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Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

The Krajina Serbs: Considering UNFIC

Krajina Serb leaders are likely to pay close attention to the rhetoric surrounding the discussion of the mandate for the new force, particularly on the issue of UN forces on Croatia's border with Bosnia and Serbia. The influence of Bosnian Serb "President" Karadzic and, more importantly, that of Serbian President Milosevic will also shape their decision. If the Krajina Serb leaders--and Milosevic--are convinced that the international community will continue to view the Vance Plan as the operative arrangement for reconciling their dispute with Zagreb, and if the proposed border force is small and focused on monitoring rather than controlling the border crossings, they probably will accept the agreement.

Suspicion and Relief

Despite their internal power struggle, key Krajina Serb leaders--"President" Martic, "Prime Minister" Mikelic, and "Foreign Minister" Babic--appeared to share a favorable initial reaction to Tudjman's decision to permit UN troops to remain in Croatia. They are suspicious, however, of the prospect of having UN forces on Croatia's border with Bosnia and Serbia.

- All three view the UN presence--even at reduced levels--as key to Serb consolidation of control over Serb-occupied areas of Croatia. They fear that a complete UN withdrawal would mean a renewed, all-out war with Croatia in which they probably would take heavy losses.
- Martic--the Krajina Serb leader who is closest to Karadzic--said that
 "Tudjman acted reasonably" in allowing UN troops to stay, but that the
 deployment of a "peace force on the border with Bosnia and Serbia is where
 we, most probably, are not going to agree." Martic later said that UN
 civilian police--not troops--could be deployed on the border to monitor the
 work of Serb border authorities.
- Mikelic--Milosevic's man in Knin--credited Tudjman's change of heart to constructive actions on the part of his own government and the international community, but left open the issue of whether the new force would be satisfactory to the Krajina Serbs.

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position as the most pow Tudjman's decision to all	prochement with Milosevic probably will secure his erful man in the Krajinasaid that he was relieved at ow UN troops to stay, but that "the one-sided erb border will not meet with understanding in the				
The Influence of Karadzic and Milosevic					
Martic is likely to confer closely w troops along the Croatian border.	ith Karadzic regarding the acceptability of UN				
Martic has grown increas blockade of the Bosnian	ingly close to Karadzic since Milosevic imposed his				
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Milosevic, whose military forces are vital to the Krajina Serbs' defense, probably will hold the greatest sway with the Krajina Serb leadership.					
 The "Yugoslav" Army (VJ) already gives direct support to the Krajina Serbs and most Krajina Serb brigades probably have a cadre of professional VJ personnel. Special operations troops from the VJ and Serbian Interior Ministry probably would be the primary forces involved against a Croatian attack. 					
Milosevic apparently hav year's feud between the t	leadership struggle with Martic, Babic and e achieved a rapprochement that supersedes last wo. Babic and Mikelic discussed the Croatian c in Belgrade shortly after it was announced, s.				
Although Milosevic has not reacted directly to the plan, the Serbian state-controlled press reported it in a straight-forward mannereven describing Tudjman as a peacemaker, according to US Embassy reporting. Milosevic may decide to refrain from publicly supporting or opposing the plan, although we believe he has good reason to encourage the Krajina Serbs to accept it. If he does openly support the plan, he is certain to face a wave of criticism from his internal opposition.					
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	The plan is Milosevic's only option for keeping UN translation Milosevic believes that are essential to deter a Croatian attack. Milosevic knows depend on the VJ to come to their aid, but he is Serbia in a new war with Croatia. The argument that the selp stave off war while protecting Krajina Serb interest appeal to the Serbian public, which is generally unenther crospect of another Serbo-Croatian war. The plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give Milosevic more time to foster a manufacture of the plan would give milosevic m	the UN forces there was that the Krajina loathe to involve the Croatian plan will ests is also likely to ausiastic about the degotiated settlement in			
	he Krajina, either by prodding the Krajina Serbs to co				
, [with Zagreb or by attempting to cut a secret territorial	deal with Tudjman.			
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:	Milosevic continues to see Karadzic as his biggest rival greater Serbia." The placement of UN troops on Croserve Milosevic's interests by complicating the growin the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs.	atia's border could			
	By not standing in the way of the plan, Milosevic may earn additional credit with the international community could be applied toward sanctions relief. If approach views on the Croatian plan, Milosevic might responded to the could be an important way for his support to domestically.	y, which he would hope led regarding his nd that sanctions			
Milosevic's critics are already mobilizing against the plan, according to US Embassy reporting.					
	Arch-rival Vojislav Seselj said that placing UN troops was a very dangerous move, according to press report President of the Democratic Party of Serbia, charged to gave Croatia more time to build up its war machine an ikely than peace.	s. Vojislav Kostunica, hat Tudjman's decision			
Milosevic's open support for the plan probably would drive his domestic critics even closer to Karadzic if the Bosnian Serb leader decides to oppose the proposal, a development that Milosevic does not want to encourage. For now, however, he is strong enough to weather opposition criticism.					
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