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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

29 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Methods of Studying  
the Probable Enemy During Exercises

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on articles from a ~~SECRET~~ Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article describes the methods used in exercises by the Polish Armed Forces for the preparation, insertion, and flow of realistic intelligence information on the probable enemy (NATO). It sets forth the amount, sources, and types of information, the use of mock-ups of NATO combat equipment, and the use of foreign-language material. It also describes the training of radio-electronic reconnaissance troops, which includes the use of tape recordings of actual NATO radio traffic. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article appeared in Issue No. 14, which was published in 1977.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the [redacted] Codeword [redacted].

John N. McMahon [redacted]

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NCS made no additional redactions to this document.  
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Page 2 of 9 Pages

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Page 3 of 9 Pages



## Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY POLAND/WARSAW PACT

DATE OF  
INFO. 1977

DATE 29 March 1979

SUBJECT

WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Methods of Studying the Probable Enemy  
During Exercises

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article was written by General of Arms E. Molczyk of the Polish Armed Forces. This article describes the methods used in exercises by the Polish Armed Forces for the preparation, insertion, and flow of realistic intelligence information on the probable enemy (NATO). It sets forth the amount, sources, and types of information, the use of mock-ups of NATO combat equipment, and the use of foreign-language material. It also describes the training of radio-electronic reconnaissance troops, which includes the use of tape recordings of actual NATO radio traffic. This article appeared in Issue No. 14, which was published in 1977.

End of Summary

Comment:

General of Arms Eugeniusz Molczyk also wrote "For Higher Quality of Combat Training" which was published in Przegląd Wojsk Lądowych, No. 1, January 1976. He has been identified as Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Polish Armed Forces and as a Candidate Member of the Central Committee. He was decorated in October 1968 with the Order of Lenin and previously was decorated with the Order of the Banner of Labor - Second Class.

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Methods of Studying the Probable Enemy During Exercises

by

General of Arms E. MOLCZYK  
Chief Inspector of Troop Training,  
Vice Minister of National Defense of the Polish People's Republic

For a number of years during exercises conducted by the Polish Armed Forces, information on the enemy was received by those undergoing training in the form of oral or written generalized materials which were prepared, as a rule, in advance. We found out that this method of collecting information on the enemy led to a number of negative results during the exercises. First and foremost, the method did not fully enable commanders, staffs, and reconnaissance organs to work in a creative manner, because the reconnaissance information, in keeping with the plan of the directing body, was transmitted through the umpires in the form of oral information, either via the operating communications channels or in person, as well as in the form of diagrams, maps, and summaries; i.e., in generalized fashion. All this oversimplified the process whereby information on the enemy is collected and analyzed.

As a result of the experience obtained, we have worked out and introduced into the training process a method realistically representing the sources of the reconnaissance information received by those being trained. Essentially this method consists in having the information come in through various sources by methods and ways which resemble to the maximum those which actually exist under combat conditions. The information is transmitted to the different staffs and reconnaissance organs, as well as to those subunits conducting the battle, without interruption in conformity with the tasks to be performed by the troops and with the decision on the employment of the reconnaissance forces and means.

Those being trained receive the information in the form of: documents, insignia, and shoulderboards found on enemy soldiers either killed or taken prisoner; prisoner-of-war statements recorded on paper or magnetic tape; operating manuals for combat equipment, registration and tactical numbers, and identification marks found in destroyed or damaged vehicles, helicopters, aircraft, and other combat equipment; radio messages

TS #798078  
Copy # 3

from intercepted conversations, reports, and instructions transmitted through the enemy's communications system; aerial reconnaissance information received from on board the aircraft or helicopters using procedure tables. These data are recorded beforehand on magnetic tape and passed on to those being trained through the various means of communications, or else directly from the tape recorder. In addition, staffs are given photographs, photo studies, and photomosaics, indicating the enemy's defense areas, crossing points, and other installations; and also photographs of terrain sectors showing the most important terrain factors in the combat actions zone. Reconnaissance data arrive also in the form of sound and visual effects produced as a result of employing technical means, including simulators of enemy fire means, targets, and other objects.\*

All materials are prepared in the language of the probable enemy and graphic documents are drawn up using the enemy's conventional signs and observing all specific norms and rules.

In preparing the materials for each of the sources from which they are given to those being trained, we take into account the fact that in a real situation, reconnaissance information will have varying degrees of reliability, accuracy, and completeness; it will also frequently be fragmentary and even contradictory at times. Consequently, only by the creative activity of commanders and staffs will it be possible to determine the degree of reliability and the value and accuracy of this information. It is owing precisely to their creative activity that a realistic and intelligent notion of on-going events, the situation, and possible enemy actions can be arrived at.

The amount of informational materials to be prepared depends mainly on for whom they are destined, as well as on the nature of the combat actions of our own troops and of the opposing enemy.

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\* Simulators can be set up in any terrain at actual or reduced ranges, and can be controlled by wire as well as by radio using a control panel. In addition to simulators of fire means, various types of pop-up targets which are raised by special erectors can be used.

Relying on the experience of exercises, including those carried out for the purpose of determining the capabilities of obtaining information on the enemy, we have established that, for example, for a motorized rifle (tank) regiment operating in the first echelon, it is possible that the daily flow of information may amount to 23 to 30 sets of service identity cards and personal documents of enemy soldiers; five to ten combat documents (combat instructions, orders, reports, diagrams, maps, and so forth), 50 percent of them concerning the squad, platoon, and company (battery) level, 30 percent the battalion and regiment, and 20 percent the higher levels; 10 to 15 service documents of various kinds (logs and operating manuals of combat vehicles and weapons, field post office numbers, tactical markings on motor vehicles, and others); and 20 to 25 tape-recorded orders, reports, and conversations which are transmitted by the enemy's technical means of communications (the quantitative ratio for the various levels being the same as that for the combat documents).

In exercises with motorized rifle and tank subunits, the amount of information passed out on the enemy is reduced. The contents of this information in large measure will deal with the lowest levels of control and, as a rule, is sent to squads or platoons.

During exercises in which defensive operations are being mastered, it has been noted that the amount of information on the enemy, taking into account the characteristics of that type of combat, decreases on the average by half, with the exception of tape-recorded radio intercepts which can increase by 20 to 30 percent in comparison with exercises involving the mastering of offensive actions.

In this connection it is advisable that around 10 percent of the information about the enemy contain intentionally used elements of deception whose detection will require collation and comparison with data received from other sources.

Based on the operational-tactical situation established in an exercise, as well as on the aims and training topics which are to be worked out, a plan for feeding intelligence information is worked out. This plan is later refined in accordance with the decisions made by the commander and the reconnaissance plan of the unit or large unit being trained.

We believe that in command-staff and one-sided exercises with troops, the basic method of receiving information on the enemy will be the one set forth above. As concerns two-sided exercises with troops, this information will be supplementary to that received from the reconnaissance organs and

TS #798078  
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troops operating realistically. In the event that no sources of information are available during an exercise when at the same time it is essential to receive appropriate information, the latter will be indicated in advance in the plan and transmitted during the exercise by the directing body or umpires.

Based on the two years that the Polish Armed Forces have employed the method set forth above for introducing reconnaissance data into the process of training staffs and troops, we have concluded that it promotes the achievement of better results in the study of the probable enemy.

I would now like to briefly touch upon the matter of improving the process of training radioelectronic reconnaissance units and subunits. We have succeeded in achieving that aim by introducing in exercises a method under which they conduct tactical exercises over reduced distances. This method is based on observing the following two mandatory conditions: radioelectronic reconnaissance subunits must be deployed adhering to the principles of their disposition and methods of operation that are characteristic under combat conditions, but at reduced distances (on a scale of from 1:1,000 to 1:100 depending on the level in question). To set up a radioelectronic situation, instead of using combat radioelectronic means, simulators must be used, including the radio sets that are to be employed for these purposes.

Heretofore, when training and developing the teamwork of radioelectronic reconnaissance subunits, their means would be set up over actual distances. To simulate the enemy's radioelectronic devices, naturally in limited numbers, we used our own combat means, but these had technical parameters diverging greatly from the analogous devices of the NATO countries. All this rendered it impossible during exercises to set up a radioelectronic situation maximally approaching a real situation.

The employment of simulators operating over reduced distances enables us to eliminate certain shortcomings in the previously employed method, and to a significant degree promotes more realism in the work of subunits when conducting radioelectronic reconnaissance. This also enables us to use actual prerecorded radio emissions from the control networks of NATO forces, and this is vitally important in the training of subunits, especially of those which, because they are too far away from the disposition areas of NATO forces, do not have direct contact with these forces.

TS #798078  
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The employment of radio stations and simulators emitting signals of limited power over reduced distances permits us to depict more realistically the operation of the enemy's main radio networks and radars, as well as to set up a radioelectronic situation saturated with data in conformity with the operational-tactical background that has developed in the exercise. At the same time the [exercise] director has the opportunity to check and evaluate the work of those being trained and, depending on the results, to take appropriate measures immediately.

The introduction of the method under discussion not only creates conditions for more intensive training and the development of teamwork in radioelectronic reconnaissance subunits, but also considerably reduces materiel expenditures (approximately by a factor of ten). After taking into account the educational merits and economic factors, we introduced this method into the training process for all radioelectronic reconnaissance units and subunits.

To study the armament and combat equipment of the probable enemy, the Polish Armed Forces have prepared mock-ups of the main types of combat equipment of the NATO armed forces and are using them in various exercises. They were made to actual scale and are marked with the identifying numbers and markings employed by the forces of the probable enemy. The use of such mock-ups enables us to develop in trainees practical skill in identifying combat equipment on the basis of its design characteristics and external markings. During troop exercises, the mock-ups are used as reconnaissance targets and as targets for antitank guided missile and artillery firing and for air strikes.

By realistically representing the sources from which information on the enemy is obtained, we are able to train commanders, staffs, and reconnaissance organs under conditions that maximally approach reality. At the same time, the new training techniques and methods help the personnel study in greater depth the probable enemy, his combat equipment, organization, and principles for the conduct of combat actions.

The employment of foreign language materials during exercises motivates personnel to study the language of the probable enemy, without which it is difficult to completely and effectively exploit the information obtained.

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


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Page 9 of 9 Pages

The techniques and methods set forth above which are employed in the Polish Armed Forces are constantly being developed and improved, thus contributing to a better and more effective accomplishment of the tasks of training the troops for combat.



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