



DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

[Redacted]

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

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[Redacted]

DIST 01 JAN 78

*EG Gen*

COUNTRY: EGYPT/ISRAEL/JORDAN\*ARAB STATES

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SADAT'S [Redacted] REACTION TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S TV COMMENTS ON 28 DECEMBER REGARDING THE WEST BANK (DDI: 30 DECEMBER 1977)

SOURCE:

[Redacted]

1.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR AL - S A D A T MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS REGARDING U.S. PRESIDENT JIMMY C A R T E R ' S REMARKS ON TELEVISION CONCERNING THE WEST BANK. SADAT SAID HE WAS NOT REALLY ANGRY OVER INCIDENT, AS HE REALIZED BOTH HE AND PRESIDENT CARTER HAD BEEN COUGHT A BIT OFF GUARD: CARTER, AT FIRST BY THE COMMEN-

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[REDACTED]

TATOR'S QUESTION; SADAT, THE NEXT DAY, BY AN INTERVIEWER'S QUESTION WHEN SADAT WAS NOT EVEN SURE OF WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SAID. THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER, SADAT CONFIDED, WAS THAT HE REALLY DIDN'T HAVE ANY PROBLEMS WITH THE SOLUTION PRESIDENT CARTER REFERRED TO IN HIS 28 DECEMBER REMARKS: ALLOWING THE WEST BANK TO COME UNDER EITHER ISRAELI OR JORDANIAN CONTROL IN A FINAL SETTLEMENT. THE PROBLEM WAS ONLY ONE OF TIMING, AS SADAT COULD NOT AT THIS POINT ADMIT TO HIS WILLINGNESS TO SEE THAT EVENTUAL SOLUTION. SADAT COMPARED THE INCIDENT TO DISCLOSING WHAT WAS GOING TO COME AT "STEP Y" WHEN THE GAME WAS ONLY AT "STEP B OR C". THUS, HE HAD TO MAKE A NEGATIVE REACTION STATEMENT TO HIDE FOR THE TIME BEING THE FACT THAT HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH SUCH AN END RESULT.

2. TALKING FURTHER, SADAT REITERATED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THAT HE, SADAT, MUST GET THE ISRAELIS TO UNDERSTAND HIS REAL POSITION ON THE KEY ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT SO THAT THEY WILL SUPPORT HIM IN HIS TRUE OBJECTIVES RATHER THAN TRYING TO WIN POINTS IN PUBLIC EXCHANGES. THE LATTER, HE AGONIZED, ONLY SERVED TO LOSE TIME AND COMPLICATED HIS SECRET APPROACH. HE WANTS TO GET THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO CONVINCING THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO "PLAY THIS GAME" AS IT IS THE ONLY WAY HE CAN GET TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT THAT WILL STICK WITH THE EGYPTIAN

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PEOPLE AND THEIR MAJOR ARAB SUPPORTERS, SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA.

3. SADAT CONTINUED THAT IN THIS CONTEXT HE COULD NOT SELL TO THE OTHER ARABS AN ISRAELI SECURITY PRESENCE ON THE WEST BANK IN THE INITIAL PHASE, EVEN THOUGH HE SECRETLY HAD NO PROBLEMS IF THE WEST BANK EVENTUALLY WENT TO ISRAEL. FURTHER, HE COULD NOT "COVER" HIS ULTIMATE INTENTIONS TO ALLOW THE WEST BANK TO GO TO EITHER ISRAEL OR JORDAN, IF HE COULDN'T WIN ISRAELI COOPERATION IN FINDING A SOLUTION FOR THE NEED TO BE ABLE TO DECLARE THAT HE HAD WON "SELF-DETERMINATION" FOR THE POPULATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. SADAT KEPT SAYING THERE WAS NO REAL DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN HIM AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON AN ULTIMATE SOLUTION TO THIS ISSUE; THE POINT SEEMS TO BE THAT THE U.S. AND ISRAEL STILL SEEM TO BE TAKING THE DEBATE BETWEEN SELF-AUTONOMY AND SELF-DETERMINATION AT FACE VALUE. SADAT SAID HE FELT STRONGLY THAT IF HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO FIND A WAY OUT OF DROPPING THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) -- A MAJOR OBSTACLE FOR THE U.S. AND ISRAEL -- FROM THE CURRENT PEACE PROCESS THEN THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO DEVISE A "COVER" SOLUTION FOR EGYPT ON THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI SECURITY FORCES ON THE WEST BANK AND THE QUESTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

4. TO GIVE SUPPORT TO HIS COVER POSTURE ON THE WEST

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

BANK, SADAT DISCLOSED, HE HAD SENT MESSAGES TO SEVERAL EUROPEAN LEADERS SIMILAR TO THAT TO SAUDI KING K H A L I D BIN 'ABD AL-'AZIZ AL SA'UD REPORTING ON THE RESULTS OF THE 25-26 DECEMBER 1977

-EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI SUMMIT IN ISMA'ILLIYA,

AND REQUESTING THEIR PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. HE SAID THAT WEST GERMAN CHANCELLOR HELMUT S C H M I D T, ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO EGYPT, HAD AGREED TO SUPPORT SADAT PUBLICLY ON THIS QUESTION. IN SEPARATE MESSAGES TO FRENCH PRESIDENT VALERY GISCARD D ' E S T A I N G; BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JAMES C A L L A G H A N; AND YUGOSLAV PRESIDENT JOSIP BROZ T I T O, SADAT REQUESTED THEIR PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR "SELF-DETERMINATION" ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. HE EXPECTS A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM ALL OF THEM.

5. ON THE REMAINING PROBLEMS OF THE SINAI, SADAT DISCLOSED THAT IN HIS MESSAGES TO THE SAUDIS AND OTHER LEADERS, HE HAS NOT SPECIFIED THE REMAINING PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS. HE HAD TOLD HIS MESSENGERS THAT IF ANY LEADER ASKS WHAT THESE REMAINING PROBLEMS WERE, THEY SHOULD BE DISMISSED LIGHTLY BY THE RESPONSE THAT THEY PERTAINED ONLY TO THE OLD QUESTION OF THE ISRAELIS WANTING TO LEAVE SETTLEMENTS BEHIND. HIS

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MESSENGRERS WERE NOT TO DISCLOSE THE ISRAELI DEMAND TO RETAIN TWO AIR BASES IN THE SINAI, AS HE FELT THIS WOULD UPSET THE SAUDIS AND OTHERS AND PERHAPS PROVOKE THEM INTO STRONG STATEMENTS THAT WOULD UNDERCUT HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS. SADAT SAID HE IS CONFIDENT HE CAN GET THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE OFF THE DEMAND FOR THESE BASES. "THEY WILL HAVE TO," HE SAID, "AS THEY COULD GET NO ONE IN THE WORLD TO AGREE THAT EITHER COUNTRY PARTY TO A FULL PEACE SETTLEMENT SHOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT FOREIGN MILITARY BASES OF THE OTHER." SADAT ADDED THAT WHILE HE DIDN'T WANT TO TELL THE ISRAELIS AT THIS POINT, HE IS WILLING TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE SINAI. HE SAID HE COULD TAKE CARE OF THAT WITHIN THE TERMS OF A BILATERAL EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT, ONCE HE GOT AN ARAB SUMMIT APPROVAL FOR A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES UNDER WHICH EACH ARAB PARTY COULD NEGOTIATE SEPARATELY WITH ISRAEL CONCERNING NATIONAL BILATERAL SOVEREIGNTY DETAILS.

6. SADAT CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS THAT EVENING BY SAYING THAT "COVER" FOR HIS INTENTIONS IS WHAT IS IMPORTANT TO HIM AT THIS JUNCTURE, NOT TIME. HE IS WILLING TO TAKE THE TIME NECESSARY TO PUT ENOUGH PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS AND OTHERWISE PERSUADE THEM TO GIVE HIM THE MINIMUM HE NEEDS TO TELL AN ARAB SUMMIT THAT HE HAS NEGOTIATED THE BASIC ISSUES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. THEN EGYPT

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[REDACTED]

CAN SIGN A BILATERAL PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL WITHOUT  
COORDINATING FURTHER WITH ANY OTHER NATION.



7. [REDACTED] EGYPT, CAIRO (31 DECEMBER 1977)

[REDACTED]

8. [REDACTED] DISSEM:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ --

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