

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED~~

4184

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 May 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Max Hugel
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS :
Refining the Decision on the Development
of the Offensive Operation

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons; the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson involving a front commander's orders to his chief of staff, principal troop commanders, and logistic, engineer, and chemical chiefs on the development of a nuclear-supported offensive against NATO's Northern Army Group and on the elimination of the aftereffects of a massed NATO nuclear strike. Also discussed are the party-political measures to be carried out to restore troop morale and combat effectiveness.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

Max Hugel

FIRDB-312/01397-81

TS #818128
Copy # 3


APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
19-Nov-2009

HR70 4

~~ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



FIRDB-312/01397-81

Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific and Weapons Research

Page 2 of 14 Pages

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS #818128
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED~~



Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 14 Pages

COUNTRY USSR

FIRDB - 312/01397-81

DATE OF INFO. 1977

DATE 22 May 1981

SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 25b: Refining the Decision on the Development of the Offensive Operation

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students acting as the front commander and chief of the political directorate in the issuing of orders to the chief of staff, army and corps commanders; missile, air, and air defense forces; and logistic, engineer, and chemical chiefs on the development of an offensive supported by 50 nuclear munitions against NATO's Northern Army Group, and on the elimination of the aftereffects of a massive NATO nuclear attack which has caused a total of three Soviet divisions to lose their combat effectiveness. The front's second echelon, a tank army, plays a key role in developing the offensive. Stress and coverage are focused on activities throughout the ground forces in overcoming nuclear and chemical destruction and contamination, and on the party-political measures to be carried out to restore troop morale and combat effectiveness.

End of Summary



Comment:

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this lesson probably equate as follows:

- | | | | | | |
|-------|----|---------------|------------|----|-----------------|
| Brown | -- | West Germany | Violet | -- | The Netherlands |
| Blue | -- | Great Britain | Gray | -- | Denmark |
| Lilac | -- | Belgium | Light Blue | -- | France |

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS #818128
Copy # 3



~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01397-81

Page 4 of 14 Pages

Lesson No. 25b

Refining the decision on the development of the offensive operation

The students in the role of the commander of the Coastal Front report the decision of the front commander on the development of the offensive operation.

Outline of the report:

- refinement of the concept on the development of the operation;
- enemy targets to be destroyed by nuclear weapons;
- tasks for the first- and second-echelon armies;
- tasks for the rocket troops and artillery;
- tasks for the air army;
- tasks for the air defense troops;
- tasks for the reserves;
- troop control.

Decision of the Coastal Front commander on the
development of the offensive operation
(110 minutes)

I have decided: on the morning of 12 September to deliver a strike with 50 nuclear munitions and air and artillery strikes employing conventional means of destruction against the enemy's detected means of nuclear attack, aviation, air defense means, troop groupings retaining combat effectiveness, and approaching reserves, and immediately following the nuclear strikes, to renew the offensive with all combat-ready large units of the first-echelon armies. To build up our efforts on the axis of the front's main thrust, /I have decided/ to commit the front's second echelon, the 10th Tank Army, to battle on the morning of 13 September from

TS #818128
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01397-81

Page 5 of 14 Pages

the SYKE, UCHTE line in the direction of SULINGEN, DIEPHOLZ, GRONAU; and by attacking with three armies (the 10th Tank Army, 6th Army, and 9th Army) on the BRUSSELS axis, with the 7th Army and 2nd Army Corps on the coastal axis, and with the 4th Army on the FLENSBURG axis, to complete the defeat of the Northern Army Group's main forces east of the RHINE River, and fulfill by the close of 15 to 16 September the immediate task of the front; then with the forces of the 10th Tank Army in cooperation with the 30th Airborne Division make an assault crossing of the RHINE River from the march and seize the line ZWOLLE, NIJMEGEN, HORST.

Simultaneously, part of the forces of the 7th Army together with the 2nd Army Corps are to complete the defeat of the large units of the Brown 4th Army Corps and the 6th and 13th motorized infantry divisions of the Brown 6th Army Corps, and the forces of the 9th Army in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front are to destroy the encircled SALZGITTER grouping of the Blue 1st Army Corps and Violet 1st Army Corps.

Subsequently, by developing a rapid offensive on the BRUSSELS, coastal, and FLENSBURG axes, they will defeat the enemy's deep reserves, reach the Gray border, the coast of the North Sea, and Light Blue's northwest borders; and by 18 to 19 September accomplish the follow-up task of the front.

The front will be operationally disposed in one echelon; the 28th Motorized Rifle Division will be in the front reserve.

Tasks for front troops:

-- The 4th Army (the 3rd, 7th, 16th, and 21st motorized rifle divisions, and the 2nd Tank Division) with the previous means of reinforcement, by a rapid offensive starting the morning of 12 September in the direction of NEUMUNSTER, FLENSBURG, in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet is to complete the defeat of the large units of the Brown 6th Army Corps, make an assault crossing of the KIEL Canal from the march, reach the Gray national border and the coast of the North Sea and organize their defense.

During 12 September two regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation employing five nuclear bombs, and two regimental sorties of helicopters will be allocated to support the combat actions of the army's troops.

-- The 2nd Army Corps (the 8th and 24th motorized rifle divisions), with the previous means of reinforcement and in cooperation with the large

TS #818128
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01397-81

Page 6 of 14 Pages

units of the 4th and 7th armies, is to seize the city of HAMBURG and complete the defeat of the remnants of the large units of the Brown 13th and 6th motorized infantry divisions. The corps' combat actions will be supported by one regimental sortie of fighter-bomber aviation employing two nuclear bombs and one regimental sortie of fire support helicopters.

-- The 7th Army (the 1st, 4th, 13th, and 14th motorized rifle divisions and the 9th Tank Division) with the previous means of reinforcement, is to renew the offensive following nuclear strikes in the direction of FREDEN, DELMENHORST; with part of its forces /moving/ toward ZEVEN, is to complete the defeat of the large units of the Brown 4th Army Corps and Lilac 1st Army Corps; and by the close of 12 September is to seize the line BUXTEHUDE, ZEVEN, BREMEN. In cooperation with the 2nd Army Corps, it will destroy the enemy's LUNEBURG grouping.

Afterward, it will develop the offensive in the direction of DELMENHORST, AURICH, with part of its forces /moving/ toward CUXHAVEN and BREMERHAVEN, and by the close of 13 to 14 September it will seize the line of the army's follow-up task.

The army's combat actions will be supported by two regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation employing 7 nuclear bombs, and by two regimental sorties of helicopters.

-- The 6th Army (the 12th and 17th motorized rifle divisions and the 19th and 5th tank divisions) with the previous means of reinforcement and exploiting the results of the nuclear strikes, on the morning of 12 September is to commit to battle the army's second echelon -- the 17th Motorized Rifle Division -- and develop the offensive in the direction of HEMSEN, SULINGEN, DIEPHOLZ; complete the defeat of the large units of the Brown 1st Army Corps, and by the close of 12 September seize the line BASSUM, BARVER, DIEPENAU and support the 10th Tank Army's commitment to battle.

Subsequently, it will develop the offensive in the direction of BASSUM, HAREN.

During 12 September, the army's combat actions will be supported by three regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation employing six nuclear bombs, and one regimental sortie of fire support helicopters.

-- The 9th Army (the 10th, 20th, and 26th tank divisions and the 6th, 18th, and 23rd motorized rifle divisions), on the morning of 12 September, by committing the 20th Tank Division to battle, is to develop the offensive

TS #818128
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01397-81

Page 7 of 14 Pages

following the nuclear strikes with its main forces in the direction of SARSTEDT, LEMGO; complete the defeat of the large units of the Lilac 1st Army Corps and the remnants of the 7th Tank Division of the Brown 1st Army Corps, and by the close of 12 September seize the line MINDEN, BAD PYRMONT, STADTOLDENDORF. At the same time, part of the army's forces will split up and destroy the enemy's encircled SALZGITTER grouping in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front.

It will subsequently develop the offensive in the direction of HERFORD, MUNSTER, and by the close of 14 September seize the line of the army's follow-up task.

The army's combat actions during 12 September will be supported by two regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation employing four nuclear bombs and two regimental sorties of helicopters.

-- The 10th Tank Army (the 15th and 22nd tank divisions and the 29th Motorized Rifle Division) is the front's second echelon. By the close of 12 September it is to be concentrated in the area of UELZEN, CELLE, KLOTZE in readiness to be committed to battle on the morning of 13 September from the SYKE, UCHTE line, in the direction of SULINGEN, DIEPHOLZ, AHAUS.

Its zone of advance is: on the right -- NEURUPPIN, KYRITZ, WITTENBERGE, UELZEN; on the left -- HENNIGSDORF, NAUEN, RATHENOW, STENDAL, GIFHORN, BURGDORF.

It is to cross the departure line KYRITZ, NAUEN, at 1000 hours 12 September.

-- The front rocket troops -- the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, are to be prepared to destroy the enemy's newly detected launchers of the 2nd Pershing Wing, the 650th, 450th /sic/, and 150th Lance missile battalions and 24th Lance Missile Regiment, delivery aircraft at airfields; SAM batteries, control posts, troop groupings retaining combat effectiveness, and approaching reserves.

-- The 1st Air Army is to continue to search for and destroy the enemy's nuclear means and his aircraft at airfields and in the air; and is to inflict destruction on enemy reserves in concentration areas and during their forward movement with the forces of four regiments of fighter-bomber and bomber aviation employing 16 nuclear bombs. *

TS #818128
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01397-81

Page 8 of 14 Pages

It is to support the troops' combat actions throughout 12 September: the 4th Army -- with two regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation employing five nuclear bombs; the 2nd Army Corps -- with one regimental sortie of fighter-bomber aviation; the 7th Army -- with two regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation employing seven nuclear bombs; the 6th Army -- with three regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation employing six nuclear bombs; the 9th Army -- with two regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation employing four nuclear bombs. It is to support the 10th Tank Army's commitment to battle with three regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation employing 12 nuclear bombs.

It and the front air defense troops are to jointly cover the front's main troop grouping and rear services installations from enemy air strikes; it is also to blockade the enemy's encircled troop groupings from the air. The main efforts of fighter aviation are to be concentrated on covering the 10th Tank Army during its forward movement and commitment to battle.

-- The front air defense forces are to concentrate their main efforts on covering from enemy air strikes the front's main troop grouping -- the 6th and 9th armies and 10th Tank Army, the missile brigades, the aviation's basing, the control posts, and the most important rear services installations of the front.

-- The front reserves:

a) the 28th Motorized Rifle Division is the front reserve; by 1200 hours 11 September it is to eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of chemical weapons;

b) the 11th and 23rd motorized rifle divisions and the 25th Tank Division (which have lost combat effectiveness) are to be concentrated by 1300 hours 11 September in the following areas: the 11th Motorized Rifle Division -- northeast of BERGEN; the 21st Motorized Rifle Division -- northwest of HALDENSLEBEN; the 25th Tank Division -- southeast of KOPENICK. In the above-mentioned areas they are to restore control, carry out decontamination treatment of personnel, weapons, and combat equipment, and take the necessary organizational measures to restore their losses;

c) the front's Antitank Reserve No. 2 and Mobile Obstacle Detachment No. 1 are to be deployed by 0600 hours 11 September on the RETHEM, SCHWARMSTEDT line in readiness to repel enemy tank attacks.

TS #818128
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01397-81

Page 9 of 14 Pages

The front command post is to be in the forest 3 km west of BOITZENHAGEN.

The orders of the front commander on restoring the combat effectiveness of the troops and eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction

(60 minutes)

To the front chief of staff

1. By 1600 hours 11 September, restore disrupted communications channels with the General Staff, the front's alternate command post and rear control post, the armies and corps, the Western Front, and the Combined Baltic Fleet. Take steps to restore the front forward control post.

2. Allocate the necessary forces and means from the front reserve in order to restore the control posts of the 4th, 6th, and 7th armies, which have been put out of action.

3. Allocate the necessary forces and means from the armies' complement and the front's Composite Aftereffects Elimination Detachment No. 1 in order to carry out the rapid evacuation and rescue of personnel at the command posts of the front and armies.

Perform full decontamination treatment of personnel, weapons, and equipment at the locations of the control posts of the large units and units subordinate to the front which have been subjected to chemical weapons strikes and are caught in zones with high levels of radiation.

3./sic/ Withdraw the divisions which have lost combat effectiveness and have been pulled back into the front reserve to concentration areas, where they are to carry out decontamination treatment of personnel, weapons, and combat equipment and take the necessary organizational measures. Draw on the front's reserve large units and materiel reserves to supply the shortage in armament, equipment, and personnel, taking their military occupational specialty into account. Draw up a request to the General Staff for the shortages in weapons, equipment, and personnel.

Complete the restoration of the combat effectiveness of these divisions by the close of 14 September.

TS #818128
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01397-81

Page 10 of 14 Pages

First of all, replenish the first-echelon divisions which have retained combat effectiveness with the weapons, combat equipment, personnel, and materiel which they lack.

4. Together with the chiefs of the branch arms and services, by 0600 hours 10/sic/ September develop a plan for restoring the front troops' combat effectiveness and eliminating the aftereffects of The enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction. The plan is to provide for the completion of work on restoring combat effectiveness in the armies and the army corps by 1800 hours 11 September, and in the front by 1900 hours 12 September.

To the front chief of the rear services

1. Medical treatment and evacuation measures are to be taken as follows: in the armies and the 2nd Army Corps -- on the instructions of the army commanders and the corps commander; in the large units and units subordinate to the front -- by the forces of the front separate medical detachments and fixed and mobile hospitals. Deploy the front's rear hospital base for the hospitalization of the wounded and contaminated, and move out two front forward hospital bases to areas of massive medical losses.

Evacuate the wounded from the line units by the close of 11 September.

2. Set up temporary transshipment areas at WITTENBERGE, ARNEBURG, and HAVELBERG by the morning of 12 September, with the subsequent laying of a floating railroad bridge east of STENDAL, in order to deliver cargoes to the west bank of the ELBE River.

3. By 1800 hours 11 September, issue the front reserve of munitions and fuel to replace the losses in the line units of the front's first-echelon armies.

4. Using rear services units and facilities, eliminate the aftereffects of enemy nuclear and chemical attacks against the rear services installations.

5. Restore rail movement in the front's rear zone by the morning of 13 September. Prepare requests to the Center regarding the replacement of materiel losses.

TS #818128
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01397-81

Page 11 of 14 Pages

To the front chief of engineer troops

1. With the forces and means of the front's engineer troops, the armies, and the army corps, prepare routes for the evacuation of personnel and combat equipment from areas of nuclear and chemical strikes, zones of destruction and centers of fires, and the front and armies' command posts, to areas for the restoration of combat effectiveness and the elimination of the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction.

2. Prepare routes for the withdrawal of large units and units which have lost combat effectiveness to areas for the elimination of aftereffects and restoration of combat effectiveness, and prepare routes for the forward movement of the 10th Tank Army to the line of commitment to battle. Lay bridges across the ELBE River on the forward movement routes.

3. By 1000 hours 11 September, see to the provision of water and prepare water supply points for the hospital bases; the control posts of the front, armies, and corps; and decontamination treatment points.

4. Report on the organization for accomplishing the engineer tasks by 0600 hours 11 September.

To the front chief of chemical troops

1. Continue the collection and processing of data on nuclear bursts and areas of chemical contamination.

2. Before 1000 hours 11 September, determine the actual radiation situation in the front zone, paying special attention to the radiation reconnaissance of the 10th Army's routes of forward movement, the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades' siting areas, the aviation units of the 1st Air Army, and the troops' routes of forward movement for commitment to battle.

Determine precisely the chemical situation in the armies, the corps, the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades' siting areas, the air defense troops, at the home airfields of the 1st Air Army, and at the rear services bases and depots. Ascertain the amount of work necessary to carry out the decontamination treatment of personnel, combat equipment, and weapons in the line units of the front, and prepare proposals for distributing the chemical troops that are to perform this work.

TS #818128
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01397-81

Page 12 of 14 Pages

3. By 0300 hours 11 September, report proposals about the advisability of withdrawing troops from areas with high levels of radioactive and chemical contamination, especially the large units and units of the 10th Tank Army.

4. Allocate front chemical troops for the performance of chemical support tasks in the front's missile brigades, reserve divisions, and rear services units and facilities.

5. By 1800 hours 11 September reestablish the expended reserves of weapons and protective means. Deliver by front transportation the supplies and other items which are lacking to the withdrawal areas for the large units that are removed from contamination zones.

7/sic/. By 0500 hours 11 September, report on the organization for the accomplishment of chemical support tasks.

To the army commanders and commanders of the army corps
and the large units subordinated to armies

1. Carry out with your own forces the elimination of the aftereffects of enemy nuclear and chemical strikes and the restoration of the troops' combat effectiveness (except those which have lost combat effectiveness) /sic/ before 1800 hours 11 September.

Organize rescue work and conduct evacuation measures in nuclear strike zones and chemically contaminated areas, and also eliminate centers of fires in the troops' location areas and on their forward movement routes. Withdraw the large units and units that are found to be in centers of mass destruction and concentrate them in new areas upon your own decision, which you will report to the front staff.

2. By 0600 hours 11 September, relocate the special troop large units and units and front reserves /supplies/ to other areas as necessary upon the instructions of the chiefs of the branch arms and services, coordinating this with the front chief of staff.

3. Continue to fulfill combat tasks with the combat-effective units and subunits of divisions which have /either/ retained or lost combat effectiveness.

TS #818128
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01397-81

Page 13 of 14 Pages

4. To the commander of the 10th Tank Army -- the army's troops are to remain in the areas prepared from the engineer standpoint until the radiation level drops.

5. By 1800 hours 11 September, the commander of the 1st Air Army is to rebase the aviation from destroyed and contaminated airfields to alternate ones and to prepared sections of superhighways upon his own decision.

Orders on party-political work

1. Before 0600 hours 11 September, the front political directorate is to make an analysis of the morale and psychological condition of front troop personnel who have been subjected to nuclear and chemical strikes, and prepare a report to the front Military Council. Develop a plan of measures to maintain the high morale of troop personnel.

2. Send political workers from the front political directorate to assist the commanders and political organs of the large units and units of the first-echelon armies in restoring the morale and psychological readiness of the soldiers, NCOs, and officers to perform their combat tasks.

3. The front political directorate is to assist the large units and units which have lost combat effectiveness in restoring their political organs and party and Komsomol organizations.

Based on the orders of the front commander, the Military Council member and chief of the front political directorate specifies the following in his order:

1. The restoration of political organs and party and Komsomol organizations in the two divisions which have lost combat effectiveness and have been withdrawn to the front reserve will be carried out by the allocation of two divisional political departments from the front reserve; political officers will be sent to the remaining divisions which have lost combat effectiveness.

2. The reserve of political workers at the battalion-company level will be restored by drawing on the front's reserve of political personnel and on the communists among the soldiers, NCOs, and warrant officers.

TS #818128
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01397-81

Page 14 of 14 Pages

Their training to take over the appropriate duty positions is to be organized.

3. Direction will be assumed over the political organs of the large units which are entering the front reserve.

4. Agitation and propaganda materials which address the situation as regards the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction are to be prepared and forwarded to the line units.

Synthesize and disseminate the experience /obtained/ in the work to eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction and to bring troops to combat readiness.

5. Take stock of the availability of materiel-technical means for conducting party-political work in the units and large units which have restored their combat readiness, and replenish these means.

6. The party-political work being conducted is to be reported daily to the front political directorate by 1800 hours.

Lesson summary
(10 minutes)

The lesson director restates the lesson subject and training objectives and how well they have been achieved. He discusses the content of the students' main reports, noting their positive aspects and shortcomings. He directs the students' attention to the possible procedure for estimating the situation after both sides have delivered massed nuclear strikes; the procedure for staff work and work by the chiefs of the branch arms and services in preparing data for the front commander to use in making the decision on the elimination of aftereffects, the restoration of troop combat effectiveness, and the refinement of troop tasks in further actions to develop the operation.

If necessary the director gives the students assignments for fully working out poorly assimilated topics. He briefs the students on the preparation for the next lesson, No. 26.

TS #818128
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~