



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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Tuesday 6 December 1977 CG NIDC 77/282C

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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~~Top Secret~~

(Security Classification)

ARAB STATES: Egyptian Reaction

[redacted] //Egypt reacted sharply to the Tripoli communique by announcing yesterday that it will sever diplomatic relations with Syria, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and South Yemen. The move could have the effect of forcing the summit participants to adhere to anti-Egyptian measures that they might otherwise have circumvented.//

[redacted] Egypt had earlier ordered the return of its top diplomatic representatives from these Arab capitals and the USSR, but--piqued by the resolutions issued by its Arab opponents--decided to take more dramatic action against them.

[redacted] Egypt's apparent decision not to break completely with the USSR indicates that, at least in this case, it considered the broader implications of its actions. By stopping short of a break with Moscow, the Egyptians have preserved the basic framework for a Geneva peace conference. Their rejoinder to Syria, however, will make it more difficult for either side to join the other at the negotiating table.

[redacted] The Egyptians have seriously complicated the efforts of Saudi Arabia and other Arab moderates to restore an Arab negotiating front. More important, they have probably risked again annoying Saudi leaders, whose anger over Sadat's penchant for independent action had just begun to abate. Egypt's actions will also feed the fears of Egyptian intellectuals and other sophisticated Arabs that Sadat is playing into the Israelis' hands by making concessions without gaining anything in return and by further dividing the Arab world.

[redacted] Sadat's decision to break relations was a reaction to the declaration at the Tripoli summit of a "freeze" in diplomatic ties with Egypt. The participants at Tripoli did not define their "freeze," but there is some evidence that, at least until Sadat responded with a clear break in diplomatic ties, the radicals intended that their move would have little practical effect.

Although the final summit declaration denounced Sadat's latest peace initiatives and affirmed a determination to frustrate similar attempts at "capitulation," the document did not reject peace negotiations altogether, and as such constitutes a victory for Syria's efforts to keep its options open.

Iraq's walkout came following the conference's adoption of what Baghdad described as a "servile" document, made necessary by Syria's refusal to accept the full rejectionist program of no peace, no negotiations, no recognition of Israel. Iraq had hoped to use the summit to force Syria to reconsider its previous support for a negotiated settlement.

Iraq wanted Asad and the other participants at Tripoli to denounce UN resolutions 242 and 338 and disavow any intentions to attend a reconvened Geneva peace conference, to request that Syria withdraw its forces from Lebanon and open its borders to the Palestinian movement, and to join in a military as well as an economic and political front for the total liberation of Palestine.

Iraq's proposals add up more to a condemnation of Asad than of Sadat. Baghdad still seems intent on holding its own summit, although a date has not yet been set and neither the Arab rejectionist states nor the Palestinians have indicated they will participate.