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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRYUSSR/WARSAW PACT

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DATE OF INFO. 1977

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SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON: Supplementary Material for Lesson No. 1

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of supplementary material for a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This is a translation of seven short reports by the commander of the Coastal Front and his principal staff officers on the initial stages of the offensive operation against NATO's Northern Army Group, including: the report of the chief of the operations directorate on the opposing orders of battle and his assessment of the situation; the chief of staff's proposals on the objectives, tasks, and decision for the offensive; the commander's decision, which is in large measure an acceptance and repetition of the chief of staff's proposals; the report by the commander of the air army on its role in delivering the front's initial nuclear strike against NATO's ground forces groupings and missile/nuclear means; the report by the chief of the air defense troops on the repulse of the enemy air strike by SAM and antiaircraft artillery troops; recommaissance of the radioactive and chemical situation in the front zone, and decontamination treatment of personnel and equipment following a nuclear and chemical strike, by the chief of chemical troops; and the procedures for maintaining stable communications and control during the offensive. End of Summary

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this series probably equate as follows:

Brown -- West Germany
Blue -- Great Britain
Green -- United States
Lilac -- Belgium
Violet -- The Netherlands

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REPORT

of the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the Coastal Front (variant)

1. At the start of the operation, the Coastal Front is made up of: 4 combined-arms armies, 1 army corps, 1 air army, 2 front missile brigades, 3 artillery divisions of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command /RVGK/, 17 motorized rifle divisions, 7 tank divisions, 1 airborne division, 1 antiaircraft artillery division, 2 surface-to-air missile /SAM/ brigades, 2 S-75 SAM regiments, 2 S-125 SAM regiments, and 2 antitank artillery brigades.

By the morning of D2, a tank army (3 tank divisions and 1 motorized rifle division) will arrive to form part of the front.

In all, with the above-mentioned complement, the front will have: 4 combined-arms armies, 1 tank army, 1 army corps, 1 air army, 29 divisions (18 motorized rifle and 10 tank divisions, and 1 airborne division), 214 launchers, including 102 operational-tactical missile launchers and 112 tactical missile launchers, 7,082 medium tanks, 6,246 guns and mortars, 5,665 antitank means, 1,275 combat aircraft (including 587 delivery aircraft).

The front will be allocated 680 nuclear warheads for the operation, including 320 aviation warheads.

The availability of these forces and means will enable the <u>front</u> to use more than 370 nuclear warheads (including 200 aviation warheads) in the initial nuclear strike, and during conduct of combat actions employing conventional means of destruction only, the available artillery will make it possible to break through the enemy's defense in two to three sectors over a total extent of up to 25 kilometers with a density of 100 to 110 gums and mortars per kilometer of breakthrough frontage.

2. The disposition of the troops and their status and operational situation will provide, in the course of one to two nights, for the establishment of the necessary front attack groupings in the departure area for the offensive, with three armies (4th, 7th, and 9th armies) in the first echelon; in the second /echelon/, one combined-arms army (6th Army); the 10th Tank Army, and the 2nd Army Corps; and in the combined-arms reserve, two divisions (13th Motorized Rifle Division and 20th Tank Division). It is most advisable that the main efforts of the 6th, 7th, and 9th armies and 10th Tank Army be concentrated on

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the HANNOVER-BRUSSELS axis, and the 4th Army and 2nd Army Corps on the JUTLAND axis.

This grouping of front forces and means will establish on the axis of the main thrust the following ratios of superiority over the enemy in terms of basic indicators: in missile launchers -- 1.4 to 1, tanks -- 1.3 to 1, artillery and mortars -- 1.4 to 1, and antitank means 1.8 to 1.

Engineer preparation of departure areas for the offensive is to be carried out in the period of 3 to 7 September, and they are to be occupied by troops on the two nights of 6 and 7 September.

- 3. To cover the <u>front</u> troops' advance and their deployment in the departure area and to repulse a <u>possible</u> surprise invasion by the enemy, /recommend/ allocating one motorized rifle regiment from each of the first-echelon large units and the 1st, 8th, and 21st motorized rifle divisions at full strength, which are to be brought up to the state border on the night of 2 September. The preparation of their positions and zones is to be completed by 2400 hours 4 September.
- 4. The readiness of <u>front</u> troops for the transition to the offensive and for delivery of the initial nuclear strike will feature the following indicators:
- -- it is possible for the first-echelon troops to go over to the offensive and arrive at the state border within three to seven hours from their permanent garrison posts and to do this within one and a half to two hours from the departure areas for the offensive;
- -- front rocket troops can deliver a nuclear strike within eight to ten hours from the condition of constant combat readiness, and within 30 minutes from the condition of combat readiness /Sic/;
- -- aviation can deliver the initial strike from the condition of constant combat readiness within one and a half to two and a half hours, and from the condition of increased readiness within 20 to 25 minutes;
- -- from alert status, a strike can be delivered by missiles within 10 to 12 minutes and by aviation within 15 to 20 minutes.
- 5. The terrain in the <u>front</u>'s offensive zone is trafficable for all types of combat equipment and transport off the roads except for some sectors north of BERLIN and in the area of SULINGEN, VECHTE, DIEPHOLZ. The enemy is positioned in predominently level terrain with 25 to 30 percent woodlands, and the southern part of the zone is hilly in places with a number of low mountain ridges which are difficult to traverse off the road.

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On the coastal axis the terrain is low-lying and open with numerous rivers, wide estuaries, canals and drainage canals, and swampy floodplains and shorelines. The northern part of the axis, especially Lilac territory, can be flooded by the destruction of sea dikes.

Troops will have to carry out special measures in order to seize the large cities of HAMBURG, BREMEN, and HANNOVER and the northern part of the RUHR industrial area.

The ELBE River, KIEL Canal, and the WESER, IJSSEL, RHINE, and MAAS rivers are major natural water obstacles. Overcoming them will require the employment of front and army engineer troops.

The forest tracts are cut through by wide (three to eight meters) lanes, which will allow equipment to be moved and troops to be concealed in them. However, if nuclear strikes are delivered, obstructions, demolitions, and fires may arise, which will hinder troop actions.

The network of motor roads is quite developed (80 to 100 kilometers per 100 square kilometers of territory) and will allow the preparation of three to four routes for each first-echelon division during forward movement to the state border. The road bridges have carrying capacities of 30 to 60 tons.

There are five bridges on the ELBE River in the departure zone and four bridges on the HAVEL River. To ensure troop crossings over these rivers, it will be necessary to lay three to four additional bridges across the HLBE River and one to two bridges across the HAVEL River.

6. Meteorological conditions are relatively favorable for <u>front</u> troop actions.

However, the westerly direction of the average wind at a speed of 30 to 40 km per hour will favor the enemy's establishment of zones of radioactive contamination of the terrain.

7. The materiel allocated to the <u>front</u> for the operation will support its execution.

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CONCLUSION: The combat strength of the front, the available means of fire destruction, and the materiel support will allow the necessary superiority in forces and means over the enemy to be established on the axis of the main thrust and /will allow/ fulfillment of the assigned tasks in the operation both with and without the employment of nuclear weapons.

The operational situation of <u>front</u> troops and the terrain conditions provide for the establishment of attack groupings of troops in the departure position for the offensive within the prescribed time limits and /provide for/ the repulse of a surprise enemy invasion and the transition to a decisive offensive.

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Report of the Front Chief of Staff's Proposals on the Decision (variant)

I. The objectives and tasks of the front in the operation

The Coastal Front has the task of repelling a possible attack by the enemy and preventing his invasion into its territory. It is to prepare and by special instruction of the Supreme High Command carry out an offensive operation on the JUTLAND and HANNOVER-BRUSSELS axes, and, in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet and the 3rd Army of the Western Front, rout the troop grouping of the Northern Army Group and the aircraft of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, capture the northern part of Brown territory and the Lilac and Violet territory, reach the coast of the North Sea, and organize its defense.

The depth of the task is 600 kilometers. Front troops must fulfill this task within 10 to 12 days. The average rate of advance will be 50 to 60 km per day.

In fulfilling the immediate task, front troops must rout the main forces of the Northern Army Group, advance 250 km, and seize the line FLENSBURG, WESTERLAND, AURICH, ASCHENDORF, LINGEN, MUNSTER within five to six days. The average rate of advance will be 40 to 50 km per day.

During fulfillment of the follow-up task, front troops are to rout the operational reserves of the Northern Army Group, make assault crossings of the IJSSEL and RHINE rivers from the march, advance up to 350 km, and, on the tenth to twelfth day of the operation, seize the line BRUGGE, RONSE, CHARLEROI, DINANT, and reach the coast of the North Sea and organize its defense. The average rate of advance will be 50 to 60 km per day.

Thus, the Coastal Front will be in the first operational echelon in the strategic operation in the Western Theater of Military Operations and have the decisive role in destroying the troops of the Northern Army Group and the aircraft of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, in reaching the coast of the North Sea, and in organizing its defense.

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II. Conclusions from the assessment of the enemy

At 2000 hours 30 August, West brought NATO line units to a status of military vigilance and began immediate preparations to unleash war in Europe against East. The following are prepared to deliver an attack in the Coastal Front zone: Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and the naval forces in the Baltic and North seas.

Within three to five days they can establish the following ground forces attack groupings to conduct combat actions: three army corps (Brown 4th and 6th army corps and Lilac 1st Army Corps) on the HAMBURG-SZCZECIN axis; four to five army corps (Brown 1st and 5th army corps, Blue 1st Army Corps, Lilac 2nd Army Corps, and possibly the Violet 2nd Army Corps) on the HANNOVER-BERLIN axis; and they can deliver a surprise strike against front troops and installations employing over 350 nuclear warheads.

The combat actions of these groupings will be supported by the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, numbering approximately 900 combat aircraft, including over 350 delivery aircraft.

During combat actions, it is possible that the efforts of West's attack groupings will be augmented by transferring to the front zone the Blue 2nd Army Corps and Blue 3rd Infantry Division and, in addition, two to three Brown line divisions.

The possible nature of the West's actions are as follows: to split the Coastal Front troop grouping into parts by attacking on the above axes, defeat it, capture the city of BERLIN, and on the fifth to sixth day of combat actions reach the ODER River. Four to five army corps (14 to 15 divisions) may operate in the first echelon, two to three army corps in the second echelon, and in the reserve of the Northern Army Group -- one to two army corps and two to three divisions.

The major installations of West in the front offensive zone east of the NORDEN, DORTMUND line, the destruction of which in the initial nuclear strike can lead to a significant reduction in the combat capabilities of the enemy's troops, are as follows: the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, 150th and 650th Lance missile battalions, 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion, 15 to 16 home airfields for aviation; 15 to 20 nuclear weapons depots; seven to eight Nike and Hawk SAM battalions; 15 to 16 army corps divisions of the first operational echelon (Brown 1st, 6th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 18th, and 21st motorized infantry divisions; Brown 3rd, 7th, and 16th tank divisions; Green 4th Tank /sic -- Mechanized/ Division; Blue 1st, 2nd, and 4th armored divisions; Lilac 1st and 4th motorized infantry divisions); the command posts of the Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and six army

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corps; control and warning posts and centers and electronic warfare centers.

III. Conclusions from an assessment of our troops

- 1. The Coastal Front is made up of:
- -- four combined-arms armies (4th, 6th, 7th, and 9th armies), 2nd Army Corps, 1st Air Army, 17 motorized rifle divisions, 7 tank divisions, 1 airborne division, 2 front missile brigades, three artillery divisions of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command /RVGK/, 2 antitank artillery brigades, 2 SAM brigades, 1 S-75 SAM regiment, 2 S-125 SAM regiments, 1 antiaircraft artillery division, 1 S-60 antiaircraft artillery regiment, 1 chemical defense brigade, and other front units of branch arms and special troops.
- -- by the morning of D2, the 10th Tank Army, consisting of four divisions (three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division), will have arrived to join the front.

In all, the front will have for the operation: 29 divisions (18 motorized rifle, 10 tank, and I airborne); 214 launchers (102 for operational-tactical missiles, 112 for tactical missiles); 7,082 tanks; 6,246 guns and mortars; 5,665 antitank means (including 4,761 antitank guided missiles); 1,275 combat aircraft (including 587 delivery aircraft).

The front has been allocated 680 nuclear munitions for the operation, and 21 army sorties of the 1st Air Army have been planned for (including three army sorties for participation in the air operation according to the plan of the Supreme High Command).

With such a troop complement, the Coastal front has a negligible superiority over the enemy in launchers, artillery and antitank means. In tanks and aviation the balance is approximately even.

Therefore, for the purposes of altering the balance of forces and means in our favor and to establish conditions favoring the fulfilment of the assigned tasks in the operation, it will be necessary for the Coastal Front to concentrate its main efforts on the axes of attacks within narrower zones and on the destruction of the Northern Army Group's missile/nuclear means and delivery aircraft at airfields, and on the rout of its main grouping of ground forces.

The operational situation and status of front troops enables them, within a short period of time (within four to eight hours), to establish attack groupings of troops, to repel enemy attacks, and to go over to a decisive offensive.

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The width of an offensive zone is 200 km, which allows 10 to 12 divisions to be in the first echelon. The <u>front</u> can employ over 370 nuclear munitions in the initial nuclear strike: to destroy the enemy's main missile/nuclear and air groupings, nuclear munitions depots, air defense forces and means, and main posts, and to inflict defeat on his main grouping of ground forces.

When combat actions are conducted with conventional means of destruction, the front can significantly weaken the enemy troop grouping by means of air strikes and artillery fire and can ensure a breakthrough of the forward line on a frontage of 24 to 25 kilometers given a density of 100 or more guns and mortars and 50 to 60 tanks per kilometer. In light of this, it is advisable to have the adjacent flanks of two armies make the breakthrough on a frontage of 17 km on the axis of the front's main attack.

Thus, the combat strength of the front, the operational situation and status of the troops, the allocated number of nuclear and conventional munitions, and the available reserves of materiel ensure fulfilment of the tasks assigned to the front in the operation within the prescribed time periods.

IV. Proposals on the decision

1. Concept of the operation -- by means of splitting attacks the 7th and 9th armies on the CELLE-BRUSSELS axis and the 4th Army on the JUTLAND axis will defeat the enemy's HANNOVER and HAMBURG groupings; by the subsequent commitment to battle of the front's second echelon (6th Army and 2nd Army Corps), a rapid offensive will be developed into the depth and with part of the forces in the direction of the flanks; the operational stability of the Northern Army Group will be disrupted, its attack groupings of troops will be split, and, in cooperation with the Western Front and the Combined Baltic Fleet, their defeat will be completed.

By massed nuclear and air strikes and artillery fire, destruction will be inflicted on the enemy's missile/nuclear means and aviation and on his ground forces attack groupings in the areas of AHRENSBURG, BREMEN, UELZEN; CELLE, NIENBURG, HAMELN, SALZGITTER.

By employing 376 nuclear munitions in the front's initial nuclear strike the following are to be destroyed: 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, 150th and 650th Lance missile battalions, 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion; 17 nuclear weapons depots; delivery aircraft at 14 airfields; five control and warning centers (posts); the command posts of the Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and six army corps; 30 to 40 Nike and Hawk SAM batteries; 75 to 80 percent destruction is to be inflicted on 13 divisions (Brown 6th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 18th motorized infantry divisions; Brown 3rd, 7th, and 16th tank divisions; Green 4th Mechanized Division; Blue 1st, 2nd, and 4th armored divisions) and 30 to 50 percent destruction on four divisions

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(Brown 1st and 21st motorized infantry divisions, Lilac 1st and 4th motorized infantry divisions).

At the start of combat actions employing conventional means of destruction only, by means of three massed strikes with the 1st Air Army in cooperation with long-range aviation and fleet aviation, the following will be destroyed: the launchers of the on-alert detachments of the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, the batteries and battalions (regiments) of Lance and Sergeant launchers; the main forces of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force will be defeated, and air supremacy will be achieved.

Strikes by bomber aviation, fighter-bomber aviation, and army aviation and artillery fire will inflict maximum losses on the Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps, and Blue 1st Army Corps.

A possible enemy invasion will be repelled by covering forces and by encounter attacks with the main forces of the front's first-echelon armies.

The main attack of the front will be delivered in the direction of CELLE, OSNABRUCK by the forces of four armies (6th, 7th, and 9th armies and 10th Tank Army) to defeat the Brown 1st Army Corps, and, in cooperation with the Western Front's 3rd Army, the Blue 1st Army Corps and Violet 1st Army Corps will be encircled and destroyed in the area of BRAUNSCHWEIG, BODENWERDER, NORTHEIM.

The secondary attack will be in the direction of BAD OLDESLOE, FLENSBURG by the forces of the 4th Army and 2nd Army Corps, and in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet, will rout the main forces of the Brown 6th Army Corps in the area of /BAD/ SEGEBERG, HAMBURG, GEESTHACHT.

With the commitment of the 6th Army to battle on the morning of the third to fourth day of the operation from the line FALLINGBOSTEL, BISSENDORF or SYKE, UCHTE in the direction of NIENBURG, REINE, and of the 2nd Army Corps on the second to third day of the operation from the line (excluding) BAD OLDESLOE, GRUNWALD, in the direction of BARGTEHEIDE, UTERSEN, the efforts of the troops of the front's first operational echelon will be intensified and the rout of the enemy's HANNOVER and HAMBURG groupings will be completed.

With the commitment to battle of the 6th Army, the main efforts of the 7th Army, in cooperation with the 2nd Army Corps, will be directed at the destruction of the Brown 4th Army Corps' large units and part of the forces of the Brown 6th Army Corps; and the main forces of the front, developing a rapid offensive, will rout the Northern Army Group's operational reserves and on the fifth to sixth day of the operation fulfill the immediate task -- seize the line FLENSBURG, WESTERLAND, AURICH, ASCHENDORF, LINGEN, MUNSTER.

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On the first and second day of the operation, forces of the 16th Motorized Rifle Division and the 61st and 62nd naval infantry regiments will carry out an amphibious landing operation and seize FEHMARN Island and the KIEL Naval Base.

With the subsequent commitment to battle of the 10th Tank Army on the fifth to sixth day of the operation from the line FURSTENAU, (excluding) OSNABRUCK or OIDENZAAL, BORGHORST in the direction of GRONAU, EINDHOVEN, the main forces of the front (7th and 6th armies, 10th Tank Army) will develop a rapid offensive, complete the defeat of the main forces of the Northern Army Group east of the IJSSEL and RHINE rivers; and the 9th Army, in cooperation with forces of the Western Front, will encircle and destroy the enemy's RUHR grouping, make an assault crossing of these rivers from the march, and, on the tenth to twelfth day of combat actions, achieve the final objective of the front operation -- seize the line BRUGGE, RONSE, CHARLEROI, DINANT, reach the coast of the North Sea, and organize its defense.

To capture crossings and assist troops of the 10th Tank Army in the assault crossing of the RHINE River from the march, an airborne landing operation will be carried out on the fifth to sixth day of the operation by assault-landing the 30th Airborne Division in the area of EMMERICH, GROESBEEK, KEVELAER, XANTEN.

The operational disposition of <u>front</u> troops will be in two echelons. The first echelon will be the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies; the second echelon will be the 6th Army, 10th Tank Army, and 2nd Army Corps; the combined-arms reserve will be the 13th Motorized Rifle Division and 20th Tank Division.

- 2. The tasks of front troops are prescribed as follows:
- a) For armies of the first operational echelon:

-- the immediate task is to inflict defeat on the Brown 6th and 4th army corps, rout the Brown 1st Army Corps, encircle and destroy the Blue 1st Army Corps and Violet 1st Army Corps in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front, make an assault crossing of the KIEL Canal and WESER River from the march, and on the third to fourth day of the operation, seize the following lines: 4th Army -- KIEL, RENDSBURG, ITZEHOE; 7th Army -- ROTENBURG, UCHTE; 9th Army -- MINDEN, LUGDE.

Depth of the task -- 120 to 140 km, average rate of advance --- 35 to 40 km per day.

On the first day of the operation reach the line AHRENSBOK, AHRENSBURG, UELZEN, ESCHEDE, PEINE, SALZGITTER. Depth of the task is 30 to 40 km.

To augment the efforts of first-echelon troops the front's second echelon will be committed to battle: the 6th Army (D3 to D4) on the axis of the main

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thrust, the 2nd Army Corps (D2 to D3) on the JUTLAND axis. An amphibious landing operation will be carried out by forces of the 16th Motorized Rifle Division and the 61st and 62nd naval infantry regiments on D to D2 to seize FEHMARN Island and the KIEL Naval Base.

-- The follow-up task is to swiftly develop the offensive, rout the enemy's operational reserves (1st and 2nd Lilac army corps) by encounter attacks, complete the defeat of his HAMBURG and HANNOVER troop groupings, and on the fifth to sixth day of the operation fulfill the front's immediate task /sic/ of seizing the line FLENSBURG, WESTERLAND, ASCHENDORF, LINGEN, MUNSTER.

In keeping with this, the axes of attacks and the width of zones at the start of the operation are as follows:

- -- 4th Army: BAD OLDESLOE, RENDSBURG, FLENSBURG (60 km);
- -- 7th Army: CELLE, NIENBURG, PAPENBURG (75 km);
- -- 9th Army: WOLFSBURG, MINDEN, MUNSTER, and part of the forces to BODENWERDER (60 km).
 - b) For the second echelon of the front:
- -- the 2nd Army Corps as of the morning of D2 to D3 is to engage in battle from the line (excluding) BAD OLDESLOE, GRUNWALD, develop the offensive in the direction of BARGTEHEIDE, UTERSEN, and in cooperation with the 7th Army, encircle on D3 to D4 and destroy on D5 to D6 the enemy's HAMBURG grouping;
- -- the 6th Army as of the morning of D3 to D4 is to engage in battle from the line FALLINGBOSTEL, BISSENDORF or SYKE, UCHTE, develop the offensive in the direction of NIENBURG, and in cooperation with the 7th and 9th armies rout the enemy's operational reserves and on the fifth to sixth day of the operation seize the MEPPEN, BORGHORST line.

The follow-up task of the army is assigned as follows: develop the offensive in the direction of LINGEN, ARNHEM, in cooperation with the 10th Tank Army rout the main forces of the Northern Army Group east of the IJSSEL River, make an assault crossing of the river from the march, and on the eighth to ninth day of the operation seize the AMERSFOORT, 's HERTOGENBOSCH line;

-- the 10th Tank Army is to engage in battle on D5 to D6 from the line FURSTENAU, (excluding) OSNABRUCK or OLDENZAAL, BORGHORST and develop the offensive in the direction of GRONAU, EINDHOVEN, in cooperation with the 6th and 9th armies complete the defeat of the main forces of the Northern Army Group east of the IJSSEL and RHINE rivers, in cooperation with the 30th Airborne Division make an assault crossing of the RHINE River from the march, and on the

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eighth to minth day of the operation seize the EINDHOVEN, ROERMOND line.

The follow-up task for the 10th Tank Army is assigned as follows: in cooperation with the 6th Army continue to develop the offensive, destroy the enemy's reserves west of the RHINE River, and, on the tenth to twelfth day of the operation seize the SOIGNIES, DINANT line.

- c) For the assault landing forces: the 30th Airborne Division as of the morning of the fifth to sixth day of the operation is to make an assault landing in the area of EMMERICH, CROESBEEK, KEVELAER, XANTEN with the task of destroying the enemy in this area, capturing crossings over the RHINE River in the ARNHEM, WESEL sector, and assisting troops of the 10th Tank Army in the assault crossing of the river from the march;
- -- 16th Motorized Rifle Division and 61st and 62nd naval infantry regiments are to carry out an amphibious landing operation on the first and second day of the operation to seize FEHMARN Island (with a motorized rifle regiment and naval infantry regiment) and the KIEL Naval Base (with the remaining assault landing forces).
- d) For the 2nd Front Missile Brigade: siting area is LUBZ, (excluding) PUTLITZ, (excluding) PLAU; for the 3rd Front Missile Brigade it is PESSIN, (excluding) PREMNITZ, (excluding) BRANDENBURG; they are to be in readiness to participate in the initial nuclear strike of the front.
- e) For the 1st Air Army: carry out reconnaissance, destroy the enemy's nuclear attack means, support and cover the combat actions of ground forces, concentrating main efforts on the axis of the main thrust, and be in readiness to participate in the initial nuclear strike of the front. Flight resources will be allocated as follows (in regimental sorties): to fulfill the immediate task, 354 sorties; for the follow-up task, 190 sorties; for air support of the combat actions of troops, 148 sorties; and in reserve, 29 sorties.
- f) For the air defense troops: the main efforts of air defense are to be concentrated on covering the main grouping of front troops on the CELLE-BRUSSELS axis, and, in cooperation with the 6th Corps of the Air Defense of the Country, on repelling enemy air strikes.
- g) For the radioelectronic warfare forces and means: to disorganize the enemy's control of troops, combat equipment, and weapons on the axis of the main and secondary thrusts by jamming his radio communications and by covering the command posts of the <u>front</u> and armies, the missile brigades, and the main crossings against radar recommaissance and aimed air strikes; to ensure stable control of troops and weapons under conditions of jamming and delivery of strikes by enemy homing weapons.

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- h) For the front reserves: the combined-arms reserves (the motorized rifle division and tank division) are to relocate in the zones of the 7th and 9th armies and be in readiness to reinforce them; Antitank Reserve No. 1 (4th Antitank Artillery Brigade) is to be in the 7th Army's offensive zone, Antitank Reserve No. 2 (5th Antitank Artillery Brigade) is to be in the offensive zone of the 9th Army in readiness to repel possible counterthrusts by enemy tanks; mobile obstacle detachments No. 1 and No. 2 will relocate themselves likewise together with the antitank reserves.
 - i) Nuclear weapons are to be allocated as follows:
 - -- 376 for the initial nuclear strike of the front;
 - -- 166 for fulfilment of the immediate task of the front;
 - -- 100 for fulfilment of the follow-up task of the front;
 - -- 38 for the front reserve.
- 3. By the start of the operation, control posts are to be deployed as follows:
- -- front command post: as of 0400 hours 7 September in the woods 10 km northwest of NEURUPPIN;
- -- front alternate command post: as of 0400 hours 6 September in the woods 10 km northwest of GENTHIN;
- -- front rear control post: as of 0500 hours 7 September in the woods 6 km south of FURSTENBERG;

Control and communications systems are to be in readiness by 2000 hours 5 September. Operations groups are to move out to field control posts on the night of 3 September.

4. Combat tasks are to be assigned to front troops by 1700 hours 1 September, planning for the offensive operation is to be completed by 2400 hours 1 September, defense areas are to be occupied by covering units and large units by 0600 hours 2 September, departure areas for the offensive are to be prepared by the close of 5 September and occupied by troops over the course of two nights: on the night of 6 September by the first-echelon large units, rocket troops and artillery, and air defense troops; and on the night of 7 September by the second-echelon large units, the combined arms reserves, and the units of special troops.

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REPORT

of the Decision of the Coastal Front Commander on the Offensive Operation
(variant)

1. The Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and the naval forces in the Baltic and North seas are preparing to deliver an attack in the front zone. Their strength is as follows: 25 divisions, 6 of which are tank divisions (armored divisions); approximately 890 nuclear weapons delivery means (including 64 operational-tactical missiles, 84 tactical missiles, 382 atomic artillery pieces, and 360 delivery aircraft); more than 6,200 tanks, more than 4,000 guns and mortars, approximately 3,000 antitank means, and 888 aircraft.

During the operation, it is possible for enemy efforts to be augmented by the full mobilization of three to five Brown divisions and one to two divisions each from Lilac and Violet, and also by transferring the Blue 2nd Army Corps from Great Britain. Up to 330 aircraft (including no less than 170 delivery aircraft) can be added to the strength of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force.

Therefore, the <u>front</u> can be opposed in the operation by a total of: 30 to 31 divisions, including 6 tank divisions (armored divisions); 172 missile launchers, including 68 for operational-tactical missiles and 104 for tactical missiles; 1,123 aircraft, including 537 delivery aircraft; more than 7,000 medium tanks; approximately 5,000 guns and mortars, including 470 atomic /artillery pieces/; approximately 4,000 antitank means, including more than 15,000 /sic/ antitank guided missiles.

The most probable axes of the enemy attack are expected to be as follows: the main axis, HANNOVER-BERLIN, with a force of 15 to 16 divisions; the secondary axis, HAMBURG-SZCZECIN, with a force of 10 to 12 divisions. West requires five to seven days to establish the attack groupings. Combat actions can begin as of 6 to 8 September by a surprise attack with both conventional means of destruction and also the employment of nuclear weapons.

2. The Coastal Front has the task of repelling a possible enemy attack and of preventing an enemy invasion of its territory. The Coastal Front is to prepare and, upon special instruction of the Supreme High Command, Carry out an offensive operation on the JUTLAND and HANNOVER-BRUSSELS axes; in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet and the Western Front, defeat the Northern Army Group's troop grouping and the aircraft of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, seize the northern part of Brown territory and Lilac and Violet territory, reach the coast of the North Sea, and organize its defense.

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The immediate task of the front is to defeat the main forces of the Northern Army Group and the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force by thrusts in the directions of BAD OLDESLOE, RENDSBURG and CELLE, OSNABRUCK, to make an assault crossing of the KIEL Canal and WESER River from the march, and on the fifth to sixth day of the operation seize the line FLENSBURG, WESTERLAND, AURICH, ASCHENDORF, LINGEN, MINSTER. Jointly with the Combined Baltic Fleet it is to conduct an amphibious landing operation on the first day of the operation to seize FEHMARN Island, and on the second day of the operation /seize/ the KIEL Naval Base.

The follow-up task of the front is to develop the offensive in the direction of ENSCHEDE, BRUSSELS, make an assault crossing of the IJSSEL and RHINE rivers from the march, defeat the approaching reserves of the enemy, and on the tenth to twelfth day of the operation seize the line RRUGGE, RONSE, CHARLEROI, DINANT, reach the coast of the North Sea, and organize its defense.

The combat strength of the front specified for fulfilment of these tasks is the following: 5 armies, including 1 tank army, 1 army corps, 1 air army, 29 divisions (18 motorized rifle divisions, 10 tank divisions, 1 airborne division), 2 front missile brigades, 3 artillery divisions of the RVGK, 2 antitank artillery brigades, 2 SAM brigades, 1 antiaircraft artillery division, 1 chemical defense brigade, and a complement of special units and large units. In all: 214 missile launchers, including 102 for operational-tactical missiles and 112 for tactical missiles; 1,275 aircraft, including 587 delivery aircraft; more than 7,000 tanks; 6,246 gums and mortars; more than 5,500 antitank means. For the operation, 680 nuclear munitions (including 320 for aviation) and 21 army sorties of the air army (including 3 sorties according to the air operation plan) will be allocated to the front.

The balance in forces and means is approximately equal. The front has a negligible advantage in launchers, artillery, and antitank means, which will require the establishment of superiority in forces and means over the enemy on the axes of attack by the maneuvering of /our/ troops.

- 3. The following are to cooperate with Coastal Front troops in the operation:
- -- on the right, the Combined Baltic Fleet in seizing FEHMARN Island and the KIEL Canal, in seizing the southeastern coast of the North Sea, and in the organization of its defense;
- -- on the left, the Western <u>Front</u>. Its 3rd Army is to deliver a thrust in the direction of COTTINGEN, MENDEN, BASTOGNE, and together with the Coastal Front's 9th Army encircle and destroy the HANNOVER and then the RUHR groupings of the enemy.

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4. I have decided, by the splitting attacks of the 7th and 9th armies on the CELLE-BRUSSELS axis and of the 4th Army on the JUTLAND axis, to inflict defeat on the enemy's HANNOVER and HAMBURG groupings, and by the subsequent commitment to battle of the front's second echelon (6th Army and 2nd Army Corps), to develop a rapid offensive into the depth and with part of the forces in the direction of the flanks, to disrupt the operational stability of the Northern Army Group, split its attack groupings of troops, and in cooperation with the Western Front and Combined Baltic Fleet, complete their defeat.

To inflict destruction on the enemy's missile/nuclear means and aviation and on his ground forces attack groupings in the areas of AHRENSBURG, BREMEN, UELZEN; CELLE, NIENBURG, HAMELN, SALZGITTER by means of massed nuclear and air strikes and artillery fire.

To destroy the following by employing 376 nuclear warheads in the initial nuclear strike of the front: the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, 150th and 650th Lance missile battalions, 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion; 17 nuclear weapons depots; delivery aircraft at 14 airfields; 5 control and warning centers (posts); the command posts of the Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and six army corps; 30 to 40 Nike and Hawk SAM batteries; and to inflict 75 to 80 percent destruction on 13 divisions (Brown 6th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 18th motorized infantry divisions; Brown 3rd, 7th, and 16th tank divisions; Green 4th Mechanized Division; Blue 1st, 2nd, and 4th armored divisions) and 30 to 50 percent destruction on four divisions (Brown 1st and 21st motorized infantry divisions, Lilac 1st and 4th motorized infantry divisions).

At the start of combat actions employing conventional means of destruction only, to have the 1st Air Army, in cooperation with long-range aviation and fleet aviation, destroy the launchers of the on-alert detachments of the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing and of the batteries of Lance and Sergeant missile battalions (regiments), defeat the main forces of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, and achieve air supremacy.

To inflict maximum losses on the Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps and the Blue 1st Army Corps with bomber aviation, fighter-bomber aviation, and army aviation, and artillery fire.

To have a possible enemy invasion repelled by the covering forces and by encounter attacks with the main forces of the front's first-echelon armies.

To deliver the main attack of the front in the direction of CELLE, OSNABRUCK with the forces of four armies (6th, 7th, and 9th armies, and the 10th Tank Army) to defeat the Brown 1st Army Corps, and in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western Front to encircle and destroy the Blue 1st Army Corps and Violet 1st Army Corps in the area of BRAUNSCHWEIG, BODENWERDER, NORTHEIM.

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To make the secondary attack in the direction of BAD OLDESLOE, FLENSBURG with the forces of the 4th Army and 2nd Army Corps in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet to defeat the main forces of the Brown 6th Army Corps in the area of /BAD/ SEGEBERG, HAMBURG, GEESTHACHT.

By committing the 6th Army to battle as of the morning of the third to fourth day of the operation from the line FALLINGBOSTEL, BISSENDORF or SYKE, UCHTE in the direction of NIENBURG, REINE; and the 2nd Army Corps on the second to third day of the operation from the line (excluding) RAD OIDESLOE, GRUNWALD in the direction of BARGTEHEIDE, UTERSEN, to augment the efforts of the troops of the front's first operational echelon and complete the defeat of the enemy's HANNOVER and HAMBURG groupings.

Upon the commitment to battle of the 6th Army, the main efforts of the 7th Army, in cooperation with the 2nd Army Corps, are to be directed toward the defeat of the large units of the Brown 4th Army Corps and part of the forces of the Brown 6th Army Corps; and the main forces of the front, developing a rapid offensive, are to defeat the operational reserves of the Northern Army Group and on the fifth to sixth day of the operation fulfill the immediate task: seizing the line FLENSBURG, WESTERLAND, AURICH, ASCHENDORF, LINGEN, MUNSTER.

On the first and second day of the operation, forces of the 16th Motorized Rifle Division and the 61st and 62nd naval infantry regiments are to conduct an amphibious landing operation and seize FEHMARN Island and the KIEL Naval Base.

With the subsequent commitment to battle of the 10th Tank Army on the fifth to sixth day of the operation from the line FURSTENAU, (excluding) OSNABRUCK or OIDENZAAL, BORGHORST in the direction of GRONAU, EINDHOVEN, the main forces of the front (7th and 6th armies, 10th Tank Army) are to develop a rapid offensive, complete the defeat of the main forces of the Northern Army Group east of the IJSSEL and RHINE rivers, and the 9th Army, in cooperation with the troops of the Western Front, is to encircle and destroy the enemy's RUHR grouping and make an assault crossing of the rivers from the march, and on the tenth to twelfth days of combat actions, attain the final objective of the front operation: seize the line BRUGGE, RONSE, CHARLEROI, DINANT, reach the coast of the North Sea, and organize its defense.

To conduct an airborne landing operation with the assault landing of the 30th Airborne Division in the area of EMMERICH, GROESBEEK, KEVELAER, XANTEN to seize crossings and assist the troops of the 10th Tank Army in the assault crossing of the RHINE River from the march on the fifth to sixth day of the operation.

Front troops are to be operationally disposed in two echelons. The first echelon is to be the 4th, 7th and 9th armies; the second echelon is to be the

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6th Army, 10th Tank Army, and 2nd Army Corps; and the combined-arms reserve will be the 13th Motorized Rifle Division and 20th Tank Division.

- 5. Front troops are assigned the following tasks:
- a) the 4th Army (3rd, 7th, 8th, 14th motorized rifle divisions, 2nd Tank Division, 4th Army Missile Brigade, 4th Army Artillery Brigade, 4th SAM Brigade) with the 6th Artillery Division of RVGK, will repel a possible enemy attack with /its/ covering troops that are in place and with an encounter attack by the army's main forces, and develop the offensive in the direction of BAD OLDESLOE, RENDSBURG.

Its immediate task will be to defeat, in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet, the main forces of the Brown 6th Army Corps, make an assault crossing of the KIEL Canal from the march, and by the close of the third to fourth day of the operation, jointly with an amphibious landing action by the 16th Motorized Rifle Division and 61st and 62nd naval infantry regiments, seize the line KIEL, RENDSBURG, ITZEHOE. By the close of the first day of the operation, it will reach the line AHRENSBOK, AHRENSBURG, LAUENBURG.

Its follow-up task will be to develop the offensive in the direction of SCHLESWIG, SUDERLUGUM, complete the defeat of the Brown 6th Army Corps, and by the close of the fifth day of the operation seize the FLENSBURG, WESTERLAND line, reach the coast of the North Sea, and organize its defense.

In the initial nuclear strike of the front it will employ 37 nuclear missiles.

The boundary on the left will be: MIROW, PERLEBERG, LUTKENWISCH, then along the ELBE River, BRUNSBUTTELKOOG. Upon the commitment to battle of the 2nd Army Corps it will be: BAD OLDESLOE, (excluding) ELMSHORN.

b) The 7th Army (1st, 4th, and 11th motorized rifle divisions, 5th and 9th tank divisions, 7th Army Missile Brigade, 7th Army Artillery Brigade, 7th SAM Brigade) with the 8th Artillery Division of the RVGK will repel a possible enemy attack with /its/ covering troops that are in place and with an encounter attack by the army's main forces, and develop the offensive in the direction of CELLE, NIENBURG, and with part of its forces to SOLTAU.

Its immediate task will be to defeat, in cooperation with the 9th Army, the Brown 1st Army Corps, attack the Brown 4th Army Corps, make an assault crossing of the WESER River from the march, and on the third to fourth day of the operation seize the line WINSEN, ROTENBURG, UCHTE. Upon the commitment to battle of the 6th Army, be in readiness to concentrate its main efforts on defeating the enemy's HAMBURG grouping in cooperation with the 2nd Army Corps. By the close of the first day of the operation it will reach the line UELZEN,

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ESCHEDE, BROCKEL.

The follow-up task will be to develop the offensive in the direction of VERDEN, PAPENBURG and with part of the forces to BREMERHAVEN, and in cooperation with the 6th Army defeat the enemy's operational reserves, and on the fifth to sixth day of the operation seize the line AURICH, ASCHENDORF, (excluding) HAREN.

In the initial nuclear strike of the <u>front</u> it will employ 41 nuclear missiles.

The boundary on the left will be: RATHENOW, GARDELEGEN, NEUSTADT. Upon the commitment to battle of the 6th Army, it will be: WIETZENDORF, SYKE, EMMEN.

c) The 9th Army (6th, 18th, 21st, and 23rd motorized rifle divisions, 10th and 26th tank divisions, 9th Army Missile Brigade, 9th Army Artillery Brigade, 9th SAM Brigade), with the 11th Artillery Division of the RVGK, will repel a possible enemy attack with the covering troops that are in place and with an encounter attack by the army's main forces, and develop the offensive in the direction of WOLFSBURG, MINDEN and with part of its forces to BODENWERDER.

The immediate task will be, in cooperation with the 7th Army, to defeat the Brown 1st Army Corps; and with the 3rd Army of the Western Front to encircle and destroy the Blue 1st Army Corps and the Violet 1st Army Corps; make an assault crossing the WESER River from the march; and on the third to fourth day of the operation seize the MINDEN, LUGDE line. By the close of the first day of the operation it will reach the line MEINERSEN, PEINE, SALZGITTER.

The follow-up task will be to develop the offensive in the direction of MINDEN, MUNSTER and, in cooperation with the 6th Army, defeat the enemy's operational reserves and on the fifth to sixth day of the operation seize the line (excluding) BORGHORST, HAMM.

In the initial nuclear strike of the front it will employ 44 nuclear missiles.

- d) The 2nd Army Corps (16th and 24th motorized rifle divisions, 2nd Corps Missile Brigade) will be in the second echelon of the front. It will be concentrated in the area of FRANZBURG, DEMMIN, WOLGAST, in readiness as of the morning of the second to third day of the operation to engage in battle from the line (excluding) BAD OLDESLOE, GRUNWALD, and develop the offensive in the direction of BARGTEHEIDE, UTERSEN.
- e) The 6th Army (12th, 17th, and 28th motorized rifle divisions, 19th Tank Division, 6th Army Missile Brigade, 6th Army Artillery Brigade) will be in the second echelon of the front. It will be concentrated in the area of CIEDIENIK, ORANIENBURG, FURSTENWALDE, WRIEZEN, in readiness as of the morning of the third

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to fourth day of the operation to engage in battle from the line FALLINGBOSTEL, BISSENDORF or SYKE, UCHTE, and to develop the offensive in the direction of NIENBURG, REINE.

In the initial nuclear strike of the $\underline{\text{front}}$ it will employ 12 nuclear missiles.

- f) The 10th Tank Army (15th, 22nd, and 25th tank divisions, 29th Motorized Rifle Division, 10th Army Missile Brigade, 10th Army Artillery Brigade, 10th SAM Brigade) will be the second echelon of the front. By the morning of the second day of the operation, it will be concentrated in the area of BARLINEK, WITNICA, SWIEBCDZIN, PNIEWY, in readiness on the fifth to sixth day of the operation to engage in battle from the line FURSTENAU, (excluding) OSNABRUCK or OLDENZAAL, BORGHORST, and to develop the offensive in the direction of GRONAU, EINDHOVEN.
- g) Assault landing forces: the 30th Airborne Division will be the airborne landing force. As of the morning of the fifth to sixth day of the operation it will make an assault landing in the area of EMMERICH, GROESBEEK, KEVELAER, XANTEN, defeat enemy units in the landing area, and by the close of the day seize crossings on the RHINE River in the ARNHEIM, WESEL sector and assist troops of the 10th Tank Army as they make an assault crossing of the river from the march.

The 16th Motorized Rifle Division, and 61st and 62nd naval infantry regiments will be the amphibious landing force. On the first day of the operation the 62nd Naval Infantry Regiment and 48th Motorized Rifle Regiment will seize FEHMARN Island, and as of the morning of the second day of the operation the 16th Motorized Rifle Division (minus the 48th Motorized Rifle Regiment) and the 61st Naval Infantry Regiment will seize the KIEL Naval Base.

- h) The 2nd Front Missile Brigade will employ 18 missiles in the initial nuclear strike of the front. Its siting area will be LUBZ, (excluding) PLAU.
- i) The 3rd Front Missile Brigade will employ 18 missiles in the initial nuclear strike of the front. Its siting area will be PESSIN, (excluding) PREMNITZ, (excluding) BRANDENBURG.
- j) The 1st Air Army (1st, 3rd, and 5th fighter divisions; 2nd, 4th, and 8th fighter-bomber divisions; 6th Bomber Division) will:
- -- conduct reconnaissance and search for and destroy the enemy's missile/nuclear means and delivery aircraft;
- -- support the combat actions of <u>front</u> troops during repulse of a surprise enemy invasion and during the operation;

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- -- together with <u>front</u> air defense troops and troops of the 8th Army of Air Defense /of the Country/, cover troops and installations of the rear against enemy air strikes; especially cover the rocket troops, and the 7th and 9th armies during breakthrough of the forward line of defense and during the assault crossing of the WESER River; cover the 6th Army and 10th Tank Army during their forward movement, commitment to battle, and assault crossing of the IJSSEL and RHINE rivers;
- -- engage in combat against the enemy's operational reserves, safeguard the landings of the amphibious and airborne landing forces, and support their combat actions.

It will employ 200 nuclear bombs in the initial nuclear strike of the front.

Its airborne reserve will be 15 delivery aircraft with nuclear bombs to destroy the enemy's surviving nuclear attack means and other important installations.

k) Front air defense troops:

They will concentrate main efforts in the departure position for the offensive on covering the troop groupings in the areas of GREVESMUHLEN, HAGENOW, PLAU; KALBE, MAGDEBURG, NAUEN; and on covering front rocket troops, aviation, and control posts, and the bridges and crossings on the ELBE River.

During the offensive /they will concentrate/ on covering the front's main forces, rocket troops, aviation, and control posts on the CELLE-BRUSSELS axis, especially during the breakthrough of defense lines, the assault crossings of rivers and canals, when repelling counterattacks, and during commitment to battle of the front's second echelon: the 6th Army and 10th Tank Army.

- 1) Radioelectronic neutralization units will:
- -- disorganize the control over troops, combat equipment, and weapons of the Northern Army Group's attack troop groupings and over the aviation of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force on the HANNOVER-BRUSSELS axis;
- -- jam the radio communications of the nuclear weapons units of the Brown 3rd Long-Range Aviation Regiment, Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps, and Blue 1st Army Corps during delivery of the enemy's nuclear strike;
- -- cover the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, the front command post, crossings on the ELBE River, and the assault crossing of the WESER, IJSSEL and

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RHINE rivers by front troops:

- -- ensure stable control over front troops and effective use of combat equipment and weapons in the operation.
- 6. One motorized rifle regiment from each first-echelon division and the 1st, 8th, and 21st motorized rifle divisions at full strength will be allocated to cover the deployment of front troops.
- 7. The departure areas for the offensive will be prepared and occupied by covering troops by 0600 hours 2 September; by first-echelon large units, rocket troops and artillery, and air defense troops by 0530 hours 6 September; and by the second-echelon large units of the armies and front reserve by 0530 hours 7 September. Front troops will be in readiness for the offensive by 0500 hours 8 September; the transition to the offensive will be upon special instructions.
- 8. Disposition areas for control posts will be prepared by the close of 3 September and occupied as follows: the front command post as of 0400 hours 7 September in the woods 10 km northwest of NEURUPPIN.

The alternate command post as of $0400\ hours\ 6$ September in the woods $10\ km$ northwest of GENTHIN.

The rear control post as of 0500 hours 7 September in the woods 6 km south of FURSTENBERG.

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Short Report of the Decision of the 1st Air Army Commander on the Combat Actions in the Offensive Operation of the Coastal Front (variant)

I have decided: The tasks assigned to the air army in the front offensive operation and in an air operation are to be fulfilled jointly with the troops of the front's combined-arms and tank armies in cooperation with the Combined Baltic Fleet, 3rd Separate Heavy Bomber Air Corps of Long-Range Aviation, 2nd Air Army, and the 5th and 6th corps of air defense of the country by employing 320 nuclear bombs and expending 21 army sorties of front aviation and 150 regimental sorties of army aviation.

The main efforts of the air army in the <u>front</u> operation, when employing nuclear weapons in the initial nuclear strike and in the follow-up nuclear destruction of the enemy, are to be concentrated on the destruction of the main grouping of enemy ground forces: the Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps, Blue 1st Army Corps, Lilac 1st Army Corps, and Green 4th Mechanized Division; and the missile/nuclear means of the 2nd Pershing Missile Wing, 650th and 150th Lance missile battalions, 24th and 50th Lance missile regiments, and the 450th Sergeant Missile Battalion; when employing conventional means of destruction in the air operation and in the follow-up fire destruction /they are to be concentrated/ on the defeat of the enemy's air groupings (3rd DAP /Long-Range Aviation Regiment/, and Blue air forces in the Federal Republic of Germany) and missile/nuclear groupings, and on the air support of <u>front</u> troops.

In the initial nuclear strike of the front, the air army will, by means of a massed strike employing 200 nuclear bombs and in cooperation with front rocket troops and artillery, defeat 10 enemy divisions and complete the destruction of the detected operational-tactical missile/nuclear means; it will independently inflict defeat on 7 enemy divisions; the air army will take off upon the missile launch, the strike will begin 10 to 12 minutes after the rocket troop strike, and the duration of the air army's strike will be approximately 30 minutes; up to Launch plus 0.45 reconnaissance aircraft will detect enemy targets in support of the follow-up actions of rocket troops; the air army will be operationally disposed in two echelons and an airborne nuclear reserve (15 delivery aircraft with nuclear bombs); the enemy's air defense will be overcome on a broad front by using rocket troop strikes, air army strikes and electronic neutralization means.

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In case of surprise nuclear attack by the enemy, the on-alert forces, employing 41 nuclear bombs and in cooperation with front rocket troops, will destroy the enemy's operational-tactical missile/nuclear means which have been detected, inflict destruction on six of his first-echelon divisions, and deliver strikes against the remaining targets as air army units are made ready.

strike with the air army's main forces and in the air battle, it will disrupt the enemy's air defense in two zones: on the JUTLAND axis to a width of up to 70 km, and on the HANNOVER axis to a width of up to 80 km; it will destroy the on-alert launchers of the missile/nuclear means and the aircraft at seven airfields and in the air; the air army will be operationally disposed in three echelons; air troops will be provided with air support by the fire support helicopter regiments.

A preemptive air raid by enemy aviation will be repelled by fighter aviation forces in cooperation with the air defense troops of the front and of the country; all of the combat-ready forces of strike aviation will be put in the air to break through the defense in designated zones, to destroy the on-alert missile/nuclear means, and to render inoperative the runways at airfields with reinforced concrete shelters. Strikes against aircraft at airfields will be delivered from the holding zones based on reconnaissance data concerning the landing of enemy aircraft.

During fulfilment of the immediate task by front troops, it will employ 52 nuclear bombs, 115 regimental sorties of front aviation, and 90 regimental sorties of army aviation to defeat the main ground forces grouping of the Northern Army Group's first operational echelon and to inflict nuclear and fire destruction on the enemy during air support, during delivery of strikes against operational reserves, and during actions in support of the airborne and amphibious landings; it will search for and destroy the enemy's missile/nuclear means with the forces of the 2nd, 4th, and 8th fighter-bomber divisions and the 6th Bomber Division in the assigned combat actions zones with an expenditure of 10 nuclear bombs and 16 regimental sorties of these divisions; it will accomplish the destruction of enemy aviation at airfields, in the air, and at its basing areas by means of three massed strikes, by air battles in the air operation, and by the air army's follow-up echeloned actions employing 10 nuclear bombs and 27 regimental sorties of front aviation with main emphasis on in the defeat of the 3rd DAP /Long-Range Aviation Regiment/ and 4th Division of the Brown Tactical Air Command and the Blue air forces in the Federal Republic of Germany; recommaissance aviation will concentrate its main efforts on detection of the enemy's missile/nuclear and aviation groupings and reserves; troops and installations of the front's rear services will be covered by forces of the 1st, 3rd, and 5th fighter divisions in the assigned zones in cooperation with air defense troops with the expenditure of up to 70 regimental sorties of fighter

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aviation. Primary emphasis will be on covering the missile brigades, command posts, and attack groupings of the 7th and 9th armies, and on the 6th Army upon its commitment to battle.

In the follow-up /task/ it will employ 36 nuclear bombs and 199 regimental sorties of front and army aviation to complete the nuclear and fire destruction of the enemy.

Before the initiation of combat actions the air army will be based at the permanent airfields that have reinforced concrete shelters and with the dispersal airfields in full readiness.

The takeoff for delivery of the initial massed strike in the air operation will be done from the permanent basing airfields. Landings will be at permanent airfields or, according to the situation, at dispersal airfields. In case of the threat of nuclear attack, air units are to be dispersed: two airfields per air regiment. During the operation, there will be no less than two fighter-bomber divisions and two fighter divisions on the axis of the front's main attack.

The air army will be in readiness for combat actions by 0500 hours \$ September.

The air army's combat actions will be controlled from the air army command post, alternate command post, rear control post, and airborne control post; by the close of 6 September, an air army fighter aviation combat control center will be deployed at the <u>front</u> air defense command post; an air army combat control center, a guidance and target designation post, and a radio navigation post will be established in the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies; and a combat control group will be established in the ground forces' first-echelon divisions.

In accordance with the decision, tasks have been determined for the air divisions and separate regiments, and orders have been given on the organization of cooperation and on all types of support.

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Report of the Chief of Air Defense Troops of the Coastal Front (variant)

(For the front commander's decision on the operation -- for Lesson No. 1)

Facing the front and based on the opposite portion of the North German strategic axis, including the northwest and west air axes, is the aviation of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, of the allied air forces of the Baltic Approaches zone, of the Brown naval forces and coastal defense, and of the British Air Forces Home Command; and actions are also possible by Green and Blue carrier-based aircraft. In all, the enemy has up to 890 to 900 combat aircraft, of which up to 420 are delivery aircraft. In addition, the enemy has up to 500 army aviation helicopters and aircraft, and of those, up to 100 are fire support helicopters.

The airfield network for the enemy's main air grouping is situated at a distance of 150 to 400 km from the state border. Approach time at a cruising speed of 15 km per minute is up to 4 minutes at low altitudes and up to 10 to 14 minutes at medium and high altitudes.

In case combat actions begin with the employment of nuclear weapons, up to 650 aircraft, including up to 300 delivery aircraft, can take action in the initial massed strike against troops and installations of the front. The main axis of the strike will be westerly, from which up to 500 aircraft, including up to 270 delivery aircraft, might be expected.

From the northwest axis, up to 150 aircraft can operate, including up to 40 delivery aircraft.

In case combat actions begin under conditions of the employment of conventional means of destruction, up to 570 aircraft can operate in a massed strike against front troops and installations. The main axis of the strike will be westerly, from which up to 440 aircraft might be expected. From the northwest axis up to 130 aircraft may take action. It cannot be ruled out that during the operation, as a result of the rebasing of aircraft to airfields in England and by the transition of a portion of the front's forces to a seacoast defense, the main axis of the enemy's air strike may be from the northwest. In the periods between massed strikes, aggressive enemy air actions against front troops and installations by small groups and individual aircraft are possible.

At night up to 300 to 400 aircraft can operate simultaneously in air raids on two to three axes against front troops and installations by the method of a stream of aircraft pairs or of single aircraft.

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In delivering massed strikes enemy aviation can overcome the <u>front</u> air defense system in two to three narrow sectors (one on the northwest axis and two on the west axis) to the depth of the first operational echelon using groups of 12 to 16 or more aircraft.

Up to 60 percent of the enemy aircraft can operate at low and extremely low altitudes. Intensive jamming will be employed extensively against the radioelectronic means used in the front air defense system. With the development of the offensive operation (during breakthrough of the forward line of defense) aggressive actions are possible by the enemy's army aviation.

2. Front air defense troops (5 SAM brigades, 3 S-75 SAM regiments, 2 S-125 SAM regiments, 15 KUB SAM regiments, 18 antiaircraft artillery regiments, 9 fighter regiments) are located in their permanent disposition posts. The air defense of the troops will be handled by the on-alert subunits (12 SAM battalions, 35 antiaircraft artillery battalions).

Large units and units of front air defense troops are at full strength in personnel, weapons, and combat equipment (up to 95 percent /strength/) and have been supplied with materiel reserves. The combat effectiveness of the front air defense system in repelling an initial massed air strike can be rated at 27 percent.

3. Large units and units of the 8th Army of Air Defense /of the Country/ (four SAM brigades, four SAM regiments, six fighter regiments) will operate in the front zone, and cooperation with them will be implemented with respect to axes and lines. In this case, the main efforts of the 8th Air Defense Army will be concentrated on the northwest axis.

On the right, air defense means of the ships of the Combined Baltic Fleet and two radar picket ships will operate; cooperation with them will be organized by the commander of the 6th Air Defense Corps and the chief of the 4th Army's air defense troops.

On the left, on the right flank of the Western Front, the 3rd Army's air defense troops and the 15th Fighter Division will operate, and cooperation with them will be accomplished by allocating one fighter regiment (from the 5th Fighter Division) for actions within the tactical radius, and by apportioning the air targets operating at the junction of the 9th and 3rd armies.

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To carry out the air defense tasks in the offensive operation, I propose the following:

- 1. During the preparation and at the start of the operation, the main efforts of the front air defense forces and means (three SAM brigades, nine SAM regiments, two fighter divisions) are to be concentrated on covering the main grouping of front troops (7th and 9th armies).
- 2. Upon receipt of initial data concerning the massed takeoff of enemy aviation, all front air defense forces and means, in cooperation with the 6th Air Defense Corps and with a portion of the air defense forces of the Combined Baltic Fleet and the Western Front, are to be allocated to repel the enemy.
- 3. During the offensive operation, the main efforts of front air defense forces and means are to be concentrated on covering the troops as follows:
- -- in the breakthrough of the forward defense line: the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies (with four SAM brigades, ten SAM regiments, three fighter divisions);
- -- in the forward movement and commitment to battle of the front's second echelon: the 6th Army (with three SAM brigades, four SAM regiments, two fighter divisions);
- -- in the assault crossing of the WESER, RHINE, and MAAS rivers (6th Army and 10th Army: with three SAM brigades, six to seven SAM regiments, two fighter divisions) and of the KIEL Canal (4th Army: one SAM brigade, one fighter division, one antiaircraft artillery division).
- 4. To cover the troops during the movement forward and deployment in the departure areas for the offensive with part of the air defense forces and means of front, army, and divisional subordination (not more than 25 to 30 percent) of the front /sic/ with their prior deployment into their proper siting areas.
- 5. To reinforce the cover of the troops (7th and 9th armies) in the departure position for the offensive with forces of the 15th KRUG-A SAM Brigade.
- 6. During the operation, to have forces of the 15th SAM Brigade reinforce the cover for the movement forward and commitment to battle of the front's second echelon (6th Army and 10th Tank Army), and also for the assault crossing of the RHINE River by the main troop grouping (6th and 10th armies).
- 7. During the preparation and conduct of the operation, front missile brigades are to be covered by the 14th S-75 SAM Regiment and the 13th KRUG-A SAM Brigade.
- 8. The home airfields of the 6th Bomber Division and 4th Fighter-Bomber Division are to be covered by the 18th and 17th S-125 SAM regiments,

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respectively.

- 9. Installations of the <u>front</u>'s rear services in departure positions and during the operation are to be covered by fighter aviation of the 1st Air Army in cooperation with troops of the 6th Air Defense Corps.
 - 10. The air defense system is to be in readiness by 0500 hours 8 September.

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Report of the Chief of Chemical Troops of the Coastal Front

Chemical Support for the Offensive Operation (variant)

I. Of the number of nuclear warheads mentioned by the chief of intelligence, the enemy can employ up to 50 to 60 ground-burst warheads in an initial strike east of the line ROSTOCK, WITTSTOCK, BRANDENBURG against front troops and installations.

In a massed strike there can be up to 120 to 130 aircraft employing chemical weapons.

As a result, the following may find themselves in zones of radioactive contamination: front control posts, 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, 2nd and 3rd front mobile missile technical bases, airfields of the 2nd and 4th fighter-bomber divisions and the 6th Bomber Division; the second echelon of the front -- the 6th Army; the combined-arms reserve -- 13th Motorized Rifle Division and 20th Tank Division; reserves of special troops; and rear services installations -- three rear front bases and 41 /sic/ rear hospital bases, and others.

The defining of the radioactive situation will require that reconnaissance be conducted over an area of up to 17,000 square kilometers and over up to 7,000 kilometers of routes, and chemical reconnaissance over an area of up to 500 square kilometers.

Thirty to thirty-five regiments may be found to be in zones of dangerous and extremely dangerous radioactive contamination, and up to five regiments may be found to be in zones of chemical contamination, and these regiments will need decontamination treatment.

Decontamination treatment may also have to be carried out at 20 airfields and at 40 rear services units and facilities of the front.

II. Chemical support tasks:

- 1. Determine the coordinates and parameters of nuclear bursts in the <u>front</u> zone in a timely manner during the preparation and conduct of the offensive operation.
- 2. Support the following under conditions of radioactive and chemical contamination:
- -- the deployment and transition to the offensive of the main troop grouping on the CELLE, OSNABRUCK axis (7th and 9th armies) and on the BAD OLDESLOE,

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FLENSBURG axis (4th Army);

- -- the combat actions of the 1st Air Army, 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, and 13th and 15th SAM brigades;
- -- the offensive, especially during the negotiation of nuclear minefields, the commitment to battle of the 6th Army and the 10th Tank Army, and during the assault crossing of the RHINE River.
- 3. Produce interference against the enemy's optoelectronic means of reconnaissance and weapons guidance by employing aerosols during the deployment of the main grouping of front troops and during its transition to the offensive, and lay smoke screens over the bridge crossings over the ELRE and RHINE rivers, and also during the movement forward and commitment to battle of the 6th Army and 10th Tank Army.
- 4. Provide front troops with chemical troop weapons and protective means and restore their reserves of these and losses in them with timeliness.
- III. To accomplish these tasks, the front has the following large units and units of chemical troops available: one chemical defense brigade, two separate special monitoring battalions, one separate decontamination battalion, one separate smoke battalion, four separate radiological and chemical reconnaissance companies, two computation and analysis stations, and one radiological reconnaissance helicopter squadron.

In addition, the army special monitoring battalions and smoke battalions will be brought in to establish the system for determining the coordinates and parameters of nuclear bursts, and also to participate in the operational camouflage plan.

The chemical troop grouping can fulfill the following tasks:

- 1. The determination of the coordinates and parameters of nuclear bursts within the entire <u>front</u> zone (up to 400 bursts) and the issuing of information concerning the bursts within 45 minutes after the nuclear strike.
- 2. The aerial radiation recomnaissance of up to 6,000 square kilometers or 2,000 to 2,400 kilometers of routes in the course of one hour.
- 3. The ground radiation and chemical reconnaissance of 1,600 to 2,400 kilometers of routes in one hour.

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- 4. The decontamination of equipment in one and one-half to two hours for up to three regiments (brigades).
 - 5. The chemical decontamination of the clothing of a division in 10 hours.
- 6. The laying of smoke screens which will mask up to 75 square kilometers or 30 crossings over water obstacles.

The scope of the tasks which arise following a massed nuclear strike by the enemy can be fulfilled:

- 1. With respect to radiation and chemical reconnaissance, in six to eight hours.
 - 2. With respect to decontamination treatment of troops, in 20 hours.
 - IV. Comrade front commander, I propose the following:
- 1. Beginning at 2000 hours 6 September, to organize a system for gathering, processing, and transmitting information concerning the enemy's nuclear strikes and employment of chemical and biological weapons.
- 2. To have the coordinates and parameters of nuclear bursts in the <u>front</u> zone determined by the forces of six separate special monitoring battalions (beginning on D2, by seven separate special monitoring battalions). For first-echelon armies, the rear boundary will be ROSTOCK, WITTSTOCK, WITTENBERG.
- 3. To have forces of the 1st Radiological Recommaissance Helicopter Squadron conduct aerial radiation recommaissance east of the line ROSTOCK, PERLEBERG, BELZIG.

To focus special attention during the organization of radiation and chemical reconnaissance on the areas of: GOLDBERG, PARCHIM, PERLEBERG, MIROW, (excluding) MALCHIN; WITTSTOCK, WUSTERHAUSEN, CIEDIENIK, (excluding) NEUSTRELITZ; TANGERMUNDE, BELZIG, BELITZ, VELTEN.

During the offensive operation, to provide data concerning the radiation and chemical situation first of all to the control posts of the front, 1st Air Army, 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, 13th and 15th SAM brigades, front reserves, 6th Army, and 10th Tank Army, especially during the negotiation of nuclear minefields, during an assault crossing of the RHINE River, and during the commitment to battle of the second echelons (the reserves).

4. To use the 3rd Chemical Defense Brigade to carry out full decontamination treatment in support of the control posts of the <u>front</u>, the 1st Air Army, 2nd and 3rd <u>front</u> missile brigades, 13th Motorized Rifle Division and

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20th Tank Division, the second echelon, and forward front bases.

- 5. To have the chemical decontamination of clothing and protective means carried out by the 14th Separate Chemical Decontamination Battalion in the area of FELDBERG and subsequently in the area of the 1st Forward Front Base.
- 6. For interference with the enemy's optoelectronic reconnaissance and weapons guidance means, to have the forces of five smoke battalions (of six battalions beginning D2) lay smoke screens.
- 7. To replenish the chemical troop equipment and protective means which are short in the armies and army corps and by 7 September establish a 4-day reserve of them. For this, they are to have the following available, in terms of table-of-equipment requirements: gas masks -- 150 percent, skin protection means for personnel -- 160 percent, radiation recomnaissance instruments and chemical decontamination devices (sets) -- 140 percent.

An 8-day reserve of chemical troop equipment and protective means is to be held at <u>front</u> depots.

V. Conclusions:

- 1. Front troops will be able to fulfill their tasks under conditions of intense radioactive and chemical contamination.
- 2. The chemical troop grouping of the front, with its available forces, can accomplish the tasks of radioactive and chemical reconnaissance in six to eight hours and those of decontamination treatment in 20 hours.

To shorten the time for the conduct of reconnaissance and decontamination treatment, the forces and means of the second-echelon armies and <u>front</u> large units will have to be brought in.

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REPORT

of the Communications Plan to the Chief of Staff of the Coastal Front

- 1. In the forthcoming operation, communications are faced with the following main tasks:
- a) during troops' movement forward and their occupation of departure positions for the offensive -- to provide secure and stable control of the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies, the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, the on-alert air defense means, and reconnaissance units;
- b) when repelling a possible surprise attack by the enemy and fulfilling the immediate task of the front -- to provide stable control of: the 7th and 9th armies, 1st Air Army, and 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades; during defeat of the Brown 1st Army Corps and the assault crossing of the WESER River; of the 4th Army and 2nd Army Corps during defeat of the HAMBURG troop grouping and assault crossing of the KIEL Canal; of the 6th Army and 10th Tank Army during their commitment to battle; to ensure continuous cooperation of the 9th Army and the 3rd Army of the Western Front during the encirclement and destruction of the main troop grouping of the Blue 1st Army Corps and Violet 1st Army Corps;
- c) during fulfilment of the follow-up task -- to provide stable control of the 6th Army and 10th Tank Army during the assault crossing of the RHINE River and ensure cooperation between the 9th Army and 3rd Army of the Western Front during the encirclement and destruction of the enemy's RUHR troop grouping.
 - 2. These tasks are to be accomplished as follows:
- -- by using a fixed communications net reinforced with field means in the forward movement zone and in the departure area for the offensive; by using field radio, radio-relay, tropospheric, wire, and mobile communications means during the operation;
- -- by providing radio communications with the armies and the army corps via five shortwave radio nets and radio links, via one ultra-shortwave radio net and one tropospheric radio link, and with each front missile brigade via a shortwave radio net and radio link and via a tropospheric radio link;
- -- by establishing, when necessary, radio communications through the chain of command with motorized rifle and tank divisions and with missile battalions of front and army missile brigades via two shortwave radio nets;

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- -- by providing radio communications to the front commander while he is moving, from short halts, and from the airborne control post;
- -- by setting up, during the operation, radio-relay and wire communications nets made up of a communications main artery, three communications links to the armies, and four lateral routes, and by deploying 11 auxiliary communications centers;
- -- by the early movement forward and deployment during the operation of back-up positions for the communications centers of the command posts and rear control posts of the front and the armies, and the command posts of the 2nd Army Corps and 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades;
- -- by establishing the reserve of the chief of communications troops (six medium-power radio stations, eight radio-relay stations, 240 kilometers of P-296 cable, and four auxiliary communications centers) and individual reserves at the communications centers of the control posts and in the line communications units.
- 3. For purposes of radio camouflage and protection of communications against enemy radio reconnaissance and radio jamming, provisions are to be made for the following:
- a) before the start of combat actions -- to ban the transmit operation of all radio sets, except the fixed sets for warning communications, with reconnaissance of all types and with air defense means to repel the air enemy; simultaneously with this, the operation of the communications center means of the command post, alternate command post, and airborne control post of the front, the command posts of the 4th, 7th, and 9th armies, and the 3rd Front Missile Brigade, are to be simulated from dummy areas in accordance with the operational camouflage plan;
- b) during the operation -- to restrict the transmissions of medium-power shortwave radio sets from the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, 4th, 6th, 7th, and 9th armies, and the 10th Tank Army; and the transmissions among the command post, alternate command post, and rear control post of the front, by using ultra-shortwave radios and radio-relay, and tropospheric means on these links; to employ secure communications equipment, cipher equipment, and coding and high speed devices extensively; to shift the frequencies, operating modes, and power of the radio sets, and when necessary, to use a secure radio net for communications with the armies; and to use the ultra-shortwave aerial retransmitters and helicopters of the airborne control posts.

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