the defense by an army may take place on secondary axes and in theaters with ocean and open seacoasts, where a landing and operations by major enemy amphibious and airborne landing forces are possible, as well as in secondary theaters in which no offensive operations are planned at the outset of war. Furthermore, in any theater of military operations troops may go over to the defense in order to cover individual axes on the borders with neutral states through whose

territory attacks by enemy groupings are possible.

It is obvious that in the event of an early going over to the defense by an army, the command, staffs, and troops will have more time for its preparation. In this case it will be possible to prepare with greater care strikes with various means of destruction against enemy groupings that are advancing and deploying, systematically execute a necessary regrouping of forces and means, establish a defensive grouping of forces and organize a system of fire, as well as to carry out a greater amount of engineer preparation of the terrain in the army's zone of defense.

The Objective of a Defensive Operation and the Tasks of an Army in It

The objective of an army defensive operation is determined on the basis of the overall concept for the conduct of the front operation and the specific conditions which develop on the axis of actions of the given army. The employment of nuclear weapons by the defending army and by front means as well as the increased fire, strike, and maneuvering capabilities of combined-arms large units, make it possible under modern conditions to carry out a defense with a more decisive objective and to fulfil the tasks assigned to the army in considerably less time than in the past war. Thus the outcome of defensive actions by troops and the achievement of the objective of an army defensive operation is predetermined to a considerable degree by the offensive of the front main forces on the decisive axes.

The principal objective of a defensive operation by an army is to inflict with less forces the maximum losses on superior attacking enemy groupings, bleed them white, disrupt the offensive, support the development of operations on other important axes, and create conditions that are favorable for the resumption of the offensive on the given axis.

Thus the role of a defensive operation by an army consists as a rule in conducting it in support of the main groupings of front troops on the decisive axes as these accomplish the offensive tasks.

When going over to the defense at the outset of or during a front offensive operation, the tasks of an army may consist of destroying on a given axis, in cooperation with front means and adjacent armies, the nuclear means of the enemy; repulsing an offensive (invasion, counterattack) by his ground force groupings and repulsing his air strikes;

retaining lines which are important in the operational sense and not permitting advancing enemy groupings to break through into the army troop rear area, and, in the event these groupings break through into the depth of the defense, destroying them by nuclear and chemical strikes, supporting aviation, fire means, and aggressive troops actions, and then going over to a decisive offensive.

The basic tasks of defense on a coastal axis are: repulsing an enemy amphibious landing and an offensive by his ground force groupings along a seacoast, as well as strikes by his navy and aviation; destroying enemy amphibious and airborne forces that are landing or have landed, and retaining occupied sectors of the seacoast and the land front. The tasks will be accomplished by army troops in cooperation with naval forces and front means.

For defense in the principal theater of military operations a combined-arms army may be given a zone of from 100 to 150 kilometers or more in width. In other theaters (with special terrain conditions) the width of its zone may amount to several hundred kilometers. Defense in mountain areas, for example, is organized along axes accessible to an enemy offensive and may contain large gaps not occupied by troops. The presence of sectors of terrain which are difficult of access and even inaccessible for actions by an advancing enemy, and the skillful exploitation of natural barriers in conjunction with obstacles and a system of fire, make it possible to create a stable defense in the mountains and to fulfil tasks with a smaller amount of forces and means than under ordinary conditions.

The depth of an army zone, considering the dispersed positioning of rocket troops, first- and second-echelon large units, and reserves, and the siting areas, lines, and defensive zones established by them, may range from 100 to 150 kilometers.

The Nature of Modern Defense and the Main Requirements Placed upon It

The employment of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, and decisive actions by an attacking enemy, as well as the great striking, firing, and maneuvering capabilities of defending troops, have radically affected the nature of defense and imparted to it new features as compared to defense in the last war.

Modern defense is characterized, first of all, by decisiveness of objectives, high-intensity combat actions by defending troops against the superior forces of the attacking enemy, and deep echeloning of forces and means and their dispersed positioning. Other inherent characteristics of defense are the absence of a continuous front and the presence of large gaps not occupied by troops -- something especially characteristic under mountain conditions; the high mobility and aggressiveness of defending troops with their tenacious retention of individual lines; and the conduct of continuous defensive actions by axes and at the same time at various depths. Another feature of modern defense is that army large units and units may go over to defensive actions at different times and on different axes. Defensive actions most often may develop into offensive actions without a pause in the action.

The changed nature of modern defense has resulted in new requirements being made of it. In view of the present capabilities of an attacking enemy, defending troops must be capable of withstanding the massive strikes of his nuclear and chemical weapons, aviation, and artillery; repulsing an offensive by superior groupings of ground forces, especially armored troops; retaining the key lines and preventing the landing and actions by airborne (amphibious) landing forces, and in the event of a landing, penetration, or breakthrough by enemy groupings into the depth of the defense, destroying them with nuclear weapons, fire means, and decisive attacks. To achieve this the defense must be active and stable in antinuclear, antichemical, antiair, antitank, antiartillery, and antilanding respects.

In achieving active and stable defense the most important factors are: skillful organization of nuclear, chemical, and air strikes, and of a system of fire of all types in conjunction with engineer obstacles; skillful exploitation of favorable terrain conditions and the engineer preparation of the terrain; efficient organization of cooperation and continuous maintenance of it during defensive engagements; timely shifting

of fire, troops, and obstacles onto decisive axes; surprise decisive counterattacks in conjunction with tenacious retention of key lines; protection of troops from weapons of mass destruction and the rapid elimination of the aftereffects of an enemy nuclear and chemical attack; firm and continuous troop control and providing them with the necessary material and technical means.

One of the decisive factors ensuring active and stable defense, and thus the achievement of success in a defensive operation, is high morale among the defending troops. It is therefore very important, even in the most difficult situational conditions, to constantly have our troops maintain a morale superior to that of the enemy. Under modern conditions the role of party-political work, and the work of party and Komsomol organizations at all levels, is increasingly important.

To accomplish the tasks of defense, it is essential to detect the grouping of enemy forces and means in time and preempt it in the delivery of surprise and powerful strikes with nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons in order to destroy his means of nuclear attack and to incapacitate his main strike groupings -- especially tank large units -- on distant approaches, in front of the forward edge of the defense, and in the depth of the defense. In addition we must always seek to deceive the enemy with regard to the true grouping of our forces and means and actual intentions regarding their use.

PREPARING A DEFENSIVE OPERATION

The Content of the Preparation for a Defensive Operation

The preparation for a defensive operation by an army involves the carrying out by the command, staffs, party-political organs, and troops of a large set of measures designed to create an active and stable defense in a short time. The fundamental measures are: making the decision and assigning tasks to the troops; planning the operation and organizing cooperation; setting up the defense; preparing the forces and means and maintaining their high combat readiness to deliver surprise powerful strikes against the enemy and repulse his offensive; restoring the combat effectiveness of troops subjected to enemy nuclear and chemical weapons strikes or air strikes; organizing the all-round support of the combat actions of troops; and controlling the troops.

The procedure for the implementation of all these measures, as well as the work methods of an army's command and staff in preparing a defensive operation, depend on the situation as the preparation takes place and the troops go over to the defense. The key factors here are: the time available and the operational situation and the nature of actions of the enemy and of the army troops, as well as the tasks assigned to the army for the operation.

From the above-considered conditions under which defensive operations may be prepared and carried out, it is clear that when going over to the defense under enemy pressure, the preparation of the operation and the repulsing of enemy attacks will blend into a single process. The army's command and staff will have to simultaneously accomplish tasks that vary in both content and nature: take measures to repulse enemy attacks and destroy his airborne landings, take steps to eliminate the aftereffects of his nuclear attack, organize combat against enemy reserves, and prepare a defense on more advantageous lines. While organizing the defense they will at the same time have to control troops who are still continuing the offensive. It is obvious that under such conditions all steps in the preparation of the operation will have to be carried out in an extremely short period of time.

When preparing a defensive operation under conditions of non-nuclear actions, we must take account of the limited capabilities of the means of destruction of both sides, both in power and in depth of effect. At the same time troops must always be ready for a subsequent going over to actions involving the use of nuclear and chemical weapons. This will require keeping rocket troops at a high level of readiness, as well as setting up a defense that takes into account the threat of the enemy use of weapons of mass destruction. These factors suggest that preparing a defensive operation under conditions of non-nuclear actions is in many ways similar to preparing one in which nuclear and chemical weapons are used. But the former will have certain differences stemming from the fact that nuclear weapons are not used, and the enemy's main means of destruction will be artillery, tanks, and aircraft.

Making the Decision for a Defensive Operation

In each specific case in which an army goes over to the defense, the procedure for making the decision will have its own special characteristics and will be determined by the situational conditions and the available

time. When going over to the defense under enemy attacks, it may often be necessary to react separately to the situation that has developed on each axis and make individual decisions. The first measures to be taken must be those to immediately destroy the enemy's means of nuclear attack that have been discovered and inflict the greatest possible destruction on the strongest of his groupings that are already advancing, and to solidly retain important terrain lines on the axes of enemy attacks or capture the more advantageous lines. Particular attention during this period will have to be devoted to the quick preparation of nuclear, chemical, and air strikes; to the execution of movements to threatened axes; to the regrouping of forces and means in order to create an army defensive grouping, to organize a system of fire and take steps for the engineer preparation of the terrain, and to establish obstacles and prepare areas of demolition. Under these conditions the battle to gain time takes on decisive importance.

Urgent matters will have to be decided on the spot, without hesitation, and tasks must be assigned immediately to the troops for them to be carried out. Under these conditions the making of the decision, the assignment of tasks, and the organization of their fulfilment will constitute a single and indissoluble process. First it will be necessary to determine and assign tasks to rocket troops and supporting aviation brought in to disrupt the enemy's attacks, and to large units located on the axes of his offensive, as well as to engineer troops allocated to set up obstacles and create areas of demolition.

The decision of an army commander must be firm, for it is the basis of all steps taken in preparing and conducting the operation. The process of making the decision by an army commander is usually based on a clarification of the objective of the operation and the tasks of the army, and on an elaboration and estimate of the situation and a definition of the decision itself. Here it must be borne in mind that when going over to the defense under enemy attacks, an army commander will have very little time available in which to make the decision. Nevertheless the decision must always be adopted with foresight, on the basis of precise calculations, reliable data on the enemy's installations and troop groupings, and an objective assessment of the capabilities of our own forces and those of the enemy.

In clarifying the objective of the operation and the tasks of the army, the commander must have a clear picture of the purpose of going over to the defense and the role of the army in the front operation; the effect of the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons by front means on the

accomplishment of the tasks assigned to the army; the effect that may be exerted on the actions of the army by troops of adjacent formations, including naval forces, and cooperation with them; the methods by which an army may perform the task assigned.

The most important elements in the estimate of the situation are the conclusions drawn from it, which provide the answers to the following questions:

-- what is the probable concept of enemy actions that have begun or are expected; which groupings of his forces are the most combat effective and dangerous; which installations, if destroyed, would significantly reduce the enemy's offensive capabilities; what are his strong and weak points and how should we exploit them in order to successfully carry out the task assigned;

-- the capabilities of the army to disrupt an enemy offensive, and first of all to destroy his means of nuclear attack and most dangerous groupings with nuclear and chemical weapons, air strikes, and artillery fire, and to repulse an enemy's offensive and rout his groupings if they penetrate the defense; the balance of forces of the two sides on the axes of attack of the enemy; which large units will have to be regrouped and when in order to create the most advantageous defensive grouping; the large units (units) requiring immediate evacuation from zones of contamination and the restoration of their combat effectiveness;

-- the most important areas of the terrain, on whose retention the stability of the defense of the army as a whole depends, as well as those which must be firmly retained in order to support a regrouping of troops when going over to the defense under enemy strikes; on which of the axes and where, in view of the probable alternative enemy actions, is it most advisable to concentrate the main efforts of the army troops in the defense; how to best create a defensive grouping and where is it advisable to prepare defensive lines (areas) and axes of movement for the forces and means; to what extent will the formation of zones of contamination and areas of demolition impede execution of movements.

Having clarified the objective of the defensive operation and the tasks of the army in it, and drawn conclusions from the estimate of the situation, the army commander determines the concept for the defense and the tasks of the troops. The concept envisions: where, when, with what forces and means, and by which methods do we inflict a defeat on the enemy's main grouping and disrupt or delay his offensive; on which axis and in which areas should we concentrate the army's main efforts; which defensive grouping of forces should be established and by what time; what kind of engineer preparation of the terrain should be carried out, by what

time, and in what sequence.

In organizing defense during a period of nuclear actions, the basis of the defensive concept is the inflicting of defeat on the enemy's main groupings with nuclear and chemical weapons (army and front means), repulsing strikes by the air enemy, preventing a breakthrough (invasion) by his groupings, and completing their rout by going over to the offensive following the nuclear strikes.

In non-nuclear actions the concept of the defensive operation will be based first of all on the massing of fire of conventional means of destruction on decisive axes and sectors, on the tenacious retention of important lines, as well as on the conduct of decisive counterattacks and counterthrusts to rout enemy groupings which have penetrated or are breaking through, and on the destruction of the enemy with nuclear means.

In accordance with the concept for the defense, the following factors are determined: the tasks, objectives, and procedure for the use of nuclear and chemical weapons; the forward edge and army lines of defense; the tasks of first- and second-echelon large units (the combined-arms reserve), of rocket troops and artillery, air defense troops and supporting aviation, and engineer and chemical troops; the times when troops are to be ready to go over to the defense; the readiness times for the systems of fire; the nature, time schedule, and sequence for the engineer preparation of the rocket troop and artillery emplacement areas, of the defensive zones for first-echelon large units, and the defensive zones or areas where second-echelon large units and reserves are located and the lines of their deployment, and the schedule for their preparation; the system of engineer obstacles and the scheduled times when these and the sites to be demolished are to be ready; the measures in support of combat operations; and the organization of troop control.

Troop cooperation is usually organized when assigning tasks to the troops. In individual cases, when time is available, certain questions of cooperation may be elaborated by the commander (or chief of staff) during personal contact, which sometimes take place on the ground. In organizing the cooperation of forces and means in defense, attention should be devoted first of all to coordinating the nuclear strikes by the army's rocket troops with the strikes delivered by front means; the strikes by rocket troops and supporting air and artillery with the actions of first- and second-echelon large units and reserves, as well as of troop groupings operating on each of the axes of enemy attack, and with the actions of adjacent units.

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Planning a Defensive Operation

The essence of planning a defensive operation is the selection, in accordance with the task assigned to the army and the decision that is adopted, of the soundest alternative method of employing forces and means in defense; the working out in detail of the methods selected for routing the enemy, and of the measures for cooperation, support of troop combat actions, and troop control.

A defensive operation is planned according to the tasks of army troops and the axes of the enemy offensive. These tasks may be: to destroy enemy means of nuclear attack; to inflict defeat on enemy groupings on the approaches to the defense; to repulse an enemy offensive and retain the most important areas in the tactical depth of the defense; to destroy airborne -- and on a seacoast, amphibious -- landings; to rout enemy groupings that have penetrated or broken through into the depth of the defense, and to have army troops go over to the offensive.

The basis of planning a defensive operation during a period of non-nuclear actions must be the combat capabilities of conventional means to inflict damage on the enemy's main attacking groupings and repulse his air strikes. At the same time, during the planning, provisions must be made for measures that ensure the timely and effective delivery of nuclear strikes against the enemy in the event there is a going over to operations employing nuclear weapons.

When planning a defensive operation in a mountain area, the tasks of troops and the methods of performing them are planned separately for each axis, depending on its importance and the conditions of cooperation.

The operation plan is drawn up on a map with the necessary calculations and explanations. The sequence and methods of work of an army field headquarters when planning the operation, the procedure for developing the plan, and the number of matters reflected in it depend on the situation and the time available. When going over to the defense under enemy attacks, planning will be a continuation of the process of making the decision. The basic problems of planning, as a rule, will first be worked out on the map of the commander's decision, and the necessary explanations and calculations will be contained in workbooks. Later the operation plan may be set forth in a separate document. The operation plan may be updated as the situation changes.

The operation plan usually reflects: the enemy's grouping of forces and axes of strikes, as well as areas of possible airborne or amphibious landings; the grouping of army forces and means and their movements in the light of possible enemy actions; the tasks of nuclear and chemical weapons, artillery, and supporting aviation, and the targets to be struck by them; the tasks of first-echelon divisions; the tasks of second-echelon divisions and army reserves, the lines of their deployment, and the routes of march to them; the tasks of special troops; the tasks concerning the engineer preparation of the zone of defense and the establishment of a system of obstacles and demolitions; the control posts and rear services units and facilities.

Matters that cannot be shown graphically are set forth in an explanatory note.

Simultaneously with the army staff, commanders of branch arms, special troops, and services plan the combat use of troops subordinate to them, while the deputy commander for the rear plans rear services support. The planning documents worked out by them will be integral parts of the overall operation plan. The plan developed for an army defensive operation must be implemented without fail.

Disposition of an Army Defense

At the present time the disposition of an army defense includes: the defensive grouping of forces and means (operational disposition of the troops), the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons in conjunction with strikes by supporting air and fire by conventional means of destruction (under conditions of non-nuclear actions -- the system of fire), the system of air defense, and the engineer preparation of the terrain.

Depending on the conditions of the going over to the defense, the defense disposition, the sequence of development, and the make-up of forces and means for conducting it will have their particular characteristics in each specific situation, thus ruling out the manifestation of any kind of stereotyping. Here it should be borne in mind that when setting up a defense using only conventional means of destruction, it will be necessary to observe all the requirements that have already been drawn up and which are placed upon a defense when nuclear weapons are used.

Under various situational conditions, on each of the axes of an enemy offensive an army defense may set set up with different degrees of completeness. This will depend on the make-up of enemy groupings that are attacking, the combat capabilities of our troops, the time available, the nature of the terrain, and other factors. But the disposition of the defense must always be in keeping with the concept of the defensive operation and must ensure: the most effective use of all forces and means; active air defense and protection of troops from weapons of mass destruction; stability in the antitank sense, and retention of the most important lines (areas); the fullest exploitation of the maneuvering capabilities of the troops; suitable and uninterrupted cooperation; and control over the defending troops. To achieve this it may be necessary to use different ways of echeloning forces and means on each axis. Defensive groupings must be set up in such a way as to be able to repulse an offensive by superior enemy forces, both under conditions of non-nuclear actions and in those with the employment of nuclear weapons.

The operational disposition of an army in the defense usually contains the following elements: a first echelon, a second echelon (combined-arms reserve), a grouping of rocket troops and artillery, air defense troops, engineer and chemical troops of army subordination, reserves having different functions, mobile obstacle construction detachments, and control posts.

To ensure stability and activeness, modern defense in principle should be characterized by a deep operational disposition of army troops and a deep disposition of the battle formations of large units and units with a concentration of efforts on the axes of advance of enemy attack groupings.

When going over to the defense under enemy attacks it will first be necessary to establish a tactical zone of defense, especially on the axes of attack of the enemy's advancing main groupings. Large units of the army's first echelon (with means of reinforcement) which are establishing a tactical zone of defense 20 to 30 kilometers deep, are given the task, as a rule, of repulsing an enemy offensive (invasion). In addition to using nuclear and chemical weapons, they are supposed to use their means to inflict maximum losses on the enemy, prevent him from breaking through into the depth of the defense, and retain the key terrain lines, thereby creating conditions for routing, during the army's counterattack, groupings that have broken through.

Under conditions of non-nuclear actions the role of first-echelon divisions in accomplishing the tasks of a defensive operation may increase

considerably. It is therefore to the first echelon of an army, and to first echelons of divisions and regiments, that the bulk of the forces and means may usually be assigned, in order to ensure the simultaneous participation of the greater amount of the fire means of large units, units, and subunits in repulsing an enemy offensive.

The establishment of a tactical zone of defense depends directly on the conditions of the going over to the defense. In going over to the defense during an offensive, the defense may be established on the lines that have been reached, and sometimes also after the capture of advantageous forward lines. In a number of cases, because of the unfavorable operational situation of the troops going over to the defense, or a significant loss of combat effectiveness by a number of units or by a first-echelon division, on certain axes or throughout the entire army zone it may prove advisable to establish the tactical zone in the deep rear area, or on a more advantageous line, by drawing on the reserves.

In such a situation the army's main forces may go over to the defense under the cover of a portion of the forces from the first echelon's complement of troops. These may be forward detachments or forward units of divisions. By aggressive and decisive actions they can force an attacking enemy to prematurely expend part of his forces and means -- especially tactical nuclear weapons -- harass him, and gain time in order to establish a defensive grouping and prepare the defense with the main forces of the divisions and the army in the deep rear area. This is especially important in those cases where the lines on which the forward units begin repulsing the enemy offensive (counterattack) are not suitable for the organization of defense by the main forces. When going over to the defense in a border zone at the outset of war such tasks may be accomplished by forces and means allocated to support the advance and deployment of the army's troops.

The number of divisions in a tactical defensive zone depends on the width of the area defended by the army, the importance of the axes it is defending, the conditions of going over to the defense, and the balance of forces of the two sides. When going over to the defense during an offensive, this number may be primarily a grouping of forces and means of the army's first echelon that has retained its combat effectiveness. Its make-up is determined by its ability to repulse massive attacks by enemy tanks.

Large units of the first echelon of an army are assigned defense areas with up to 30 kilometers of frontage. On axes with sectors of terrain that are difficult of access, and also when defending a seacoast, the width of

the frontage defended by a motorized rifle division may range from 40 to 50 kilometers or more. It should be borne in mind that the average norms for setting up a defense by large units and units are established by regulations. But under various conditions of going over to the defense there may be significant deviations from these norms in one direction or the other depending on the nature of the actions and the make-up of the attacking enemy, the conditions of the terrain, and the capabilities of our troops to establish the necessary densities of forces and means which make it possible to repulse an attack by enemy groupings.

To reduce the effectiveness of enemy nuclear strikes against army troops, especially by tactical means, and to create a more stable and active defense, in principle it is desirable to allocate to the first echelon the lesser part of the forces and means. It may often prove advisable to station the larger portion in the deep rear area, ready for a quick movement to the decisive axes during the defensive operation. But this set-up should be employed on the basis of the specific situational conditions.

When organizing defense under conditions of non-nuclear actions it should be borne in mind that the enemy, in order for his offensive to succeed, will be forced to try to create for a certain time denser groupings of troops on the selected axes of attack. As a result, the need may arise for the defense to thicken with timeliness the density of the battle formations of troops on these axes. This must be taken into account when determining the disposition of the defense.

But considering also the need to observe the principle of dispersed positioning of forces and means in the defense, this thickening of the density of first-echelon troops on the axes of enemy attacks should be provided for either in anticipation of a going over to the offensive by the enemy or after the offensive has begun. An increase in the density of troops may be achieved by a quick and concealed movement of the second echelons of regiments and divisions, as well as by the antitank reserves and mobile obstacle construction detachments of divisions.

In certain cases, when this movement does not provide adequate density of forces and means of defense on the axis of the enemy's main attack, an additional division from the second echelon (reserve) of the army may be shifted to the first echelon while the defense is still being set up prior to the start of the enemy offensive.

For threatened axes, provisions should be made to move artillery to them from adjacent sectors or from the second echelon of the army, as well as to maneuver first-echelon units and subunits from less threatened axes. To ensure a timely movement on the probable axes of attack of the enemy's main groupings, it may be necessary to position the army reserves closer.

When organizing defense in a mountain area, groupings of defending troops are set up by axes. It is on axes accessible to enemy attack that the defense must be the deepest and multi-layered. Special attention is devoted to organizing a solid defense on terrain accessible to tanks, as well as an all-round defense of mountain passes, defiles, commanding heights, and road junctions. For the defense of axes of limited access, a limited number of forces and means are allocated, and the defense is organized by setting up individual strong points. On axes which are difficult of access only observation and patrolling may be organized. The forward edge of defense may be chosen along the slopes of mountain ranges, the most advantageous heights, and spurs of mountains, as well on lines that ensure valleys and mountain plateaus are reliably covered.

Second-echelon large units and reserves of the army, together with other elements of its operational disposition, establish an operational zone of defense that is 80 to 120 kilometers deep.

Depending on the forces available in the army, on the make-up and capabilities of the attacking enemy grouping, the importance of the axes, and the terrain conditions, the army's second-echelon and reserve forces may establish in its operational depth of defense one or two army defensive lines 60 to 80 kilometers apart from each other. To establish operational lines of defense, favorable natural lines must of course be used.

For second-echelon divisions and reserves, in addition to lines of defense, two or three counterattack axes are designated, on each of which deployment lines are assigned, as well as routes of advance and siting areas for the missile battalions and artillery of the divisions.

For the deployment of an army missile brigade, the main siting area and one or two alternate ones are designated and set up, disposed along the front and echeloned in depth. The main siting area should if possible be set up away from the axes of attack of the main enemy groupings, at a distance no closer than 50 to 60 kilometers from the forward edge of defense.

The grouping of an army's air defense troops must be organized in such a way as to be able, in cooperation with the air defense troops of the front and adjacent armies, to protect against enemy air strikes, first of all, rocket troops, the main grouping of first-echelon troops going over to the defense, the second echelon, control posts, and the most important rear services installations of the army with due regard toward maneuvering them during the defensive operation.

When organizing air defense in the mountains it is essential to consider the actions of the individual groupings of forces on disconnected axes and to devote particular attention to covering large units and units in areas of mountain passes, in defiles, gorges, at road junctions, crossings of mountain rivers, and on mountain plateaus.

The army's antitank reserve, reserves of engineer and chemical troops, and the mobile obstacle construction detachment must be stationed in areas from which they can execute quick movement toward threatened axes, both in the direction of the front and toward the flanks. Front reserves may also be pointed toward the main threatened axes.

Nuclear and chemical strikes (despite the fact that an army in a defense will probably have a limited number of nuclear and chemical warheads) will be the decisive means of routing attacking enemy groupings. On their effectiveness will depend the success of army troops in accomplishing the defense tasks.

Nuclear strikes by army and front means are prepared and carried out for the purpose of destroying the enemy's means of nuclear attack, routing his main grouping, and disrupting his offensive.

In an army's defensive operation, single, grouped, and sometimes massed nuclear strikes may be delivered. The last-mentioned are possible for the most part when front means are taking part, in order to inflict a decisive defeat on attacking enemy groupings and create conditions for the going over to the offensive. In defense the employment of nuclear warheads must be approached very carefully. Their employment against the most important targets and at the decisive moments will ensure the most effective defeat of the attacking enemy. A shortage of nuclear warheads may be offset to a considerable extent by the use of chemical weapons (both to hit enemy personnel and to establish sectors and zones of contamination on the routes of his offensive), as well as by air strikes employing conventional means of destruction.

When defending mountain areas nuclear and chemical means may be used to advantage against enemy troops situated in narrow valleys, gorges, and passes, as well as against targets whose destruction and contamination would seriously impede the movement and advance of the attacking enemy. The use of even a limited number of nuclear weapons can inflict heavy casualties on the enemy, and destroy mountain passes or defiles on the axes of actions of his troops, thereby disrupting his offensive in a short time.

When organizing defense under conditions of non-nuclear actions it is essential, in view of the constant threat of enemy use of nuclear weapons, to provide for a high degree of readiness on the part of rocket troops to deliver nuclear strikes.

A system of fire of conventional means of destruction is set up with due regard for nuclear and chemical strikes and strikes by supporting aviation, as well as in conjunction with engineer obstacles. On axes where nuclear weapons are not being used, conventional means will constitute the basic firepower for repulsing an attacking enemy.

A system of fire is organized along the axes of enemy attack and involves the planned use of the fire of artillery, antitank means, and tanks, as well of small arms to strike the enemy on approaches to the defense, in front of the forward edge of the defense areas, and in the deep rear area. It must ensure the rapid shifting of fire means onto threatened axes or sectors.

In the defense of a mountain area the system of fire must ensure multi-level flanking and cross fire and be set up in such a way as to avoid dead spaces in front of the forward edge, on the flanks, and in gaps between defense areas. Fire means should therefore be positioned both on slopes facing toward the enemy and on reverse slopes on high ground.

The main organizers of a system of fire of conventional means of destruction when the time available for setting it up is extremely limited will undoubtedly be the commanders of large units and units. But a major role in the process will be played by the army commander, who determines the artillery reinforcement of first-echelon divisions to be drawn from army and attached artillery, and the make-up and tasks of the antitank reserve of the army. The army commander issues instructions on the procedure for coordinating conventional means of destruction with the use of nuclear and chemical weapons and with engineer obstacles, for preparing and carrying out the shifting of fire to threatened axes, and on other matters, including the possible bringing in of fire means from the army's

second echelon and reserve.

When organizing defense under conditions of non-nuclear actions, the role of the army command in organizing a system of fire of conventional means of destruction increases significantly, since the fate of the defense will depend entirely on these means.

Considering an army's limited capabilities in means of destruction, fire tasks are best accomplished by successive massive attacks by fire against individual units of attacking enemy groupings. As a result, the role of centralized fire control increases, as does the role of prior and more detailed planning of the combat employment of artillery on the scale of the division and army.

Out of army and attached gun artillery an army artillery group may be established on the axis of the main enemy attack to accomplish the tasks of striking the enemy on the approaches to the defense, combatting the enemy's tactical nuclear attack means, suppressing his artillery, and reinforcing the artillery fire of divisions, as well as to support troops taking part in a counterattack. To reinforce the artillery fire of first-echelon divisions on the key axes it may be necessary to bring in artillery of the second echelon of the army.

In order to inflict defeat on the main enemy groupings which have made ready or are deploying for an offensive, a counterpreparation must be organized with the participation of artillery and aviation. In general, under conditions of non-nuclear actions a counterpreparation probably can be carried out rather frequently, especially when the army's main forces go over to the defense beforehand.

When organizing a system of fire the problem of antitank defense requires special attention. In a tactical zone it is set up by first-echelon division forces, which may have approximately 340 pieces of various antitank means (tanks, antitank guided missiles, antitank guns, and antitank grenade launchers on mounts). When hand-held grenade launchers are included, a motorized rifle division will have 665 pieces and a tank division 485. Given the average estimated capabilities of each antitank means and similar equipment and manning levels for the troops on both sides, the overall capabilities of a division (motorized rifle or tank) enable it to successfully combat the tanks of two attacking enemy divisions. In the process the antitank defense on the axis of the main enemy attack may be reinforced by drawing on the antitank reserve and the army mobile obstacle construction detachment, as well as by shifting forces

from less threatened axes. In the operational depth combat against tanks is organized along axes by forces of second-echelon divisions (or the reserve), and by shifting the antitank reserve of an army or front as well as forces from other axes.

The capabilities of combatting enemy tanks increase significantly by correctly using the fire of antitank means in conjunction with obstacles.

Engineer preparation of the terrain increases the stability of troops in defense, improves their protection from nuclear weapons and other means of destruction, and thus helps them retain their combat effectiveness and creates more favorable conditions for the effective use of all fire means and for executing a movement. It also hinders the enemy in the conduct of an offensive.

Calculations of the possible degree of damage to personnel show that defending troops with proper engineer preparation of the terrain may suffer two to three times fewer casualties than an attacking enemy when both are subjected to nuclear bursts of equal yield.

Engineer preparation of the terrain in the zone of defense of an army includes: preparation in the engineering aspect of siting areas for rocket and surface-to-air missile troops, and of firing positions for artillery and antiaircraft artillery; preparing zones of defense for first-echelon large units, areas (lines) of defense for large units of the second echelon and the reserves, and routes of movement and lines of deployment for a counterattack; shelter for control posts; preparing routes for the delivery of materiel and for evacuation; setting up engineer obstacles.

In zones of defense of divisions, in regimental sectors, and battalion areas of defense, a system of strong points is set up, linked to each other by trenches and communication trenches, which make it possible to execute a movement along the front and into the depth.

In defense without the use of nuclear weapons the importance of engineer obstacles, especially mixed minefields, increases considerably. Therefore, in the organization and course of a defensive operation, maximum use must be made of the capabilities of troop and army mechanized mine-laying means (minelayers), which are organic to engineer obstacle construction detachments, for the quick establishment of sectors of minefields on the probable axes of breakthrough of enemy tank groupings. To speed up the laying of mine obstacles helicopters may also be extensively used.

When organizing defense in mountain areas, sectors and axes accessible to an enemy advance may be made difficult of access by blowing up cliffs, scarping mountain slopes, and creating mined timber and rock barriers. Of great importance here are special projects in building roads and laying cross-country routes which bypass sectors where landslides and barriers may be formed. Roads, cross-country routes, and sectors of terrain in the depth of defense that are accessible for actions by an attacking enemy are prepared for demolition.

* * *

One of the most important measures in preparing a defensive operation is also the organization of troop control. An organized going over to the defense by army troops and success in routing an attacking enemy depend to a considerable extent on stable control.

In an army defensive operation the following control posts are usually set up: a command post 50 to 60 kilometers from the forward edge of the defense, an alternate command post 20 to 30 kilometers from the command post, sometimes a forward command post on the axis of the enemy's main attack or on the axis of the army counterattack, and also a rear control post. In defense on a broad front an auxiliary control post may be set up in certain cases to direct troops operating on a separate axis.

During a going over to the defense in the course of an offensive, troop control is usually exercised from the command post or forward command post established during the preceding combat actions.

THE CONDUCT OF A DEFENSIVE OPERATION BY AN ARMY

The methods of conducting a defensive operation by an army as a whole, and the methods of routing each enemy grouping when the tasks of a defense are being carried out, will flow from the concept of the operation and be determined by the conditions under which the army goes over to the defense, the composition and nature of actions of the attacking enemy groupings on each axis, the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons by front means, the nuclear and chemical warheads available to the army, the conditions of the development of the offensive by the main forces of the front on adjacent axes, and other factors.

The basic method of conducting a defensive operation by an army under conditions of nuclear actions consists of repulsing attacks by enemy ground force groupings and aviation, inflicting defeat on his attacking groupings with nuclear and chemical weapons and conventional fire means in conjunction with a firm retention of the key areas, and carrying out decisive counterattacks immediately after the nuclear strikes. Modern means of combat, especially nuclear weapons, make it possible to achieve the goal of disrupting an enemy offensive at various stages of its preparation or conduct. On the whole this will depend on the capabilities of the defending army to inflict a decisive defeat on the main enemy groupings, on the possibilities of having front means act upon these groupings, as well as on the amount of assistance given the defending troops by adjacent attacking operational formations.

Depending on these factors, the routing of the enemy's offensive groupings, and consequently the disruption of his offensive, may be accomplished in the following ways:

-- by delivering nuclear and chemical strikes against enemy groupings while they are advancing;

-- by carrying out a counterpreparation against enemy groupings which are deploying or have made ready for an offensive, and sometimes also, immediately after the counterpreparation, by delivering a strike with combined-arms large units in front of the forward edge of the defense;

-- by repulsing the enemy offensive with simultaneous destruction of his airborne landings;

-- by carrying out an army counterattack against an enemy grouping that has broken through.

Let us briefly examine each of the above-mentioned methods of routing an attacking enemy.

Delivery of Nuclear and Chemical Strikes Against Advancing Enemy Groupings on the Approaches to the Defense

Under favorable situational conditions the defeat of the main offensive (counterattack) groupings of the enemy may be accomplished while they are still in the process of advancing by means of surprise nuclear strikes as well as by air strikes using chemical and conventional ammunition, beginning at the maximum ranges of each of the available means.

But in order to force the enemy to completely abandon going over to the offensive (or carrying out a counterattack), it appears that we should inflict the kind of destruction on his offensive groupings that would result in casualties of 60 to 70 percent. In so doing, any newly discovered operational-tactical means of nuclear attack of his must be destroyed in good time, before they deploy or begin to occupy siting areas. And in that case there will be no need for army troops to go over to the defense.

Should an army or front not have available these opportunities of disrupting an impending enemy offensive (counterattack), the use of even a small number of nuclear warheads may weaken the enemy groupings, delay their advance, and gain a certain amount of time in order for the army troops to prepare a defense. In this case, the first targets to be destroyed are nuclear means and tank groupings. Strikes against them by army means may often be delivered by order of the front troop commander in cooperation with front means.

Even greater results in inflicting damage on the enemy's advancing groupings and delaying his going over to the offensive may be achieved by employing surface nuclear bursts, carrying out additional strikes with chemical weapons, and also by creating zones of contamination, demolition, and flooding on the routes of their advance. In so doing it is of course essential to take into account weather conditions, as well as operational considerations, so as not to create difficulties for the actions of the army's troops and of the forces adjacent to it.

When going over to the defense in mountain areas, nuclear and chemical strikes and air strikes may be delivered most effectively against groupings concentrating in valleys, gorges, and basins, as well as against columns when the latter are negotiating mountain passes, defiles, crossings of mountain rivers, and other narrow places on approaches to the defense.

Carrying out a Counterpreparation and an Attack by Combined-Arms Large Units in Front of the Forward Edge of Defense

Inflicting defeat on the enemy and disrupting an imminent or incipient offensive may be accomplished in a number of cases by carrying out a powerful counterpreparation against his main grouping which is deploying for the offensive. But to carry out the counterpreparation there must be

time to organize strikes with nuclear and chemical weapons and by aviation, and also to organize artillery fire.

A counterpreparation is usually a front measure, organized by the front command, which has at its disposal the main forces and means for carrying it out. But often the organization and immediate direction of the counterpreparation may also be assigned to the army commander. For a defense under mountain conditions this may be the usual procedure.

The task of a counterpreparation may be decisive -- to disrupt an imminent or incipient enemy offensive. But if it is carried out with only a limited amount of means -- especially nuclear -- having been brought in, only limited tasks may be accomplished: weakening the main enemy grouping while it is being deployed for an offensive, delaying the start of the offensive, and gaining additional time to organize the defense on threatened axes.

The main targets of destruction in a counterpreparation are: the enemy's means of nuclear attack and his main attack grouping, primarily tank large units and units, artillery in firing positions, and key control posts. Particular attention must be paid to combat against tactical nuclear means. If the bulk of them are not destroyed while they are deploying and taking up siting areas (firing positions), the enemy may gain a significant advantage in the battle for the tactical zone of defense. When carrying out a counterpreparation in a mountain area, strikes must also be planned against key mountain passes and defiles.

A counterpreparation may be prepared on each of the axes of attack of the main enemy groupings. But it may be carried out either simultaneously against all these groupings, or only against the main enemy grouping. A counterpreparation must be initiated by surprise, so as to forestall the enemy in the employment of nuclear weapons and other means of destruction, and deprive him of the opportunity to carry out an air and artillery preparation against defending army troops.

In certain cases following the conduct of the counterpreparation on one axis or another, an attack by combined-arms large units and units may be delivered in front of the forward edge of defense. The task of such an attack may be to complete the rout of an enemy grouping that is going over to the offensive with the simultaneous capture of advantageous terrain areas or advantageous lines that provide more favorable conditions for the going over to the offensive by army troops. To carry out such an attack certain first-echelon divisions or units may be brought in, and sometimes a

part of the army's second-echelon forces as well.

If the counterpreparation and this attack achieve the decisive objective -- routing the enemy's offensive grouping and disrupting the offensive he has prepared -- then the attack in front of the forward edge may become the beginning of the going over by army troops to a decisive offensive. But the attack in front of the forward edge may also be carried out with limited tasks: to capture advantageous sectors of the terrain in order to improve the position of the defending troops, and delay the start of an enemy offensive on this axis.

Repulsing an Enemy Offensive

Should an army go over to the defense under pressure of an enemy who is already attacking, its defensive operation usually begins by strikes with various means of destruction against the enemy's means of nuclear attack that have been discovered and against his most threatening groupings, with the simultaneous repulsing of his offensive and his air strikes.

When repulsing an enemy offensive, the main efforts of the troops aim to inflict maximum destruction on groupings in front of the forward edge and within the zones of defense of the army's first-echelon divisions. This is achieved by strikes by rocket troops and aviation and by artillery fire using nuclear, chemical, and conventional warheads, by activating engineer obstacles, by tenaciously retaining key terrain areas on axes of the enemy offensive -- including even the waging of combat by first-echelon units and large units when they are encircled -- as well as by carrying out surprise counterattacks with second echelons and reserves.

Combat actions by an army's first-echelon large units when repulsing an enemy offensive may develop along separate axes and may take the form of scattered centers of fighting. This may be especially typical in mountain conditions.

When the enemy penetrates the defense of a first-echelon large unit, by firmly retaining advantageous areas and lines on the key axes, by our nuclear and chemical weapons and the fire of conventional means of destruction as well as by decisive counterattacks, we will inflict maximum possible casualties on him, split up his battle formations, delay his advance into the deep rear area, and thus lay the groundwork for routing

him with a counterattack by the army's second echelon. Antitank reserves and mobile obstacle construction detachments advance onto the axes of attack of enemy tank groupings and, in coordination with antitank means of the defending units, destroy the enemy's tanks and prevent them from breaking through into the deep rear area. Engineer troops at the same time reinforce obstacles on the threatened axes, carry out demolitions, and blow up controlled minefields when enemy tanks come upon them.

When conducting defensive operations in mountain areas, measures must be taken to enable troops to tenaciously retain commanding heights, mountain passes, and road junctions, in conjunction with decisive counterattacks, usually carried out in a downhill direction and along roads, valleys, and mountain ridges.

Under conditions where counterattacks are either inadvisable or impossible, first-echelon divisions, using all their forces and means, by tenaciously retaining the primary areas on advantageous lines and using all types of fire, inflict defeat on the attacking enemy, thus supporting the advance and deployment of second-echelon large units and army reserves in the conduct of a counterattack.

Should the need arise to withdraw some of the forces from under an attack by superior enemy forces so that they can occupy a more favorable line in the depth of the defense, such a troop withdrawal can be carried out only with the permission of the senior command, and it must be executed in an organized manner, quickly, and with concealment.

During defensive operations by first-echelon troops, the commander and army staff determine more precisely the enemy's main axes of attack and have strikes by rocket troops and supporting aviation concentrate on destroying the enemy's groupings operating here and on his approaching reserves, and have antitank and other army means carry out a movement to reinforce the defense on the threatened axes. They must not relax their efforts to take measures to protect the troops and eliminate the aftereffects of enemy use of nuclear and chemical weapons. For this purpose the status of troops subjected to enemy nuclear and chemical strikes is sought and defined, and the degree and scope of contamination of troops, rear services installations, and the terrain is established. The first measures taken are those to restore disrupted control, the air defense system, the combat effectiveness of troops, and their cooperation on the main axis of attack of the enemy.

When conducting a defense in mountain areas we must keep in mind the possibility of mountain landslides occurring during nuclear bursts and the creation of higher concentrations of toxic agents in gorges and valleys, as well as the difficulty in finding ways to bypass contaminated sectors of the terrain. At the same time, to disrupt an enemy advance on certain axes, barriers and landslides may be created in narrow places on roads.

To destroy enemy airborne landing forces, reserves (a second echelon) stationed nearby are used, and when necessary, aircraft may be brought in and chemical weapons can be employed.

Carrying Out an Army Counterattack

Enemy groupings that have penetrated or broken through into the depth of the defense are destroyed by delivering strikes with nuclear and chemical weapons in conjunction with conventional means, as well as by decisive counterattacks. Rocket troops and front aviation may also take part in the delivery of these strikes, and front reserves can participate in the counterattacks.

An army counterattack may result in the routing of an enemy grouping which has penetrated or broken through into the depth of the defense, and lay the groundwork for a subsequent going over to the offensive by the army. Under less favorable conditions an army counterattack may be carried out with a limited task -- of routing the most dangerous enemy grouping, or the one that has penetrated most deeply, and restoring the defense on one of the advantageous lines. In certain cases it may be advisable for part of the second-echelon forces to take up the defense on the army line, repulse the enemy attack from there, and then deliver a counterattack.

Determining the right moment to deliver the counterattack will be of great importance. It should be delivered while the overall stability of the army defense is still intact and some first-echelon large units continue to retain their zones and areas, while the enemy has sustained considerable losses from nuclear strikes and other means of destruction, and when the commitment to battle of the army's second echelon and reserves results in superiority over the enemy and ensures he will be routed. It would be advantageous if at the moment the counterattack is delivered the enemy has begun to relocate his artillery and tactical means of nuclear attack -- and part of his operational-tactical means of nuclear attack -- and committed his immediate reserves to battle while his deep reserves are

delayed by strikes by rocket troops and aviation.

Depending on the situational conditions, an army counterattack may be delivered against one or both flanks of the enemy's main attacking grouping. This method of routing a grouping that has penetrated or broken through is the more advantageous, since its accomplishment creates conditions that make it possible to exploit weak spots in the enemy's combat disposition, thus enabling army troops to quickly reach the rear of the main forces of his attacking grouping, isolate it from approaching reserves, capture or destroy means of nuclear attack, and thus rout the enemy in detail.

The employment of nuclear weapons may make it possible to deliver a counterattack from the front as well, in order to split an enemy grouping that has penetrated or broken through and subsequently destroy it in detail. A frontal counterattack may take place, obviously, in those cases where an army already possesses the nuclear warheads for the infliction of a decisive defeat on an attacking enemy grouping, or where the movement of second-echelon large units of an army against the flanks of this grouping is impeded by the nature of the terrain or involves considerable loss of time. Depending on the situation, an army may deliver a counterattack from the flank and front simultaneously.

Strikes with nuclear weapons during a counterattack are delivered against the most important and precisely fixed targets, the destruction of which ensures the quick rout of the enemy's groupings that have made a penetration. These targets may be his means of nuclear attack or troops of the main grouping, especially tank troops and approaching reserves, and control posts.

In addition to second-echelon divisions and army reserves, large units and units of the army's first echelon that are conducting combat actions on the axis of the counterattack, as well as units from sectors not attacked, are allocated to the groupings of forces for the delivery of the counterattack. The units not under attack must be regrouped quickly onto the required axes so that they will have enough time to prepare for the fulfilment of the tasks assigned.

The actions of combined-arms large units taking part in the counterattack must be decisive and be conducted without let-up, with the utmost vigor in order to complete as quickly as possible the rout of the main enemy grouping and prepare conditions for going over to a decisive offensive with all of the army's forces without a pause in troop combat

actions.

During the counterattack it will be necessary to destroy newly discovered means of nuclear attack of the enemy, to destroy his reserves advancing from the interior to the area of the counterattack, and also to reinforce the cover against air strikes of the counterattack grouping and to secure its flanks.

The conduct of a counterattack in mountain areas, in view of the poorly developed road system and difficulty in moving troops, requires, as a rule, the prior deployment of troops on previously prepared lines. A counterattack along a wide mountain valley or on a large mountain plateau may be carried out by deploying troops from the march.

Special Features of Conducting a Defensive Operation under Conditions of Non-Nuclear Actions

The basic tenets of the theory of operational art examined above apply equally to a defense without the employment of nuclear weapons.

At the same time the conduct of a defensive operation without the employment of nuclear weapons will have a number of important distinguishing features, stemming from the fact that nuclear weapons are not employed, and that the principal means of destruction will be artillery and aviation, as well as fire and attacks by tanks. As a result there is a sharp drop in the capabilities of the means of destruction of both sides, both in yield and in the depth of effect. The only means of destroying the enemy on distant approaches will be aviation.

Under conditions of non-nuclear actions the defending troops will have to inflict fire destruction on attacking enemy groupings in successive stages -- on the approaches to the defense, when the enemy is deploying for an offensive, when repulsing attacks, and, if the enemy penetrates into the depth of the defense, enemy groupings will be destroyed by fire from all means in conjunction with counterattacks, counterthrusts, and tenacious retention of important areas. This successive method of defeating the enemy in each period of his offensive can and should lead in the end to the disruption of his offensive.

When conducting a defensive operation using only conventional means of destruction, strikes against advancing enemy groupings on distant

approaches can be carried out only by aviation. Thus the effects of actions against the enemy during this period will be considerably less than when using nuclear weapons. The number and scope of the tasks performed by supporting aviation under these conditions increase considerably. Its main efforts should be directed to destroying nuclear means and routing the most dangerous attacking groupings, and to covering the troops and destroying enemy radiotechnical means and control posts. In the process extensive use may be made of incendiary means.

The tasks of a counterpreparation become limited, as it can only achieve a weakening of the forces delivering the initial enemy attack, or disrupt their timetable for beginning the offensive. Attacks in front of the forward edge probably can be carried out only under certain exceptionally favorable conditions.

In non-nuclear actions, regardless of whether the defense is prepared in advance or under enemy pressure, its objectives can be achieved first of all during combat to retain the tactical zone. In battles to retain battalion areas (the first position), the main fire means of regiments and divisions may take part, and even their antitank reserves and other reserves. During the operation extensive use must be made of movement to tighten up the battle formations of troops on the enemy's main axes of attack. The entire attention of the army commander is directed toward inflicting the greatest possible losses on the enemy with all available means, and halting his offensive.

To carry out a counterattack it will obviously be necessary to have more compact groupings, committed to battle simultaneously when possible. It is very important to begin the counterattack with a powerful surprise fire strike by artillery and aviation. For this purpose army artillery and the artillery of the divisions of the counterattack grouping are brought in, as well as that of first-echelon divisions in whose zones the counterattack is being carried out. In addition, it is advisable to try to deliver the strike against both flanks of the enemy grouping that has penetrated, and at the weakest points in his combat disposition.

To exploit a counterattack and go over to the offensive without pausing, it will be necessary to bring in troops from sectors not attacked, and also to commit army reserves and possibly front reserves.

During the conduct of a defense using only conventional means of destruction, the key task of the troops remains that of combat against enemy nuclear weapons, especially tactical, so that the moment combat

actions go over to the employment of nuclear weapons, the enemy's advantage in these means is wiped out.

At the same time particular attention must be devoted to keeping rocket troops constantly ready to deliver nuclear strikes against an attacking enemy. Constant readiness of rocket troops to employ these weapons is achieved by continuously updating the tasks for the delivery of nuclear strikes, and by keeping missile launchers in a state of readiness that will ensure preempting the enemy in the use of nuclear weapons.

Another key condition for ensuring constant readiness on the part of rocket troops is that of continuously reconnoitering enemy actions in order to discover any preparations for the employment of nuclear weapons and to determine the targets to be destroyed. At the same time it will be necessary to take all measures to conceal the actual groupings of our own rocket troops.

The defending troops of an army will have to constantly observe the requirements for protection against weapons of mass destruction and implement the measures for it.

"Deep among the people," said V. I. Lenin, "a constructive process is taking place, an accumulation of energy and discipline, which will give us the strength to survive all blows."*

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* V. I. Lenin, Complete Collection of Works, Vol. 36, p. 86.