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3 February 1986

DCI TALKING POINTS FOR US OPTIONS

- I believe Option 2, or something close to it, is the proper position.
 - Pocket Gorbachev's statements insofar as they're consistent with our goals.
 - Move where Soviets have moved, i.e., INF.
 - Follow up to see if Soviets are serious; e.g., about verification. We should explore vigorously to see what the Soviets mean by their new generalities on verification.
- One of the urgent things we need to do is get our own verification policy in order. We need to press ahead on a government-wide basis to define to ourselves what we mean by effective verification and what margins of uncertainty are and are not militarily significant. Failure to do that can undercut any deal we are able to negotiate.
- A 50 percent reduction in offensive missiles would still leave the Soviets with the capability to disarm us with a preemptive strike. That emphasizes the need to move ahead with SDI.
- Option 3, in calling for us to offer extension of ABM, is self-defeating. It would hand the Soviets, some Europeans, and domestic critics additional ammunition to propagandize against and defeat SDI. It is SDI which has precipitated and can continue to drive reductions in offensive missiles. An 8-year extension of ABM would be almost certain to cause us time and progress in developing a testing missile defense while reductions in offensive missiles are not fully assured. We should stick with clear position successfully taken at Geneva against further restricting SDI.
- Should insist on proportionate/simultaneous INF reductions in Europe and Asia in order not to offend Japan, China, and other Asian allies.
- The Gorbachev proposal seeks to undercut your effort to broaden US-USSR dialogue beyond arms control; we cannot allow this to happen.
 - We should stress in the arms control context that moving to eliminate nuclear weapons requires work on non-nuclear defenses, correcting conventional force imbalances, full treaty compliance and "rules of the road" on incursions into third countries. Gorbachev's call for outlawing non-nuclear weapons based on new physical technologies. This would apply to stealth, laser millimeter wave programs and undercut our conventional defenses.
 - Also, need to stress US positions, particularly on verification, to that Soviet position is not dominant and so that Gorbachev cannot pin any failing to get an agreement entirely on SDI.

Approved for Release by CIA
Date Jan 2011

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*for NSPG on
arms control*