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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2 February 1978


MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Problems of Rear
Services Support in the Collections and
Information Bulletins of the Military
Districts and Groups of Forces

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article briefly surveys a number of proposals advanced in the collections and information bulletins of various military districts and groups of forces on matters of improving and increasing the efficiency of the materiel, technical, and medical support for a battle and operation, as well as of the organization and control of the rear services. The focal point in this is the question of mobility, that is, the need for mobile fuel depots, for increased mileage reserves between overhauls, and for increased mobility of the army rear control post. Regarding medical support it is proposed to have common rear hospital bases for the treatment of both servicemen and the civilian population. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (70) for 1963.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

John N. McMahon

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
Director, National Security Agency

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF INFO

Late 1963

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2 February 1978

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Problems of Rear Services Support in the Collections and Information Bulletins of the Military Districts and Groups of Forces

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (70) for 1963 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of this article are Colonel (Retired) V. Gorskiy and Colonel (Retired) A. Orekhov. This article briefly surveys a number of proposals advanced in the collections and information bulletins of various military districts and groups of forces on matters of improving and increasing the efficiency of the materiel, technical, and medical support for a battle and operation, as well as of the organization and control of the rear services. The focal point in this is the question of mobility, that is, the need for mobile fuel depots, for increased mileage reserves between overhauls, and for increased mobility of the army rear control post. Regarding medical support it is proposed to have common rear hospital bases for the treatment of both servicemen and the civilian population.

End of Summary

[Redacted] Comment:

The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

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Problems of Rear Services Support in the Collections
and Information Bulletins of the Military
Districts and Groups of Forces
(A Brief Review)

by

Colonel (Retired) V. GORSKIY
Colonel (Retired) A. OREKHOV

In the collections and information bulletins of the military districts and groups of forces great attention is devoted to the materiel, technical, and medical support for the battle and the operation as well as to the organization and control of the rear services.

Let us briefly review the most interesting material published in 1962 in the above-mentioned publications.

Materiel support. The problems of materiel support were quite thoroughly examined in Information Bulletin No. 3 of the Southern Group of Forces. Based on the summary of a military science conference, recommendations were set forth on the number of rear services units and facilities of a front designated to provide materiel support of the troops when the front goes over to the offensive with a partial concentration of its forces and means in the initial period of a war under conditions of the powerful action of enemy missile/nuclear weapons. It is proposed that in peacetime we have a front base headquarters, two or three depots for each type of supplies, a motor transport brigade, a fuel delivery battalion, a special propellant delivery battalion, and a pipeline battalion. As for reserves of materiel at all levels of the rear, these should be established in peacetime and be counted upon to support the conduct of a minimum of two successive front offensive operations, they should be dispersed according to the grouping of forces that has been adopted and according to their tasks, and they should also be dispersed based on the layout, traffic capacity, and carrying capacity of the network of the transportation routes of a given axis as well as on the capabilities for maneuvering.

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In our view, we should not establish reserves in these amounts in peacetime on each operational axis because this is not favorable from either an economic or an operational standpoint. ///

In the Collection, recommendations were set forth to increase the mobile reserves of fuel and rations among the troops. In particular, it was recommended that the fuel reserves in the transport of the divisions and regiments be brought up to the norm for the daily expenditure when the rates of advance are 100 kilometers per day. In regard to this, organic transport must be fueled up and in the battalions. It was recommended that the mobile reserves of rations be increased to eight days' rations (without increasing the organic transport) as follows: per soldier one day's dry ration of selection No. 1; in battalion and regimental transport -- two days' rations, including one field ration; and in division transport -- three days' rations, one of which is a field ration.

In Information Bulletin No. 9 of the Belorussian Military District the authors of a series of articles based on the experience of exercises and on the materials of the 14th military science conference of the military district have set forth valuable proposals on rear services support of troops when operational formations are advancing from the rear area towards the front and when they are being committed to an engagement from the march in the initial period of a war. First of all, they remarked on the difficulty of providing the troops with fuel. To solve this key problem, they recommended attaching two additional 200-liter drums with fuel to each tank, placing six to eight fuel cans on ZIL-164 trucks, four to five fuel cans on ZIL-157 trucks, three fuel cans on GAZ-63 trucks, and five fuel cans on GAZ-51 trucks. Furthermore, they proposed allocating additional transport for fuel shipments by loading ammunition and other types of items more efficiently. In the opinion of the authors of these articles, by implementing the indicated measures we can achieve the following increases in the mobile fuel reserves of a motorized rifle division: up to 2.15 fuelings of motor vehicle gasoline, up to 2.5 fuelings of diesel fuel, and up to 1.64 fuelings of B-70 aviation gasoline. With the aim of speeding up the process of refueling vehicles, they recommended having regimental transport and some division transport with fuel in the forward columns of the starting formation. Refueling means should also be present in the battalion and regimental columns. ///

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

In order to provide fuel to a combined-arms army completing a 1,000-kilometer march (requiring 11,500 tons of POL) it is necessary, in the opinion of the authors of the articles, to have at least two fuel delivery motor transport battalions in the army. The same conclusion was arrived at in the North Caucasus Military District (Information Bulletin No. 19). In addition, here they consider we must have a fully mobile army fuel depot and eliminate from it the existing unwieldy containers.

But we must note that it is unlikely that we can count on regular deliveries of fuel when such a march is being made. Most likely, as the march proceeds over long distances, reserves of fuel will be established on the routes of movement.

Posing the problem of the mobility of a fuel depot is worthy of attention, but we cannot accept the proposed alternative as being the only one. In our opinion, instead of having tanker battalions, it is better to have battalions of trucks carrying rubber containers. This will permit us to use transportation if necessary for the evacuation of the wounded, which will be a matter of great importance when there are massive medical casualties.

In Information Bulletin No. 10 of the Kiev Military District they examined the organization of the delivery of materiel during an offensive operation. It was shown that complete and uninterrupted materiel support can be achieved when army transport is able to make two trips a day. But to do this it is necessary that the front, using its own transport, provide for the delivery of materiel to the army depots, and when necessary, that it deliver tank ammunition and diesel fuel to the division depots. In individual cases, army transport can also be brought in to deliver materiel from the front depots. But we should not use troop transport for this purpose since it may lag behind in the course of the offensive.

In the Bulletin special attention was devoted to the delivery of fuel to the tank subunits. It is well known that the authorized vehicles designated for the delivery of fuel to the tanks do not possess adequate cross-country capability, which can affect the timeliness with which tanks are supplied with POL during an offensive. This task can be accomplished, as shown by the experience of the 37th Guards Tank Division, by fitting out





the tank recovery vehicles with platforms so as to place 25 drums (5,000 liters) of fuel on them. It goes without saying that such platforms should be factory-produced and provided with appropriate armor protection against fragments and bullets.

To reduce tank refueling time, they proposed attaching 10 to 12 fuel tanker trucks to each regiment or the same number of trucks carrying fuel in small containers. In this case, the refueling of a regiment will require no more than 40 to 50 minutes.

Technical support. An extremely important problem is that of technical support for troops in present-day offensive operations and when they are conducting extended marches. The greater the range of combat equipment and of motor transport, the greater will be the combat readiness and capabilities of the troops.

The material of Information Bulletin No. 9 of the Belorussian Military District presents an analysis of the established norms for the minimum range of equipment based on the mileage reserves between overhauls and arrives at the conclusion that these mileage reserves between overhauls (for medium tanks -- 1,000 kilometers, for heavy tanks -- 800 kilometers, for amphibious armored personnel carriers and tanks -- 1,000 kilometers, and for trucks and armored personnel carriers -- 5,000 kilometers) allow us to conduct only one front offensive operation, and that one only on the condition that when the forces are moving forward to the front, the tracked equipment will be shipped by railroad or on heavy load trailers. In connection with this, it is recommended that the average range for armored equipment before scheduled maintenance be 2,000 to 3,000 kilometers and for armored personnel carriers and trucks -- 5,000 to 10,000 kilometers. But in so doing, a difficulty arises owing to the fact that the maximum range of a tank's tracks amounts to no more than 2,400 kilometers. Therefore, we must seek a solution to the problem of increasing tank ranges not only by increasing the range based on mileage reserves between overhauls, but also by establishing reserve sets of tracks in the depots in the probable zone of movement of the large units and operational formations and by introducing trailers into the troops.







Great difficulty is posed by the problems of technical support for tank troops when they are making an assault crossing of a wide water obstacle on the bottom of a river (Information Bulletin No. 10 of the Kiev Military District). The point is that with existing equipment we have to carry out the sealing of tanks in two phases; the preliminary phase -- at a distance of 20 to 30 kilometers from the river, and the final phase -- six to seven kilometers from the river. As a result of this, the assault crossing of a river from the march is not attainable. Therefore, it is recommended that tanks be provided with equipment enabling them to be sealed in a single phase 25 to 30 kilometers away from a river and also that the evacuation platoon of the separate division repair and restoration battalion be increased up to 30 men with the appropriate block-and-tackle and other equipment in order to successfully accomplish the tasks of evacuation and rescue service when tanks are making an assault crossing of water obstacles on the river bottom.

Medical support. A future war, especially in its initial period, will be characterized by extremely high medical casualties. Not only will there be unavoidable losses among personnel of the troop units, large units, and operational formations as a whole, but also among the civilian population in the front zone of action and in the interior regions of the country. Therefore, in the Southern Group of Forces (Information Bulletin No. 3) they consider it necessary, at the present time throughout all of the country, including the border areas, to provide for medical contingents to furnish assistance and medical treatment to wounded and sick servicemen and civilians. Matters of the efficient utilization of local public health organs in a front zone must be meticulously thought out, planned, and prepared while we are still at peace.

The successful utilization of all medical forces and means in a front zone in the initial period of a war is possible only by establishing in the territory of the front common hospital bases which will provide for the reception and medical treatment of both servicemen and the civilian population.

To this end, the entire front zone, depending on the availability and organization of the civilian medical treatment network, should be split up into areas, each of which will be serviced by one rear hospital base. These bases must be engaged






in treating the wounded and sick (servicemen and civilians) who come in from the area being serviced, as well as the wounded and sick evacuated from the forward hospital bases until such time as the front establishes its rear hospital bases.

The common rear hospital bases must have at their disposal evacuation means and the means needed to carry out medical treatment and evacuation measures in the centers of massive medical casualties in the territory of the area being serviced.

When a tank army is making an assault crossing of a water obstacle (Information Bulletin No. 10 of the Kiev Military District), medical support can be organized as follows: "Battalion medical aid stations are reinforced by regimental means; the regimental medical aid posts of the first-echelon regiments of a division are not set up before the crossing; medical support for the crossing is accomplished by using the means of the units supporting the assault crossing (artillery and engineer means, etc.), and also by using the medical battalion of the division. The main body of this battalion must stay undeployed a distance of five to six kilometers away from the river in readiness to cross immediately behind the first-echelon regiments and to deploy for work on the opposite shore (on the bridgehead). The providing of complex types of medical assistance on the departure shore must be carried out by army means. For this purpose, and by order of the army chief of medical service, a separate medical detachment must be deployed a distance of eight kilometers away from the river on the basis of one per division. But if the medical battalion of a particular division finds itself overburdened with wounded at the beginning of the assault crossing, then an army medical detachment must be moved up behind the division."

Questions of organizing and controlling the rear services. In a number of military districts special attention has been devoted to the organization and control of the rear services of operational formations. In Information Bulletin No. 3 of the Southern Group of Forces the question of rear services support for an army corps was raised. At present the situation is such that a front must take upon itself the rear services support of a corps, especially when the latter is operating on an independent axis. This means that we must send out behind a corps an operations group of staff and service officers with



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communications means, transport, and materiel, and repair-and-recovery and medical facilities of the front rear services, or else we must attach front rear services units and facilities to the corps, that is, establish, as it were, an improvised corps rear services. But by this method it will be difficult to accomplish efficiently the tasks of rear services support for a corps, especially as the rear services department of a corps does not have at its disposal the necessary forces and means to exercise control.


All of this attests to the fact that an army corps must have its own rear services, which are structurally similar to those of an army.

A recommendation of the Southern Group of Forces which is worthy of attention concerns the security of the rear services, specifically, the establishment for this purpose of organic subunits equipped with tanks, artillery, antitank means, and other means for conducting combat actions.

Furthermore, they recommend reducing the strength of the army rear control post by eliminating from it those departments and facilities which are not associated with the control of the rear services (personnel department, organizational accounting and manning, judge advocate and courts-martial, special department, finance department, bank, editorial staff, song and dance ensemble, post office). The indicated departments and facilities can be positioned in a separate group located up to 15 kilometers away from the rear control post. They also propose organizing a continuous flow of information to the rear staff on all changes in the operational situation as well as equipping all rear services units and facilities of an army with radio communications means.

The questions of using computer equipment for troop rear services support are examined in Collection No. 8 of the Transbaykal Military District. Regarding this, they recommend developing a common system for the coding of all information and drastically reducing the nomenclature lists, which are extremely lengthy at present. Thus, in the rations supply service there are up to 200 food items and over 500 items in the kitchen and tableware inventory; in the clothing and equipment supply service there are 2,036 items; in the fuel supply service -- 500; in the

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


motor vehicle-tractor service -- up to 25 thousand; in the armored service -- up to 60 thousand; and in the missile and artillery armament service -- over 200 thousand weapons items and approximately 30 thousand ammunition items. It is perfectly obvious that it is time the central supply directorates and services really got busy on this problem.

In Information Bulletin No. 19 of the North Caucasus Military District certain changes in the structure of the mobile army base are proposed for a mountain theater of military operations. The organization of this base should have two groups of depots with their respective control organs, means of communications, and means of mechanized loading and unloading work.

In order to avoid possible stoppages in supplying troops with special propellant during a front offensive operation in the initial period of a war in a mountain theater of military operations, in the Transcaucasus Military District it was recommended that a front have at least three missile propellant depots, and that branches of the depots should be supplied by motor transport so that they would be able to move forward independently immediately behind the missile technical bases. A depot must have reliable communications with the branches, missile technical bases, missile propellant delivery subunits, and with the front fuel supply directorate. Under conditions of a mountain theater it is better to have separate delivery companies rather than special fuel delivery battalions. Furthermore, in order to provide for the relocation of the forward front base by motor transport it is necessary to make provisions for flexible containers in the fuel depots, to reduce the stocks of materiel in the base, and to correspondingly increase them in the front rear base.

They also recommend incorporating subunits for drilling and blasting work into the T/O of road units, speeding up the development and introduction of rubberized fabric pipelines, incorporating into the system of the rear services units of a front operating in a mountain theater of military operations three to four transshipping detachments made up of one or two motor transport battalions, one PMT-150 field mainline pipeline company (with 50 kilometers of pipeline), two separate loading and unloading work companies, one road traffic control company,





one reinforced road and bridge company, and a communications platoon.

In conclusion, we must state that the writings of the military districts and groups of forces are worthy of our closest attention. The central directorates of the Ministry of Defense should disseminate in their publishing organs the proposals that have been adopted. This would to a considerable extent help the troops accomplish more purposefully the tasks of further improving the organization of the tactical and operational rear services and the materiel, technical, and medical support.

