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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS : Preparation and Reporting of Proposals of the Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery on the Combat Employment of Rocket Troops and Artillery in a Front Offensive Operation

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons, the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation from Russian of the lesson involving the planning by a front chief of rocket troops and artillery for an initial nuclear missile strike and conventional artillery preparation and fire support in an operation in the northern part of West Germany.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

JN John N. McMahon

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON NO. 1c : Preparation and Reporting of
Proposals of the Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery on the Combat
Employment of Rocket Troops and Artillery in a Front Offensive Operation

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students acting as front chiefs of rocket troops and artillery in planning an initial nuclear strike with 360 nuclear missiles in the area of NATO's Northern Army Group. The report outlines the tasks, NATO targets to be hit, main axes of attack, Soviet missile and artillery strength, allocation of nuclear missiles; tasks, allocation, and densities of artillery; and the time factors affecting the movement, deployment, and launch preparations of missile units.

End of Summary

Comment:

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this lesson probably equate as follows:

Brown -- West Germany

Blue -- Great Britain

Lilac -- Belgium

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Lesson No. 1c

I. Lesson subject: "Preparation and reporting of proposals of the Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery on the combat employment of rocket troops and artillery in a front offensive operation".

II. Estimated time:

- for group lessons under an instructor -- 2 hours;
- for individual study by students -- 3 hours;
- total -- 5 hours.

III. Training objectives of the lesson:

-- to impart to the students the practice of in-depth and thoroughly sizing up the tasks of the rocket troops and artillery in an operation, estimating their situation and condition, and through these processes, reaching sound conclusions;

-- to give the students practice in making operational-tactical calculations concerning the combat employment of rocket troops and artillery;

-- to instruct the students in the presentation of consistent, brief, clear, and complete proposals to the front commander on the combat employment of the rocket troops and artillery in an operation;

-- to improve the methodology of making calculations regarding the combat employment of rocket troops and artillery;

-- to investigate matters concerning destruction of the enemy by nuclear and fire means.

IV. The method of conducting the lessons -- group exercise on maps and in a classroom.

V. Methodological recommendations on preparing the students for the lessons.

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At the beginning of the students' individual preparation for the lesson, the directors of the groups will recommend at group briefings, as necessary, that the students:

-- study the /lesson/ literature paying particular attention to /acquiring/ a firm knowledge of the organization of the missile and artillery large units and units and of the tactical-technical characteristics of missile complexes and artillery systems, the norms for the preparation of missiles, the stages of readiness of rocket troops and artillery, missile large units and units, delivery vehicles, missiles, and warheads; devoting 60 minutes to this;

-- draw up the proposals of the front Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery concerning the combat employment of rocket troops and artillery in the operation (dealing with the matters set forth in the assignment). Additionally, two students will be assigned the individual projects of "Substantiating the allocation of missiles by tasks and front formations"; 120 minutes are to be allotted to the preparation of the proposals.

VI. Procedure for the conduct of Lesson 1c -- 90 minutes:

* < 1. As concerns theory, one topic is to be examined -- "The role and tasks of the rocket troops and artillery in a front offensive operation." For the response, see the textbook "Rocket Troops and Artillery in Offensive and Defensive Operations", accession Nos. 108858 and 108860. Time -- 10 minutes.

2. Students assuming the role of Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery are to present to the troop commander proposals on the combat employment of rocket troops and artillery in the operation according to the situation as of 1200 hours 1 September and dealing with the following matters:

* -- tasks, combat strength, condition, and combat capabilities of the rocket troops with regard to the nuclear destruction of the enemy in the operation and proposals on the establishment of the rocket troop grouping;

* -- the allocation of missiles on the basis of the tasks of the operation;

* -- the combat strength, condition, and combat capabilities of front artillery with regard to the destruction of the enemy by fire, and proposals on the establishment of the artillery grouping;

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X -- the tentative allocation of artillery ammunition on the basis of the tasks of the operation;

v -- the organization of reconnaissance and control;

^ -- the possible deadlines for the readiness of rocket troops and artillery.

Time -- 75 minutes.

It is advisable to conduct the briefing on the proposals on a point-by-point basis, and if time is available, in full scope and summed up.

Proposals of the Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery of the Coastal Front concerning the combat employment of rocket troops and artillery in the offensive operation. A report (variant), Operational time -- 1200 hours 1 September.

I. It is advisable to assign the following tasks on the nuclear and fire destruction of the enemy to the rocket troops and artillery:

-- destroy the nuclear attack means of the Northern Army Group: the 1st through the 4th squadrons of the 2nd Pershing-1A Missile Wing, two battalions and two regiments of Lance missiles, one Sergeant missile battalion, delivery aircraft at 13 airfields, and 13 nuclear warhead depots and field-mobile nuclear warhead supply and storage points;

-- in cooperation with the Air Army, destroy by nuclear and fire means 12 divisions with their tactical nuclear attack means, and one airborne brigade;

-- destroy the command posts of three Brown army corps, one Blue army corps, and two Lilac army corps; and five control and warning posts and centers of the enemy's tactical aviation;

-- destroy the surface-to-air guided missile batteries of eight Hawk missile battalions and one Thunderbird regiment in the overflight zones of our aviation.

When the operation is conducted without employment of nuclear weapons, in cooperation with the Air Army, by means of concentrated and massed artillery fire inflict damage on the enemy groupings in the event they

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attempt an invasion along the axes of MELN /?possibly MELLEN in GDR/, HAGENOW, LUDWIGSLUST; UELZEN, STENDAL; CELLE, GARDELEGEN, RATHENOW;

-- upon joining a meeting engagement, strike with fire the following large units: 18th, 13th, and 6th motorized infantry divisions, 1st Motorized Infantry Division, 3rd and 7th tank divisions, and 1st and 2nd armored divisions, destroying their nuclear attack, artillery, and antitank means;

-- in the breakthrough of the enemy's defense by the main forces of the first-echelon armies, inflict fire damage on the enemy by conducting an artillery preparation for an attack in a sector: of 16 to 18 kilometers on the CELLE-BRUSSELS axis and of 8 kilometers on the JUTLAND axis;

-- be in readiness to repel counterattacks by enemy groupings from the SOLTAU-GIFHORN and HILDESHEIM-GIFHORN axes, hit the enemy with fire when making the assault crossing of the IJSEL and RHINE rivers and when the second echelon of the front (6th and 10th armies) is committed to battle. Destroy the enemy's ships and landing forces on the coastal axis.

2. To accomplish its tasks, the Coastal Front will have at the start of the operation:

-- 178 operational-tactical and tactical missile launchers;

-- 5,598 guns and mortars and also 2,152 antitank means. Taking into account the troops (10th Tank Army) which are to arrive during the operation on D2 /day two/, the front will have:

-- 214 operational-tactical and tactical missile launchers;

-- 6,246 guns and mortars, as well as 2,263 antitank means?

The front troops at present have 289 nuclear missiles (129 operational-tactical and 160 tactical). The available delivery missiles are to be kept in readiness as follows: R-300's in Readiness No. 6, R-65's in Readiness No. 5. The number of delivery missiles in the missile brigades is to be in conformity with the number of launchers. The remaining delivery missiles (including the R-65's) and all warheads are to be held at front and army mobile missile technical bases.

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3. The following are allocated for the operation: 360 nuclear missiles (160 operational-tactical and 200 tactical) for the rocket troops; 7.5 units of fire for the artillery, with the additional stipulation that the minimum reserve of 2.3 units of fire be stockpiled by the end of the operation.

4. Taking into account the combat strength and condition of the rocket troops, I propose that in order to accomplish our tasks the following grouping of large units and units be established. The allocation for the initial nuclear strike: the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, the four army missile brigades of the armies of the front's first echelon, the corps missile brigade and the 14 separate tactical missile battalions of the first- and second-echelon divisions of the front first-echelon armies, in all, 146 launchers (90 for operational-tactical missiles and 56 for tactical missiles). The main efforts of the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, in addition to /the efforts of/ the organic means, are to be concentrated along the axis of the front's main attack, in the zones of the 7th and 9th armies.

When the 6th Army and 10th Tank Army are committed to battle, for the nuclear destruction of the enemy the following are to be called upon in addition to the army and front missile brigades: the separate missile battalions of the first-echelon divisions of these armies and also the 7th Army Missile Brigade and two or three separate tactical missile battalions of this army.

In order to accomplish the full scope of tasks during the initial nuclear strike, a follow-up launch of 30 tactical nuclear missiles is to be carried out, so that in all 176 missiles will be employed in the initial nuclear strike.

In conformity with the plan of the operation, I propose the following allocation of nuclear warheads for the rocket troops:

a) By tasks:

-- for the initial nuclear strike -- 176; for accomplishing the immediate task -- 94; for accomplishing the follow-up task -- 64; to be held in reserve -- 26.

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b) By formations (from resources allocated for the immediate task):

-- for the 4th Army -- 13 (3 operational-tactical and 10 tactical missiles); for the 7th Army -- 17 (3 operational-tactical and 14 tactical missiles); for the 9th Army -- 18 (4 operational-tactical and 14 tactical missiles), for the 6th Army -- 21 (5 operational-tactical and 16 tactical missiles), for the 2nd Army Corps -- 8 (2 operational-tactical and 6 tactical missiles), for the 2nd Front Missile Brigade -- 8, and for the 3rd Front Missile Brigade -- 9.

5. Destruction of the enemy by fire is to be accomplished in cooperation with front and army aviation, tanks, and other fire means, and by delivering massed and concentrated artillery fire.

In case the enemy goes over to the defense and occupies a prepared line of defense east of HAMBURG and HANNOVER, effective destruction by fire when breaking through the defense can be accomplished on a frontage of up to 30 kilometers with a density of up to 110 to 120 guns, mortars, and BM RA /multiple-round rocket launchers/ per kilometer of front in the breakthrough sector.

In conformity with the concept of the operation, the main efforts of the artillery are to be concentrated on the CELLE-BRUSSELS axis. Artillery of the RVGK /Reserve of the Supreme High Command/ is to be allocated as follows:

-- to the 4th Army, artillery from the 6th Artillery Division of the RVGK; when committed to battle (on the morning of D3), the 2nd Army Corps is to be reinforced by the 1st Gun Artillery Brigade and 4th Howitzer Artillery Brigade of the 6th Artillery Division of the RVGK; to the 7th Army, from the 8th Artillery Division of the RVGK; when committed to battle (on D3 to D4), the 6th Army is to be reinforced by the 8th Artillery Division of the RVGK (minus the 2nd Gun Artillery Brigade); to the 9th Army, from the 11th Artillery Division of the RVGK; when committed to battle (on D5 to D6), the 10th Tank Army is to be reinforced by the 11th Artillery Division of the RVGK (minus the 15th Heavy Howitzer Artillery Brigade and the 12th Rocket Launcher Artillery Brigade). The antitank reserves of the front will consist of: No. 1 -- the 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade of the RVGK, and No. 2 -- the 5th Antitank Artillery Brigade of the RVGK.

The proposed allocation of the artillery of the RVGK ensures a density of 110 guns per kilometer of front in breaking through the prepared defense

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line during the operation, and ensures the establishment of powerful artillery groups on the main axes: regimental artillery groups consisting of two to three artillery battalions, division artillery groups consisting of three to four artillery battalions; and army artillery groups and army rocket launcher artillery groups consisting of five to nine battalions. Specific calculations are given in Appendix 3 to the assignment for Lesson 1c /not received/.

For the 4th Army to accomplish the tasks of fire destruction when breaking through the enemy's defense, it can call upon an army artillery brigade and an arepp /?sic for areap: army rocket launcher artillery regiment/ -- 144 guns, the artillery of two first-echelon divisions (162+162 = 324) 324 guns, and the 2nd Corps Artillery Regiment and the 2nd kredn /?corps rocket launcher artillery battalion/ -- 72 guns; total 540 guns. Shortage is 409 guns. The reinforcement capability is 360 guns (artillery divisions of the RVGK). The actual density amounts to 112 guns per kilometer of the breakthrough sector.

Destruction of the enemy by fire during the operation is to be accomplished:

-- during repulse of an invasion, from temporary firing positions along the border by means of massed and concentrated fire against the areas of RATZEBURG, MELN, SEEDORF; GUDOW, TALKAU, BUCHEN; VELPKE, NEUNDORF, BARMKE, HELMSTEDT, SCHOPPENSTEDT, ERKSGEYM /?sic for ERKHEIM/, bringing in the artillery of the covering forces and of the division and army artillery groups. Massed and concentrated fire of three to five battalions is to be prepared at the boundaries of the armies;

-- when a meeting engagement is joined, the large units of the Brown 6th, 4th, and 1st army corps, the Lilac 1st Army Corps, and the Blue 1st Army Corps are to be hit by fire, and their nuclear attack, artillery, and antitank means are to be destroyed;

-- when the forward detachments reach the state border, the enemy antitank means, artillery and mortars, radio and radar reconnaissance means, and control posts are to be destroyed by a 10- to 15-minute artillery strike;

-- when breaking through the enemy's defense on the axis of the front's main attack, the destruction of the enemy by fire on the CELLE-BRUSSELS axis is to be accomplished by conducting a 30- to 35-minute artillery preparation for the attack, by artillery support for the attack

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by means of a moving barrage in conjunction with successive fire concentrations, and by artillery close support for the attacking troops in the depth of the enemy defense.

The artillery ammunition allocated to the front (excluding the minimum reserve) is to be distributed as follows:

-- for fulfillment of the immediate task -- 5.0 units of fire; for fulfillment of the follow-up task -- 2.2 units of fire; in reserve -- 0.3 unit of fire. The front's total expenditure of ammunition for the operation will come to 7.5 units of fire.

6. The moving out and deployment of the rocket troops and artillery are to be carried out in the following sequence: first, the large units and units of the covering forces will move out and deploy on the night of 2 September, together with the separate missile battalions, their organic and attached artillery, and the artillery reconnaissance subunits and units.

Missile battalions (one from each missile brigade) of the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, the 4th, 7th, and 9th army missile brigades, as well as the 6th Army Missile Brigade and the 3rd /?sic for 2nd/ Corps Missile Brigade, are to be put on full-strength alert from the primary siting areas following receipt of permission to issue nuclear warheads.

On the first night (6 September), as the first-echelon divisions begin to occupy the departure areas, the missile large units and units participating in the initial nuclear strike, as well as the organic artillery of the armies, will move out into the siting areas.

The separate missile battalions will move into the departure areas together with the divisions, where these battalions will deploy in the alternate siting areas. The moving out of the missile battalions taking part in the initial nuclear strike and their deployment in siting areas at the border is to be carried out under special instructions.

Times required to bring the rocket troops of the Coastal Front into readiness for participation in the initial nuclear strike are as follows:

-- for operational-tactical missile brigades -- 4 to 8 hours (40 minutes to be placed on combat alert, 1.5 to 4 hours for a march of 30 to 100 kilometers, 60 minutes for deployment; in all -- 4 to 8 hours);

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-- for separate tactical missile battalions of the divisions -- 3 to 8 hours (40 minutes to be placed on combat alert, 1.5 to 5 hours for a march of 30 to 120 kilometers, 35 minutes for deployment; in all -- 3 to 8 hours).

It takes 6 to 8 hours to bring the artillery of the RVGK to full combat readiness and for its deployment (40 minutes to vacate the camps, 1.5 to 3.5 hours for the march to the resubordination area, 1.5 to 3 hours for the march to the firing position area, 1 hour each for pulling into the area and for deploying at the firing positions; in all -- 6 to 8 hours).

The relocation of front and army missile brigades prior to delivery of the initial nuclear strike is to be accomplished according to the front plan, that of the separate tactical missile battalions, according to the plans of the armies.

7. To fulfill the tasks of the reconnaissance and the pinpointing of the coordinates of the targets to be destroyed by the nuclear weapons of the rocket troops, I request that you provide for the allocation of 36 aircraft sorties from the 20th Operational Reconnaissance Air Regiment in support of the front missile brigades, and 64 aircraft sorties from the 21st and 22nd tactical reconnaissance air regiments in support of the army missile brigades.

8. Control of the rocket troops and artillery during the preparation and conduct of the offensive operation, while in the process of bringing them to full combat readiness and during their movement to and deployment in the siting areas, is to be exercised from the command post via fixed secure wire communications channels.

During their movement into the siting areas, control of the rocket troops and artillery subordinate to the front will be exercised from the front command post by means of short signals in the listening watch mode as well as by using the supporting wire communications system.

9. With the missile large units and units in the siting areas, and upon receipt of permission to issue nuclear-armed warheads to the troops, the times required to complete preparations for the delivery of a nuclear missile strike will be as follows:

-- for the R-300 missile brigades: 2 hours 45 minutes;

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-- for the R-65 separate missile battalions: 35 to 45 minutes, of which 10 to 15 minutes are for the move to the missile technical platoon point, 16 minutes for transferring the missiles onto the launchers, and 10 to 15 minutes for the move to the launch site.

The time for the critique of the lesson is 5 minutes.

* The study-group director will make known to the students the training objectives which have been established, evaluate the level of their achievements during the lesson, rate the reports of the students, note the positive and negative aspects of their reports, and instruct them in ways to eliminate shortcomings which have surfaced during the lesson. As required, he will indicate to the students matters which they have not adequately understood and the procedures for mastering them.



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