

~~Secret~~

Approved for Release CIA Historical  
Collections Division AR 70-14  
1OCT2013

2 March 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Acting Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Probable 3 March 1995 Principals' Committee Meeting

1. The Principals will deal with issues that the Deputies will have discussed twice this week. Since the second Deputies meeting will not happen until 1800 tonight, I'll have to brief you on this meeting in the prebrief. In particular, the Principals will try to resolve:

- Should the Administration approve Phase 2 of prepositioning to prepare for the UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia and/or Bosnia?
- What should be the US long-term policy regarding the Balkans war?

2. At this point, you do not have any actions for the meeting. In the discussion of prepositioning you may want to note that the timeline for extracting UNPROFOR could slip badly if a Congressional supplemental bill is required, and planning should account for that. Also, you may want to participate in the discussion on the bottom-up review of strategy, particularly regarding possible reaction to a large NATO force in Bosnia/Croatia. Finally, you could raise some key questions in any discussion of an enhanced presence in Macedonia promoted.

### PRE-POSITIONING

3. In this week's discussion of prepositioning, some of the Deputies were concerned about trying to get Congressional approval to deploy over 100 US personnel to Croatia for a NATO extraction plan of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Croatia that has not even been completed yet, much less approved by the President. JCS and OSD argue that the prepositioning needs to go forward as a precaution.

4. JCS is now offering a choice of three alternatives: approve prepositioning Step 2 and follow-on operations; authorize only Step 2; or defer a decision until the operation has been updated, the President approved, and Congress has passed a supplemental budget request. Apparently in the NAC, the British, French, Italians, Dutch, and maybe Canadians broke silence on prepositioning.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

SUBJECT: Probable 3 March 1995 Principals' Committee Meeting

5. At the 28 February Deputies meeting, OSD mentioned that it wants a Congressional supplemental to finance the extraction which could cost NATO \$1.7 billion. Deutch argues they cannot afford the mission in any other way. **In the interagency teleconference, I mentioned that given the apparent agreement by the Deputies, that Congress must approve a supplemental to finance an extraction, the time line to extract UNPROFOR beginning in the spring could become impossible. The legislative affairs representative at NSC agreed that a supplemental would not come soon.**

6. Last weekend, Sandy Berger tasked us to assess the likely reaction of the warring parties and other involved states to a large NATO presence in Bosnia and Croatia. The bottom line of that paper is that the Bosnian Serbs and Krajina Serbs are likely to impede a UN withdrawal, especially if they believe it will lead to US airstrikes. Meanwhile, Croatia and the Bosnians are likely to try to encourage NATO towards mission creep. (See UNPROFOR tab)

#### POLICY REVIEW

7. At the last Principals' meeting, the Deputies were charged with doing a bottom up review of policy on the Balkans. The BTF led that effort with its paper on "Balkans: The Next Three Months." (See Policy Review tab) It explores three scenarios for the next few months and the driving actors. The study concludes that the peace scenario is not likely, and that the most likely outcome is an outbreak of fighting in both Bosnia and Croatia. The most optimistic scenario we see is that the fighting can be delayed a few months after considerable arm-twisting

8. The NSC drafted a paper that built on our scenarios to explore possible policy decisions in the next few months. It has developed a timeline for when the various decisions must be made for our most plausible scenario of increased fighting. The paper identifies four basic policy options, all undesirable:

- Continue our present policy of muddling through;
- Adopt a policy of neutrality and focus on active containment;
- Apply a policy of containment and undertake a long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia, as we did with the USSR; and
- Increase US commitment to the Bosnian Government; apply military pressure to compel Serb acceptance of a settlement.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

SUBJECT: Probable 3 March 1995 Principals' Committee Meeting

9. One issue that may also be discussed is the proposal to beef-up the deployment in Macedonia, an idea pushed by Secretary Perry and State Charge in Macedonia Komras. OSD was tasked with a paper on its plans for beefing up Macedonia with more troops. We continue to believe that the main threat to Macedonia is internal stability, not the Serb threat. (See Macedonia tab) If so, more NATO troops may not help a point you made in an earlier Principals' Committee meeting. If chaos erupts in Macedonia, a possible scenario is for the Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians to partition the county. We have included a paper on the impact on Macedonia's stability from UNPROFOR withdrawing elsewhere.

10. Questions you might want the Deputies to raise to the Principals' attention are:

- What should be the orders for the NATO forces there if domestic violence erupts?
- What conditions would be necessary to consider the mission completed and departure permitted? How long would that be likely to take?
- What would such a deployment cost annually?

Ray Converse

~~Secret~~