

SECRET

26 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: SA/DCI/IA
SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on START, 27 March 1984

1. You are scheduled to attend a National Security Council meeting tomorrow at 1400 hours in the Cabinet Room to discuss (no decisions) the status and prospects for major nuclear arms control negotiations, particularly INF and START. This will be a principal plus one meeting and [redacted] will be accompanying you.

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2. The SOVA paper at Tab A, that you have already seen, will serve as a centerpiece for the meeting.

3. Your talking points are at Tabs D & E. There are two versions here, one prepared by Fritz Ermarth and another prepared by [redacted] (which is EYES ONLY.) [redacted] has a second version of his talking points at Tab C, which is EYES ONLY.) Rather than melding the two together and boiling them down to the least common denominator, I thought it wiser to let you see both of them so that you can get a feel for the differences of view that are at play here. Fritz believes that the Soviets are unprepared to make the necessary concessions required for real movement in the major arms control arenas [redacted]

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[redacted] is more optimistic about the prospects for an agreement this year if the US wants one [redacted]

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
25X1

4. Finally, I thought you might also find of interest the appended draft SOVA Monthly which provides a rundown of the major arms control negotiations. SOVA expects to publish this draft next month.

TAB X

5. If I can do more to help you prepare for this meeting, please call.

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DDI 01904/84
ACIS 169/84
26 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: [REDACTED]
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, 27 March

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1. This memorandum transmits your briefing book for the NSC meeting now scheduled for 1400 on Tuesday, 27 March. [REDACTED]

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2. The topics of this meeting began two or more weeks ago as trade offs and frameworks of the US START policy. A week ago at a meeting of the Senior Arms Control Policy Group (SACPG), Richard Perle made it clear that he thought the issue was not trade offs and the associated details, but rather US strategy in arms control between now and the first Tuesday in November. That idea was accepted by Mr. McFarlane. Consequently, the issue of START trade offs has been replaced by the two issues now on the table as stated by Mr. McFarlane:

- o Soviet interest in arms control in 1984.
- o US interests in 1984.

Last Thursday, Mr. McFarlane said this NSC meeting is intended for discussion, not decision.

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3. The paper on Soviet interests was written by SOVA analysts. In addition to the obvious evidence, this paper is based on two private chats we had with Amb. Jack Matlock, NSC Staff, and Dr. James Timbie, Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Ken Dam. The session with Mr. Matlock dealt with his views on Soviet interests. The session with Dr. Timbie dealt with the Reagan-Chernomirko correspondence, as well as the Eagleberger-Burt/Dobrynin-Sokolov talks in Washington and the Gromyko-Hartman talks in Moscow. The paper does not refer to such exchanges but the paper is congruent with our understandings of the contents of those exchanges. In any case, I think SOVA's paper is a good piece and the comments last Thursday of the SACPG participants indicate they agreed. [REDACTED]

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DDI 01904/84
ACIS 169/84
26 March 1984

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, 27 March

4. Attached (on left) is a Table of Contents tailored to these two issues. I am skeptical that the OSD paper on US strategy, written by Richard Perle but to be signed out to the President by Secretary Weinberger, will arrive before the meeting. I asked Mr. Perle for a copy. In any case, I expect that State Department, and perhaps ACDA, will write their own views of the second issue. I have asked that copies be made available to you, either through me or to you directly, but I doubt they will arrive too.

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5. If there is anything more I may do to assist you on this subject, please call and let me know.

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Attachment:
As stated

DDI 01904/84
ACIS 169/84
26 March 1984

SUBJECT: NSC/NSPG Meeting, 27 March

DDI/ACIS [redacted] (23 Mar 84)

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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR DCI

1. Moscow's current policy toward the US is to maximize pressures on the administration during an election year to extract concessions, especially in arms control.

- The basic Soviet aim -- admittedly a long shot -- is to deflect the Reagan Administration from its main foreign policy course of rearmament and tough competition with the USSR.
- 1984 offers their best, perhaps last, chance to do this.

2. But they have not, repeat NOT, made any fundamental decisions to change their own basic policies to mitigate the competition yet. The notion that the Soviets are at a basic turning point of policy because of Chernenko is mistaken.

- a. They were moving toward more tactical flexibility before Chernenko acceded to power.
- b. Even if Chernenko is more powerful than he sometimes looks, the leadership is not in shape to make a major departure from the strategies of the past decade.
 - Remember, on things that matter most to the US, Andropov was not that different from Brezhnev.
- c. The Soviets have no reason to embrace a fixed view of the US now. In the Soviet view ...
 - Reagan will probably be reelected, but it's not certain.
 - Even if he is reelected, economic and political realities are likely to make his reach greater than his grasp in defense and foreign policy during a second term.
- d. The Soviets are very unlikely to hold the view that "it's better to strike a deal before the election than after."
 - It will be impossible to sign, much less ratify, a major "agreement" e.g., INF, before the election.
 - The appearance of a deal-in-the-offing would probably help the President's reelection prospects, something which the Soviets do not want to do, according to all our sources.
 - Soviets would see a high risk that a reelected Reagan administration would break away from a pre-election agreement in principle.

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3. They want to create the appearance, particularly to the top levels of the USG, that they are ready for "a deal." But they are not yet ready on their own part for the concessions necessary to make "a deal" of real or lasting value for the US.

-- This accounts for the faintest hints of reasonableness in some public statements (recently turned hard again) and private encouragement from Dobrynin on prospects for relations.

4. Even this narrow tactical purpose on the Soviet part, however, makes them willing to engage in an arms-length minuet.

-- This offers the US the opportunity to create the image of slight improvement in US/Soviet relations, of benefit to us with allies and publics.

-- The risk for the US is that the Soviets -- having a more disciplined system -- will manipulate us more effectively than we manipulate them.

5. Given the Soviet tactical interest, we can probably keep alive their willingness to engage in exploratory dialogue, at least to the extent seen since January, without major concessions on START, INF, and other areas where we are far apart (e.g., ASAT, Chemical Weapons).

-- A cautious US approach would concentrate on CBMs (e.g., HOTLINE) and peripheral issues ... at least for some months.

6. To get more dramatic movement we probably have to consider more costly concessions. The crucial concession the Soviets are clearly Looking for is a moratorium on INF deployments.

-- The Soviets believe that an INF moratorium, and perhaps just talk about a moratorium, could rekindle the INF controversy in Europe and stop further US deployments permanently.

7. During the election, the Soviets will try to create an atmosphere in which the two US candidates compete in terms of who can better create amity with Moscow.

-- This will create pressure for US concessions.

8. If the US holds firm during a period of maximum political "vulnerability", i.e., 1984, this will go a long way to creating the conditions for a more genuinely flexible Soviet posture in 1985-1988.

-- During the latter period US political freedom of movement will be greater.

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- The results of our defense programs will begin to show.
- A stronger Soviet political leadership with better prospects for longevity may emerge and be better equipped to engage in longer-term planning and genuine give-and-take.

10. Throughout 1984 we have to remember the supreme importance of preserving the kind of credibility in Moscow that would allow us to manage a real crisis which could blow up at any time, e.g., in the Gulf.

- It would be dangerous to create the illusion in Moscow that the US cannot for political reasons risk a worsening of relations such a crisis could entail.

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Proposed Talking Points for DCI at NSC/NSPG Meeting, 27 March 1984

1. As always, the Soviets are acting in arms control in five areas of increasing political sensitivity:
 - o public statements, as in TASS, et al.
 - o unofficial bilateral exchanges of views, as in Dartmouth Group, et al.
 - o official exchanges, as in MBFR, CDE, SCC, etc.
 - o private or semi-private feelers, as in Dobrynin's "leaks" to Boston Globe, et al.
 - o official letters between President Reagan and General Secretary Chernenko.

2. There is not, and probably cannot be, substantive consistency in all five channels from day-to-day or even week-to-week. It is too hard to orchestrate all that.

3. The mix of "positive" and "negative" channels varies over time; in some cases, as today, public statements and official letters are congruent in substance.

4. In fact, I think it is clear the Soviets are purposely "talking out of both sides of their mouths."

5. The key question is whether any meaning is there for the US.

6. The USSR clearly is looking for US "concessions", such as taking UK and French nuclear missiles into account somewhere. Such steps by US would:
 - o look good in their own right to USSR.
 - o let the USSR out of the political box they created when they left INF and START.
 - o be useful for any internal arguments in USSR that this leadership knows how to deal with the US.

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7. In any case, the Soviets will be tough bargainers in normal diplomatic channels or private ones. 1984 will complicate in obvious ways any US or USSR efforts to:
 - o identify areas of mutual interest for any progress.
 - o actually work it out.
8. The Soviets appear to have adopted a two-pronged strategy on arms control, taking an inflexible line on INF and START, while simultaneously expressing willingness, and signaling that a breakthrough in US-Soviet relations is possible if Washington shows flexibility in these other areas.
9. They presumably calculate that this strategy enables them to stand firm on the central issues of INF and START, without making themselves appear so intransigent as to rally support for NATO's policies or to demonstrate that they, not the Administration, are responsible for poor US-Soviet relations.
10. Meanwhile, they continue to probe for flexibility on a range of issues, with the aim of extracting the maximum price for any marked improvement in relations or arms control issues before the US elections.
11. The Politburo will be wary of any major steps unless convinced that significant gains are at hand for the USSR, especially on their fundamental concerns in START and INF.