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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

20 October 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : [ ] Report

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John N. McMahon

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## Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Poland/ Warsaw Pact

DATE OF INFO. 1974

DATE 20 October 1978

SUBJECT

Exercise "LATO-74"--a Nuclear War Scenario

SOURCE Documentary

### SUMMARY:

This report is a translation of a Polish document entitled "Critique of Exercise LATO-74" and classified SECRET. The report includes critiques by General JARUZELSKI, Minister of Defense, and Major General SIWICKI, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. The purpose of the exercise was to test commands and staffs of the army, front, and defense ministry level on mobilization and operational deployment of front forces under conditions of conventional and nuclear war, with focus on offensive operations in Central Europe. Two situation maps are of particular interest; map 1 depicts more than 100 nuclear weapons strikes. For comparison with a conventional war scenario, refer to [redacted] Special note is made of the release and ignition of liquid fuels in the Main River to serve as a barrier for 5-6 hours duration. ✓


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Ministry of National Defense  
The General Staff

SECRET

Critique of Exercise  
"Lato-74"

Warsaw  
July 1974

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The Political-Military Scenario,  
Intentions of the Opposing Sides, and  
Conduct of Exercise "Lato-74" Critique

By Major General Florian SIWICKI,  
Deputy Minister of National Defense,  
Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces

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Within the framework of the training program of the Ministry of National Defense of the Polish Peoples Republic and the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, an interallied exercise, under the direction of the Minister of National Defense, was conducted from 10 to 24 June 1974. The exercise, under the cryptonym "Lato-74", was a one-sided, bilevel front (front-army) command post exercise using field communications means, and its theme was: "Organization and Conduct of Offensive Operations of a Front".

The principal objective of the exercise was to improve preparedness of the participating commands, staffs, and operational groups of the central institutions of the Ministry of National Defense for efficient mobilization and operational deployment of front forces, and control over them during combat operations conducted under complex conditions of conventional and nuclear war.


In addition, the exercise included testing and verification of some of the solutions integrated into practical application, and deeper analysis of a number of objectives or theories pertaining to:

- operations of peacetime commands and institutions of the armed forces in a situation of increasing threat of war;
- new guidelines for deploying the field command system of a front and army;
- method for planning operations on a new axis while controlling forces in the process of their mobilization expansion;

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- employment of an air army in air operations in the Western Theater of Military Operations;

- use of many captured operational documents written in foreign languages, and control of forces under conditions of radioelectronic jamming and breakdowns in wire and radio relay communications;

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- replacement of human losses and material-technical, medical, and transportation support of combat operations of a front based on the home front system.

In compliance with the decision of the Minister of National Defense a rather wide scope of studies, encompassing selected topics from the Ministry's program devoted to improvement of the development of the armed forces, was also carried out during the exercise. In order to accomplish this task, groups of officer specialists, including military scientists, were assigned to undertake research work in this field. The studies encompassed mostly problems related to structures of command elements, particularly on the front level, and of some of their support units, from the point of view of searching for the best possible solutions ensuring uninterrupted transition of wartime strength, and analysis of factors for increasing their mobility and survivability.

An experimental exercise integrating reconnaissance and radioelectronic warfare systems was conducted in order to verify theoretical principles pertaining to integration of reconnaissance units with radioelectronic warfare, improvement of information dissemination and analysis, and most importantly-- acceleration of decision making processes pertaining to the conduct of radioelectronic attacks. Studies in the field of information science were also initiated and, of course, the traditional personnel problems.

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Based on conclusions drawn from previous higher level exercises and from experiences of the military districts and branches of the armed forces, modified organizational-methodical guidelines were accepted for exercise "Lato-74". The substance of these guidelines was expressed in broader deployment of simulated groups which represented a kind of a final control element of the participating staffs, and even though they were at the disposal of the exercise directing staff they simulated enemy operations on orders from the participating commanders who were the point of departure for working out subsequent situations for the opposing sides. *new method*  
This method permitted more realism in the exercise, and at the same time compelled the staffs to generate missions for the subordinate tactical large units. We substantially reduced the number of umpires in the participating commands, and we assigned a group of umpires-specialists to observe the work of individual headquarters in subsequent episodes of the exercise. Work of the umpires organized in this manner allowed comparison of evaluations, improvement of their objectivity, and preoccupied the participating teams to a much lesser degree. Some of the umpires were assigned research tasks, and to a certain degree they combined their activities with the work of the research teams.

In order to deceive the reconnaissance organs of the NATO armed forces, our exercise was camouflaged by undertakings designated by the cryptonym "OMEGA-74".

Exercise participants included:

- assigned central institutions of the Ministry of National Defense playing the role of command and staff of the 3d Western Front (command post, forward command post, quartermaster command post--at full strength);

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- operational groups of the Secretariat of the National Defense Committee, the Ministry of National Defense and other ministries working at points of contact with the armed forces;

- assigned teams of commands and staffs of military districts playing the role of commands and staffs of combined arms armies: The Pomeranian Military District--the 11th Army; the Silesian Military District--the 12th Army; and the Warsaw Military District--the 13th Army (reduced to 60 percent strength);

- command and staff of the Air Force playing the role of command and staff of the 14th Air Army;

- assigned teams from the Northern Group of Soviet Forces playing the role of the 41st Army and the 46th Fighter Bomber Aviation Division;

- wartime staff of the Silesian Military District;

- command and staff of the 3d National Air Defense Corps;

- forces and means of the experimental army regiment and of two divisional reconnaissance and radioelectronic warfare battalions. ✓

A total of 20,000 persons participated in the exercise. The exercise directing staff apparatus, including umpires and simulating groups, numbered 456 persons. A total of 3,666 vehicles of various types, 102 aircraft and helicopters, and 661 radios, radio relay stations, radars, and communications vans were used.

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A field communications system was organized for the exercise directing staff and participating staffs, in which 17 operational level and 5 tactical level communications centers and 14 official Soviet high frequency communications ? centers were deployed. A total of 1090 kilometers of radio trunk lines and 980 kilometers of cable lines were established.

The relevant operations of the front were played out on the Dresden-Frankfurt operational axis in difficult, wooded-mountainous and urban terrain. However, the participating commands, staffs and units, actually deployed and conducted operations in the central and western part of Poland, in an area of approximately 130,000 square kilometers.

#### The Political-Military Scenario

It was assumed that the process of a deteriorating international situation began in the first months of 1974. The contributing factors were disagreements mounting among the capitalist countries, creating an atmosphere of proliferation of conflicts in the South American, Asian and European countries. In the Near East, Israel provokes a series of military incidents. Then, jointly with the United States, organizes military operations intending to occupy oil-producing areas on the Persian Gulf. Balancing on the brink of war, the United States resumes armed intervention on the Indochinese Peninsula. The Governments of the principal capitalist countries are limiting democratic freedoms and are demanding that the socialist countries cease supporting forces fighting for social freedom and independence from imperialism. This tense situation is intensified by the irresponsible policies of Chinese leadership circles which, on a broader scale than heretofore, provoke armed incidents on the borders with the USSR and Mongolia. In the German Federal Republic the right wing of the CDU-CSU parties, which come to power, hardens the policies toward the socialist countries, and the revisionist and revanchist circles initiate diversionary-sabotage operations on the borders with the German Democratic Republic and the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia.

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Faced with the fiasco of political pressure, the NATO countries resolve to achieve their goal by a military decision. On 4 June 1974 they secretly initiate a changeover of their armed forces from a peacetime to wartime footing. Under the pretext of exercise "Big Lift-74," they airlift strategic reserves from the United States and Great Britain to the German Federal Republic. Incidents in space and in the Atlantic Ocean, provoked by the United States against the USSR, follow. Countries of the Warsaw Pact propose negotiations in order to settle the growing issues. At the same time, they are strengthening their defenses in proportion to the growing threat. Within the framework of these developments, since 10 June, higher states of combat readiness are gradually implemented in the armed forces of the PPR, and under the pretext of exercise "Tarcza-74" ["Shield-74"] the disposition of the operational forces is improved.

#### Plans of the Opposing Sides

Forces of the "West" intend to break away the German Democratic Republic from the community of socialist countries and--under favorable conditions--also other central European socialist countries. With this goal in mind, they plan to initiate offensive operations at 0500 hours on 19 June, without employing nuclear weapons, making their main attacks on axes as follows:

#### Northern Army Group:

- Lueneburg, north of Berlin, south of Szczecin.

#### Central Army Group:

- Bamberg, north of Karl Marx Stadt, Spremberg;

- Amberg, north of Pilsen, north of Prague, Zgorzelec.

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Simultaneously, they plan an operational air drop on the line of Odra-Nysa Rivers, in order to isolate the first strategic echelon of the "East" forces from the flow of fresh forces, and as much as possible, to contain the first phase of operations within the territory of the German Democratic Republic and partly Czechoslovakia. Within the framework of joint land-air operations of the NATO forces, they intend to defeat the "East" forces on the territory of the German Democratic Republic, and reach the western border of Poland in 6-8 days.

In the event of an unfavorable turn of military operations, they plan to use nuclear weapons.

The "East" forces are determined to repulse every strike of the "West" forces, then change over to the offensive, making their main effort in the Western Theater of Military Operations on axes as follows:

1st Western Front:

- Goslar, Cologne, Brussels;

2d Western Front:

- Plzen, Straubing, south of Munich;

3d Western Front formed from the Armed Forces of the Polish Peoples Republic:

- Perleberg, Verden, Lingen, The Hague.

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Using forces of these three fronts, they plan to defeat the forces of the Northern Army Group, the Central Army Group, and the 2d and 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces [NATO] operating jointly with them, and on the 6th or 7th day of operations, occupy the line Kolding-Ebsjerg-Ems River-Dortmund-west of Bonn-Koblenz-Frankfurt.

Then, by committing additional forces to battle, defeat enemy operational-strategic reserves, eliminate Denmark, Netherlands, and Belgium from the war, and on the 12th to 14th day of operations, reach the North Sea coastline and western and southern borders of the German Federal Republic.

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The exercise was divided into four stages:

In the first (initial) stage which began at 0800 hours on 10 June and continued for 7 days, we assumed that despite declarations of peace, the NATO countries were secretly building up their war potential.

As a result of secret mobilization measures, and initiation under the pretext of exercise "Big Lift-74" of an air bridge and amphibious lift of forces and equipment, the strength of the NATO armed forces in the Western Theater of Military Operations increased by an additional 10 divisions, compared with their peacetime strength.

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During the exercise, consistent with developments of the political-military situation, permanent, intensified alert duty of operational groups was successively implemented at the basic commands of the armed forces, which performed an ongoing analysis and evaluation of the threat, and fulfilled essential tasks increasing national defense capability. At 0100 hours on 12 June, the front and army forward command post system was deployed.

At 0800 hours on 14 June, a state of increased combat readiness was declared, and army and front commanders were ordered to open their operational plans for further familiarization and updating. Faced with intensified airlifts of United States strategic reserves to the German Federal Republic, and their concentration in Bavaria and in the Nurnberg area, the Supreme Commander of the Combined Armed Forces, in an operational directive, ordered the commander of the 3d Western Front to prepare an operational plan for a new, Dresden-Frankfurt operational axis, under the cryptonym "Sudety", allowing however for an option of alternate action based on plan "Pomorze" or "Sudety". At the same time an operational order was issued to the air force commander, defining participation of the 14th Air Army in coalition air operations in the Western Theater of Military Operations. Anticipating the capability of the "West" forces to initiate military operations, the General Staff under the cover of exercise "Tarcza" began to improve the disposition of part of the front forces, moving them to the western areas of Poland, thus ensuring the capability to change over to offensive operations on the northern-coastal or Dresden-Frankfurt axis.

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Simultaneously, the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers and the civilian ministries began to render services in support of the armed forces within the framework of the estimated annual plan-71.

On 17 June we initiated the second phase of the exercise, assuming that: NATO forces, while employing a full arsenal of strategic deception means designed to weaken the alertness and to exhaust the defensive system of the Warsaw Pact countries, in fact began fulfillment of final preparations for aggression. The NATO armed forces, while continuing the lift of troops and equipment from the United States and Great Britain--and conducting mobilization--increased their buildup in the Western Theater of Military Operations to 37 divisions, 362 ground transporters for nuclear weapons, and approximately 3,000 aircraft. In addition, under the pretext of exercise "Summertex", they initiated operational deployment of ground forces along the eastern border of the German Federal Republic, attaining full readiness for initiating military actions at dawn on 19 June.

The Warsaw Pact forces, in possession of information on preparations for an attack by NATO forces, increase combat readiness of their armed forces and prepare to repulse aggression, consistent with the actual threat.

Within the framework of these undertakings, on 17 June, the front and army command system was deployed. By deciding to deploy command posts sooner than in the past, we intend for this system to attain early full combat readiness of the forces for the control of which the system was designated. The exercise fully verified the validity of the above guidelines, initiated during decision-making games of the command cadre of the armed forces.

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On 18 June, as a result of an increased threat of war, a state of full combat readiness was instituted in all the armed forces. Until that time, within the framework of secret mobilization, tactical large units and most of the combat support units of the first operational echelon were deployed, and alert echelons were called up for the remainder, thus augmenting their authorized strength. The armed forces attained overall 80 percent of their wartime strength. This undertaking allowed full deployment of front forces, except reserve divisions and replacement elements, prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

At the same time mobilization was ordered, the General Staff directed further improvement of operational disposition of forces, while the commands and staffs of the front, the 11th, 12th, and 13th armies, and also the 14th Air Army were preparing operational plan "Sudety", and the 14th Air Army in addition was preparing a plan for its forces to participate in the first air operation in the Western Theater of Military Operations.

As a result of the dynamic work method at front headquarters, all subordinate commands began parallel work on the new operational plan already by the end of the same day on which they received new missions.

The staff of the 41st Army assigned to the Northern Group of Soviet Forces, operating as a component of the 1st Western Front, while planning on offensive-defensive operation, also organized cover for the border of the German Democratic Republic in its zone of operations.

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Radioelectronic warfare units, working within the framework of an experimentally formed system, actually deployed a shortwave radio reconnaissance system along the northwestern border of Poland and designated jamming means for alert duty, assigning them the mission to provide radioelectronic cover for forces of the 11th Army.

When the course of events, precipitated by actions of NATO forces, created an irreversible situation and it became necessary to strengthen the left flank of the Polish forces in the Western Theater of Military Operations, the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, acting in compliance with the decision of the Supreme Commander of the Combined Armed Forces, sent a message at 0400 hours on 19 June to the front commander putting into effect plan "Sudety".

On 19 June at 0500 hours we began the 4-day, third stage of the exercise, the theme of which was conduct of operations under conditions of conventional warfare.

We based the first phase of this stage--commitment of the front to battle--on the assumed situation that: at 0500 hours on 19 June, following mass strikes of the air forces, the forces of the Northern and Central Army Groups, using conventional weapons, changed over to offensive operations on axes according to plan. At 1100 hours on the same day, following an air preparation lasting approximately 3 hours, the 18th Airborne Corps, composed of an equivalent of three divisions, landed on the line of the Odra-Nysa Rivers, captured most of the bridges and crossings and split the operational grouping of the 3d Western Front. In addition, the 101st Air Cavalry Division captured the areas: Torgau, Riesa and Meissen, forming a second line which delayed the forces that were regrouping. The course of the border battle on the flanks of the theater, initially favorable to the enemy, allowed him to carry the operations deep into the territories of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia on the axes: Bremen-Perleberg, and Nurnberg-Prague.

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However, on the strategic central axis, the forces of the Northern Army Group and the Central Army Group lost the border battle on their internal flanks and were forced to conduct delaying actions.

From the time of outbreak of hostilities, forces of the 1st Western Front and the 2d Western Front were repulsing mass enemy strikes from the air and land. The air force, executing air operations anticipated in plans for the Western Theater of Military Operations, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.....[Part of Text Missing]

The second phase of this stage encompassed deployment for offensive operations deep in the enemy defense, repulse of enemy counterattacks, and commitment to battle of the second echelon of the front. We assumed that NATO forces (Northern Army Group and Central Army Group) in the Central European Theater of Military Operations on the dawn of the fourth day of war, after committing to battle strategic-operational reserves, and still adhering to the use of conventional weapons, were making efforts to reach the planned objective of the campaign by coordinating operations with the air landing on the Oder River which was continuously reinforced and strongly supported by air. The strategic-operational reserves committed on the northern coastal axis consisted of the 2d Army Corps (Great Britain) and the 1st Army Corps (Netherlands), totaling six divisions, and on the Dresden-Frankfurt operational axis--the 3d Army Corps, the so-called supercorps (US), with a strength of five divisions. After about 24 hours of fighting--after the momentum of the NATO forces attack significantly slowed down as a result of determined operations of the forces of the 1st Western Front and the 3d Western Front, and when commitment to battle of the closest of the approaching strategic reserves, consisting of four Soviet armies, clearly changed the ratio of forces to the disadvantage of the "Western" forces--the enemy decided to employ nuclear weapons. In this manner, at 0400 hours on 23 June, we progressed to the fourth stage of the exercise, the substance of which was nuclear war.

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The Warsaw Pact forces, on the basis of unmistakable indications in their possession that the enemy was preparing to use weapons of mass destruction, delivered a preemptive nuclear strike, thereby preventing the enemy from fully achieving desired objectives.

As a result of the use of nuclear weapons by both sides, the following strikes were delivered:

- by enemy forces: 196 strikes of 8.1 MT yield, including 116 strikes against forces of the 3d Western Front, and 80 strikes, including 29 surface strikes, against Poland, causing wide zones of contamination on the lines of the Odra-Nysa Rivers and Vistula River.

- by missiles and aviation of the 3d Western Front: 113 nuclear strikes of 8.5 MT yield, primarily against the means transporting nuclear weapons, the command system, antiaircraft defense, and the "supercorps".

The characteristic feature of this stage of operations were the large losses in life and equipment which, unfortunately, were too optimistically estimated by the exercise participants. Some tactical large units and units lost all combat effectiveness. The 13th Army, which had attained operational readiness at 2300 hours on 22 June, suffered heavy losses as a result of remaining in the assembly area where it was surprised by the first nuclear strike which considerably reduced its capability to carry out its task, particularly in view of the fact that the line of departure required a forced crossing of the defended Main River immediately upon commitment of the first echelon divisions.

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The exercise ended at 1800 hours on 23 June upon the announcement of decisions made.

In the immediate future, the General Staff will perform a detailed analysis of the wealth of material prepared by the umpires, research teams, and respondents, and will use the conclusions drawn in the course of official activities.

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Critique of Exercise "Lato-74"

By General Wojciech JARUZELSKI,  
Member of the Political Bureau  
of the Central Committee of the  
Polish United Workers Party, and  
the Minister of National Defense

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Comrades:

Exercise "Lato-74" was the focal training event of our armed forces during the current year. It added to our theoretical knowledge and practical competence, enriched our experience, and brought out a number of conclusions bearing on the doctrinal-training and structural organizational development of staffs and forces. This exercise, encompassing at the same time training objectives of the Combined Armed Forces plan, was yet another proof of allied unity and close collaboration.

A noteworthy highlight of the exercise was the visit, on 21 June, of Comrade Edward GIEREK, the first Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, and the congratulations and best wishes he extended to all the participants of the exercise. Thus, once more, keen interest and sincere concern of the party leaders, always held for the Armed Forces, was underlined, compelling us and calling upon us to attain even greater accomplishments.

Thirty years ago, on 23-24 June 1944, one of the greatest battles of World War II was fought on the 500-kilometer long front from Vitebsk to Mozyr. The Soviet Army, concentrating its main effort on the central strategic axis, went on the offensive. By defeating Hitler's army group "Center", it cleared the avenues of approach to Poland and to liberation of our country. The Polish Army, formed on Soviet soil with brotherly assistance of the Soviets, also marched to its homeland, side by side with its Soviet ally and comrade-in-arms.

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On the same day, 23 June 1944, the Association of Polish Patriots, together with the Polish Army, on the basis of a resolution adopted by its Main Directorate, was subordinated to the National People's Council--the first people's democratic government, still operating, from the underground. At about the same time, in the Janowski Forest and Skolska Wilderness, units of the People's Army together with groups of Soviet partisans fought hard battles with the invader.

I am recalling these events because of their historical importance to our nation. They occurred on the very threshold of the birth of People's Poland. There is symbolism in them, and a lesson as well--we must preserve this symbolism, strengthen it and pass it on to future generations. We must relate to this symbolism each day of well performed soldierly service.

The years, which passed since that time, constitute in their essence a period of revolutionary transformations--and therefore--foundations of the present. As soldiers, we recall that those were also difficult years of continuous, unyielding confrontation with imperialism, demanding constant, intensive defensive effort. There were times when pressure and tension grew to an extremely dangerous level. However, in each instance imperialism had to back down, retreat, restrain itself, which was always the result of the defensive strength of socialism. To the sum total of this strength, the Polish People's Army has always made, and continues to make an active and earnest, loyal and proportional contribution.

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If currently a new leaf is being turned--the period of detente--then it is a dialectic consequence of all those confrontations, it is a historical result of effective opposition to imperialism carried out on various levels: ideological and political-diplomatic, economic and scientific-technical--and in the final analysis the military defense level. As a result of these processes, particularly during recent years, conditions favorable to improving international relations and factors limiting the adventurism of imperialism continued to develop. However, comrades, I ask you to note, that not only imperialism's actual intent at a given moment is important, but also what imperialism is potentially capable of undertaking, what originates from its nature, and what is its main objective.

These considerations once more confirm the need to continue strengthening the combined defensive potential of socialism--the Warsaw Pact. It is this strength, and primarily, the might of the Soviet Army and Navy, which lays real foundations for mounting a peace offensive. It is the Soviet Union that plays the leading role in this peace offensive. Therefore, from here stems the feeling of reliance and confidence which this tested ally inspires in us, who at Yalta and Potsdam also insisted on recognition of our rights, later cleared a way for us on the question of border recognition, and finally now, at conferences at Geneva and Vienna, takes a common stand on the interests of Poland and all countries of the socialist community.

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Exercise "Lato-74" was but another practical example of active participation of our armed forces in the military organization of the Warsaw Pact, in particular, of brotherhood-in-arms and collaboration with the Soviet Army. In this spirit, I cordially welcome General Afanasyev F. SHCHEGLOV, representative of the Supreme Commander of the Combined Armed Forces and his colleagues, and express sincere appreciation of their presence and friendly, helpful attitude toward our exercise. I also sincerely welcome Lt. General Ivan A. GERASIMOV, Commander of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces, and Brig. General Vasilii A. DANILOV, member of the Military Council, and the entire team of Soviet comrades who came superbly prepared, and I thank them for the assistance in conducting the exercise and for their active participation in it.

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The scenario for exercise "Lato-74" related to the realities of the actual international situation, particularly in the strategic-military aspect. In this situation, we assumed the possibility of aggression as a result of a shift in the policy of imperialism. Features of this shift were presented today in detail by the Chief of Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. I would like to refer briefly to some of the ideas and aspects of this broad problem.

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Let us view the international situation as a relation between detente and chances for peace on one hand, and tension and threat of war on the other hand. This, of course, is a reflection of the relation between socialism and imperialism. However, the fact of the matter is that this relation develops in many different aspects and areas of confrontation, and at this time, has developed successfully and to an advanced stage. Therefore, even if the global relation of forces were shifting in favor of socialism, its components in individual aspects and areas could, during the same time, be forming somewhat differently, some favorably, and some even unfavorably. Briefly speaking, socialist positions are not equally strong everywhere. And herein lies one of many reasons why simultaneously with the process of detente, various explosive situations can develop.

Therefore, clearing the road to permanent peace requires creating such realities in which positions once attained by socialism are permanently secured and, which at the same time, would constitute for the opposing side a final, established condition difficult to reverse. In this sense, it is extremely important to shape actively man's psychic domain, his views and awareness oriented toward condemnation of militarism, demanding peace, and the public call for detente. This kind of attitude is spreading in the West. Such an attitude is holding back reactionary-military circles from winning public opinion and stimulating various anti-communist neuroses.

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Despite all this, it is necessary to keep in mind that detente is being maintained against enormous opposition and constantly renewed counteraction efforts of cold war and militaristic circles. They are searching for and are ready to take advantage of each of our possible weak spots, every sensitive point, and less favorable situation. There are a number of fluid, unstable, indecisive situations. Hotbeds of unrest, clashes and unextinguished war still exist. It is not feasible to rule out once and for all the recurrence of dangerous confrontations. Our exercise also focused on these factors.

Let us consider the Near East. General normalization of relations between the Arab countries and Israel are still in the distant future. The United States, taking advantage of Egypt's departure from Nasserism and general stimulation of Arab conservative elements, strives to weaken and eliminate progressive and liberation movements and, at the same time, to restore its influence and to alter the alignment of forces. This is not indifferent to the matter of peace, and not in the best interests of the socialist community in this strategically important area.

Also, the situation on the Indochinese Peninsula, which was taken into consideration during the exercise, continues to give rise to anxiety. The victory of the Vietnamese nation, won with the assistance of socialist countries, forcing the United States to renounce direct military intervention in that country, has not ended the war. The USA continues to support the regimes of THIEU and LON NOL, and to blackmail by yet another intervention. However, of importance here is the fact that the huge sums spent on this war in the past, which at the peak reached 21.5 billion dollars on an annual scale, later were left in the Pentagon's budget. Every year these sums are invested in armaments.

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The problem in Asia and in the Far East is primarily China. Maoist leadership of China is attempting to torpedo the peace policy of the socialist community. China is traveling on a provocative anti-Soviet course, hand in hand with the most reactionary imperialistic forces, including the West German revanchists and militarists and Chilean fascists. It appears, that one has to assume that this fact influences strategic calculations of NATO.

Finally, Europe. For us, her affairs are most important. The last 3 years of this continent's postwar history were the most successful in the sense of relieving international tensions, many constructive achievements, and stabilization of peaceful coexistence. I will just mention the universal recognition by the Western countries of the statehood of the German Democratic Republic--an unthinkable matter not too long ago. Consequently, the basic international-legal problems which at one time were referred to the so-called German Peace Treaty--or--as believed, into infinity, already have been defacto settled and normalized.

Therefore, without negating the importance of the many positive events and facts (included among them is the pending visit of President NIXON to Moscow), it is necessary to see also the other, less favorable side of the matter. Even though it is true that detente has already progressed sufficiently in the political-diplomatic realm, and it continues to develop in spite of opposition, nevertheless, in such a basic field as the military, it has not created--for all practical purposes--any reverberations, on European soil in particular.

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For example, let us consider the problem of negotiations pertaining to the armed forces and arms limitations in Central Europe. For us, the basic issue is full observance of the so-called equal security. This is the only basis for a possibility of agreement. The result of this is the possibility of an agreement only for such reductions which would not disturb existing relations of military potentials, and which would include foreign and national troops (of course, including the Bundeswehr), ground forces as well as air forces, together with nuclear weapons.

However, the NATO circles desire an entirely different formula for reductions. While adhering to the asymmetrical formula, they strive to change in their own favor the complementary and balanced relation of forces established in Central Europe, a relation which has proved itself historically as a reliable peace factor in this major area of contact between the socialist world and capitalism. This same relation of forces in Central Europe simultaneously constitutes a certain compensating factor on a global scale: it freezes the profits, so to say, from maintaining a system of forward bases which the United States would reap unilaterally as a result of their geostrategic locations.

Similarly, the scale of proposals submitted in Vienna and Geneva pertaining to the so-called concurrent moves is unacceptable. In reality, it is a delaying game and at the same time an attempt to obtain a full view of the disposition and training of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.

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At the time when the above tactic characterizes the relation of the NATO countries toward disarmament talks in Europe, when they bemoan their alleged military weakness, when they demonize the forces and intentions of the Warsaw Pact--at the same time, a real intensification of armaments is taking place in those countries.

As a side note to this problem, I would like to express my view on the universally used phrase "armaments race". Its precise meaning does not correspond with the essence of the matter; it camouflages it, distorts, and is misleading. Bourgeois propaganda takes great advantage of this opportunity. We must therefore remember that the concept of the so-called armaments race can be dealt with only by mutual agreement. After all, imperialism is the initiator, it is imperialism which challenges us. On the part of socialist countries, it is simply a necessary reaction to this state of affairs, a vital defense.

It was with this in mind that comrade L. BREZHNEV, the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union recently stated, that "with regard to limiting armaments...we were successful in concluding several international agreements without which the current situation would have been, without doubt, much more serious. Unfortunately, we were unable to slow down the armaments race."

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Let us examine a concrete example of armament of NATO countries during the last 3 years only, and those were years of detente. During that time, as a result of rapid increases in military budgets--by 20 percent in the overall alliance, and as much as 33 percent in the group of its European members--quantitative and primarily qualitative armament factors were developed.

In American strategic weaponry--as a result of introduction of multiple warhead reentry vehicles, and despite slower growth in the number of launchers, in accordance with SALT-I agreements--the number of nuclear charges in a single salvo increased by about 80 percent, and with regard to nuclear submarines--by as much as 125 percent.

In the Western European Theater similar phenomena are taking place. Increases in fire power, or volume of a salvo, as a rule, have greatly exceeded the quantitative increase of corresponding armament. For example, in the air forces, the number of aircraft increased by 6-7 percent, but because of modernization of one-fifth of the total park, the nuclear salvo increased overall by 23 percent, and the conventional salvo--by 30 percent. A similar situation developed in ground operational-tactical nuclear weapons, the quantitative potential of which increased by 13 percent, whereas the volume of the nuclear salvo increased by 70 percent. An improved generation of antitank guided missiles has been introduced, and allocation of these weapons increased by 54 percent; lastly--the modern means of antiaircraft defense of troops increased by 27 percent.

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Even from this sketchy review a conclusion can be drawn, that we are dealing with a complex, long-range expansion process frequently difficult to discern from external appearance. The number of divisions or numerical strength of personnel simply does not define this expansion; however, the quantitative, combat-technical and technical-structural transformation does.

For these reasons, it is essential to constantly oppose this process. The Soviet Union and all the countries of the socialist community have been doing this successfully for years. Lasting peace is and always will be the function of political resistance, economic vigor, and above all, socialism's military unity and power. Exercise "Lato-74" also served this purpose.

\* \* \*

Exercise "Lato-74" was a successive, higher phase of interallied cooperation and intensification of brotherhood-in-arms between the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries and specifically between our forces and the Armed Forces of the USSR. This cooperation has its rich and beautiful history. It was indeed the Soviet Army, its people, experience, combat equipment which served as the basis for creation of the Polish People's Army, and they served us with unfailing assistance along the road to development. The permanent basis of interallied ties is above all ideological unity, but there is also--based on Marxist-Leninist foundations--the foremost Soviet socialist art of war, and there are our identical views on doctrine for the conduct of modern warfare. Therefore, the exercise offered another opportunity to enrich the substance and methods of combined operations, exchange experiences in this regard, and to penetrate deeper the problem area of conducting operations within the coalitional pact against a background of specific operational guidelines.

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The direct, practical expression of this was participation in the exercise by operations groups from the Northern Group of Soviet Forces, playing the role of commands and staffs of the 41st Army and the 46th Fighter Bomber Aviation Division. This was the first time that so many actual, far-reaching combinations characterizing coalitionist operations were introduced and played out in all their phases. This was demonstrated in the manner in which: air operations in the theater of war operations were conducted and supported; the 41st Soviet Army was included in the composition of the 3d Western Front; and some Polish divisions were subordinated to this Army, and some Soviet divisions to the Polish Armies. \*

The staffs participating in the exercise were fully aware of the substance and importance of interallied coordination. These were the basis for numerous contacts between our and Soviet large units.

These contacts produced considerable experience-training benefits. In followup work, general conclusions should be drawn from them, they should be thoroughly studied, and disseminated. Particularly, it is necessary to determine precisely the rules for exchanging operations groups equipped with means of communications, the use of common form documents, the problem of supplying maps, repair of unique equipment, and similar practical problems. \*

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In accordance with the objectives of the exercise, we concentrated our attention on operation of the staff sections of the front. Of particular importance was gaining deep understanding of the location and role of our front as a component part of the coalitional defense system of the Warsaw Pact countries. Also, it was important to test and improve the mobilization process, and operational deployment of the front and conduct of offensive operations under complicated conditions of a conventional war followed by a nuclear war.

In this process, the progress in organization-training consolidation of the front staff, already during peacetime, became an important factor. This was achieved, among other things, by improving the structure of the Inspectorate of Training which now has in its composition both of the basic staff sections--the operational directorate and reconnaissance directorate. Subordinated to the Chief Inspector of Training are the chiefs of rocket troops and artillery, and of air defense troops, and since this year, also chiefs of engineer and chemical troops. In addition, included in the composition of the collegium of the Chief Inspector of Training were chiefs of the basic organs of the staff of the front who in time of peace are not subordinate to him. The above mentioned moves will have a positive influence on stabilization of cadre assignments, and will create a favorable basis for playing the role of higher forms of a front staff section.

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The exercise fulfilled not only the main objective discussed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, but also a number of detailed objectives. In addition, many new, original solutions to structural arrangement and methods of operation of the exercise command and umpire apparatus were verified or analyzed.

Justification of these solutions was, in general, confirmed. We have the capability to organize an exercise of great organizational-operational momentum, and of educational and up-to-date substance. The authors and the staff of the exercise command did a good job in that respect. However, we also observed weaknesses. On the basis of conclusions drawn from this exercise, we will continue to improve control of this type of training undertakings.

The exercise was at the same time a kind of a workshop by itself, where specific concepts and guidelines for the development of the forces surfaced. Therefore, the exercise was a sort of lead-in to the currently being prepared organizational-technical plan for the development of the armed forces during years 1976-80, and a base for enriching and precisely defining its initial guidelines. An important role in this regard was played by the special research teams which were appropriately integrated into the structure of the exercise and operated according to individual programs, and either verified or undertook selected problems from the viewpoint of the guidelines of this plan.

Of the entire complex of broad and comprehensive problems, I shall, for obvious reasons, discuss only some problems of most current interest to us.

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✓ During the multiyear cycle of operational training, we endeavored to play out various, even radically different, variants of entering into war. For example, during exercises "Lato-70" and "Kraj-73," the outbreak of war was preceded by mounting tensions in the international situation and a gradual operational-mobilization buildup of the armed forces. During exercise "Lato-71" hostilities broke out under conditions of rapid deterioration of the situation, and the armed forces switched to a war structure when nuclear operations were already in progress. But in each situation we strove to attach great importance to the period directly preceding the outbreak of hostilities.

For this reason, in May of this year, we conducted for key officials of our Ministry a decision game dealing with the subject of operation of the central institutions during the process of attaining higher states of combat readiness by the armed forces. From this game we derived many valuable ideas. The conclusions drawn dictated the need for further improvement of the operating system of the Ministry's central organs, particularly the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, institutions subordinate to the Chief Inspector of Territorial Defense, Chief Quartermaster of the Polish Armed Forces, and Chief Technical Inspector of the Polish Armed Forces during the crucial period initiating transition of the national economy and administration and the armed forces to conditions and requirements of wartime. These institutions, and in particular the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, having direct or indirect influence on the degree of readiness of the national defense potential, should, during that period, effectively weigh the increase and decrease of tensions, pay attention to possible political, economic and operational-strategic consequences of proposed or undertaken decisions. This is why the problems under consideration are complex; the need for synchronization of tasks with plans for the buildup of the national economy and the armed forces must be continuous, along with the need, even in the future, for their systematic verification during subsequent decision games and high level exercises.

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During this year's exercise "Lato-74", national problems were played out by operations groups of selected central institutions of the Ministry of National Defense, interested civilian ministries, the wartime command and staff of the Silesian Military District, and the 8th National Air Defense Corps. Therefore, from that point of view, this exercise was sort of a continuation of exercise "Kraj-73," except it was treated primarily from the standpoint of services rendered by the national economy and obligations of the national administration and of the territorial system on behalf of the external front. I believe that this was necessary, useful, and helpful for subsequent planning and organization-defense studies.

In this exercise we decided to integrate routine training and mechanics of procedure with the operational plan. For this purpose, a training operations plan was prepared in advance (within the framework of preparations for the exercise) with reference to which subsequent activities were played out. For example, among many tasks during the period preceding the outbreak of hostilities, the necessity to make essential corrections in the plan for operational use of forces becomes greater. It is only then, that the outline of many problems becomes more realistic--tasks are determined, development of events progresses, and current dispositions of forces becomes evident. Of course, the scope of corrections can vary, including the change of operational axis, which was the case in our exercise. Constant updating of plans makes their implementation easier and does not cause loss of time when time becomes a critical factor. In our exercise, the staff of the front prepared a complete alternate operational plan, and what is important--in minimum prescribed time, and operationally transmitted the essence of changes to be implemented by the chain of commands of the armies.

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This plan correctly directed the front forces to operations on a new operational axis and properly defined the basic operational and supply-technical support units of the operation. The substantive value of the plan would have been even greater were the evaluations and calculations of capabilities of our own and enemy forces more specific.

The critical moment for operations of the commands of the front and the armies was activation of the field command system for the operational forces. As a starting point for playing out this part of the exercise, a modified variant of pertinent standing rules was used. It was based on sending out command elements prior to the deployment deadlines for the troops, and on occupation by them individually--particularly by the forward command post--of disposition areas ahead of the troops. In this manner, the staffs of the front and the armies could properly prepare themselves in advance for work under field conditions, initially to participate in the control of troop movement, then, gradually, to assume full command "in person". Of course, these undertakings should be accomplished in a highly organized and disciplined manner, so that neither the intention, nor the very fact that individual commands and staffs are being assigned, or that command posts are being occupied by them, are compromised.

The process of deploying the field command system in our exercise was generally efficient in the first phase. However, during displacement of posts in combat operations, breaks in continuity of control occurred, primarily caused by failure to use technical means of communication which were available during the move.

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The exercise offered another opportunity to verify the applicable provisions of the mobilization plan. Experiences gained in this respect confirmed again the validity of the principle of flexibility in conducting mobilization, simplification of controlling its progress, and greater involvement of territorial authorities in this process.

Speaking on the subject of these problems, we should at the same time firmly keep in mind that NATO countries have at their disposal modern armed forces which are kept in a relatively high state of combat readiness and are capable of initiating operations without a prolonged period of preparation. A specific example indicating that the potential enemy is capable of taking advantage of such an eventuality serves the fact that all the armed forces of the United States were placed in a state of increased combat readiness during the critical October days last year. All of this confirms again the necessity to comply strictly with the standing procedures pertaining to combat readiness and to continue perfecting proceedings in this extremely important area.

In the exercise, a possible variant was outlined for participation of our operational large units in strategic operations conducted within the framework of coalitional operations in the Western Theater of Military Operations. Commitment to battle of the 3d Western Front was intended to be an unusually important moment of this operation because its mission was destruction of northern flank forces of the Central Army Group operating on the Leipzig-Karlsruhe axis. The only condition for accomplishing this mission was commitment to battle of a strike grouping sufficiently strong and appropriately supported.

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In this respect, a certain confusion developed. The fact was confirmed that redeployment of a large mass of troops, especially after an outbreak of hostilities, is an extremely complex undertaking, demanding excellent preparation and unfailing command.

Fighting an enemy airborne landing, strong air bombardment, losses en route, especially at water crossings, caused major changes in our exercise in time and spatial fulfilment of the plan for redeployment of troops, particularly congested on 20 June. A solution to this situation presented real difficulties to the participants.

The degree of complexity of the situation was not always very realistically evaluated. There occurred insufficiently justified overcommitments of certain divisions, and the actual times of their commitment to battle did not ensure operational synchronization of the attack. Also, a tendency prevailed to use frontal attacks exclusively and to form insufficiently deep groupings in mountainous, channelized terrain. Nevertheless, by more thorough analysis of certain aspects of the critique and by making corrections, the participating staff formed a strike group, in principle suited to the plan, capabilities, and requirements of the operation. Of great, even crucial, importance to fulfilment of this plan was the posture of the 41st Army which contained the enemy pressure and ensured that the main forces of the first echelon of the front were committed to battle from an advantageous line. A correct decision and good organization of positions by the commander and the staff of this army allowed the exercise directing staff to declare that appropriate terrain lines were held, and that enemy operational freedom at this stage of operations was decidedly limited.

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During this exercise we have undertaken, for the first time on such a broad scale, the problem of committing an air army to air operations in the theater of military operations. Experiences of past wars, beginning with Hitler's attack on Poland in 1939 through Israel's aggression in the Near East, provide evidence that an air operation was the initial, extremely important act of a conventional armed conflict. The role of air operations is maintained also today. Its main objective, in the final analysis, is destruction of main enemy air groups on the ground and in the air, and, by disorganizing his air command system and air defense systems, to create for the ground forces and other branches of the armed forces more favorable conditions for strategic operations in the theater of military operations. ✓

In our exercise, the air army was to participate in air operations by flying three army missions on the axis of the adjacent front, then, immediately upon redeployment to another operational axis--to support the commitment to battle and conduct of operations of its parent front.

This variant of employing an air army required from the participants, among other things, the organization of a command system working with precision, capable of accomplishing two successive difficult missions.

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In this phase of the exercise, the army command experienced serious difficulties as a result of dispersion of the air army command potential. This had a negative effect in preparation of essential tactical-operational calculations and made organization of coordination within the army and combat support of operations difficult. However, in time, particularly during the third mission, this state of affairs gradually and perceptibly improved.

Therefore, participation of the air army in air operations ✓ in the theater of military operations should become for the staff of the air forces a subject for penetrating and thorough studies. During the process of operational-tactical preparation of officers, it is necessary to devote more time and attention to this lightly treated subject than thus far.

Defeat of the modern multilayered enemy antiaircraft defense is, so to say, a derivative problem. This problem is becoming progressively more difficult. At this time, the enemy has at his disposal powerful antiaircraft weapons. In the immediate future he will introduce into the armament systems more modern missiles (Rapier, Roland I and II, Crotale, Blowpipe) and antiaircraft guns (Gepard, Falcon) designed to combat aircraft flying at low altitudes. After all, this is the general trend in development of these weapons. Experiences of the last Near East war confirm this, where, of the 105 Israelis aircraft shot down, 99 were destroyed by ground antiaircraft weapons, most of them by "Kub" and "Strela" missiles, and ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft guns ★ at altitudes less than 100 meters.

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The staff of the air army (except in the first phase of the exercise) made deliberate efforts to work out various methods for combatting a strong enemy antiaircraft defense. However, these efforts should be made constantly and be more aggressive than thus far. For the pilots, mastering this problem is literally a matter of life and death. We expect the scientific seminar, prepared by the command of the air forces and the General Staff Academy, to furnish us many good and specific conclusions in this regard.

We should also be concerned about ensuring safety for our own pilots. Flight corridors were established and time intervals and flight altitudes were designated with the chief of the antiaircraft troops of the front. However, it is essential to initiate more organized, scientifically supported efforts to maintain high physical and mental pilot endurance in the subsequent stages of operations, as well as collection, analysis and effective dissemination of experiences gained during every day of aerial combat.

For the first time in many years we enacted a theoretically possible and in practice conceivable variant of a massive enemy air drop along the Oder and Nysa line at the moment when redeploying forces were most vulnerable, that is, when this line, to a certain degree, cut the operational grouping of the first echelon armies into two parts isolated from each other.

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There are ample historical precedents for this type of operation. The not-so-successful allied airborne operation under the cryptonym "Market-Garden" can serve as an example. Analysis of this operation indicates that Western forces accept a high percentage of risk in the calculations of their plans, and that at times, they initiate this type of an operation without sufficiently rationalizing it. Likewise, modern doctrinal principles do not allow ruling out the possibility that NATO countries will resort to this means of warfare in the initial period of hostilities, particularly calculated to eliminate the German Democratic Republic from the war first. Also, we know that an equivalent of two divisions of airborne troops, in high degree of readiness, is stationed in Europe. In an emergency, they can be rapidly reinforced with at least one airborne division from the United States. It is this concept on which the Pentagon is concentrating its efforts, envisioning adaptation of certain aircraft (C-141, B-747, DC-10) of the so-called civilian air fleet reserve for transatlantic air lift of heavy armament and equipment.

By introducing into the exercise a powerful airborne landing, we deliberately assumed that the landing could not secure far-reaching strategic-political objectives. However, the landing could and did have severe consequences, affecting accomplishment of missions by the redeploying main forces. This type of a situation, in summary, is realistic, highly educational, and should not be treated lightly. Such a situation can be created not only by a massive air landing, but also by concurrent and, to a certain degree, coordinated operations of numerous diversionary groups, air strikes against bridges, panic of the population, and the like. Therefore, for our front, it remains a major problem which should be constantly kept in sight, studied, and in a practical manner played out in various aspects and forms and with different results.

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However, let us return to the problem of the airborne landing. The substance of the situation, developed as a result of the landing, was an attempt to stop the movement of the regrouping front forces, entangle them in stubborn battles, disrupt the structure of the operational grouping being formed from the march, force rerouting of traffic, and gain time--in effect--to disorganize the entire operational plan of the front. According to enemy reckoning, this would permit breaking the resistance of the 41st Army (Soviet), over extended on a wide front, and moving up fresh forces in order to attack in depth and seize the initiative from the very beginning of the campaign.

Although the problems of command presented specific difficulties, in general the reactions of the participants can be evaluated as proper. The main force of the redeploying troops was assigned the mission to break through in the direction of the lines of commitment to battle, and operational groups were designated for commanding units assigned to combat the airborne landing. Simultaneously--as the territorial forces, units of internal defense troops, motorized units of the Citizens' Militia, reserve Border Guard Troops and other forces were moved to the airborne landing area--the command process was assumed by the commands of military districts coordinated by the General Staff which for this purpose assigned an operations group from the composition of the command post of the Ministry of National Defense. Likewise, the problem of coordination with the German Democratic Republic was not overlooked, which under these conditions was absolutely necessary and beneficial.....

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Striving to be ahead of the enemy should express itself not only in categories of time, therefore surprise, or in modern ordnance and equipment. There is a third, extremely important factor of being ahead, without which the first two factors cannot achieve the intended effect. Specifically, this factor is the ability to anticipate, to react in advance, to monitor the development of phenomena, tendencies, future organizations, and arms which certainly will appear in a future war.

Consequently, we accepted as training objectives--deliberately and purposely in advance--certain planned, or currently in the experimental stage, structural-organizational and technical changes, to name only a few, organization of the "supercorps", the TRICAP [triple capability] type division, the so-called laser and TV bombs, new generations of antitank and anti-aircraft weapons, the "BARE BASE"\* system and the AWACS\*\* system, and the like.

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\* Assembly of equipment in support of combat operations of tactical aviation from airfields with a minimum of essential facilities, having only a runway and access to water.

\*\* Detection and guidance system of USA tactical aviation, mounted on E-3A aircraft (Boeing 707); operates at altitude of 9 to 11 kilometers; range up to 700 kilometers.)

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I believe that this is sound practice and consistent with scientific and dialectical methodology. We should apply it appropriately--of course, primarily on operational levels. This is exactly the form by which to overtake the enemy already in peacetime, decode his trump cards, and actively confront possible surprise. It is a method that mobilizes, giving the feeling of holding a hand on the pulse. Such an approach should constitute one of the strength factors of the socialist army because it stems from its nature, it stems from the assumption that the absolute necessity to be ahead of the enemy is up to the conscious, enlightened man looking into the future.

In summary, Exercise "Lato-74" revealed that the reconnaissance organs achieved a higher degree of preparedness. Despite still existing shortcomings--which have to be eliminated such as drawing conclusions with accuracy, disseminating information, being alert to the air threat, and reacting effectively to developing situations--they constitute a better functioning, increasingly more creative organ. In modern armed forces, the importance of radioelectronics is ever increasing.

Among the many practical applications of this field is radioelectronic reconnaissance one of the important sources of information in time of peace and war. The other practical application is radioelectronic countermeasures.

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In our exercise, this problem was played out in a practical and relevant manner, more extensively than thus far. Particularly praiseworthy was the search for better organizational structures and closer collaboration by the radioelectronic reconnaissance and countermeasures units which the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces discussed today.

We continue to consider improvement of the radioelectronic warfare system an open problem requiring further theoretical studies and experimental research and verification of results obtained during the exercises. Therefore, radioelectronic warfare continues to be mostly a slogan. Primarily, specialists are working on it, to some extent, outside of the mainstream of staff activity. Radioelectronic countermeasures have not yet gained a place among the leading types of tactical and operational support. Its main trends are not outlined, comprehensive analyses are not conducted, and there is no accountability for tasks performed. Undertaking this problem on a broad front, determining its nature, and personal involvement of commanders and chiefs of staffs should be the next stage of our activity. \*

Over the span of recent years, the antiaircraft defense of forces was improved comprehensively and is expanding dynamically. Treating this sector on a priority basis, we have now entered the stage for conversion of antiaircraft artillery troop units to missile units. It suffices to say, that rearming of only one antiaircraft artillery regiment with missiles, increases: the ceiling from 4 to 10 kilometers, and range from 5 to 24 kilometers; the number of targets engaged simultaneously from 2 to 5; the probability of effective fire from 30 percent to 96 percent; and extends the covered zone from 81 square kilometers to 2,500 square kilometers.

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Completion of all organizational-technical changes planned will produce an entirely new quality in the field of engaging enemy air attack means.

This prospect was taken into consideration in our exercise. But at the same time we must say with pleasure, that the participating chiefs of the antiaircraft artillery troops fulfilled their assignments in an outstanding manner. We tested a number of keen and interesting problems, e.g., the subject of establishing and maneuvering missile reserves, realistically constructing a radar field for given field conditions, forming unique antiaircraft barrage units--so-called antiaircraft ambushes, and organizing air corridors with exit and entry gates for friendly aviation, etc. As a result, the exercise directing staff rewarded instructive and reasonable solutions for antiaircraft defense with correspondingly reduced losses.

Recently, considerably more attention is being directed to the problem of camouflage, and we note with satisfaction definite progress in this area. It applies mainly to practical undertagings carried out primarily by engineer troops. In particular, last year certain changes were made in camouflage subunits, and various tests pertaining to setting up dummy command posts of the front and of missile launching positions were conducted jointly with the air forces.

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Likewise, certain practical elements of operational camouflage were integrated into this exercise. Several dummy installations of the front command post and of missile launching positions were constructed. Although simple means and methods were used, good effects were obtained nevertheless, as verified by the results of air reconnaissance conducted specifically for this purpose. However, operational camouflage is not an undertaking exclusive of a technical nature. Primarily, it is an integrated and comprehensive system deceiving the enemy and concealing from him our intentions and activities. Fulfilment of specific undertakings related to camouflage is the responsibility of all command levels, according to their missions and competence, but the leading role and primary responsibility for operational camouflage rests with the staff of the front. The point is to have the objectives and purposes of operational camouflage conform to the central idea of the operations planned. It is in this context, therefore, that I would like to sensitize you, comrades, to a distinct necessity to increase the skill and to form a habit of employing camouflage concepts in the process of making operational decisions.

Examining the broadly viewed camouflage problem, it is necessary to signal a renaissance and, specifically speaking, new requirements in the field of using camouflage smokes. Unfortunately, in the exercise, this problem was treated somewhat indifferently despite the fact that besides the known forms of chemical smoke--even though not actively and thoughtfully employed, for example, for covering river crossings, camouflaging certain installations, etc.--with the development of modern equipment, new capabilities and new requirements appeared. This applies in particular to the use of chemical smokes for hindering various types of devices which are based on the use of laser, television, and night vision technology.

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Constantly increasing mass employment of these devices increases the importance of chemical smokes, giving them operational application. Special attention should be paid to laser equipment because of its long-range potential and its capability for versatile application. Chemical smokes especially can become one of the leading means countering lasers. They can find laser's weak spot--they can block its path. Of course, the complexity and unusually rapid growth of the scale of this problem demands not only further technical research but also comprehensive operational-tactical consideration, especially determination of planning trends, coordination, and--in relation to other tasks--unimpeded execution of these measures on a complex battlefield and in a battle saturated with a variety of equipment (I visualize in this subject broad and, to a certain extent, collective efforts of the General Staff Academy, the Military Technical Academy, and the Military Chemical and Radiometry Institute).

The enemy has not given up the concept of using the still extremely dangerous weapon--combat chemical agents. This is attested to by American activities in Vietnam, stockpiling, and research currently being conducted. The United States does not respect the universally accepted Geneva Protocol. Using a peculiar interpretation, the Americans argue that incapacitating agents, those not causing fatal poisoning, and defoliating agents are not included in the prohibition. This interpretation supposedly justifies conduct of large-scale research on chemical weapons as a result of which a binary chemical ammunition program is being carried out.

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Even though in our exercise the enemy used chemical weapons already on 20 June, this fact unfortunately was not reflected in the basic estimates or in specific decisions made by the commanders. Therefore conclusions can be drawn as to the necessity for treating this aspect of combat with more discrimination, assigning it appropriate priority in training of commands, staffs and troops and constantly observing all new phenomena occurring in it.

The current exercise was conducted on the central operational axis, having terrain features different than those to which we have been accustomed for years. From the viewpoint of conducting military operations, the terrain was difficult, confronting the participants with special demands. The mountain range and high ground ranging from 500 to 1400 meters altitude above sea level, facilitated organization for defense on the one hand, but on the other hand--slowed the momentum, canalized movement of forces, and made their deployment difficult.

Experiences gained from operations conducted by the Soviet Army in mountainous terrain during the last war indicate, that under similar conditions, the momentum of offensive operations is reduced on average by 30 to 40 percent and more, and of a march, by 20 to 30 percent in comparison with operations conducted on ordinary lowland terrain. To what extent mountains can influence the tempo of an offensive was demonstrated during operations of the 1st Guards Army and the 18th Army of the 4th Ukrainian Front in the east Carpathian Mountains in September 1944, described by Marshal GRECHKO in his book titled "Over the Carpathian Mountains." Also, we know that natural features of mountainous terrain can restrict employment of large armored units, hamper command, coordination, and supply support. They may cause serious interference in operating radio transmitters and radiotechnical means of detection and guidance of aircraft, and to a considerable degree limit also conduct of radioelectronic reconnaissance.

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It should be stressed, that in the event of nuclear strikes the shock waves enclosed by high slopes will travel at a higher velocity along the axis of the passes causing, in addition to extensive losses, considerable devastation and deformation of the terrain and frequently total paralysis of movement and transportation. We got the impression that this situation was not considered carefully enough by the participants.

Water barriers present additional difficulties in operations in mountainous-forested terrain. Although contemporary river crossing equipment to a great extent facilitates negotiation of water barriers, the peculiarity of mountain streams can greatly complicate the situation. Particularly dangerous is the sudden release of large water masses from storage reservoirs existing on that axis situated on higher mountain ranges, as could well have been the case in our exercise on the Saale and Mulde Rivers.

It is always necessary to reckon with utilization of the specific juncture of terrain features with the infrastructure. For example, in our exercise it was the fact that large quantities of liquid fuels were stored upstream on the Main River, and after being released into the river and ignited, they became a barrier of fire impassable for about 5 to 6 hours. Regrettably, the report of this event had not reached the staff of the front.

While on the subject of terrain features, we should also constantly keep in mind the elements of the infrastructure existing in the zone of front operations.

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This problem should be studied in three aspects:

- first, how and which elements of the infrastructure in enemy territory should be completely destroyed in order to make conduct of his operations more difficult;
- second, how to weigh the effect of these destructions on our own operations conducted subsequently in depth;
- third, how to spare and then seize, secure, and use appropriate elements and structures, especially those serving supply, transportation, and other purposes.

We have not yet attained in training this kind of comprehensive and, at the same time, penetrating and selective approach to the above discussed problem. However, it should be emphasized that, for example, the staffs of the antiaircraft defense and of the engineer troops of the front and the 41st Army, and the reconnaissance units of the 12th and 13th Armies demonstrated considerable familiarity with the terrain and capability to make a detailed evaluation of its features. Subsequently, the staff of the 11th Army prepared a useful, innovative operational document worthy of dissemination--a plan for seizing major installations.

The NATO armies, aware of the armored power of our community, treat antitank defense on a priority basis. As a result, there is large-scale coverage with various antitank weapons.

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The systematic qualitative improvement of antitank weapons increases the significance of the problem. A new generation of semiautomatic guided missiles (MILAN, TOW) with greater range and effectiveness has been introduced. Mobile antitank reserves--on land, in armored combat vehicles, in helicopters in the air--are becoming a real factor. Mobility of the antitank defense is additionally increased by incorporating into it a system of rocket missiles with warheads having cassette mines which can carry into forward areas or deep into the opponent's grouping in order to lay minefields there and antitank barriers.

The role which even traditional antitank mines continue to play was demonstrated by, among other things, their mass use in the Arab-Israeli armed conflict. On the Sinai Peninsula alone, during several years of static war (1967-1973) and during military operations in 1973, Egyptian troops laid approximately one million mines, and the Israeli more than 750 thousand mines (by the way, information on the latter, gained by our combat engineers serving in the Near East, should facilitate for us appropriate technical-training preparations).

Finally, if we add to all this the enemy capability to utilize the terrain features mentioned above, which under certain conditions could become a natural factor multiplying the effectiveness of the entire antitank defense system, then we can visualize the difficulties in overcoming this system.

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All these considerations demand that our commanders and staffs apply effective, innovative methods of operation based on thorough knowledge of the enemy in order to come up with the most favorable anti-antitank solutions.

~~It should be stated, that our cadre as yet does not represent the highest level of knowledge in this area,~~ although we note some progress which, with regard to the operational commands, was confirmed in our exercise. Therefore, we will continue to work on this problem intensively.

We are seeking, for example, ways to increase the number of motorized infantry in tank regiments, which incidentally, was achieved in practice in the 11th and 12th Armies. Also attempts were made to increase the capability of tanks to combat antitank helicopters. We are expecting much from the test exercise on this subject which will take place soon. Appropriate higher military schools and institutes are also charged with this problem. However, regardless of all these undertakings, the key to overcoming effectively strong antitank defense rests in the hands of our commanders and staffs, in the hands of our cadre, in its attitude toward this problem, in the effectiveness of training, and in its aggressiveness on the modern battlefield.

Continuing offensive operations, the front forces encountered strong enemy reserves, seasoned during cyclic exercises (mostly the "Reforger" and "Wintex" type), launching counterattacks supported by aviation and artillery, and covered on the flanks by nuclear and antitank mine barriers.

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However, this time, this reserve appeared in the form of the already above mentioned so-called "supercorps", that \* is to say a truly powerful operational large unit of the "West". We concluded, that since the enemy had at his disposal so large a reserve, he may want to commit it as a last resort to reach his objectives, to establish certain accomplished facts, still without employing nuclear weapons. After all, he is aware of the consequences of employing weapons of mass destruction. The strategic capability of the Soviet Union to retaliate, makes in effect, a nuclear strike of the "West" an act of desperation.

Repulsing the "supercorps" counterattack and planning the commitment to battle of the second echelon army of the front was therefore the last event of this exceptionally long nonnuclear phase of hostilities. The obvious problem, resulting from the ratio of forces on the axis of the counterattack, was the necessity to shift part of the front forces to defense, while simultaneously striving to accomplish the offensive mission assigned to them.

The decision of the front commander to repulse the counterattack of the "supercorps" using 12th Army forces, to attack the enemy flank using part of the 11th Army forces, and to commit the 13th Army to battle on the axis of the main effort is considered proper. Nevertheless, it caused constant concern for the flank threatened by possible success of the enemy counterattack. For this reason, the commander of the 13th Army correctly planned for the possibility of committing part of the forces, including the antitank artillery reserve, to add depth to the defense of the 12th Army. However, the calculation-organizational framework of this decision was not sufficiently comprehensive. Under actual conditions, vulnerable areas could have developed--and how dangerous that could have been for a redeploying army. And what a flanking attack can do, we also know well from our history--from the bitter experiences of the 2d Army of the Polish Armed Forces in the final phase of the last war.

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The problem of delivery of the first nuclear strike was of profound importance to the front command and to the army commands.

Theoreticians in the West conjecture many various concepts on the subject of nuclear war in general, and delivery of the first strike in particular. These deliberations, conducted under the pretext of unofficial theoretical opinions, probably contain also camouflaged elements of confusion and deception. At the same time, NATO force exercises in Europe almost automatically include various options and ways to carry out actions in all conceivable circumstances of the initial phase of the armed conflict and stages of its progression, up to nuclear world war included.

These endeavors take on different expressions. In addition to training objectives, they can also be read as an attempt to implant in us false notions on the nature of future operations, and to put Warsaw Pact strategic estimates on the wrong track. Or they can be evaluated, to a certain extent, as soundings for our possible course of action in the event nuclear weapons were used. However, without a doubt, the enemy is attempting to work out, even now, certain conditions which would enable him to seize the initiative at the moment of the first nuclear strike. ✓

We examined these problems in sufficient detail during previous "Lato"-type exercises, which successively enriched and improved our orientation in the realm of probable variants of enemy operations. Likewise, in this exercise we gained new qualitatively better, cognitive elements on this subject.

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Effectiveness of the first strike is conditioned on proper selection of targets against which the strike is suppose to be directed. It is important to carry out the first, most powerful strike against targets, which in given situation, are the most threatening, therefore, the means of enemy nuclear attack. For this reason, the matter which will continue to be of crucial importance is a particularly detailed evaluation of targets according to their importance, nature and sequence of destruction, keeping in mind their location and mobility.

The results of the exercise allow us to state, that--in this respect--we have taken a big step forward. The plan of the first strike, substantively correct, was systematically updated, and rocket and aviation units were kept in constant readiness to execute it. During periods evaluated by the front commander as critical, additional reconnaissance means, including appropriate offensive means, were committed to the operations. The front commander and staff were fully prepared to accomplish their mission when they received the time signal for delivery of the first strike. The additional reconnaissance ordered ensured effectiveness of the first strike. This time, organizational staff work was fully coordinated. I would like also to stress the objective cooperation with the rocket troops of the 41st Army (Soviet). Attention should be called to the precision of performance and good equipment of the headquarters of the rocket troops and artillery of the front, ensuring full and modern control of nuclear weapons delivery means.

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Related to the problem of the first strike, even though peculiar for the political-strategic and technical context, is the question of conceivable use of nuclear mines by the enemy.

The Dresden-Frankfurt operational axis, constituting the hub of operations of the front exercise, is one of the axes saturated with nuclear weapons. On this axis, mainly in its border zone, there are 32 [possibly one or more digits missing at end] clusters with 1145 mine chambers. This constitutes a density of 8 clusters per 100 square kilometers, or 4 clusters per 1 kilometer of the front in the border zone. By comparison, the density of clusters of mine chambers on the northern-coastal axis is 8 times smaller, and consists of 1 cluster per 100 square kilometers, or half of a cluster per 1 kilometer of the front.

Overcoming nuclear barriers is, from a technological and tactical viewpoint, a rather complicated problem. This undertaking, analogous to defense against weapons of mass destruction, is of a specialistic as well as combined arms nature. All arms of troops should participate in it on a proper scale. However, the commander of the operational large unit is responsible for accomplishing this task.

In this exercise, we had examples of constructive approaches to this problem. Interesting tactical-technological proposals in this area were prepared by the chiefs of engineer troops of the front and the 12th and 14th Armies. Work in this sector should continue, other solutions sought, and interest of appropriate academies, institutes, and officer higher schools should be stimulated.

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Enemy nuclear strikes against the forces of the front and national territory create a complex of problems related to eliminating the effects of these strikes. Integration of operational-combat and disaster-rescue functions should be viewed as of special importance to understanding these problems. Therefore, on one hand, consistent striving to accomplish the main objective of the operation, to reconstitute the disrupted command system, the organizational structure, and survivability of troops, and to ensure continuous flow of replacements and material support, and on the other hand--to rescue the population effectively, render mass medical aid, and organize special measures and evacuation. On the contrary, specifically at this critical moment which could prejudice the fate not only of the operation but the entire war, the most essential qualities required are preparation of the commands, staffs and troops, their moral-political condition, training, psychological strength and determined will to fight. It is necessary also to keep in mind, that following the first massed strike, the enemy will deliver subsequent nuclear and air strikes, and on critical axes he will strive to commit available reserves to battle and in "followup of the strike" he will strive to use all possible means and methods for combat and psychological effect.

In the event weapons of mass destruction are employed by both sides, success will belong to the one who will first capitalize on the effects of the strike, thus, the one who will recover from the nuclear strike sooner, seize the initiative, and continue the battle. ✓

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Subsequent to the nuclear strikes, the first echelon operational large units of the front occupied an area of operations under specific geographic-physical conditions and economic structure, and the fighting forces had to cross the deformed terrain, negotiate terrain without roads, the devastated infrastructure of large urban-industrial agglomerations, and overcome a fire barrier in wooded terrain. This required organization of a variety of efforts and utilization of all possible organic as well as local miscellaneous means for rescue work, combatting the elements, and negotiating the terrain.

The problem of eliminating the effects of nuclear strikes should be viewed in the entire complexity and associated multilayered physical, biological, moral, and psychic phenomena.

Therefore it is necessary to continue to enrich and diversify training-indoctrination substance and methods; to develop a high moral-political consciousness in troops, and to be convinced that the power and unity of the Warsaw Pact member countries are unyielding and that the combat equipment of our armies is of high quality. At the same time, every tactical exercise should create surprise situations, develop the habit of performing under emotional stress, of sensing the threat while expecting various surprises, requiring from the participants instant reaction combined with a prudently assumed and controlled element of risk.

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Against the background of evaluating the possible development of the war situation, we considered the essential problems of organization and function of rear services and supply-technical support of the armed forces.

In this respect, the experiences and conclusions drawn from past exercises and studies were very helpful (primarily from exercise "Bariera-73", conducted under the direction of Marshal Ivan YAKUBOVSKY, the Supreme Commander of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact).

Enemy action on our national territory and in the rear zone of the front, played out in the exercise, complicated the supply system of the forces. Disruption of the lines of transportation on the Oder and Neisse Rivers by the airborne landing made organization of the intended field supply system much more difficult. In this situation, first echelon tactical large units were committed to battle even with incomplete mobile reserves of ammunition. In view of the anticipated losses and expected disruption in continuity of supply deliveries, it became necessary for the commanders of operational large units to initiate strict measures reducing expenditure of supplies on hand, especially of rockets and ammunition.

Also, it should be remembered, that economical management of means in short supply, particularly of rockets, antiaircraft and antitank ammunition, is mandatory not only in critical situations, but it should be the rule for planning combat operations, selection of targets, and allocation of these means, primarily to those forces which at a given time carry out the primary mission.

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The exercise gave evidence of distinct progress in planning material-technical support for the troops. Of course, there is still more improvement to be made in planning, especially in the area of coordination with the quartermaster department. Also, the system of essential interrelations of the two main supply components at the quartermaster command post should be improved (for example, during the exercise there were incidents of the same information reaching both components at intervals several hours apart).

The quartermaster services participating in the exercise resolved correctly the problem of organizing supply, medical, and technical support rendered to the 41st Army, as well as the tactical large units of this Army and those subordinated to the 11th and 12th Armies. In this respect, the participating organs of the rear services of all echelons demonstrated good knowledge of the principles for rear services support of joint operations of tactical and operational large units, initiated by the Supreme Commander of the Combined Armed Forces on 1 January 1974.

The headquarters of the front quartermaster resolved the problems of security and defense of the rear areas with discretion. However, this is a broad and unusually difficult problem. Security and defense of the rear services, constituting an integral part of operational support, is not an exclusive problem of the rear services. It should be more thoroughly studied and resolved more realistically.

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It should be stated, that in general, the quartermaster services of the front and the army demonstrated a considerable amount of initiative and realistic approach to situations as they developed.

The performance of participating technical services can be evaluated similarly.

At the present time, the efforts of the technical components should be increasingly directed--without sacrificing the scope of maintenance--toward the problem area of rendering support for combat readiness and reliable operation of technical equipment, especially of the very sensitive and continuously-being-improved technical means of reconnaissance, radioelectronic warfare, automation of command and other.

The exercise offered another opportunity for a relevant play of integrating the same type of maintenance units of individual arms of troops and services into a system of maintenance bases. This system should make possible comprehensive maintenance of complicated construction equipment which increasingly is being introduced into the armament of the armed forces.

Operation of the field maintenance system, in view of the anticipated mass losses of equipment, is of particular importance. The scope of the problem is best illustrated by the fact that already in the first phase of combat operations, when conventional weapons were used, losses were very serious, and after nuclear strikes were delivered, they increased dramatically.

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The exercise demonstrated that progress was made in equipping, organization, and operating technique of the operational staffs. Our greatest achievement, above all else, was the broad introduction of modern, highly functional staff buses. Also, the practically universal use of properly formalized command documents, employment of many useful training aids and equipment, and, finally, the preparation of instructions or diagrams establishing a most efficient organization for staff work (as was the case at the quartermaster command post and the command post of the 13th Army), indicate that years of searching and researching, experimenting and training produced highly beneficial results.

Progress was noted also in field application of informatics. Its expression--among others--is the considerably greater scope, than heretofore, of informatics support rendered to an exercise. In reality, this was a very new quality. This was evidenced not only by the genuine aggressiveness of the command organs in using the technical programming base placed at their disposal, but also by the comprehensiveness of the programs and the computer-information problems resolved according to these programs. In this respect, particularly favorable impressions were made by the headquarters of the antiaircraft defense and chemical troops of the front, the staffs of the 11th and 13th Armies, and the technical services of the front and the 14th Air Army.

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These efforts should be continued, and useful experiences effectively disseminated, while not forgetting the necessity to improve--let us call it--the classic experiences. Above all, the very fact, that we have staff buses should not put our concern to rest. Without a doubt, they represent an essential step forward, but they do not resolve the problem as basic as survivability of the command components. This problem still confronts us. For example, we should think about portable equipment, increased self-entrenching capability, and--for longer range planning--partial introduction also of armored command means at the operational level.

In addition, the exercise demonstrated that there is still much to be accomplished, among other things, in the field of useful utilization of the massive flow of information, improvement of efficiency of internal information, including contact between the command post and the forward command post, preparation of maps and charts, making calculations, proper and proportional distribution of work, etc.

It is worthwhile to emphasize, that there were no instances of major security violations. There was improvement in the use of communications equipment. Yet, observations made of radiorelay communications indicate that more attention should be paid to security conscious and responsible use of it.

As in previous years, also in this exercise a series of studies were completed which encompassed organizational structures of selected command-staff elements and their support units.

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Conclusions drawn from the studies confirm the usefulness of the newly adopted wartime organizational structure of the front staff reduced by about 30 percent. It should be noted that introduction of this structure was preceded by instructions issued by the front headquarters which prescribed the procedures and work policies at the field command posts. Against the background of the exercise, the possibility of reducing the number of transport vehicles in front support units was also studied.

The studies also disclosed that the direction of the changes made in the command and staff of the air army were correct. Relocation of its peacetime home base from Warsaw to Poznan, some 300 kilometers westward, elimination of a fragmented organization, and reduction of its size (by approximately 17 percent), are positive signs. Relations between this command and the aviation forces remaining on the national territory were reexamined, which will allow improvement of its structure and delineation of authority.

During the exercise, policies for revising duties of the wartime military district command were defined, including coordination with civilian organs, and conclusions drawn from exercise "Kraj-73" pertaining to improvement of efficiency of the command system structure of the district military units were studied more thoroughly.

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In all the undertakings within the scope of strengthening the defensive potential, we regard as most important the ideological-moral values of our troops, their military and general knowledge, and their proficiency to function efficiently. These are the fundamental forces of our superiority over the enemy, resulting from the peasant class nature of our troops.

These qualities we hold particularly important for the officer cadre. We are consistently implementing policies of the comprehensive political program for the cadre adopted in recent years. According to its provisions, during the period between exercises "Lato-71" and "Lato-74," many changes were made, including some in higher positions. As a result, participants in this exercise included 136 officers who graduated from the Soviet Armed Forces Academy, or who completed operational-strategic courses at this academy or at our own General Staff Academy which, when compared with exercise "Lato-71," constitutes an increase of 90 officers, or 200 percent, who have received this training. It should be pointed out that at this time over 61 percent of the participating officers and graduates of military academies and 15 percent have higher education appropriate for the positions they hold.

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Evaluating the results of the concluded exercise it can be stated with satisfaction that our personnel achieved new, higher qualities which were reflected in smooth execution of replacement of entire directing teams, particularly at the operational level headquarters. A total of 248 officers were actually replaced at the participating commands and staffs, of which 30 were in key positions. Officers who were assigned new duties, generally speaking, fulfilled them in a satisfactory manner, and, having best intentions and proper preparation, were able to adapt to new conditions. Therefore, it is a good practice which we will follow gradually and systematically, particularly in regard to the officers from the accelerated development pool.

An important problem became evident during the exercise, namely, the manner and the scope of replacing officer losses.

According to indicators of personnel losses that combat forces can sustain, as ~~accepted by the Warsaw Pact armies~~, during 4 days of conventional offensive operations the 3d Western Front lost 8,500 officers and warrant officers, and--after 1 additional day of nuclear warfare--lost approximately 16,000 officers and warrant officers, 2,000 of which possessed higher military qualifications, replacement of which in a short time would have been very difficult.

Therefore, the exercise proved that the problem of replacing losses with officer personnel is very complex, requiring further study, followed by appropriate practical organizational measures.

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Exercise "Lato-74" was also a broad platform for activities of the party-political apparatus. This apparatus fulfilled its tasks satisfactorily. The exercise allowed the party-political organs to analyze and evaluate the political-social situation of the area under its jurisdiction. The problems of this work were differentiated according to the development of the situation played out in the exercise. The work took into consideration the peculiarities of front forces operations on the territory of our own country, in the country of our German ally, and on enemy territory. It was concentrated on tightening brotherly ties with the soldiers of the Soviet Army.

The subject of particular attention of the party-political apparatus was the comprehensive characterization of the enemy. This was especially justified, since the operations were played in particularly reactionary areas of the German Federal Republic. There are located the principle anti-Polish centers, the dense network of displaced persons and militaristic organizations, and a large concentration of hostile emigration. By the way, at present, as the 30th anniversary of the Polish Peoples Republic draws nearer, these organizations are actually intensifying the ideological struggle and psychological diversion. They are directing their activities primarily against our party and the people's government, against the alliance with the Soviet Union. For this reason our daily experiences or propaganda countermeasures were productively utilized in exercise activities.

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In conformance with the guidelines of the exercise, the political apparatus paid much attention to the substance and methods for improving political work under conditions of nuclear war.

Our experiences proved that substantiation of activities related to psychological strengthening of troops for the time of employment of mass destruction weapons is a problem of primary importance.

During the exercise, we took into consideration the strong enemy influence on our troops and our civilian population and the role played in this regard by USA and FRG psychological warfare battalions and companies. The party-political apparatus of the participating commands displayed a good grasp of the policies and substance of enemy psychological actions. The conclusions drawn from conducted analyses constituted supplementary and broadening intelligence material on enemy combined arms.

Finally, it should be emphasized, that we highly appreciate the current party-political activity. This activity contributed effectively to the high morale-political state and discipline of the participating staffs and their support troops.

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Comrades!

Operational competence requires constant refresher practice. Exercises of this nature alone, because of their infrequency, do not guarantee accomplishment of this task. Pressures of daily requirements performed by the central institutions and operational staffs, in some measure, push our primary responsibility of war preparation tasks into the background. As a result, we observe some comrades have certain weaknesses in the field of present-day operational-tactical knowledge, insufficient adherence to specifics, indifference to realities, and insufficient inquisitiveness. Also, we must develop operational reactions and a sense of fighting against time; we should improve efficiency, precision, excellence of staff work in its broad meaning, and be concerned with clarity of terminology, and the like. To a great degree this is a matter of training.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces jointly with the Chief Inspector of Training will submit to me appropriate proposals on this subject matter.

Comrades!

With exercise "Lato-74" we concluded an important phase of improving operational-strategic training of the key cadre of the Polish Armed Forces. The conduct and results of the exercise demonstrated that we gained experience which enriched our know-how in the art of preparing and conducting front operations on the main strategic axis within the unified allied pact.

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The exercise, conducted at a fast pace, was full of suspense and complex operational situations changing rapidly--demanding from the participants good preparation, physical stamina, and understanding of the work rhythm of a large command-staff body. Despite the weaknesses mentioned above, the overall evaluation is very positive. We have well qualified experienced staffs which have at their disposal solid theoretical knowledge, rich experience, and operational insight.

It is with this understanding that we treat the achievements gained during the exercise as a real contribution of the peoples Polish Armed Forces in strengthening the national defense; as a test of soldierly duties inscribed in the anniversary book of our socialist state.

Dear Comrades--the experiences gained in the exercise should be appropriately and fully endorsed for the subsequent phase of training, research work, and the planning process.

Today's critique does not exhaust the total wealth of examples, experiences, and conclusions drawn from it. The broad observations made by the exercise directing staff, the staff, and the umpires--and no doubt, by the participating commanders themselves--should be given appropriate future consideration. This should be done in the course of routine training, by conducting local evaluations and discussions within individual elements, components, and specialties.

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In general, exercise "Lato-74" should--for a long time to come--constitute a source of many organizational, methodological and training inspirations, should increasingly aid achievement of combat readiness of our forces and improvement of operational efficiency of our staffs.

Concluding the critique, I wish to thank the members of the exercise directing staff and the staff, the scenario writers, and the comrades from the umpire and enemy simulating apparatus for their effective and creative participation in preparing and conducting the exercise.

I wish to thank the participating commanders and staff officers for their dedicated work and accomplishment of tasks assigned them.

I also wish to point out the specific, fruitful contribution of the supporting services. Particularly effective was the operational and security performance of the Military Internal Service apparatus which effectively resolved problems confronting it. Communications, transportation and the entire auxiliary apparatus worked well and selflessly, and I commend them for it. I wish to thank every participant in the exercise. I sincerely thank and wish well our Soviet comrades in arms. I wish all of you dear comrades much success.

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Legend to Map 1

1. Outline of Intentions of the Opposing Sides for Exercise "Lato-74"

2. Initial task of the front

Depth of the task: 250-330 km  
Width of the operations zone: 320-400 km  
Duration: 6-7 days  
Average rate of advance: 45-50 km/24 hrs

3. Subsequent task of the front

Depth of the task: 200-300 km  
Width of the operations zone: 300-350 km  
Duration: 4-6 days  
Average rate of advance: 50-60 km/24 hrs

4. Coastal Front

Two armies; one air army

5. 3d Western Front

6. 1st Western Front

Six armies; two air armies

7. Northern Army Group

1st Army Corps (W.Ger.), 12th Army Corps (G.B.), 1st Army Corps (B), 1st Army Corps (Neth.)

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8. 1st Western Front

Four armies; one air army

9. 40th Army

94th, 95th, 96th Motorized Divs; 97th Tank Div

10. 3d Western Front

11th, 12th, 13th Armies; 14th Air Army; 11th Airborne Div; 31st and 33d Reserve Mechanized Divs; front 8th Operational-Tactical Missile Brigade

11. 41st Army

101st, 102d, 103d Motorized Divs; 104th Tank Div; army 36th Operational-Tactical Missile Brigade

12. 3d Western Front

Four armies; one air army

13. 2d Western Front

Three armies; one air army

14. 60th Army

47th, 48th Motorized Divs; 49th Tank Div

15. Central Army Group

23d Army Corps (W. Ger.); 3d, 5th, 7th Army Corps (US); 18th Airborne Corps (US-W. Ger.)

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16. Tactical Air Forces

17. Subsequent Task of the front

Depth of the task: 250 km  
Width of the operations zone: 220 km  
Duration: 4-6 days  
Average rate of advance: 45-50 km/24 hrs

18. Initial Task of the front

Depth of the task: 200 km  
Width of the operations zone: 170-200 km  
Duration: 5-6 days  
Average rate of advance: 35-40 km/24 hrs

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Legend to Map 2

1. Outline of Intentions of the Opposing Sides for Exercise "Lato-74" (in the zone of the 3d Western Front)
2. 3d Western Front  
11th, 12th, 13th Armies; 41st Army (allied); 14th Air Army; 11th Airborne Div; 31st, 33d Reserve Mechanized Divs; front 8th Operational-Tactical Missile Brigade
3. 2d Western Front  
Three armies; one air army
4. 3d Army Corps (US) D+3  
4th Mechanized Div; 2d Armored Div; 1st Air Armored Cavalry Div
5. Central Army Group  
2d, 3d Army Corps (W. Ger.); 3d, 5th, 7th Army Corps (US); 18th Airborne Corps (US-W. Ger.)
6. 18th Airborne Corps (US-W. Ger.)  
82d Airborne Div (US); 101st Air Cavalry Div; 1st Airborne Div (W. Ger.)
7. 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces  
1830 aircraft (1056 nuclear weapons carriers)

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8. 7th Army Corps (US)  
1st, 3d Mechanized Divs; 1st Armored Div
9. Initial task of the front
10. Subsequent task of the front

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Glossary to Map 1 and 2

A - army

(A) - US forces

ABROT - army operational-tactical missile brigade

AL - air army

AP(F) - field army (French forces)

(B) - Belgian forces

BAR - missile artillery brigade

BPD - airborne brigade

CGA- Central Army Group

cztery dyw = four divisions

(D) - Danish forces

D - D-day

D3 - D-day + 3

D 5/6 - D-day + 5/6

DAR - missile artillery division

DD - assault landing division

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Des - assault landing  
DKP - air cavalry division  
DKP Panc - air armored cavalry division  
DP - infantry division  
d"P" - "Pershing" battalion  
D Panc - armored division  
DPD - airborne division  
DPG - mountain infantry division  
DPZmot - motorized infantry division  
DZ - mechanized division  
DZmot - motorized division  
FBROT - front operational-tactical missile brigade  
GODes - assault landing operations group  
(H) - Dutch forces (Neth)  
JKA - Jutland Army Corps  
KA - army corps  
KON - convoy

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KOPK - National Air Defense Corps  
KPD - airborne corps  
NBJ - nuclear weapons carrier  
(NZ) - West German forces (W. Ger.)  
par - missile artillery regiment  
piec dyw = five divisions  
ppd - airborne regiment  
PTSP - allied tactical air forces (NATO)  
RDZ - reserve mechanized division  
rp panc - antitank reconnaissance  
samodz - independent  
SOW - Silesian Military District  
spr"P" - "Pershing" separate missile regiment  
S-tow - number of aircraft  
(W Br) - British Forces (GB)  
WSD - forward command post

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z - from

Zach - Western

3D - three divisions

~~5D~~

D3 = five divisions by D-day + 3


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
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MAP 1

SCHEMATIC



3FBROT




### Legend

- ==== Situation and Intentions of the opposing sides on D-1
- Situation as of 1100 hrs on D-day
- ==== Situation and outline of decisions of the opposing sides on D4/5
- x-x- Operations of the 3rd western Front according to the "POMORZE" plan
- ..... Operations of the 3rd western Front according to the "SUDETY" plan
- Participation of the 14th Air Army in air operations

Classified as: Secret  
 Exempt from general  
 Declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
 Exemption category: 5B  
 Declassification date: Indefinite





# ZADANIE BLIŻSZE FRONTU

Głębokość zad.	200 km
Szerokość p.	170-200 km
Czas trwania	100
Srednie tempo	35-40 km/dobę

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# YS ZAMIARU ST

2

## ZADANIE BLIŻSZE FRONTU

Głębokość zadania 250-330 km  
Szerokość pasa działania 320-400 km  
Czas trwania 6-7 dob  
Średnie tempo: natarcia 45-50 km/dob

4

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8

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



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3

**ZADANIE DALSZE FRONTU**

Głębokość zadania 200-300 km  
Szerokość pasa działania 300-350 km  
Czas trwania 4-6 tyg.  
Średnie tempo natarcia 50-60 km dobie






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(W PASIE 3 FRONTU 2



„LATO -74”

