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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

HR70-14

5 August 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

John H. Stein

Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT

USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS:

Developing an Offensive Operation with the

Commitment to Battle of the Front's Second Echelon: Supplementary Material

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: \ the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons; the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of supplementary material for the lesson concerning the development of an offensive to encircle and destroy NATO ground forces in the northern area of West Germany. The material consists of model brief reports by the front's chief of staff and commander setting forth the overall situation, the proposed concept for developing the offensive by committing the second echelons of the front-line armies to encircle and destroy NATO forces, and the tasking of the front's major components, including the air army.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive. this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

John H. Stein

FIRDB-312/02295-81

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Page 1 of 11 Pages

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Page 2 of 11 Pages

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Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 11 Pages

COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF 1977 INFO.

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DATE 5 August 1981

SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 22a: Developing an Offensive Operation with the Commitment to Battle of the Front's Second Echelon: Supplementary Material

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This supplementary material is used to instruct students acting as a front chief of staff and front commander in the presentation of brief reports covering the following: the overall combat situation, the proposed ground and air actions to be taken to attack, encircle, and destroy opposing NATO forces through the employment of conventional weapons, and the tasking of the front's major components, including the air army. Although nuclear weapons do not play a role in the material, air elements are to be ready to employ them; and NATO's nuclear-capable means are to be sought out and destroyed.

End of Summary

Comment:

1. Lesson No. 22a, which this report supplements, was disseminated as FIRDB-312/00370-81.

2. Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this material probably equate as follows:

Brown -- West Germany Lilac -- Belgium

Blue -- Great Britain Violet -- The Netherlands

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Page 4 of 11 Pages

SUPPLEMENT

to the training methods manual for Lesson 22/a/

Task No. 12 (77/78)

Developing an offensive operation with the commitment to battle of the front's second echelon

REPORT OF THE FRONT CHIEF OF STAFF

(Condensed)

- 1. Troops of the Coastal Front with the forces of attack groupings have broken through the prepared defenses of the large units of the Brown 6th Army Corps on the HAMBURG axis and of the Brown 1st Army Corps on the HANNOVER axis; advanced up to 40 to 50 kilometers on the HAMBURG axis, and up to 80 kilometers on the HANNOVER axis, widening the breakthrough up to 40 and to 75 kilometers respectively; and established conditions favoring the development of the offensive on the JUTLAND, CLOPPENBURG, and OSNABRUCK axes. They have halted a further offensive of the Brown 4th Army Corps' large units on the STENDAL axis and of the Blue 1st Army Corps' /large units/ on the MACDEBURG axis, creating the threat of reaching their rear area and of encircling them with front troops independently or in cooperation with the Western Front.
- 2. The enemy, with the attack groupings of the Brown 6th and 4th army corps, Blue 1st Army Corps, and Violet 1st Army Corps, and with air support, is striving to develop the offensive in the HAGENOW area on the STENDAL and MACDEBURG axes, to split up the front troops, and to emerge in the rear of their main grouping, which is advancing on the HANNOVER axis. The enemy has succeeded in penetrating our territory to a depth of 25 to 35 kilometers. Lacking the reserves to develop a breakthrough into the depth, the enemy is tenaciously holding on to the captured areas with the aim of using them as the departure springboards to develop an offensive when deep operational reserves approach or when he makes the transition to actions employing nuclear weapons.

On the HAMBURG and HANNOVER axes, with forces of the Brown 6th and 1st army corps, and with air support, the enemy is striving to delay the advance of <u>front</u> troops with stubborn resistance on favorable lines for the purpose of gaining time to complete the activation of deep operational reserves and their movement forward to the front line.

As of the morning of 10 September an enemy counterattack with Lilac forces

Page 5 of 11 Pages

should be expected: with the 1st Army Corps in the direction of FALLINGBOSTEL, GIFHORN, and the 2nd Army Corps in the direction of HILDESHEIM, GIFHORN.

3. The operational situation and status of <u>front</u> troop groupings by axes is described as follows:

The 16th Motorized Rifle Division and two naval infantry regiments in the KIEL area are capable of successfully fulfilling their combat task.

On the HAMBURG axis the attacking 4th Army grouping is superior to the enemy only in artillery. To develop the offensive on the NEUMUNSTER axis and the rout of the HAMBURG grouping it is necessary to commit to battle the 4th Army's second echelon and the 2nd Army Corps.

On the STENDAL axis, where the enemy has superiority in divisions and tanks, the commitment of additional forces is required in order to accomplish the task of encircling and destroying his grouping.

On the HANNOVER axis the <u>front</u> attack grouping is superior to the enemy in nuclear weapons delivery means, and in divisions, tanks, and artillery. However, the 7th Army does not have reserves, and it is advisable to use the 9th Army's second echelon to encircle and rout the SALZGITTER grouping. To repel the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps' counterthrust and develop the offensive on the axis of the main thrust will require the activation of no less than four fresh divisions, which will make it necessary to commit the <u>front</u>'s second echelon to battle.

The operational situation and balance of forces and means on the MAGDEBURG axis make it possible for the 9th Army, in cooperation with the Western Front's 3rd Army, to encircle and rout the main forces of the Blue 1st Army Corps and Violet 1st Army Corps.

4. I propose: at 0600 hours on 10 September, after 24 minutes of preparatory fire, to commit the 6th Army to battle from lines: No. 1 -- BERGEN, MELLENDORF, and No. 2 -- FALLINGBOSTEL, 4 kilometers west of NEUSTADT in the direction of CELLE, NIENBURG, LINGEN, and in cooperation with the 7th Army, rout the Lilac 1st Army Corps in a meeting engagement.

To complete the rout of the Northern Army Group's main forces and of the aviation of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force east of the RHINE River with forces of the 7th, 6th, and 9th armies on the axis of the main thrust, and by the close of 12 to 13 September fulfill the <u>front</u>'s immediate task.

At 0600 hours on 10 September on the JUTLAND axis, with the commitment to battle of the 4th Army's second echelon and the 2nd Army Corps, to complete the rout of the /Brown/ 6th Army Corps' main forces and by the close of 12 to 13

Page 6 of 11 Pages

September fulfill the front's immediate task.

On the JUTLAND axis at 0600 hours 10 September, with the commitment to battle of the 4th Army's second echelon and the 2nd Army Corps, to complete the rout of the /Brown/ 6th Army Corps' main forces and by the close of 10 to 11 September capture KIEL and HAMBURG.

To encircle and destroy the /Brown/ 4th Army Corps' main forces in the ARENDSEE area with the forces of four divisions of the 7th Army (including the 13th Motorized Rifle Division).

To repel the Lilac 2nd Army Corps' counterthrust with forces of the 9th Army's 6th and 18th motorized rifle divisions supported by aviation and artillery.

To allocate four divisions of the 9th Army (including the 26th Tank Division), in cooperation with the Western Front's 3rd Army, for the encirclement and destruction of the SALZGITTER grouping.

To concentrate the 10th Tank Army east of Berlin by the morning of 10 September.

To carry out on 10 September the fire destruction of the enemy's nuclear attack means, control posts, and main groupings with three sorties of the 1st Air Army, 16 regimental sorties of army aviation, and most of the <u>front</u>'s artillery.

To have the rocket troops and aviation in readiness to deliver the initial nuclear strike against planned targets.

To be operationally disposed in two echelons: the first consisting of the 4th Army, the 2nd Army Corps, and the 7th, 6th, and 9th armies; the second consisting of the 10th Tank Army. The reserve is to be the 20th Tank Division.

I request permission to relocate the <u>front</u> control posts by the morning of 10 September to the /following/ areas:

- -- the alternate command post -- to the woods 9 kilometers east of CELLE;
- -- the command post -- to the woods 10 kilometers south of WITTINGEN;
- -- the rear control post -- to the woods 10 kilometers west of KLOTZE.

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Page 7 of 11 Pages

SUPPLEMENT

TO THE TRAINING METHODS MANUAL FOR LESSON NO. 22a,

TASK 12 (77/78)

DEVELOPING AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION WITH THE COMMITMENT TO BATTLE

OF THE FRONT'S SECOND ECHELON

FRONT COMMANDER'S REPORT

(variant)

1. The enemy has been striving to develop the offensive in the KHACHENOV /sic -- HAGENOW/ area on the STENDAL and MAGDEBURG axes for two days with attack groupings of the Brown 6th and 4th army corps (five divisions), Blue 1st Army Corps (three divisions) and Violet 1st Army Corps (two divisions), supported by aviation. Augmenting his forces by committing tactical reserves, he succeeded in advancing 30 kilometers in the HAGENOW area, 35 kilometers on the STENDAL axis, and up to 25 to 30 kilometers on the MAGDEBURG axis, and in containing considerable front troop forces.

However, the enemy did not achieve a decisive operational success, and not having the forces to develop the offensive, he is tenaciously holding on to the captured areas with the aim of preventing the encirclement of the invading groupings.

On the HAMBURG and HANNOVER axes the enemy, with stubborn defense by his troops, is striving to hinder the offensive of the front's main troop grouping through counterattacks and counterthrusts with the immediate operational reserves in order to gain time for completing the activation and forward movement of the deep operational reserves.

As of the morning of 10 September a counterthrust by the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps should be expected.

2. Coastal Front troops have inflicted considerable damage on the troops of four enemy army corps; with the forces of the attack groupings they have broken through the prepared defense of the large units of the Brown 6th Army Corps on the HAMBURG axis and of the Brown 1st Army Corps on the HANNOVER axis; and they have halted a further advance of the invading groupings in the HAGENOW area and the STENDAL and MACDEBURG axes.

Page 8 of 11 Pages

Having penetrated enemy territory to a depth of 40 to 50 km on the HAMBURG axis and up to 80 km on the HANNOVER axis, front troops have established conditions for further development of the offensive on the JUTLAND, CLOPPENBURG, and OSNABRUCK axes and for the encirclement of the invading enemy groupings in the ARENDSEE area in cooperation with the troops of the Western Front that are east of SALZGITTER.

Concept of actions: at 0600 hours 10 September after 24 minutes of preparatory fire, to commit the 6th Army to battle from these lines: No. 1 -- BERGEN, MELLENDORF; and No. 2 -- FALLINGBOSTEL, 4 km west of NEUSTADT in the direction of the CELLE, NIENBURG, and LINGEN; and with the forces of the 7th and 6th armies rout the Lilac 1st Army Corps in a meeting engagement.

To complete the destruction of the main forces of the Northern Army Group and the aviation of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force east of the RHINE River with the forces of the 7th, 6th, and 9th armies on the axis of the main thrust, and by the close of 12 to 13 September fulfill the <u>front</u>'s immediate task.

To complete the rout of the /Brown/ 6th Army Corps' main forces by committing to battle the 4th Army's 2nd Tank Division and the 2nd Army Corps on the JUTLAND axis at 0600 hours 10 September, and by the close of 10 to 11 September capture KIEL and HAMBURG.

To encircle and destroy the main forces of the /Brown/ 4th Army Corps in the ARENDSEE area with the forces of four divisions of the 7th Army (including the 13th Motorized Rifle Division).

To repel the Lilac 2nd Army Corps' counterthrust with the forces of the 9th Army's 6th and 18th motorized rifle division supported by aviation and artillery.

To allocate four divisions of the 9th Army (including the 26th Tank Division) for the encirclement and destruction of the SALZGITTER grouping in cooperation with the Western Front's 3rd Army.

To concentrate the 10th Tank Army east of Berlin by the morning of $10\,$ September.

To destroy by fire on 10 September the enemy's nuclear means, control posts, and main groupings by means of three 1st Air Army sorties, 16 regimental sorties of army aviation, and the greater part of the <u>front</u> artillery.

To have rocket troops and aviation in readiness for delivery of the initial nuclear strike against planned targets.

The operational disposition is to be in two echelons: the first consisting

Page 9 of 11 Pages

of the 4th Army, 2nd Army Corps, and 7th, 6th, and 9th armies; the second consisting of the 10th Tank Army.

Tasks for the troops:

- 1. The 4th Army (the 3rd, 7th, and 16th motorized rifle divisions, and the 2nd Tank Division), with the commitment to battle of the 2nd Tank Division, will develop the offensive in the direction of BAD SEGEBERG, RENDSBURG, and in cooperation with the 2nd Army Corps rout the main forces of the 6th Army Corps north of HAMBURG; and by the close of 10 to 11 September it will capture the line KIEL, RENDSBURG, ELMSHORN. Subsequently it will attack in the direction of RENDSBURG, FLENSBURG, VEJLE.
- 2. The 2nd Army Corps (24th and 8th motorized rifle divisions), with the commitment to battle at 0600 hours 10 September of the 24th Motorized Rifle Division in the direction of BARGTEHEIDE, UTERSEN, in cooperation with the 4th Army will rout the enemy's HAMBURG grouping and by the close of 11 September capture HAMBURG.
- 3. The 7th Army (1st, 4th, 11th, 13th, and 14th motorized rifle divisions and the 9th Tank Division), in cooperation with the 6th Army in a meeting engagement, will rout with two divisions the Lilac 1st Army Corps. The 14th Motorized Rifle Division will make a thrust in the direction of DANNENBURG, LUNEBURG, and by the close of 10 September seize the line LUNEBURG, ROTENBURG, BLENDER. Forces of the 13th and 4th motorized rifle divisions will complete the encirclement of the enemy in the ARENDSEE area.

Subsequently the main forces will advance in the direction of ACHIM, ASCHENDORF.

4. The 6th Army (12th, 17th, and 28th motorized rifle divisions, and the 5th and 19th tank divisions) will be committed to battle at 0600 hours 10 September from these lines: No. 1 -- BERGEN, MELLENDORF: and No. 2 -- FALLINGBOSTEL, 4 kilometers west of NEUSTADT in the direction of CELLE, NIENBURG, LINGEN; and in cooperation with the 7th Army will rout the Lilac 1st Army Corps and Brown 3rd Tank Division in a meeting engagement and by the close of 12 to 13 September capture the MEPPEN, BORGHORST line.

Subsequently it will attack in the direction of LINGEN, ARNHEM.

5. The 9th Army will repel the Lilac 2nd Army's counterthrust with a two-division thrust in the direction of HANNOVER, RINTELN, rout the units of the /Brown/7th Tank Division, capture HANNOVER, and by the close of 10 to 11 September reach the PETERSHAGEN, LUGDE line. At 0600 hours on 10 September the 26th Tank Division will be committed in the direction of KEYNE /probably PEINE/,

Page 10 of 11 Pages

BOCKENEM; and with four divisions, in cooperation with the Western Front's 3rd Army, /the 9th Army/ will encircle and destroy the enemy's SALZGITTER grouping.

- 6. The 10th Tank Army by the morning of 10 September will be concentrated in the area (excluding) GRANZE, (excluding) BERLIN, (excluding) FURSTENWALDE, JOACHIMSTAHL in readiness for commitment to battle in the direction of DIEPHOLZ, ENSCHEDE, EINDHOVEN.
- /7./ The rocket troops and artillery will be in readiness to participate in the front's initial nuclear strike against planned targets.

They will inflict fire destruction on the 21st and 11th motorized infantry divisions and the 3rd Tank Division in front of the line of commitment and on the flanks of the 2nd Army Corps and 6th Army, and will support their actions during development of the offensive.

They will inflict fire destruction on the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps during their deployment for a counterthrust. They will prevent a further advance of the enemy groupings on the STENDAL and MAGDEBURG axes and inflict fire destruction on them during their encirclement and destruction.

7. /sic -- 8./ The 1st Air Army will continue up to the close of 9 September the destruction of the launchers of the 650th, 450th, and 150th battalions of the 24th and 50th Lance and Sergeant regiments and continue supporting the 7th and 9th armies' troops.

On 10 September it will inflict fire destruction on the Lilac 1st Army Corps with three army sorties of front aviation and 16 regimental sorties of army aviation; safeguard the commitment to battle of the second echelon -- the 6th Army and 2nd Army Corps; and support the 4th, 7th and 6th armies' troops during development of the offensive and the 9th Army in repelling the Lilac 2nd Army Corps' counterthrust.

It will continue to search for and destroy nuclear means, especially Pershing, Lance, and Sergeant launchers.

At dawn on 10 September it will have one flight in each fighter-bomber aviation regiment ready to employ nuclear weapons.

9. The air defense troops, in cooperation with 1st Air Army fighter aviation, will cover the front's main grouping during the development of the offensive, /cover/ the 2nd Army Corps and 6th Army when they are committed to battle, and the 7th and 9th armies' troops during the encirclement and destruction of the enemy groupings on the STENDAL and MACDEBURG axes.

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Page 11 of 11 Pages

I request:

- a) permission to relocate the $\underline{\text{front}}$ control posts by the morning of 10 September to the /following/ areas:
 - -- the alternate command post to the woods 9 kilometers east of CELLE;
 - -- the rear control post to the woods 10 kilometers west of KLOTZE.
- b) permission to coordinate joint actions with the adjacent forces on the left for the encirclement and destruction of the enemy's SALZGITTER grouping.

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