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9 March 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Video Conference on Bosnia,
4 March 1993

1. The Deputies heard discouraging news on the negotiations in New York, made progress toward defining US policy options (tighter sanctions and military intervention), explored pros and cons of an airlift to Tuzla, and reviewed the status of interagency papers in preparation. [redacted]

2. **New York Talks.** After taking a call from Ambassador Bartholomew, Peter Tarnoff reported that Izetbegovic and Karadzic were leaving. On an upbeat note, Izetbegovic promised Bartholomew he will make concrete suggestions on the map. [redacted]

3. **Discussing Policy Options with the Allies.** Sandy Berger asked how the US should respond if the Bosnian Serbs "defy" the UNSC Presidential Statement warning them to cease their offensive in eastern Bosnia. This unanswered question led to a broader discussion of three US options for stronger action on Bosnia: tighten sanctions, use US air power, or commit US ground forces.

- The DDCI noted that talk of military action will encourage Muslim intransigence in the peace talks, and the Deputies agreed that such discussions with the Allies would leak. Discussion and planning will be done only within the Washington community for now.
- Ambassador Wisner noted that there would be no trouble using NATO for a military operation in Bosnia provided it had a UN umbrella. We and the Russians agree NATO is the appropriate tool, and the French will sign on.
- The Deputies decided any discussions with the Allies should be limited for now to beefing up the sanctions. Leon Fuerth said that two US teams discussing sanctions on goods and financial dealings are being well received in Europe. But Fuerth warned that if the USG only discusses sanctions, the Europeans will do that and nothing more. [redacted]

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4. **Focus or Broad Brush?** Wisner suggested the US should focus on a few key initiatives, setting aside for now others like No-Fly enforcement. Jenonne Walker said that anything the UN commits itself to doing should be done, including No-Fly.

5. **Tuzla Airlift.** LTG McCaffrey said an airlift into Tuzla would be feasible, but it would require a "full-fledged military operation" and we should "assume ground combat" to secure the area and set up a distribution system on the ground. He favored more escorted convoys instead. Wisner noted that he came away from his confirmation hearings that same day with one clear message: avoid the slippery slope to US military involvement. Nonetheless, Wisner agreed to take a detailed look at Tuzla--at what was feasible and what resources would be required--if the reported refugee buildup there is confirmed.

6. **Papers in Process.** Berger asked about several papers in process for the Deputies or Bartholomew:

- Ambassador Wisner summarized the OSD assessment on what US military intervention in Bosnia might entail. The paper was based on two earlier Task Force studies of the military provisions of the Vance-Owen plan and the record of non-compliance with the London Accords. The NSC/IWG was to discuss the OSD paper the next day, with the Deputies returning to it thereafter (however, there has been no IWG meeting).
- The DDCI explained that we are awaiting the latest Muslim and Serb maps from New York before finishing the map assessment with INR. (Rather than wait, the paper was completed and given to the DCI, DDCI, and Tarnoff on Monday. We can add an analysis of the latest maps later.)
- Mr. Slocumbe noted that only State had commented on his paper on lifting the siege of Sarajevo. (We sent comments over the next day.)

Daniel W. Wagner
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

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