



Washington, D.C. 20505

21 August 1978

Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 13 NOV 2013

Historical Collection

AK 10-14

Outside the System 82
Bill Gault
CDA 14/1

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's Perceptions
of the Camp David Summit as of 18 August 1978

1. Attached for your information is a report [redacted]
[redacted] concerning Egyptian
President Anwar al-Sadat's observations of the Camp David Summit in
which he has expressed hope for the attainment of two separate but
related achievements.

2. This information, [redacted] is
a raw report, not finally evaluated intelligence. The report is also
being made available to the Secretary of State.


STANSFIELD TURNER

Classified by signer
Exempt from general
Declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)
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Date impossible to determine

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SUBJECT: Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's Perceptions of the
Camp David Summit as of 18 August 1978

1. [redacted] Egyptian
President Anwar al-Sadat told [redacted]
that despite anticipated difficulties, he has hopes for the success
of the Camp David Summit. He stated that the participation of
President Jimmy Carter in the peace process makes possible, if not
probable, the attainment of two separate but related achievements.
The first achievement would be a two-part publicly announced agreement
to include the acceptance of principles, based on UN Resolution 242,
coupled with an agreement on the Palestinian question based on the
Aswan Formula announced by President Carter at Aswan, Egypt in January
1978. ✓

2. The second achievement, to be won through hard bargaining,
would be a precisely written secret agreement on the framework for a
Middle East peace settlement. This secret agreement would be signed
by both President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin with
a witnessing signature by President Carter. The reason President Sadat
would insist on a written document witnessed by President Carter is to
prevent subsequent statements by the two parties--either inadvertently
or deliberately--misinterpreting the understanding reached between the
leaders of Egypt and Israel.

3. In defining what he meant by a precise agreement on the
framework for a Middle East peace, President Sadat stated that both he
and Prime Minister Begin had to agree on a clear definition of all the
major aspects of a Middle East settlement. Following the acceptance of
this major, overall framework of agreement, details would then be
worked out by committees, hopefully to include the participation of
other Arab nations also.

4. President Sadat's own basic tenet for a framework of an
agreement allows for considerable flexibility on details, but no com-
promise on sovereignty or territory--except for minor adjustments on
the West Bank.

5. President Sadat proposed the Palestinian question as one example
of the need for both a public and a secret agreement. Whereas the
public statement could announce an agreement on the Aswan Formula as a
basis for the Palestinian issue, secret negotiations would need to
address Israeli concerns regarding which Palestinians would be the

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future leaders of a Palestinian West Bank.

6. President Sadat stated that President Carter's participation is essential because he (President Sadat) has lost the trust and confidence which he had in Prime Minister Begin, and now he must fall back on his trust in President Carter's sincerity and fairness. President Sadat felt that if he and Prime Minister Begin reached a precise written understanding and if President Carter witnessed that written understanding, then the peace process could indeed take a major step forward.

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