

DCI TALKING POINTS
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT re ARMS CONTROL
17 July 1986, 9:30

- I think the proposal is a very good one. It takes your open laboratories idea another step. It makes your idea of sharing SDI specific. It will put the ball back in the Soviet court. It should appeal to our NATO Allies and also to the Japanese.

- The proposal should help institutionalize SDI. For this, it should be followed up quickly with a strong, calm and continuing public presentation by diversified and credible bipartisan advocates--industrial leaders, former government officials, scientists, and a cross-section of people of stature who I believe could be quickly mobilized for this.

- As for the specifics, in subparagraph (a) on the first page, I would take out "...no less than..." I think it is better to propose a specific time period. Saying no less than ten years is an invitation for the other side to come back and propose ten. They can, of course, do that in any event but it seems better not to extend the specific invitation that this language does.

- In the text on page 2 describing reductions in strategic offensive forces, we should ask the Soviets to begin these reductions in first strike strategic weapons, as a follow-up to your discussion with General Secretary Gorbachev, as you remind him in the second paragraph on page 1.

- In the first line of the second page I would change "...we would be prepared to sign a treaty..." to "we would be prepared to sign an agreement." I think this is wise for legal and political reasons.

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- On page 2, last sentence of the last full paragraph, where you say "[These reductions should be completed within an agreed period of time (for example, five years).]", I would strike out the five years and leave the period open for further consideration.

- In the last full paragraph on page 3, I would change "...we could then establish a process of further reductions..." to "explore further reductions."

- In this same paragraph, I would also eliminate the last sentence which says "For example, we could agree to reduce, from that time, the number of nuclear tests in relationship to the scale of reductions in strategic nuclear arms actually implemented." I believe there is some concern about strategic risk in doing this.

- On page 4, in the first full paragraph, I would change the words "complete insurance" to "assurance."

- Our verification work for the basic ideas in your letter shows that a strong, defensible verification package can be created. This package, evolving as US options change, is comprehensive and commensurate with the limits in your draft letter. But the success here is dependent in part on Soviet cooperation and funding of US intelligence. If the Soviets do not cooperate, even with generous funding for US intelligence, the US may have to reconsider whether all of the detailed limits now on the table are still in our interest; one example is percentage limits on ballistic missile throwweight.