

DCI TALKING POINTS
NSPG re RSVP
16 April 1986

I believe we should, without tearing up the Treaty, take the position that as long as the Soviets are in violation, we are free to take any steps that we deem are required by our security needs.

We cannot afford to allow the Soviet leaders to see us as having made a major issue of their violations and then reacting weakly.

You were briefed last week on the most recent national estimate on Soviet strategic forces which shows how strongly the Soviets are moving to develop and deploy new, mobile, more powerful and accurate offensive forces and to put themselves in a position to rapidly deploy nationwide missile defense.

This is exacerbated by the Soviet violations of the offensive and defensive restrictions imposed by the SALT and ABM agreements.

Because we take seriously their violation (and potential violations) of the ABM Treaty, we should be laying out an R&D program involving penetration aids or other measures for offensive missiles to improve our ability to penetrate any Soviet ABM deployments beyond that now at Moscow.

It would be a mistake to reaffirm the ABM Treaty as some have suggested. It is unnecessary and it would be grist for the mill of those opposed to the treaty. It would be likely to slow down SDI development and weaken your successor's ability to carry on that vital program.

To now reaffirm the ABM Treaty would be rewarding Soviet violations and exploitations of ABM Treaty ambiguities [redacted]

[redacted]

Attempting to

strengthen the ABM Treaty's constraints on inherently multi-purpose and

ambiguous R&D...

Approved for Release by CIA
Date Jan 2011



ambiguous R&D activities would clearly constrain us while leaving the Soviets free to continue their exploitation of Treaty loopholes in a "creepout" from the Treaty.

As you saw in the briefing Larry Gershwin gave you a few days ago, the Soviets' strategic modernization program puts them in a position to exceed SALT II limits. But we believe it unlikely that the Soviets need to or would soon take steps beyond their ongoing vigorous programs that would make a big difference in the strategic balance, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the proper arbiter on this point.

One thing which is clear is holding to SALT II limitations would require us to dismantle more warheads than the Soviets, as shown by this chart.

Since the Soviets have exceeded the SALT II limit on Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, an appropriate and proportionate response would be for the US to do so as well. Such a step should involve strategic weaponry as modern as possible, rather than preserving old gear.

It seems to me that the submarines and the deployment of vulnerable MINUTEMAN III missiles fail to meet that test.

A major US purpose here ought to be to get the USSR back into compliance, not to join them in non-compliance, unless our strategic and political needs require it.

One significantly strategic step could be to announce and prepare ourselves to exceed the ALCM limit later this year. This would serve notice to the Soviets that we are ready to respond to their violations by strengthening our survivable deterrent, yet provide an incentive by giving the Soviets a finite amount of time to come back into compliance.

