


2515



Intelligence Information Report



PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE



HR70-14

REPORT NO. FIRDB-312/ 01640-82

DATE DISTR. 30 JUL 1982

~~SECRET~~

TRANSMITTAL OF PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE REPORT

1. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the source, the attached Intelligence Information Report (FIRDB-312/01640-82) is being distributed only to the addressees listed below. The addressees are requested to limit circulation of this report to those officers who have a clearly evident need to know.
2. Further use of this intelligence information must not violate the controls which have been placed on it.

3. Addressees are asked to consult the Reports Clearance Office of the Directorate of Operations  whenever use beyond that authorized by the dissemination controls is contemplated.


APPROVED FOR
RELEASE -
HISTORICAL
COLLECTION
DIVISION DATE:
06-18-2012

Distribution: Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
United States Air Force
Director of Naval Intelligence
Director, National Security Agency
National Intelligence Officer for USSR/EE
Director, Office of European Analysis
Director, Office of Scientific and Weapons
Research
Director, Office of Soviet Analysis

~~SECRET~~



Intelligence Information Report



THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 OF 7 PAGES

FIRDB-312/ 01640-82

REPORT CLASS

~~SECRET~~ 

COUNTRY

Poland/Warsaw Pact/USSR

SUBJECT

The Organization of the Warsaw Pact
(DOI: Late 1981)

SOURCE

A former Polish General Staff officer who made the following comments based on his considerable past experience and contacts. He has reported reliably in the past.

1. The Warsaw Pact of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and its attendant organization were theoretically intended as a means of providing for the common defense of its member states against aggression in Europe. In fact, the treaty and the organization are the legal and practical instruments whereby the national security policies and programs of the member states are developed, unified and implemented under the supervision and direction of the USSR. The statutes of the Warsaw Pact, which have the force of law in the member states, provide for both a peacetime and a wartime organization for the Pact. The peacetime apparatus will be completely replaced in wartime. The wartime apparatus effectively subordinates the armed forces and national economies of the member states to the Supreme High Command of the USSR through its working organ, the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces.

5
4
3
2
1

2. The central policymaking body for the Warsaw Pact in peacetime is the Political Consultative Committee (PCC). It meets usually on an annual basis in the Spring

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

in the capitals of the member states on a rotating basis according to the Cyrillic alphabet. The National Defense Committees (NDCs) are represented on the PCC, and serve as the link between the individual national members and the PCC. (Source Comment: The Soviet equivalent to the National Defense Committee is the Defense Council.) In effect, this includes the party and state leaders of the national members. The resolutions of the PCC form the political and legal basis for the activity of the other working organs of the Warsaw Pact. The various delegations to the PCC meetings always include the National Ministers of Defense or General Staff Chiefs, and other senior officers of the National General Staffs as advisors. In the Polish case at least, all speeches and other documents dealing with national security issues which were to be presented by the Polish leadership at PCC meetings were drafted in the Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff. The basic procedures of the PCC require that an agenda for meetings be circulated 30 days prior to the meeting. Also, copies of any resolutions or other documents to be acted on at the meeting, and copies of all press releases must be circulated with the agenda 30 days prior to the meeting. (Comment: To the best of source's knowledge, these procedures have never been violated by a non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) member. They have been violated by the Soviets on rare occasions, however.) These same basic procedures are followed by all other collective organs of the Warsaw Pact organization.


3. The Committee of Defense Ministers (Komitet Ministrov Oborony--KMO) and the Military Council (Voyenny Sovet -- VOYENSOV) are the principal collegial organs of the PCC for defense matters in peacetime. The KMO is composed of the Ministers of National Defense of the member states (the Minister of Defense in the Soviet case). The KMO usually meets annually in the winter, rotating among the member states' capitals. Resolutions taken at the KMO meetings are subsequently presented to the PCC for ratification, a process which is pro forma most of the time. The details of defense issues were worked out at the level of the General Staffs and Ministers of Defense. Political leaders had only cursory knowledge of most defense issues facing the Warsaw Pact. Soviet leader L. I. Brezhnev frequently feigned surprise at defense proposals forwarded by the KMO to the PCC, even though the proposals had been beaten out of the NSWP members by the Soviet military leadership.

5
4
3
2
1

4. The VOYENSOV is composed of the Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces (CAF) of the Warsaw Pact, the national General Staff Chiefs, other military leaders appointed by the National Ministers of Defense, and chaired

5
4
3
2
1


~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

by the Commander in Chief of the CAF. It meets annually in the autumn in the members' capitals. The VOYENSOV provides preliminary review of the details of issues to be brought before the KMO, provides a forum for exchange of information at the level of the national General Staffs, and sets the agenda for KMO meetings. (Source Comment: The Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces is not a member of the VOYENSOV, since he is the superior to both the CinC and Chief of Staff of the CAF, and the de facto superior of the entire membership of the VOYENSOV.)

5. The executive organ of the PCC and the KMO in peacetime is the Combined Command and Staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states.




At the present time, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. ((Kulikov)) is the Commander in Chief of the CAF, and Army General A. I. ((Gribkov)) is the Chief of Staff. Concurrently, Kulikov is a First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and Gribkov is a First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. Attached to the CAF HQ is the Technical Committee of the CAF (current chairman unrecalled), which deals with the development and production of military equipment by the Warsaw Pact member states.

6. The CAF HQ is divided into three parts. One part is composed of the six national "Representations to the Combined Armed Forces." (Source Comment: There is no Soviet Representation.) These officers do not participate in the daily work of CAF Staff. Their peacetime function is to act as a transmission belt between the Soviet General Staff and the National General Staffs. In wartime, in addition to being used for this purpose, they will serve as a source of additional personnel to flesh out the theater-level staffs. The six national Representations are housed in Moscow in a separate building from the rest of the CAF HQ.

7. The second and most important part of the CAF HQ is the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces. The CAF Staff is an annex to the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. The officers of the CAF Staff are all Soviet General Staff officers drawn from the appropriate directorates and departments of the Soviet General Staff. (Source Comment: It is well known throughout East European military circles that the Soviet General Staff is the principal workhorse of the Soviet political leadership in national security affairs, and this includes Warsaw Pact matters.) All operational plans and programs for the CAF are developed in the Soviet General Staff, transmitted to the CAF HQ, and thence to the National General Staffs through either

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~


the CAF Staff or the national Representations to the CAF in Moscow. The role of the CAF Staff in peacetime is two-fold: 1) to plan for the wartime utilization of the CAF under the direction of the Soviet General Staff; 2) to act as a two-way transmission belt between the Soviet General Staff and the National General Staffs. There was some organizational overlap between the CAF Staff and the Soviet General Staff. The CAF Staff is composed of an Operations Directorate, an Intelligence Directorate, a Signal Directorate, an Organizational Directorate, and various other support departments and directorates representing the arms and branches of service. Each of the elements of the CAF Staff is subdivided into two sectors (napravleniye) -- a Western Sector and a Southwestern Sector, reflecting the intended division of the CAF in wartime into two theater-level commands on a western and southwestern axis.

8. The third part of the CAF HQ is composed of the "Groups of Representatives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces." There are six such groups, with one posted to each NSWP member country. The "Representation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces to the Polish Armed Forces" is currently headed by Army General A. F. ((Shcheglov)), who holds the title of Counselor to the Polish Minister of National Defense, the members of Shcheglov's group are assigned reporting responsibilities for the arms and branches of the Polish Armed Forces, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These officers function as day-to-day observers for the Soviet General Staff, preparing regular reports on the Polish Armed Forces, inspecting the performance of Polish personnel in the central military apparatus, and performing other duties at the direction of the Soviet General Staff. For example, beginning in August 1980 they were charged with preparing daily situation reports on events in Poland and sending these directly to the Soviet General Staff in Moscow. They had no command authority, however, and on several occasions Shcheglov was witnessed to be treated in a demeaning manner by Kulikov, Gribkov and Soviet General Staff officers. (See also FIRDB-312/01036-82, dated 13 May 1982, and TDFIRDB-315/01528-82, dated 25 January 1982, from same source.)

9. The peacetime CAF HQ has no independent command nor operational control over the armed forces of the member states. Nor does the CAF Command have Soviet forces operationally assigned to it in peacetime. ([redacted] Comment: During his many years of association with the CAF HQ, source observed consistently that this body never made decisions regarding Pact military policy or programs on its own initiative. Rather, all such

| | | | |
|---|--|---|---|
| 5 | to it in peacetime. | ([redacted] Comment: During his many years | |
| 4 | of association with the CAF HQ, source observed consistently | | 4 |
| 3 | that this body never made decisions regarding Pact military | | 3 |
| 2 | policy or programs on its own initiative. Rather, all such | | 2 |
| 1 | | | 1 |

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

matters were invariably forwarded to the Soviet General Staff in Moscow for resolution, and then executed by the CAF HQ. Furthermore, when pressed by the East Europeans on a significant problem, the response at CAF HQ would always be that the matter was not under the jurisdiction of the CAF HQ, but would have to be resolved in Moscow by the General Staff.


10. The CAF HQ never functions as an independent command in the scenarios of Warsaw Pact exercises. In the past, they have always functioned as an exercise control staff without playing an active scenario role. In recent years they have begun to play the scenario role of a theater-level command. Throughout the history of the Warsaw Pact the Soviet General Staff has always been the highest echelon of command designated in Pact-wide exercise scenarios. This situation was always something of a political embarrassment until 1980, since it put the NSWP members in the position of practicing a wartime structure which had not been formally sanctioned by the Warsaw Pact membership. The ratification of the Statute on the War-time Command of the Combined Armed Forces in January 1980 formalized this structure by pre-designating theater-level commands in wartime, and naming Soviet leader L. I. Brezhnev as the Supreme Commander, in Chief of the CAF and the Soviet General Staff as his executive organ.

11. The Polish crisis of 1980-81 presents an example of one of the roles of the personnel assigned to CAF HQ in peacetime. In addition to the functions of Shcheglov's group cited above, the CAF HQ provided the personnel to staff Kulikov's headquarters at Legnica, which was established in August 1980. This staff was composed of about 100 officers, 80% of whom were Soviet and the rest from the NSWP national "Representations" (including members of the Polish Representation in Moscow). There were also additional groups of officers assigned to visit the headquarters of Polish military districts during this time. All these groups were to form the nucleus of intervention staffs should that have become necessary. (Source Comment: This was similar to the pattern followed in 1968 prior to the Czech invasion.) These groups (including that at Legnica) were not responsible for planning the invasion. The plan for the invasion was accomplished in Moscow by the Soviet General Staff, with on the spot assistance from a group of 30 General Staff officers ensconced at the army barracks at Rembertow near Warsaw. The groups from the CAF HQ were charged with preparations for implementing the invasion plan in the event that became necessary.

5
4
3
2
1


4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

12. The wartime structure of the CAF as defined in the Statute on the Wartime Command of the Combined Armed Forces and its associated protocols, does not provide for the functioning of any of the peacetime apparatus of the Warsaw Pact. No provision is made for roles for the PCC, the KMO or the VOYENSOV. The functions of all these organs are taken over by the Supreme High Command (VGK) through the Soviet General Staff. In addition, high commands of a Western and a Southwestern Theater of Military Operations will be subordinate to the Soviet General Staff. These commands will be formed from the peacetime CAF HQ, which will simply split in two and cease to exist as a separate entity. The Statute makes no reference to a role for the peacetime organs of the Warsaw Pact, nor for the organs of the national political leadership in a decisionmaking aspect. The Soviet position is that since these organs are not mentioned in the wartime Statute, they will not exist in wartime. The scenarios for Pact exercises since 1978 have reflected this view.



5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~