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JCS Paper

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INFORMATION PAPER

1. ~~(U)~~ Purpose. To provide options, and a strategy, to strengthen UNPROFOR.
2. ~~(U)~~ Background. The Principals Committee met 28 March 1995 and agreed the US should immediately approach the British and French to explore measures to strengthen UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

3. ~~(C)~~ Assessment. At the 11 April Troop Contributors Meeting (TCM), Mr. Akashi and GEN Janvier recounted UNPROFOR's successes, most of which they feel are not recognized. Additionally, they indicated the equipment and manpower previously offered by nations, and subsequently accepted by the UN, is all that is needed. This is a clear indication of UNPROFOR priorities and the likelihood that they would not accept any new initiatives.

CJCS's lengthy discussion with the British CHOD indicated great reluctance on the part of the British. However, the CJCS and his British and French counterparts have agreed to discuss these options at a flag officer/staff level meeting next week. The British, French, and the UN will likely resist all efforts to move UNPROFOR beyond a current Chapter VI impartial posture. Our major leverage is their concern in preventing US Congressional action on unilateral lift. We should use this leverage to encourage UNPROFOR to act with a stronger hand to enforce the current mandate.

4. ~~(C)~~ Options. There are specific options that may strengthen UNPROFOR ability to perform within its mandate. These include:

- **Securing Sarajevo and Tuzla Airports.** The focal points of international interest in the conflict. Measures would include securing the perimeter, approaches, high terrain, and buildings. Establish a safe zone with increased armored patrols, and airborne immediate response capability.
- **Establishing a ground corridor between Konjic and Sarajevo.** Would ensure the free flow of aid into Sarajevo. This would require forces trained in crowd control, armored self-protection of convoys, combat engineers, TACPs moving with convoys, and a "quick reaction force."
- **Establish ground corridors between Sarajevo and eastern enclaves.** Same as above, would ensure free flow of aid to enclaves.
- **Create cease fire lines.** UNPROFOR, without use of force, can not physically separate the warring factions. This initiative must be one fought

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on the political front, and decided among the warring parties. A cessation of hostilities or peace agreement is required to define cease fire lines.

- **Increase the number of, and consolidate UNPROFOR into, safe areas and exclusion zones.** Protects the civilian population and ensures access for aid. Not compatible with the use of the safe areas for military activities. Enforcing demilitarization requires increases in UNPROFOR's capability. Need to provide ground and air mobility assets, and a "quick reaction force" securing the safe areas. Will require secure lines of communication to safe areas to ensure delivery of aid.
- **Enhance capabilities within UNPROFOR.** Provide heavy lift helicopters, engineer battalions, UNMOs, civilian police, TACPs, counter battery radars, and mobility assets.

5. ~~(C)~~ Execution Strategy. To execute this initiative the following steps are necessary:

- CJCS contact British and French CHODs proposing new initiative. (Complete)
- Expand US proposals (shown above), study options for effectiveness and risk. Provide to British and French on 18 April.
- Convene a tri-lateral flag/staff working group 19-20 April in Washington. (Scheduled)
- Brief tri-lateral proposal to CHODs (possibly off line at the MC/CS) and refer to capitals by end of April.
- Brief to President 1 May. Consult with Congress, if necessary, on 2-5 May.
- Introduce initiative to UNSYG, SRSG, UNPROFOR Commanders by 8 May.

6. ~~(C)~~ Summary. Proactive actions to deliver humanitarian aid and permit freedom of movement for UNPROFOR must be carefully weighed against the associated risks and benefits. Strict enforcement of these measures may place UNPROFOR at odds with both the GOBH and the SRBH. Impartiality and the delivery of humanitarian assistance are UNPROFOR's first priorities.

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