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27 April 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence**FROM:** Acting Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force**SUBJECT:** Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia/Croatia, April 28,
1630-1800

1. State and the Office of the Vice President will lead on near-term diplomatic strategy, and JCS will brief on OPLAN 40104. **You have not been tasked with any agenda items, but you probably can comment on the prospects for renewed fighting; State is more optimistic than we that fighting will be restrained this summer. [See Military Outlook Tab.]**

DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

2. This will be a short segment mainly reaffirming the conclusions of Thursday's Deputies Committee meeting. In short, the Deputies agreed to let State try to pursue the strategy of offering Milosevic further sanctions relief in exchange for his recognition of Bosnia and agreeing to allow a firm international presence--less than 500 people--to really close the Bosnian Serb-Serb border. State asserted the Bosnian Government is on board with this strategy and would accept recognizing Bosnia within its current borders in lieu of recognizing Bosnia as a state. Then, according to the scenario, Bosnia will then agree to extend the cessation of hostilities agreement another two-to-four months, thereby avoiding the need to extract UNPROFOR.

3. Once again, I fear that State is overly optimistic in anticipating these cards will easily fall into place. Some of the Allies see a glimmer of hope in a recent Milosevic proposal, but we are more cautious. **[See Contact Group: Another Glimmer of Hope? in Diplomacy tab.]** In addition, State does not consider how Croatia will react if Milosevic receives substantial sanctions relief for Bosnia. There have been some critical public exchanges between Karadzic and Mladic; some might take heart that the Bosnian Serbs are splintering among themselves, but we believe they still agree on the basic goals. **[See Bosnian Serbs Dispute War Tactics; Not Goals in Diplomacy.]**

4. Meanwhile, Fuerth produced another one of his matrices on what to offer Milosevic for recognition. **[See Meeting Paper tab.]** One issue that could arise refers to Leon Fuerth's idea to close the back-door on sanctions--traffic through the Krajina--by deploying Treasury Customs officials to Croatia as Sanctions Assistance Monitors. Treasury is resisting doing this because of security concerns, and today asked the Balkan Task Force to provide an assessment.

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OPLAN 40104

5. Most of the meeting will be dedicated to the JCS briefing OPLAN 40104--to use NATO to extract UNPROFOR. Depending on how well the briefing goes, the President may be briefed as early as next week. The Administration could also decide to begin the process of Congressional notification and seeking prior funding for the mission.

6. We have prepared two papers related to UNPROFOR. See UNPROFOR tab. The first argues that harassment of UNPROFOR has increased by both sides. Efforts to convince the Bosnian Government and Congress that UNPROFOR should stay in Bosnia by strengthening its mission will be difficult. The Allies may agree to some increase in equipment, but NATO agreement on more robust enforcement measures seems unlikely. The other paper does not anticipate an imminent extraction of UNPROFOR and notes that only the French seem to be impeding the planning. However, the French and some other Allies are concerned about the need to develop plans for scenarios short of complete withdrawal.

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