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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : [Redacted] Report

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John N. McMahon

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Poland/Warsaw Pact

DATE OF INFO. 1979

DATE 28 November 1979

SUBJECT

Wartime Statute of the Combined Armed Forces

SOURCE Documentary

SUMMARY:

This report is a translation of a Polish General Staff memorandum commenting on a draft Statute of the Combined Armed Forces for wartime and classified SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE. Polish General Staff and Ministry of Foreign Affairs comments are critical to the point where many provisions are considered unacceptable and their exclusion or revision is strongly recommended. Polish objections mainly reflect deep concern over loss of party, political, and economic control of the Polish Armed Forces during wartime subordination to the Soviet-dominated Supreme High Command, which is a loss of national sovereignty for Poland and other Warsaw Pact member countries. The Polish General Staff expresses its concern that defense of Polish territory is relegated to a low-priority status under the Supreme High Command. Another major Polish objection is the proposal that all political activity be centralized at the Combined Armed Forces level, rather than by individual national military and political organs.

It is noted that the security classification of this report is unusual in that it appears on all pages, rather than on the title page only, the usual Polish practice. This may reflect the delicacy of the subject matter.


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MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES

SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE

MEMORANDUM

on the Wartime Statute of the
Combined Armed Forces

In accordance with the Political Consultative Committee resolution of 23 November 1978 the Combined Command is engaged, together with the ministries of national defense of the Warsaw Pact member states, in working out the draft Statute of the Combined Armed Forces (CAF) and of organs directing them during wartime; the draft is to be studied at the next session of the Committee of Defense Ministers, whereupon it will be ratified through a special Political Consultative Committee resolution.

We have now received for coordination a draft version of this document from the CAF Combined Command, with the notation that it has taken into consideration proposals and views of the allied army leaderships. (The translated draft Statute was presented to the party-political leadership of the Polish Peoples Republic on 6 (10) September 1979).

A. GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE DOCUMENT


The draft Statute contains regulations declarative in nature, together with those which pertain to defensive

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preparation in peacetime, and finally statutory provisions for wartime; thus, the document is disjointed and untidy in style. It consists of general regulations, and nine chapters of provisions expressed in various styles, not always with sufficient precision. They deal with the Supreme High Command of the Warsaw Pact member states Combined Armed Forces, High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operations (TMO), Combined Fleets and principles of AA defense, CAF commands in the theaters of military operations, political work, rear echelon and special-technical support, relations between the CAF High Commands of the TMO and the national military leaderships, and matters of financial support.

In its context the document deviates significantly from other drafts passed to us informally at the working level.

In the present version the proposed statutory provisions are based on the premise that common defense demands utilization of all political, economic, scientific, technical and military potential and, thus, goes far beyond strictly military matters, entering deeply into almost all basic fields of activity of state organs of the socialist countries. Thus, we see that insufficient differentiation has been made in regard to the political direction of war by the Warsaw Pact nations and commanding the Combined Armed Forces; also, no consideration has been given to the problem of political direction (sovereignty) of the national armed forces. In a certain sense the distinction has been eliminated between forces assigned to the CAF and the remaining national forces and state resources under vested authority of the party-state leaderships of individual allied countries; these are the forces and resources which serve to support the functioning of the government and the existence of the nation.

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The document consists basically of regulations bestowing wide-ranging authority on the Supreme High Command (SHC) of the CAF and on the High Commands of the CAF in the theaters of military operations which would enable central and operative means to shift the Warsaw Pact country defense potential from peacetime to wartime state, and utilization of allied forces and means for achieving war objectives in the theaters of military operations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that certain of these regulations touch on matters which fall, according to constitutional provisions, within the competence of the highest national organs of state authority (e.g., declaration of a state of war or wartime state [stan wojny lub wojenny] and, therefore, transition from peacetime to wartime state).


The draft of the statute introduces several new provisions going beyond those which are now in force, and which may bring about serious economic consequences already in peacetime (assignment of new forces and formation of reserves which would constitute Supreme High Command reserves, the necessity of additional investments in the command and communications systems, and other matters). These issues completely neglect, however, such matters as provisions for jurisdiction in relation to members of the national armed forces by organs of administration of justice while applying laws of the given country and simultaneously observing the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the Warsaw Pact member country on whose territory allied forces are temporarily operating or stationed.

Despite certain deficiencies in the subject statute the Ministry of National Defense, in coordination with the Organizational Department of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

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? and Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers, and guided by the all-important goal which is the strengthening of coalitional defense where the decisive role is played by the USSR and its armed forces, supports the subject draft. This support is accompanied by remarks and substantive proposals which bear on national rights and constitutional and legal provisions of the Polish Peoples Republic, and which should be editorially more precisely defined.

B. DETAILED COMMENTS

General regulations


They contain miscellaneous provisions and must be generally tidied up.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that Article 1, which in a declarative form confirms and elaborates upon allied obligations inherent in the Warsaw Pact (WP), should be adapted to the text of WP Article 4 and should at the same time specify that the goal of the Combined Armed Forces is defense of WP member states in case of an armed attack in Europe. However, matters taken up in Article 2, which deal with functions and tasks of the Political Consultative Committee are already contained in WP Article 6 which is a legal act of the highest order pertaining to the WP. For this reason these questions should be excluded from the Statute.

It seems also necessary that a more precise interpretation be used in the document to define the term "national military leaderships". In our opinion this term should mean only the ministries of national defense and the general (main) staffs and not--as the draft states--also commands of branches of the armed forces, operational large units and

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other command organs. This would permit avoidance of many ambiguities appearing in other portions of the document.

I. CAF of the WP Member States

This chapter clarifies the concept of Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states in wartime, discusses their structure (division into strategic groupings in the theaters of military operations and Supreme High Command (SHC) reserves), principles for establishing and possibly changing combat composition and personnel strength of forces assigned to the CAF, transition of the CAF from peacetime to wartime state, and subordination to the SHC.


In defining the concept of the Combined Armed Forces (Article 5), their purpose was, in our opinion, treated too broadly and with too many generalities. We consider it necessary to specify, in accordance with Article 4 of the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation, that they exist to repulse aggression in Europe directed at one or several Warsaw Pact member states, and to conduct operations in the European Theater of War.

In its structure the CAF (Article 6), in addition to strategic groupings of the theater of military operations, also contains reserves of the Supreme High Command. These reserves are to include, in addition to forces assigned to the CAF which were not placed within the composition of CAF strategic groupings, also specially assigned reserves of material and technical means of WP member states. In addition, the possibility is anticipated of utilizing in the TMO (after coordination with the national military command), in the interest of and in accordance with the SHC and CAF High Commands, all military formations, schools, and command

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and supply organs remaining in subordination to the national military commands. In practice this means the possibility of utilizing, in addition to forces assigned on the basis of bilateral agreements, the additional defense potential of the state in the CAF interest at the expense of curtailing the functional capability of the government and its internal front. For this reason we consider that the additional assignment of forces and means, and of services on behalf of the CAF, can be brought about only as a result of bilateral agreements between the leadership of the CAF and the national government and military leaderships of the Warsaw Pact member states.

We hold a similar position on the question of defining and changing the combat composition and personnel strength of assigned CAF naval and ground forces (Article 7). In our view this can occur both in peacetime and in wartime by authority of the national government leadership, in peacetime on the recommendation of the CAF Commander in Chief or at the suggestion of the national military leadership, and in wartime on the recommendation of the Supreme High Command or the CAF Commander in Chief in the TMO.


In accordance with valid Polish legislation there is a need to revise the statement that in case of a sudden attack naval and ground forces are to shift to a wartime state on the basis of the national military leadership (Article 9). In our situation this can occur--in accordance with National Defense Committee Resolution No. 01/75 on State Defense Readiness--only by regulation of the government leadership (National Defense Committee).

It is also necessary to replace the general phrase "allied state" with the more precise term, in the context of matters constituting the subject of statutory regulations, of "Warsaw Pact state."

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II. Supreme High Command of the CAF of the Warsaw Pact Member States

This chapter deals with the creation of the SHC and its tasks together with the function of Warsaw Pact member state representatives at the SHC. The essence of provisions contained therein is to guarantee a central wartime CAF command.

In our view the SHC problems are treated too generally. There is no mention, for instance, of who brings it into existence, and where. We judge that SHC authority may encompass a wide range of questions connected with direction of the war effort on a world-wide scale. As a result there should be a determination of the range of SHC authority in relation to the CAF (by specifying that this concerns direction of operations in the European Theater of War) and eventually to determine the relationship of the CAF to the Political Consultative Committee.


The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that the content of Article 10 requires substantive additions. There is need for a clear statement that the SHC will be composed of national command representatives of WP member states and at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff plenipotentiaries of general (main) staffs of WP member states will be represented.

Also, in our opinion, questions pertaining to representatives of the WP member states at the SHC were treated much too generally. We think it is necessary that there be an unequivocal statement on their rank and authority.

We also believe that this chapter should specify the mutual relationships between the general (main) staffs of

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the WP member states and the USSR General Staff acting as the SHC command organ. After all, within the authority of these organs are, among other things, matters which also necessitate mutual coordination in wartime, such as, intelligence outside the TMO, matters of estimated annual plans, deliveries of equipment, and civil defense problems.

III. CAF High Command in the TMO

This is a lengthy chapter comprising about 25 percent of the entire document. It describes in detail the composition of CAF High Commands of the TMO and duties of individual operating personnel; it also specifies the principles for establishment of organizational structure of these commands and bringing them up to full strength. The essence of these regulations is the establishment of functional principles of these commands in wartime; simultaneously these principles confer on the commands certain powers already in peacetime.


In regard to the composition of the CAF High Command in the TMO (Article 14) we intend to propose that in the draft statute the proposed CAF deputy commander in chief in the TMO from an allied country should be the commander of the national operational large unit comprising part of the CAF composition; we also propose to continue backing our former proposal on assignment of duties to deputy chief of staff for national army matters.

In our opinion, the draft statute concept which gives authority to the CAF commander in chief in the TMO, and which states that he acquires full authority in the direction of operations of troops subordinate to him (Article 16), is too broad. We consider it desirable to state precisely that this refers to direction of combat operations.

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
Article 18 of the statute grants CAF Headquarters in the TMO authority to control transition of naval and ground forces from peacetime to wartime state. This assertion directly contradicts our position that the question of transition from a peacetime to wartime state is a prerogative of national leadership. For this reason we think that the CAF Headquarters may only cooperate with national military leaderships in implementing plans pertaining to transition of forces assigned to the CAF from a peacetime to wartime state and to command [dowodzic] them during their operational deployment (not to direct [kierowac] them in the broad meaning of the word).


The authority of CAF deputy commanders in chief has, in our opinion, been unnecessarily restricted, even if only in regard to matters connected with utilization of forces of a given country. It would be desirable to expand the authority of these deputies at least in regard to their participation in organizing cooperation in the coalition system.

We adopt a contrary view of the question of ratification of organizational structure and personnel strength of command organs of the CAF Commander in Chief in the TMO (Article 27). Because this is connected, as we surmise, with establishment of a "key" ("klucz") for filling meaningful positions, we think the CAF Headquarters proposals in this matter should be ratified by governments of appropriate countries located in a given TMO, and not by the CAF Commander in Chief. We also believe that this article should contain a restatement of the existing principle of proportional participation of armed forces representatives of individual states in the composition of coalition command organs.

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IV. Combined Fleets

This chapter deals with composition and principles of commanding the Combined Baltic Fleet (CBF) and the Combined Black Sea Fleet. The essence of provisions contained in the chapter--as it pertains to the CBF--is assurance of a centralized utilization of the total forces of the USSR Baltic Fleet, Polish Peoples Republic Navy and German Democratic Republic Peoples' Navy under command of the USSR Baltic Fleet.

The document does not state when the Combined Fleets are to come into existence. In our opinion they should be activated in wartime, and this should be unequivocally specified in the statute.

The draft envisages inclusion in the CBF of the entire fleet of the Polish Peoples Republic (PPR). Acceptance of such a formulation would mean agreement to exclude defense of the PPR seacoast as a function of the national leadership, and its transfer to the coalition leadership. For obvious reasons we cannot accept such a position and propose the specification that [only] the naval forces of the PPR [detached and] assigned are to form part of the composition of the Combined Baltic Fleet.

Examination shows that the command system of the Combined Fleets is treated differently from that of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations. * While there is no prejudgment as to who will be Commanders in Chief of the CAF in the TMO, in the case of the Combined Fleets it is uniquely asserted that USSR commanders of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets will command the Combined Fleets. Because Combined Fleet commanders are to be at the same time CAF deputy commanders for naval affairs in the TMO, such an

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assertion is contradictory to Article 25 which speaks of assignment already in peacetime on the basis of resolutions of Warsaw Pact member state governments of key personnel to High Command of the CAF in the TMO, and also of deputy commanders in chief in the TMO. In light of the above, it is proposed that Article 31, dealing with command of Combined Fleets, be formulated as follows:

Article 31. Command of the Combined Baltic and Black Sea Fleets is exercised by appropriate Commanders in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operations through their deputies for naval affairs, which simultaneously serve as commanders of the Combined Fleets (analogous to Point 37 dealing with air defense command).

We will take into consideration--just as in the case of the CAF High Command in the TMO--creation of Military Councils of the Combined Fleets.

There is also a need for a more precise explanation regarding the matter of national naval operational groups in the Combined Fleet Headquarters (are they to be assigned already in peacetime?).


In our opinion, the authority of the Combined Fleet deputy commanders, who will be the naval commanders of individual states, has been restricted. We believe they should participate fully in commanding the coalition large unit, i.e., the Combined Fleet, and, in addition, exercise direct command of the entire naval forces of their own country.

V. Principles of Air Defense

The essence of regulations in this chapter is

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


establishment of an integrated air defense in the TMO which would encompass all forces and means assigned to engage air targets. This is a new solution. It means that in reference to the PPR National Air Defense (NAD), the NAD will be subordinated to the CAF Commander in Chief in the TMO through his deputy for air defense matters, (who serves at the same time as deputy commander of Air Defense Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states) and not, as heretofore [when he was subordinated], directly to the Commander in Chief of Air Defense Forces of the WP member states. Such a solution assuredly will increase the possibilities of utilizing PPR NAD forces and means (particularly fighter aviation) on behalf of the CAF which engages in operations in the Western Theater of Military Operations. This, in turn, would under certain situations be accomplished at the expense of a weakened air defense of the national territory. For that reason subordination of National Air Defense Forces to the CAF Commander in Chief in the Western TMO is not too favorable for Poland. In any case such a solution is a glaring contradiction of regulations in Article 5 of the Statute of Unified System of Air Defense of Warsaw Pact Countries, which was accepted by the Political Consultative Committee in 1969. General revision of all of Chapter V in the spirit of the above-mentioned document is advisable, and should this be impossible we need at least to supplement the existing text with a statement that utilization of NAD forces and means outside the national territory may take place only upon coordination with the national leadership of the given country.


VI. Principles of Commanding the CAF in TMO

The chapter concerns primarily the unified system of CAF command and communications achieved and organized ahead of time, already in peacetime. Essentially its provisions enable the Supreme High Command and CAF commands in the TMO to effect an immediate assumption of CAF command, in case of need.

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
Regulations proposed in the draft relate to the necessity of assignment by the government in peacetime of additional means needed to support execution of these regulations. Final consequences would demand sanctioning of a formulation to include in the unified command and communications system also national operational large unit command points. This would require that we prepare in peacetime appropriate front, individual army and navy command points, which would call for significant additional fiscal outlays. We propose for this reason the peacetime inclusion in the unified command and communications system of command points of national military leaderships, and not of national operational large unit commands.

The CAF communications system in the TMO is proposed to be based on command point communications centers, and on the basic military and governmental communications nets of the WP member States (Article 41). Such a construct could authorize (under certain conditions) unlimited use for the CAF of the above-mentioned net. For this reason we consider it necessary that this construct be defined by wording to the effect that this use proceed in accordance with prior bilateral government agreements. Exception is also taken to the content of another paragraph in the same article (41). Its retention in the statute would call for creation in the Polish Armed Forces of special communications units (at least a brigade) in order to provide communications with CAF High Command in the TMO and with the Supreme High Command. In view of the generally sanctioned principle that communications with subordinates is provided by superiors we consider it appropriate that the wording be supplemented by a statement referring to utilizing for this purpose chiefly communications units of the high commands.

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Article 43 speaks, among other things, about CAF High Command representatives of Warsaw Pact member states stationed in peacetime with the military districts (fleets), armies, and tactical large units. At the moment there are no such representatives with the Polish Armed Forces, and for that reason we propose--considering the possibility that such representatives are with the armed forces of other WP countries--that we employ the more general term of "lower-level representatives."

However, we consider it advisable to specify that dispatch of operational groups of the CAF High Command to the TMO, and of Combined Fleet Command to subordinate operational large units of allied forces, would begin at the moment of transition from a peacetime to wartime state.

VII. Principles of Political Work


The content of this chapter is truly unprecedented when viewed against present principles. Its substance is establishment of coalition direction of political work in the CAF.

Acceptance of the principle of coalition direction of political work contradicts the present practice, and also existing provisions in this field. We believe that, in formulating political work principles within the coalition, we could consider positively experiences of the 1st Army of the Polish Armed Forces during World War II.

Without denying the need for creation of a coalition political organ in the CAF High Command in the TMO, we believe that role should be limited exclusively to coordination of political work in the allied national armies without giving it authority to direct this work. Such an authority should rest exclusively within the national direction of the party and the armed forces. (Detailed proposed changes are contained in the enclosed text of the draft statute).

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VII. Principles of Rear Support and

IX. Principles of Specialized and Technical Support

The essence of the proposed provisions is a guarantee of conditions for efficient and maximal utilization by the Supreme High Command and the CAF High Command in the TMO of rear and special-technical forces and means and also, to a certain degree, of the communications infrastructure, production and repair potential and of material resources of individual countries in order to satisfy fully the needs of the CAF in a given TMO.

The consequence of this comprehensive approach to matters of rear and special-technical support would be for Poland the necessity to perform additional services on behalf of the CAF--also in peacetime and, as we may judge, without any financial compensation. For this reason we see the need to introduce several substantive definitions, by establishing conditions for the possible use, by coalition command organs, of other forces and means than those assigned by the given country to the CAF; these conditions would be established in coordination with national leaderships (either in day by day coordination or coordination based on bilateral protocols). (Detailed proposed changes are contained in the enclosed text of the draft report).

X. Relation Between CAF High Commands in the TMO and National Military Leaderships of WP Member States

The proposed wording of the text of the chapter does not correspond to the title, because basically it does not explicitly address the relation between the CAF High Commands in the TMO and the national military leaderships; also a large portion of its provisions pertains to matters which are the subject of Chapters I and III.

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We cannot accept the wording of Article 58 to the effect that national military leaderships operate on the basis of directives and guidelines of the Supreme High Command, and of Article 60 stating that national military leaderships are to ensure full and timely execution of decisions and guidelines of the SHC. Such a formulation would appear to sanction subordination of national military leaderships of the WP member states to the SHC.

Also, in our opinion, the document pertaining to the CAF contains superfluous details of the obligations of national military leaderships; should this be brought up, it may be asserted that they implement decisions and guidelines of the national government leaderships.

In our opinion, in light of the above, Chapter X could be omitted from the Statute with simultaneous elucidation of relations between CAF High Commands in the TMO and the national government and military leaderships being taken up in the introductory part of the document (General Regulations), and shift some of the text of Articles 58, 59, and 62 to the appropriate articles in Chapters I and III (16, 9, 28). Article 61 is, however, entirely superfluous.


XI. Financial Support

The guiding thought in provisions contained in this chapter is the preparation of budgets for CAF High Commands in the TMO. The percentile share of the PPR, proposed in the draft, of the CAF High Command in the Western TMO reflects proportionally our actual participation in the budget of the CAF High Command of WP member States in peacetime. However, considering the possibility of changes in the composition of the CAF in the TMO (also noted in the draft project, Article 64) it would appear that in order to avoid the necessity of making changes required in such a

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case, including changes in the percentile share of individual states in the budget of CAF High Command in the TMO, it would be more desirable to retain the present principles for establishment of one total budget for all the CAF and retain the present rate of contributions (PPR-13.5 percent); financing of individual CAF High Commands in the TMO should be in proportion to actual needs at a given moment.

In addition to this, in order to prevent a possible uncontrolled rise of expenditures connected with expanding the Western TMO, we propose a complete rewriting of Article 64 (proposals are in the text of the document).

ATTACHMENTS [not available]:

1. Schematic framework of CAF High Command organs (as proposed in presentation of PPR Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
2. CAF command structure (according to CAF wartime draft Statute).
3. Translation of the CAF wartime draft Statute.
4. Wartime CAF draft Statute in Russian language.

General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces

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