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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on "Yugoslavia,"
3 February 1993

1. This second NSC/PC reviewing US policy toward the former Yugoslavia established the basic approach of US policy, selected specific actions to propose to the President, discussed military options (but set them aside for now), and directed specific intelligence and policy "next steps." The NSC/IWG was instructed to prepare an options paper for the President to be considered by another NSC/PC, likely tomorrow. (The NSC/IWG approved that draft this morning, and the NSC promised us a clean copy this afternoon to be cleared by Principals.)

2. **US Policy Takes Shape.** Tony Lake began by outlining four broad policy approaches:

- A. Own the Problem. Dump the Vance-Owen (V-O) proposal and stake out an assertive US approach.
- B. Lead the Effort. Modify the V-O map into something we can support morally and practically, and impose it.
- C. Support the Effort. Stay out of the map debate, impose nothing, but press all parties toward whatever settlement they can collectively accept.
- D. Disown the Problem. Back off this "European problem" except to provide aid and support sanctions.

3. Ambassador Albright and Secretary Christopher described with some frustration our isolation among the Allies, Vance, and Owen in New York. They said the others disparage the Muslims we are accused of goading on, and that the Allies insist they will pull out if we try to lift the arms embargo. Lake then moved, and all agreed, to discard "A" and "D." Consensus evolved to a "B-/C+" solution.

- Secretary Christopher favored "B," likening it to the US-brokered Mid-East Peace Process, although he urged that military force not be used until the V-O proposal is tried and seen to have failed.

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- Secretary Aspin urged "C," not imposing anything, remaining "agnostic" on V-O, insisting that "only a consensual 'C'" could endure, and suggesting Bosnia might surpass the Cyprus record as a peacekeeping mission without end. General Powell explained the requirements and costs of a high-end military option and judged that the Europeans have no more troops to contribute. He underscored that "imposing" a plan could mean anything from peacekeeping to full combat.
- Lake dismissed the V-O map as unacceptable. He defined the group's consensus as "C+," although it was not clear precisely what this means.
- The Principals then reviewed approximately 30 specific policy actions and selected those to be proposed to the President. They shelved the high-end military options for now and deemphasized the military aspects of the remaining options, but retained most suggestions designed to promote the delivery of relief assistance and tighten sanctions and other pressures on Belgrade).

4. On modalities, the US intends to work with the P-4; Lake's suggestion of forming a contact group (ala Namibia) was abandoned in favor of Ambassador Wisner's advice to work in parallel with the Allies and Russians rather than in concert. Lake suggested we work with the Bosnian Muslims to redraw the V-O map, sell it to the Europeans, and then impose it. Recognizing that Vance is tired and won't commit beyond February, State will nominate a US point man to work with and pressure whomever the UN names to succeed Vance. We should also send someone (Matlock?) to brief Yel'tsin, and we need to get the Germans to restrain Croatian President Tudjman.

5. **Military Options.** General Powell advised that airpower "solutions" won't work, and his preference (if a military option is called for) is to go in fast and heavy, intimidate the opposition, and hopefully scale back rapidly. His estimate of the force needed to enforce a V-O-type solution would be a "division package" of 20,000 troops for openers, triple that if rotations are needed over a long haul, UN Chapter Seven ROEs, and

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\$1 billion marginal costs over the first six months. General Powell also warned that Congressman Murtha has begun calling to ask the price tag.

6. **CIA Contributions.** Mr. Woolsey supported the discussion by outlining differences between the V-O map and what the Muslims want, by walking participants through the humanitarian aid shortfalls, and by highlighting likely reactions to the proposed policy options (our matrix was not as useful as hoped, however, because, in simplifying, we glossed over some important exceptions, and because the NSC had changed the order of the policy options addressed in the matrix). All in all, however, the meeting was well served with intelligence.

7. **Next Steps.** I have passed along several taskings from Mr. Woolsey [redacted] General Powell (medical shortfalls in Sarajevo), and Ambassador Wisner (fuel deliveries and a suggestion to smuggle in medicine). We also are printing a map for tomorrow's PC meeting that will highlight the changes the Muslims want to the V-O map, with accompanying talking points on the implications. Finally, [redacted] is attending a meeting of Leon Fuerth's new sanctions group this afternoon.

Daniel W. Wagner
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

cc: DDI, D/EURA, D/RTT, [redacted]

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