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1 December 1980

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Staff Meeting Minutes of 1 December 1980

The Director chaired the meeting. [ ]

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The Director noted he will brief the President today at 1330 hours and will present an encapsulated version of NIE 11/3-8, which was the last portion of the strategic balance briefing given the President-Elect. [ ]

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The Director reported on two meetings at SAC last week. One was with General Ellis, CINC/SAC; the other was with a SAC briefing team, which reviewed for the Director, the approach to evaluating the strategic balance. The team also discussed the U.S. manned penetration bomber versus the cruise missile and its delivery system. SAC is in favor of the manned system since it is considerably less expensive than the cruise missile system (three manned bombers can be bought for the price of one missile system). According to SAC, they are not in favor of building the B-1 bomber but prefer to wait for the Stealth bomber. [ ]

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The SAC briefing team's analysis of Soviet advances in strategic forces is similar to CIA's, i.e., the Soviets will be ahead in the early 80's but the advantage will shift to the U.S. in the mid and late 80's. The SAC team said that their analysis was in synch with those of SAGA, PA&E, and Rand. The Director said he explained to the briefing team that when the Soviets see the advantage beginning to swing to the U.S., they will have to do something, be it the use of mobile missile launchers, more SLBMs, etc., to reduce the vulnerability of their strategic systems. [ ]

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The Director said he would also brief the President on Poland and asked what the significance was of the closure of restricted areas in East Germany. Clarke said this was covered [ ] Clarke observed that the exercises taking place near Poland were unscheduled and were unprecedented for this time of the year and said these events were causing further concern about Soviet intentions and that the whole situation was going to be covered [ ]

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[ ] Clarke opined that Soviet activity could be related to preparations for intervention in Poland or could be taking place to intimidate the Poles. [ ]

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[REDACTED]

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Clarke reported that there will be a meeting of Community representatives today at 1000 hours to review the Polish situation and to determine whether another Alert Memorandum should be issued. [REDACTED]

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To insure that all NFAC resources are integrated efficiently, Clarke announced that he had established a Polish Task Force. [REDACTED]

25X1

The Director noted that [REDACTED] revised the estimate of the warning time we would receive if the Soviets decided to intervene in Poland. A general discussion ensued with Lehman reminding the attendees of the events leading up to the 1968 Czech invasion where the Community had noted massive Soviet activity and then saw nothing for the three weeks preceding the actual invasion, which occurred with no warning. [REDACTED]

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In response to the Director's question about the delivery of the PDB to the President-Elect, Clarke said it was going well and that Dick Kerr had been able to spend 15 minutes every day with President-Elect Reagan going over the book. [REDACTED]

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The Director told Clarke he wants the energy briefing he intends to give the President-Elect worked up to go with the Soviet economy. The Director is not sure if he will brief the President-Elect once or twice next week. In the event of only one session, the energy briefing will have to be held for a later date. [REDACTED]

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Clarke thanked the DDA for their help in providing logistics for Kerr on the West Coast. [REDACTED]

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The Director noted an article from the New York Times which reported on the situation in Namibia and the fact that the new Administration will have to make an early decision with relations in South Africa. The Director asked [REDACTED]

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
The Director passed to Clarke a copy of a New York Times article on the world grain situation and asked for an NFAC critique. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Fitzwater said he provided the transition team with copies of Agency regulations. He said at his meeting with the transition team, Codevilla homed in on the SIS. [redacted]

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
Lipton reported that [redacted] has the CIA input for the [redacted] supplemental. [redacted]

Mr. Carlucci left the meeting. [redacted]

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Hitz said we are not going to get the [redacted] we had hoped to reprogram. [redacted] said that is not certain because we may be able to use the funds earmarked for one of our satellite collection systems. Hitz will prepare a memorandum on the issue for the Director's use with several congressmen. [redacted]

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
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The Director asked all attendees, less himself and Mr. Carlucci, to get together and come up with a list of 10-12 suggestions on how to improve intelligence-related matters that he or Mr. Carlucci can present to the incoming Administration. (Note: Messrs. Dirks and Lehman will meet with attendees following the DDCI's staff meeting on 3 December.)

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