


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

17 August 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT :  Report

1. Enclosed is a  report. For convenience of reference by NFIB agencies, the codeword  has been assigned to the product of certain extremely sensitive agent sources of CIA's Directorate of Operations. The word  is classified  and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

2. This report must be handled in accordance with established security procedures. It may not be reproduced for any purpose. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this report in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.



John N. McMahon




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
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
Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Warsaw Pact



DATE OF INFO. 1978

DATE 17 August 1978

SUBJECT

War Game Scenario--Central Europe--1978

SOURCE Documentary

SUMMARY:


This report is a translation of a Polish document entitled "Scenario Number 4 for a War Game by the Directing Staff of the Ministry of National Defense (Situation as of D+4)." The report is classified SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE. The scenario describes a large-scale NATO attack on the Warsaw Pact bloc using conventional means. The combined Warsaw Pact forces counterattack, but losses are heavy. A situation map outlines NATO and Polish dispositions, order of battle, and movements. Loss statistics are given for Polish forces and industrial plants engaged in defense work. War game participants are required to assess and evaluate the situation and report solutions to problems confronting the nation and the Polish Armed Forces.

END OF SUMMARY

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MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
GENERAL STAFF OF THE PPR

SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE

This document must be returned to Directorate I of the General Staff of the Polish Peoples Republic (PPR) on the day the game is concluded. It is distributed to all war game participants.

SCENARIO NO. 4
FOR THE WAR GAME BY THE DIRECTING STAFF OF THE
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE


(Situation as of D+4)

Astronomical time--10 Feb. 1978
Operational time--0900, 3 May 1978

Warsaw 1977

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


I. GENERAL SITUATION

The NATO countries, using as a pretext occurrences and incidents along the Berlin border--which they themselves have provoked--began on 30 April 1978 a war of aggression, which they had prepared in the autumn of 1977, against the socialist community. A violent attack, using the most modern means of armed warfare against political and administrative centers and the most important links of the Warsaw Pact countries defense system, met with a determined and prepared counteraction of the Combined Armed Forces. During 4 days of particularly bitter fighting and operations, though without the use of nuclear weapons, NATO armed forces succeeded in overrunning sizable areas of the German Democratic Republic (Old MARGRAVATE and northwestern part of BRANDENBURG) together with the western part of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CESKY LES, SUMAVA). The Combined Armed Forces, however, carried the fight to enemy territory along the central strategic axis and overran BRAUNSCHWEIG and the foothills of HESSE. After committing to battle fresh forces from the rear of the theater of military operations, the Combined Armed Forces also took the initiative along the northern seacoast operational axis.

The intensive enemy assault on PPR territory and Northern Front forces, which were being regrouped and committed to combat, caused serious difficulties in the national transportation system, combat troop supply, and armament production for war needs.

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
II. SITUATION IN DETAIL

1. At 0330, 30 April 1978 NATO Armed Forces, under cover of a strategic "radioelectronic offensive," launched a large scale air operation, accompanied by a simultaneous assault by nine army corps, coordinated with air and naval operations. This action was calculated to bring about a lightning armored breakthrough toward BERLIN and PRAGUE and a rapid seizure of western areas of Poland and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

The main effort of the air forces during the first day was to attain air superiority and at the same time to hit key elements of the defense system and rear bases of the Warsaw Pact countries. As of 1 May 1978 this effort was redirected toward direct support of army group operations along main attack axes and confinement of the combat area to the ODER-NEISSE line. In the air assault on forces and installations in territories of the Polish Peoples Republic, German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovak Socialist Republic large scale use was made of napalm bombs and aerial fuel (paliwowo-powietrzne) bombs, as well as guided missiles using laser, television, and radar devices. Air assaults were integrally linked with radioelectronic jamming by RB-57, RC-130, and RC-135 aircraft and with neutralization of air force and antiaircraft missile guidance by F-105G aircraft.

As of dawn 30 April 1978 the ground forces began offensive operations in the Western Theater of Military Operations and, using armored and mechanized groupings, made concentrated attacks along the main line OSNABRUECK, BERLIN, BYDGOSZCZ and STUTTGART, PILSEN, PRAGUE.

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As a result of 4 days of fighting, the assault force of the Northern Army Group (1st FRG Corps and the 1st UK Corps) broke down resistance of tactical large units of the 1st Western Front and advanced along the HANNOVER-BERLIN axis up to 120 km into the territory of the German Democratic Republic (HALBERSTADT, DELITZSCH, TORGAN, WITTENBERG, BRANDENBURG, WITTENBERGE). Forces operating on the flanks of the Northern Army Group had no success, and, under attack by operational large units and the Northern Front, were forced to defend successive lines of their own territory (1st Belgian Corps--SALZGITTER, HILDESHEIM, 30 km west of KASSEL; 1st Netherlands Corps and the Jutland Corps--VELZEN, HAMBURG, LUTENBURG).

The Central Army Group (2d FRG Corps and 7th US Corps) broke down the defense of the tactical large units of the 2d Western Front, advanced along the STUTTGART-PRAGUE axis up to 50-65 km into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (PLECHY, STARKOLICA, west of PILSEN, west of KARLOVY VARY, CHED). The 5th US Corps and the 3d FRG Corps, fighting on the left flank of the Central Army Group, suffered significant casualties in their border battle and, attacked by operational units of 2d Western Front, were forced to defend successive battle lines on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany (KULMBACH, BAMBERG, SCHWEINFURT, MARBURG, KORBACH).

NATO ground forces utilized in their operations new types of weapons and equipment which were to have been introduced into the armed forces only during the second half of a 5-year period (1978-1980); included among other things were USA assault helicopters AH1S TOW-COBRA and FRG Bo-105 with HOT missiles, M-110E2 203-mm, M-109A1 155-mm and FH70 155-mm howitzers of the UK and FRG.

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
The Allied Naval Forces of the Danish Straits and Western Baltic, with the cooperation of the air force, carried out active sea operations aimed at the destruction of Combined Baltic Fleet assault groupings and retention of superiority in the waters of the Western Baltic and Danish Straits. During the morning hours of 30 April naval aviation mined exits from the ports of SWINOUJSCIE, USTKA, GDYNIA, and GDANSK. New KORMORAN missiles were used to destroy assault craft groups.

2. The Combined Armed Forces, faced with unavoidable aggression, carried out promptly basic projects connected with full combat readiness and operational deployment of the strategic first echelon. As soon as the attack was launched they shifted without delay to retaliatory operations aimed at full destruction of the aggressor's armed forces and seizure of his territory. Once the enemy mass air assaults were repulsed, strategic aviation and front air forces assigned to it, including the 3d Air Army, executed a retaliatory air operation in the Western Theater of Military Operations.

Simultaneously troops of the fronts deployed on the territories of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic shifted without delay to operations aimed at breaking the enemy offensive and creating conditions for initiation of an offensive operation against the whole Western Theater of Military Operations.

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


The 1st Western Front held back the advance of the enemy main attack grouping along the HANNOVER-BERLIN axis; it inflicted serious damaging blows and, beginning with the second day of war, it already shifted with the 2d Western Front to offensive operations along the ERFURT-KASSEL-DORTMUND axis; it penetrated 60-90 km into Federal Republic of Germany territory (SALZGITTER, HILDESHEIM, HOLZMINDEN, MOLSSEN, western MARBURG, VOGELSBERG). At the same time along the northern maritime operational axis it maintained a defense position with part of its forces in the border zone, protecting the planned deployment and shift to offensive operations by the Northern Front.

The 2d Western Front used part of its forces to defend successive lines along the STUTTGART-PILSEN-PRAGUE axis causing the enemy to suffer serious losses, while its main forces, in cooperation with the assault grouping of the 1st Western Front, shifted to offensive operations along the LEIPZIG-MANNHEIM-SAARBRUECKEN axis and penetrated 50-70 km into the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany (VOGELSBERG, HASSFURT, KULMBACH).

The Northern Front, having reached full combat readiness, began at 2000 hours 29 April 1978 to carry out its operational plans. Under intensive enemy air attack, it regrouped its first echelon operational large units and its front units into the assembly area, and on 2 May 1978 it shifted to offensive operations along the SCHWERIN-NEUMUENSTER axis (using 1st Army troops) and along the GRABOW-ROTENBURG axis (using the 2d Army). By 0900 hours 3 May 1978 it controlled the line of LUTJENBURG, PLOEN, west of BAD SEGEBERG, east of HAMBURG, west of WINSSEN and LUENEBERG, and north of UELZEN.

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Naval forces assigned to the Combined Baltic Fleet engage the enemy naval forces in order to gain superiority in the middle and western part of the Baltic Sea; they conduct reconnaissance of the Danish Straits, clear the sea lanes in the GDANSK and POMERANIAN Gulfs; they also participate in removal of strike effects on bases and ports.

On the territory of the Polish Peoples Republic, the 4-day intensive pounding by "western" aircraft and by sabotage-reconnaissance groups on regrouping troops and rear services and activity of the armed political underground engaging in anti-state operations have created a complicated situation in the functioning of a number of defense system centers, the state administration, and the national economy.


A. Northern Front forces situation in detail.

The Northern Front forces engaged since 2 May 1978 in the first offensive operation find themselves in the following situation:

1) The 1st Army, overcoming resistance of tactical large units of the Jutland Army Corps, is successfully developing its offensive. Divisions of the army first echelon are engaged along the following lines: the 12th Mechanized Division, LUTJENBURG, PLOEN: the 20th Armored Division, (excl.)* PLOEN, forest west of BAD SEGEBERG: the 8th Mechanized Division, (excl.) forest west of BAD SEGEBERG, northeastern and eastern outskirts of HAMBURG.

* [Translator's note: Abbreviation "excl." is translation of Polish abbreviation "wyl" which can be expanded to the word "wylaczajac" meaning "excluding" or to "wylacznie," its opposite, "exclusively."]

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The more serious losses of the operational first echelon were: tanks--211, armored personnel carriers--102, large losses in field and antiaircraft artillery, neutralized tactical missile battalion of the 8th Mechanized Division. 20th Armored Division Command Post--no communication, no way to direct subordinate troops.

Situation of the remaining 1st Army forces:



- 16th Armored Division prior to 1000 hours 3 May 1978 concentrates in the zone: (excl.) WISMAR, (excl.) BRUEL, BUETZOW. Losses: tanks--23; armored personnel carriers--16; antiaircraft guns--9; miscellaneous motor vehicles--47; neutralized reconnaissance battalion;

- 2d Operational-Tactical Missile Brigade in the area of launch positions--(excl.) RATZEBURG, (excl.) ZARRENTIN, 10 km west of GADEBUSCH. Losses: one battalion neutralized;

- Army 75th Antiaircraft Missile Regiment provides cover for the main army forces (heavy losses in combat equipment and personnel). Army 55th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment provides cover for the army command post. Losses: 12 antiaircraft guns;

- 1st Army special reserves: antitank reserve (army 14th Antitank Artillery Regiment) in the area 5 km south of LUEBECK, barrier construction unit (minelaying battalion of the 5th Combat Engineer Brigade)--west of RATZEBURG; engineer unit (5th Combat Engineer Brigade minus the minelaying battalion)--northeast of GADEBUSCH, ready to take on tasks. Losses: one technical battery and battalion neutralized; antitank defense--7guns, engineer unit--14 miscellaneous motor vehicles burned;

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- command post of the 1st Army as of 1 May 1978 in the area of woods 10 km north of SCHWERIN: forward command post--woods east of LUEBECK--unable to assume command (heavy losses in personnel and communications equipment).

Other losses of the 1st Army: ammunition for BM-21 rocket launchers--20%; in personnel--2,600 (820 killed and 1,780 wounded).

2) Covered by allied troops, the 2d Army forced the Elbe River and developed offensive operations using forces of two division (4th Mechanized Division and 5th Armored Division) in its first echelon, which overcame resistance of the 1st and 4th Netherlands Mechanized Divisions and occupied the line: 4th Mechanized Division, WINZEN, SALZHAUSEN; 5th Armored Division, (excl.) SALZHAUSEN--(excl.) WELZEN: in addition, the 2d Army's first echelon in its operational zone conducts defensive operations against attacking forces of the 3d FRG Armored Division and part of the forces of 11th FRG Mechanized Division; allied forces on the line: east of WELZEN, north of LUECHOW, LENZEN, WITTENBERGE.

The more serious losses of the 1st operational echelon: tanks--123, armored personnel carriers--53; large losses in field and antiaircraft artillery; tactical missile battalion of the 5th Armored Division destroyed.

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Situation of the remaining forces of 2d Army:

- 11th Armored Division was concentrated as of 0300 hrs 3 May 1978 in the area: (excl.) PARCHIM, 15 km east of LUDWIGSLUST, (excl.) woods west of MEYENBURG. Losses: tanks--12; armored personnel carriers--21; miscellaneous motor vehicles--31; large losses at the divisional command post;

- 10th Armored Division concentrates prior to 0930 hrs in the area: (excl.) PRITZWALK, 15 km east of PERLEBERG, 10 km north of KYRITZ. Losses: tanks--27; armored personnel carriers--18; miscellaneous motor vehicles--53;


- 2d Mechanized Division on the march: right column along the road KOSTRZYN, SULECIN, SWIEBODZIN; left column along the road: SLUBICE, KROSNO ODRZANSKIE, ZIELONA GORA; as of 0900 hrs 3 May 1978--with head of columns along the line: KOSTRZYN, SLUBICE. Losses: tanks--11, armored personnel carriers--16; howitzers--4; anti-aircraft guns--7;

- army 18th Operational-Tactical Missile Brigade in the area of launch positions--10 km north of LUESTHEEN, NEUHAUS, 15 km northwest of DOMITZ. Losses: one technical battery and a battalion neutralized;

- army 66th Anti-aircraft Missile Regiment provides cover for the army's main forces and 84th Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment covers the crossing of the Elbe River. Losses: 3 launchers and 24 miscellaneous motor vehicles destroyed;

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- 2d Army special reserves: antitank reserve (army 20th Antitank Artillery Regiment) and a barrier construction unit (minelaying battalion of the 4th Combat Engineer Brigade) in the area: BLECKEDE, (excl.) LUENEBURG, BEVENDORF--will reach readiness for action by 1030 hrs 3 May 1978; engineer unit (4th Combat Engineer Brigade without minelaying battalion) in the area north of DOMITZ--ready for action. Losses: 11 antitank guns.

- 2d Army Command Post since 1 May 1978 in area north of MEYENBURG; forward command post--woods north of DAHLENBURG. Losses: 2 command cars, 3 radios, 12 special motor vehicles.

Other 2d Army losses: 2d Army Quartermaster Command Post--heavy losses in manpower and communications means; one KUB antiaircraft missile battalion destroyed, heavy losses at the army mobile base (lack of precise data), 2d Army Operational-Tactical Missile Brigade technical battery destroyed, heavy losses in ponton park. Manpower losses are about 3,000 (950 dead and 2,050 wounded).


3) 4th Army deploys its forces to an assembly area west of the Oder River to occupy following positions:

- 1st Mechanized Division concentrates prior to 1100 hrs 3 May 1978 in the area of (excl.) GRANSEE, GROSS SCHOENEBECK, 15 km north of TEMPLIN. Losses: tanks--18; armored personnel carriers--23; antitank guns--4; antiaircraft guns--9; miscellaneous motor vehicles--32;

- 3d Armored Division deploys along the axis: SIERPC-WALCZ-north of SZCZECIN; head of column is along the line 5 km northeast of BYDGOSZCZ-BARCIN. Losses: armored personnel carriers--7, miscellaneous motor vehicles--12;

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- 9th Armored Division deploys along the KALISZ-SULECHOW-EBERSWALDEN axis; head of column is along the line LESZNO-GORA SLASKA. Losses: tanks--3, armored personnel carriers--7, anti-aircraft guns--2, miscellaneous motor vehicles--17;

- army 32d Operational-Tactical Missile Brigade--subordinate to the front commander--in the area of launch positions (excl.) ZARRENTIN, BENNIN, WITTENBURG. Losses: one battalion neutralized.

- army 32d Gun Artillery Regiment as of 0800 hrs 3 May 1978 is in the area northwest of GRANSEE. Losses: 4 howitzers and 17 miscellaneous motor vehicles destroyed;

- army 126th Antitank Artillery Regiment as of 0830 hrs 3 May 1978 is in the area west of TEMPLIN. Losses--4 antitank guns and 11 miscellaneous motor vehicles;


- army 15th Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment provides cover for the Oder River crossing in the area 8 km northwest of CEDYNIA. Losses: 16 anti-aircraft guns; 7 tractors and 14 miscellaneous motor vehicles;

- 4th Army CP on the march with head of column south of GORZOW WIELKO POLSKI.

Total manpower losses in the 4th Army: 160 killed, 440 wounded.

4) 3d Air Army, after redeployment of forces on the territory of the German Democratic Republic and execution of tasks in an air operation in the theater of military operations since morning of 2 May 1978, is concentrating main effort on direct support of combat operations of the 1st and 2d Armies.

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The more serious losses: missiles and bombs--about 30 percent; large losses in personnel and equipment in the 10th Air Army Mobile Base, combat aircraft (fighters--20 percent, fighter-assault planes--15 percent, bomber-reconnaissance and reconnaissance planes--50 percent, helicopters--15 percent), airfields in the area: west of WISMAR, southwest of SCHWERIN and southwest of LUDWIGSLUST--incapable of basing air units. Losses in personnel: about 1,100 (240 killed and 860 wounded).

5) Tactical large units, units, and elements subordinate to the front:

- 15th Mechanized Division concentrates prior to 1130 hrs 3 May 1978 in the area: (excl.) GRIMMEN, 10 km east of GNOIEN, LOITZ. Losses: tanks--17, armored personnel carriers--22, howitzers--7, antiaircraft guns--4, miscellaneous motor vehicles--62;

- 6th Airborne Division concentrates prior to 1100 hrs 3 May 1978 in the area (excl.) SZPROTAWA, (excl.) SWIETOSZOW, (excl.) CHOCIANOW:

- 7th Assault Landing Division concentrates beginning at 0400 hrs 3 May 1978 in the area (excl.) BOBOLICE, 15 km south of KOSZALIN. Losses: tanks--4; armored personnel carriers--11; miscellaneous motor vehicles--12;

- by 2400 hrs 3 May 1978 operational readiness will be achieved by the 26th Reserve Mechanized Division in the area (excl.) SWIDWIN, (excl.) LOBEZ, (excl.) CHLEBOWO; 28th Reserve Mechanized Division in the area: (excl.) ZLOTORYJA, (excl.) LWOWEK SLASKI, (excl.) WOJCIESZOW:

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- front 3d Operational-Tactical Missile Brigade--in the area of launch positions--CRIVITZ, KIRCHJESAR, 15 km northwest of PARCHIM. Losses: one battalion and 22 special motor vehicles destroyed;


- front 1st Gun Artillery Brigade--subordinate to 2d Army commander. Losses: 14 guns, 27 motor vehicles and tractors, 2 radios destroyed;

- front 61st Antiaircraft Missile Brigade provides cover for the main front forces and for crossing of the Elbe River; front 69th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment provides cover for the front command post. Losses: one missile battalion and one missile delivery battalion destroyed;

- Front special reserves: antitank reserve No. 1 (front 15th Antitank Artillery Regiment) and barrier construction reserve No. 1 (minelaying battalion of 1st Combat Engineer Brigade)--in the area: 10 km south of WITTENBURG, (excl.) LAUENBURG, (excl.) HAGENOW reaching combat readiness as of 1000 hrs 3 May 1978; antitank reserve No. 2 (front 91st Antitank Artillery Regiment) and barrier construction reserve No. 2 (minelaying battalion of 2d Combat Engineer Brigade)--in the area: GRABOW, (excl.) LENZEN, (excl.) KARSTADT in operational readiness; engineer reserve No. 1 (1st Combat Engineer Brigade minus the minelaying battalion)--assembled in the area north of LUDWIGSLUST; engineer reserve No. 2 (2d Combat Engineer Brigade minus minelaying battalion but with 114th Engineer Machinery Battalion)--in the area north of PRITZWALK. Heavy losses were suffered by the antitank reserve No. 1 and engineer reserve No. 2 (data on extent of losses is lacking);

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- Northern Front Command Post--as of 1 May 1978 in wooded area 5 km north of KAROW; forward command post--in wooded area 10 km north of SCHOENBERG; Quartermaster Command Post --in wooded area 5 km northwest of NEUSTRELITZ.


Total Northern Front losses in personnel are about 10,000 (3,070 killed, 6,930 wounded). Of this, losses in units subordinated to the front are about 2,700 (900 killed and 1,800 wounded)--in combat units about 1,500 (500 killed) and rear services about 1,200 (400 killed).

Staff losses (included in total losses): officers--832 (230 killed and 602 wounded), warrant officers--395 (142 killed and 253 wounded). Among officers killed are the 1st Army chief of staff, 2d Army quartermaster, 3d Air Army chief of technical services, 2 divisional commanders (20th Armored Division, 8th Mechanized Division), three brigade commanders (army 2d Operational-Tactical Missile Brigade, front 1st Gun Artillery Brigade, 1st Combat Engineer Brigade), Chief of the Reconnaissance Directorate of the front, five regimental commanders, 28 pilots.

B. Losses and material-technical status of the armed forces.


As a result of 4 days of combat operations, losses in specific types of armament and equipment and expenditure of missiles and ammunition were as follows:

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

Item	External Front		Internal Front	
	in%	Quantity	In%	Quantity
Tanks and combat vehicles	15	449	3	17
APC and armored vehicles	8	296	2	7
Vehicles	18	16,235	2	962
Ponton parks	12	4.7	4	1.5
Surface to surface rocket equipment	24	16	-	-
Surface to air missile equipment for combatting high and medium altitude targets,	10	1	30	83
- including VOLKHOV and DVINA	-	-	30	80
Surface to air missile equipment for combatting medium and low altitude targets,	10	4	30	20
- including--NEVA	-	-	30	19
- KUB	10	4	25	1
STRELA-1M surface to air missile equipment for combatting low altitude targets	20	32	14	2
Antitank defense means	15	118	-	-
Field artillery and mortars	8	126	-	-

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AA artillery	25	247	20	166
Fighter aircraft,	28	31	20	80
- including MIG-21	30	29	25	47
Fighter-assault aircraft	15	28	-	-
Bomber-reconnaissance and reconnaissance aircraft	50	53	-	-
Helicopters	15	30	4	4
High and medium power radios	15	21	4	32
Radio relays	12	58	3	6
Radars	25	50	30	62
Line and special purpose ships	20	55	-	-
Surface to surface missiles	17	22	-	-
Surface to air missiles, including	60	226	15	109
- VOLKHOV, DVINA and NEVA	-	-	15	109
- KRUG	60	12	-	-
- STRELA-1M	60	49	-	-
- KUB	60	165	-	-

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Small-arms ammunition	6	9,000,000 rounds	5	2,300,000 rounds
Antitank grenades	9	17,800 rounds	-	-
Artillery and mortar ammunition	5	18,000 rounds	1	1,300 rounds
Missile ammunition	7	2,200 rounds	-	-
Tank ammunition	4	10,700 rounds	-	-
AA ammunition	16	24,200 rounds	20	8,400 rounds

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
In addition, as a result of enemy air operations, 20 percent of ammunition reserves in the field dumps of the 1st Army, 15 percent of the 2d Army, 40 percent of operational-tactical missiles in the field technical rocket bases of the 1st Army, and 20 percent of the 2d Army were destroyed. Also 10 percent of the central armaments and ammunition depot at PRZEWOZ, and 15 percent at JASTRZEBIE SLASKIE were destroyed.

Considerable damage was sustained also by industrial works throughout the country:

- "MALAPANEW" Metallurgical Plant in OZIMEK--foundry shop and martensite steel furnace totally destroyed;
- "MIFAMA" Mining Machinery Plants in MIKOLOW--transmission assembly department totally destroyed and machining department partially destroyed;
- Transportation Equipment Plant in WROCLAW--testing station totally destroyed;
- NOWOTKO Mechanical Equipment Plants in WARSAW--aluminium foundry and assembly department totally destroyed;
- "STALOWA WOLA" Metallurgical Plant in STALOWA WOLA--steel mill and rolling mill totally destroyed;
- Chemical Plants in BYDGOSZCZ--ammunition filling department and TNT production department totally destroyed;

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- KRASNIK Antifriction Bearing Plant--two machining departments and stamping plant totally destroyed;

- "PRONIT" Chemical Plants in PIONKI--signal ammunition production department, elongated charge department and hunting ammunition department totally destroyed;

- "H. CEGIELSKI" Metal Industry Plants in POZNAN--cartridge case department (Dept. 8) totally destroyed;


- Metal Products Plants in SKARZYSKO-KAMIENNA--small-arms ammunition production department, detonator production department, and rocket projectile filling assembly department totally destroyed; galvanizing plant partially destroyed.

C. Transportation situation.

As a result of massive air strikes and operations of enemy sabotage-reconnaissance groups against the national transportation network and installations, 80 percent of the permanent bridges over the Vistula and Oder Rivers, 10-15 percent of rail junctions, and some fixed transloading areas, seaports and airfields were destroyed. Formation and regrouping of military transportation service units of the front and of militarized units assigned to the armed forces from departments of the national economy were delayed.

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


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The transport capability of railroad transit traffic has been reduced approximately 70-80 percent, and zonal traffic 50 percent. The capability of fixed transloading facilities has decreased. Temporary transloading facilities, organized on the line of large water barriers on D+3 and D+4, are gradually attaining full readiness to transload arriving transports with a delay of 24 to 72 hours (operational transports), and 48 to 96 hours (supply transports). Of the operational shipments, 40 transports of allied troops were transferred to the GDR and CSSR railroad systems, and transports of Polish troops and the remainder of the Soviet Army were routed through zonal traffic of the Vistula, Vistula-Oder transloading areas, or regrouped for movement using organic transportation. Of the supply shipments, 21 transports of Polish forces (10 transports of ammunition* and 11 transports of refueling groups), and 26 transports of the Soviet Army were transferred directly to GDR and CSSR railroads. Two ammunition transports of the Polish forces were destroyed by enemy air on GDR territory. Destruction of bridges over major water barriers caused delays in the flow of empty trains (rolling stock backup) from western Poland and the GDR for loading in permanent transloading areas.

* Artillery ammunition for preparatory fire for attack--0.6 unit of fire.

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As a result of destruction of certain road junctions, and especially of bridges over the Vistula and Oder rivers, movement by highway transport of forces and operational rear services, as well as second echelons of the front, was delayed. Engineer units of Polish and Soviet troops gradually established ponton bridge facilities to support movement of forces to the assembly areas.


In inland water transport, navigational traffic has been disrupted by obstructed waterways resulting from the destruction of permanent bridge structures.

D. Rear area situation.

During 30 April and 1 May 1978, front troops replenished fuel expended during regrouping from contingency reserve supplies at permanent depots, and from rail transports of refueling groups. The tactical large units drew ammunition for preparatory fire for attack from rail transport, using organic vehicle transport.

As a result of expenditures and losses sustained during 2 days of operations, reserve supplies on hand in tactical large units committed to battle will support requirements of 1 to 1.5 days of combat operations. Because of intensive "Western" air activity, movement of the operational rear services was considerably delayed, primarily as a result of destruction of river crossings. The rear services of the first echelon armies were held up at the approaches to the Oder River line.

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The forces and means of emergency support of the transportation system (of the ministries and Headquarters of the Military Transportation Service) attained readiness in the areas where operational assignments were planned. In maritime ports and transloading facilities, loading of merchant ships and cutters with materiel designated for the external front continued. Enemy aviation continues to attack the harbors and lay mines in their exits (clearing of channels will require 24 to 36 hours).

E. Situation with regard to enemy subversive-psychological activity and public morale in the PPR.

Enemy subversive-psychological activities.


The mass media of the NATO countries accuse the Warsaw Pact countries of causing and starting the war, paralyzing all peace aspirations, initiatives, and efforts undertaken by the West thus far. The will to "unite" is emphasized, allegedly expressed unequivocally by the whole German nation on both sides of the "artificial and unjust" border established after World War II.

Subversive-psychological themes are broadcast by radio from Europe and other continents. Also, it has been established that so-called "black radio stations" are operating, pretending to be radio stations of alleged "patriotic resistance groups" in Poland, including one "workers' radio station."

The broadcasts imply that:

- Party and national leaders have thrown the national territory open to Soviet forces, thus exposing the population to the consequences of possible nuclear attacks;

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- in reaction to an alleged general discontent with the participation of Poland in the war, Polish authorities filled the prisons with "genuine patriots."

Intensive psychological warfare activity on the operational axis of Polish Armed Forces units has been confirmed. Appeals, directed against our soldiers, emphasize that:

- Polish soldiers are the aggressors and they fight and die for causes which are alien to them,

- they are using combat equipment which is primitive in comparison to NATO equipment;

- further expansion into territories of the NATO countries can compel NATO forces to use nuclear weapons.

Morale of the Polish population

The commencement of hostilities moved the population to indignation, hatred of the attackers, and a feeling of gravity. However, at times, opinions are expressed among the population doubting the strength of the Warsaw Pact. Enemy air raids and operations of subversion-reconnaissance and sabotage groups caused considerable disorganization in the functioning of certain establishments and public installations.

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
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In western areas of Poland there are incidents of spontaneous abandoning of places of residence and work. The rural population accepts the displaced city residents with understanding; nevertheless, rumors are being spread that, first of all, families of privileged social groups and employees of higher levels of the national administration were included in the planned dispersion. This information is broadcast by the so-called "workers' radio station." Also, several armed attacks were made against government functionaries, small groups of Polish and Soviet soldiers were fired upon, and along their march routes hostile signs and leaflets of local origin were found. Increased vigilance against enemy penetration has been observed among the civilian and military populace. In many cases, attempts of sabotage were prevented. The effects of devastation in cities and working establishments are being aggressively eliminated. However, in some environments, the difficult problem of social discipline has appeared. In the major industrial centers, fear of the effects of possible use of mass destruction weapons is growing. In this connection, feelings of concern also prevail among some of the military.

Based on reports from military units, it is apparent that the commanders and the political system are in control of the morale of the troops. Nevertheless, incidents of desertion, spontaneous abandonment of combat positions, and disobedience to orders occur.

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III. TASKS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED

1. On the basis of Scenario No. 4, all participants of the war game will evaluate the situation and be prepared to report conclusions drawn and proposals for solutions, and also supplement or expand the problems under discussion.

2. According to their capabilities, all participants will be prepared to analyze comprehensively and present the problems as follows:

a) Chief of Training Inspectorate--present proposals for the buildup of forces for operations of the front.


b) Chief of Directorate VII of the Polish Armed Forces General Staff--determine material requirements for the armed forces, and the capability to fulfil them according to the Estimated Annual Plan under conventional warfare conditions.

c) Chief of Military Transportation Service--determine the necessary scope, capabilities and selection of the main course for reconstruction of the transportation system from the point of view of military operations and functioning of the national economy.

d) Chief of Staff of the Main Quartermaster Hqs of the Polish Armed Forces--determine possible methods for maintaining the flow of supplies to combat troops under conditions of devastation in the transportation system.

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e) First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate--
present an evaluation of the possible scope, forms and
results of the subversive-psychological activities, and
policies and methods for countering them.

Attachment: Map "Situation and Disposition of NATO Armed
Forces and Selected Elements of the Polish Armed Forces in
the Central European Theater of Military Operations as of
0900 hrs 3 May 1978."


War Game Directors

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
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Legend to map

A--army

ABROT--army operational-tactical missile brigade

apaplot--army AAA regiment

AL--air army

AR--Soviet Army

BAOPK--National Air Defense artillery brigade

BM--bridge brigade

BP(WB)--infantry brigade (Great Britain)

BPM--marine brigade

BSzF--front hospital base

BTr--transportation brigade

BWK--railroad brigade

BZ(A)--mechanized brigade (US)

CGA--Central Army Group


CGKRW--central troop movement control group

CSD DWOPK--Central Command Post of the National Air Defense
Forces Command

d--naval division

(D10)--(D-day + 10)

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DA OPK--National Air Defense artillery division

DD--assault landing division

DPanc--armored division

DPD--airborne division

DPG--mountain infantry division

DPM(A)--marine division (US)

DPZmot--motorized infantry division

DZ--mechanized division

FBAA--front gun artillery brigade

FBROT--front operational-tactical missile brigade

FBRPlot--front antiaircraft missile brigade

FO--naval flotilla

FOW--coastal defense flotilla

FP--Northern Front

FRONT POLNOCNY--Northern Front

FZ--western front


FRONT ZACHODNI--western front

GDR--sabotage-reconnaissance group

JDZ--Jutland Mechanized Division

KA(B)--army corps (Belgian)


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KA(NZ)--army corps (West German)
KON--convoy
KOPK--National Air Defense corps
KSD--rear services command post
MW--Navy
OGPU--naval hunter-killer group
OGU--naval strike group
pcz(F)--tank regiment (French)
PGA--Northern Army Group
plmsz--fighter-assault aviation regiment
POW--Pomeranian Military District
PTSP--allied tactical air forces
pz(F)--mechanized regiment (French)
RBA--army mobile base
RBAL--air army mobile base
RBF--front mobile base
RDZ--reserve mechanized division
RP--transloading area
SD-1 MON--Command Post #1 of the Minister of National Defense
SK--control post

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SKRW--troop movement control zone
SOW--Silesian Military District
SWL--Air Force Headquarters
TRP--temporary transshipment area
TBF--front rear services base
WSD--forward command post
WSK--forward control post
WOW--Warsaw Military District
ZRZ--reserve loading area
ZU--strike grouping

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