

~~SECRET~~Approved for Release CIA Historical
Collections Division AR 70-14 1OCT2013DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
23 March 1993**Likely Consequences of Warnings of Air Strikes
Against Bosnian Serbs and Serbia**

Threats alone will neither intimidate the Bosnian Serbs nor persuade Belgrade to stop aiding them. Attacks on Serbia would be opposed by Russia and other countries, expand the violence, and probably wreck the Vance-Owen process.

- Neither the Bosnian Serbs nor Belgrade will give in to any threats not backed by a clear willingness and capability to use military force on a large scale.
- To be effective, strikes would have to be directed against both the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia proper, and would widen the war.
- Strikes against Serb military targets in Bosnia could lead to an increase in Serbian aid, while strikes against Serbia proper could lead Belgrade to send larger forces to Bosnia to raise the stakes and crush the Muslims.
- Attacks on Serbia would also raise the likelihood of new Croatian offensives against the UNPAS and an uprising by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
- Western airstrikes against targets in Bosnia and Serbia probably would make both Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs even more defiant and resistant to making any political concessions to the West.
- Popular political support for Milosevic and the ultranationalists in Serbia would probably increase as well.
- Such an action would spell the end of humanitarian relief efforts in Bosnia and possibly lead to a quickening of the pace of "ethnic cleansing" in Serb-held areas.
- They would also likely encourage the Bosnian Government to believe that Western intervention to roll back Serb gains was forthcoming and lead them to quit the Vance-Owen talks.
- Moscow would almost certainly not agree to such an action, and unilateral action by the West would probably lead to a serious break in relations and the undermining of Yelstin.

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