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13 April 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia--14 April 1995

1. Friday's Principals-only meeting will review options for minimizing fighting in Bosnia, the status of efforts to implement a new UN mandate in Croatia, options for strengthening UNPROFOR, and a strategy for briefing Congress on OPLAN 40104 and the evils of lifting the arms embargo.

-- You will not be required to take the lead on any issue. At the pre-brief, the BTF will provide you with talking points on recent military developments and intelligence information related to agenda items.

2. The Administration realizes that diplomatic efforts aimed at avoiding renewed fighting in Bosnia are at a deadend. During a meeting earlier this week, Milosevic flatly refused a Contact Group offer for sanctions relief in exchange for recognition of Bosnia as a state within its current borders; Milosevic demanded a complete lifting of sanctions in exchange for willingness to recognize a Bosnian "union" consisting of the Croat-Muslim federation and Bosnian Serb political entity. The Contact Group will be put "on the shelf" until some future point when negotiations hold out more promise for achieving a settlement. The CONTACT GROUP TAB includes the State NODIS readout of the Contact Group meeting with Milosevic.

3. Meanwhile, senior policymakers do not appear as concerned as they should be about developments in Croatia. UN negotiators have given up efforts to negotiate details of the new UNCRO force with Croatian and Krajina Serb authorities; the deadline for working out the details is next Friday. The UN instead will try to develop and impose its own concept for UNCRO. The plan reportedly would have UN personnel at key FRY-Croatian and Bosnian-Croatian border crossings whose role would be limited to visual inspection of vehicles attempting to cross the border and reporting to the Security Council any movement of military personnel and supplies. This would be totally unacceptable to the Croats. The CROATIA MANDATE TAB includes additional background.

-- Although we have no firm evidence that either side expects a conflict, the confusion surrounding the

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new mandate could cause a rapid deterioration in the situation. Also, there have been a number of incidents in which Croatian and Krajina Serb forces have harassed UNCRO personnel.

- The CROATIA-MILITARY TAB includes the BTF's third assessment of Croatian military readiness. Readiness remains high, but there is no evidence of imminent plans to attack.

4. JCS has contributed a paper for the meeting on options to strengthen UNPROFOR (see TAB D under MEETING PAPERS). Options include securing Sarajevo and Tuzla airports, establishing secure aid corridors to the eastern enclaves, increasing the number of safe areas, and enhancing capabilities within UNPROFOR. Senior policymakers hope that more effective implementation of the UNPROFOR mandate could be used as a carrot to urge the Bosnian Government to renew the cease-fire. The Allies may be open to some improvements, but not to any changes in the UNPROFOR mandate. The UNPROFOR TAB includes additional background on this issue.

5. Congressional strategy probably will dominate the meeting. Although the immediate issue is the need to brief Congress on details of OPLAN 40104, the Administration is concerned about a confluence of issues, including next week's required review of whether to extend sanctions relief to Serbia, the expiration the following week of the cease-fire in Bosnia, and the likely introduction by Senator Dole of a unilateral lift resolution.

- There may be another Principals' Committee on Tuesday to determine whether the US should oppose another extension of sanctions relief for Serbia in view of continuing serious violations of inter-Serbian sanctions (see INTER-SERBIAN SANCTIONS TAB for our latest assessment). For diplomatic reasons, the Administration probably will decide to continue sanctions relief--something which probably will provoke Congressional charges that it is too soft on Milosevic.

- On lift, the Principals may decide to establish an interagency briefing team to discourage support. NSC and State Congressional affairs officers are resigned to passage of a resolution; the objective will be to narrow Dole's margin of victory to make a Presidential veto as easy as possible.

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