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AR 70-14 1OCT2013

January
18 September 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

**SUBJECT: Report on Deputies Committee Meeting
January 11, 1995**

1. The principals at the meeting were Sandy Berger for the NSC, Admiral Owens for JCS, Under Secretary Walt Slocombe for OSD, Leon Fuerth for the Office of the Vice President, David Scheffer for US/UN, Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke for State, and Doug MacEachin for CIA. Also attending were General Clarke, Joe Kruzal, Sandy Vershbow, Rick Saunders, Ambassador Galbraith, and Robert Frazure. [REDACTED]

The Peacekeeping Budget Gap

2. The meeting started with Sandy Berger mentioning the need to discuss in a future Deputies Committee Meeting (DC) an apparent problem with the current policy of encouraging other nations to supply more troops for UNPROFOR in the Balkans. The additional 6,500 troops recently requested by the UN would cost \$180-200 million of which the US would pay a third, placing a heavy burden on limited peacekeeping funds. Walt Slocombe requested an immediate decision because Secretary Perry was about to ask India to provide troops. The deputies agreed that for the present the US continue to encourage contributors to UNPROFOR. [REDACTED]

Diplomatic Efforts on Bosnia

3. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke updated the group on the diplomatic situation in the Contact Group. He said that the talks in Sarajevo went well and that his publicized run-in with Silajdzic was an attempt by Silajdzic to make the US look bad because the language Holbrooke used had been coordinated with Izetbegovic. After the cessation of hostilities agreement is implemented, the Contact Group plans to shuttle between Pale and Sarajevo as long as it is productive. [REDACTED]

4. Holbrooke said based on private conversations with Bosnian leaders that the Bosnian Serbs only need to say the word "accept" before serious negotiations can begin. He noted that the Bosnians are extremely interested in seeing what the Bosnian Serbs will offer and that currently there is a split within the Bosnian government. Also, the Bosnians apparently want to open a private channel to the Bosnian Serbs by sending our DCM to Embassy Bosnia to Pale. [REDACTED]

5. The group noted that there are only some eleven weeks to reach a settlement before fighting breaks out in earnest again.

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The key question is whether Karadzic really is willing to negotiate. The pending trip of the Contact Group to Pale was considered a major concession because it legitimizes Karadzic.

6. The deputies agreed on the need for a future discussion of our planned role in the negotiations, such as whether we should be proactive and suggest proposals. The deputies also mentioned exploring ways to encourage the Bosnians to settle, such as by offering reconstruction assistance or security guarantees. Slocombe suggested discussing possibly putting pressure on the Bosnians to encourage a settlement, but Holbrooke refused to discuss it because he considers it a mistake. Sandy Berger suggested this was not an appropriate discussion topic now. CIA was tasked with drafting a paper looking at the key negotiating sticking points in preparation for the next DC.

The UN Mandate of Croatia

7. The deputies agreed that the decision to end the UN mandate reflected frustration by Zagreb for the lack of progress on the Krajina. President Tudjman was scheduled to give a speech about the mandate the next day, and the deputies decided the US should encourage him not to give that speech or at the least to allow himself a loophole on extending the UN mandate.

8. Ambassador Galbraith suggested that the US could use either a hard or soft approach on Tudjman. On the hard side, the US could inform Zagreb that if he fails to renew the mandate, the US commitments to Croatia, such as holding sanctions on Serbia until recognition, would be void since the commitments were made to support a policy of peace. The deputies decided for now to avoid a hard approach, and that carrots would be more productive than sticks.

9. A softer approach would be to encourage the Croatians to accept a redefined UN mandate. This would include: allowing the UN to continue its headquarters and logistics support in Croatia, to police the cease-fire at the confrontation lines in Croatia, maintaining the economic agreement on the Belgrade-Zagreb highway, and allowing convoys through to Bihac and Banja Luca. The 10,000 troops in the UNPAs would be withdrawn as not doing much anyhow.

10. Galbraith also recommended a high-level diplomatic mission to the key European capitals and Moscow to talk up the Croatia issue and show the Croats that we have not forgotten their concerns. Also, the US would encourage formally tabling the Z-4 Plan. The deputies agreed with these recommendations but balked at the idea of having the President publicly make his commitment that there will be no sanctions relief for Belgrade until it recognizes Croatia. The problem is that the Contact Group has privately promised sanctions relief after the Bosnian

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Serbs accept the Contact Group plan, an apparent inconsistency with the President's private promise to Tudjman. [REDACTED]

11. It was agreed after the meeting that the administration would do a full-court press with the Croats. Holbrooke and others would deliver the message that evening to Tudjman's son, Ambassador Albright would inform the Croatian Ambassador, and our DCM in Zagreb would inform the Croatian government there.

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