Approved for Release CIA ^{TO} Historical Collections Division			
AR 70-14 10CT2013		,	

5 June 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT:

Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia,

6 June 1995

- 1. Tomorrow's <u>Principals-only</u> meeting will assess options for <u>UNPROFOR</u> reconfiguration and how to deal with the plethora of developments in <u>Bosnia</u>, including responding to the F-16 shootdown, hostage relief efforts, the possible need for airdrops, and the continuing failure of diplomatic efforts to produce results.
 - -- You will not be required to take the lead on any issue.
 - -- We will ensure that you have the latest intelligence on the status of the US pilot, the hostages, and any other significant issues in time for the meeting.
- 2. Although not on the agenda, you may want to warn the Principals of a troubling military development that could lead to renewed fighting in Croatia. With international attention diverted to Bosnia, Croatian and Bosnian Croat forces have mounted a successful offensive along the Croatian-Bosnian border. By our calculations, they advanced twelve kilometers over the weekend, and are within 13 kilometers—shelling range—of the Krajina Serb capital of Knin, and within 10 kilometers of a critical Krajina Serb logistics route.
 - -- The Krajina Serbs are threatening to retaliate if the offensive continues by shelling Croatian cities.
 - -- Krajina Serb shelling, in turn, would give Zagreb the pretext it needs to launch a new offensive of its own.
 - -- We have included copies of a map summarizing recent military developments inside the back cover of this book.
- 3. The humanitarian situation--including the level of supplies available to UNPROFOR--is becoming more serious in several enclaves. The UN's suspension of relief convoys through Bosnian Serb and Krajina Serb territory--ordered on 25 May as a precaution against retaliation for NATO airstrikes--has increased prospects for significant food

r	
TOP SECRET	

snortage	s in several enclaves.
Tow on a	UN forces in Gorazde and Zepa were running upplies and that aerial resupply of 30 days of food
and wate	r may be needed.
una wacc	I may be needed.
	The possibility that airdrops might be called for
	will raise questions about what to do about Bosnian
	<u>Serb air defenses</u> . In the past, military planners
	have advocated neutralizing these systems as a
	prerequisite to initiating airdrops.
	The ATD DEEPNER MAD included be already information
	The AIR DEFENSE TAB includes background information on Bosnian Serb air defense capabilities.
	on bobiltan belb all delense capabilities.
	·
	We have presented a more face and to distribute and
	We have prepared a map for you to distribute on our knowledge of the disposition of these forces as of
	2 June (copies inside back cover of this book).
	Tours (sopres inside sack cover of this sook).
4.	The Principals will also review the status of
Ambassad	or Frasure's efforts to win Milosevic's recognition
of Bosni	a in exchange for significant sanctions relief.
	suggests growing concern among the Croatians and
Bosnian	Government about the merits of these talks. The
	s worry that we are giving away much leverage over
Serbia a	nd anima mathing in the control of a management to the
Croatian	nd gaining nothing in the way of a resolution to the
CIUacian	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting
too litt	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is
too litt	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the
too litt	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is
too litt being as Bosnian	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government.
too litt being as Bosnian	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government. Finally, you should be familiar with our paper on
too litt being as Bosnian (5. possible	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government. Finally, you should be familiar with our paper on threats to US monitors along the Serbian-Bosnian
too litt being as Bosnian (5. possible border (problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government. Finally, you should be familiar with our paper on
too litt being as Bosnian (5. possible border (problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government. Finally, you should be familiar with our paper on threats to US monitors along the Serbian-Bosnian see the SANCTIONS TAB). We have no information of a
too litt being as Bosnian (5. possible border (problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government. Finally, you should be familiar with our paper on threats to US monitors along the Serbian-Bosnian see the SANCTIONS TAB). We have no information of a hreat to the monitors
too litt being as Bosnian (5. possible border (direct t	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government. Finally, you should be familiar with our paper on threats to US monitors along the Serbian-Bosnian see the SANCTIONS TAB). We have no information of a hreat to the monitors Serbian paramilitary personnel affiliated with
too litt being as Bosnian 5. possible border (direct the	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government. Finally, you should be familiar with our paper on threats to US monitors along the Serbian-Bosnian see the SANCTIONS TAB). We have no information of a hreat to the monitors Serbian paramilitary personnel affiliated with have been dispatched to Tuzla and Srebrenica in
too litt being as Bosnian (5. possible border (direct t) "Arkan" search o	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government. Finally, you should be familiar with our paper on threats to US monitors along the Serbian-Bosnian see the SANCTIONS TAB). We have no information of a hreat to the monitors Serbian paramilitary personnel affiliated with have been dispatched to Tuzla and Srebrenica in f American hostages. We extrapolate from this
too litt being as Bosnian (5. possible border (direct t) "Arkan" search o Serbian	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government. Finally, you should be familiar with our paper on threats to US monitors along the Serbian-Bosnian see the SANCTIONS TAB). We have no information of a hreat to the monitors Serbian paramilitary personnel affiliated with have been dispatched to Tuzla and Srebrenica in f American hostages. We extrapolate from this paramilitary personnel in Serbiabeyond the control
too litt being as Bosnian () 5. possible border () direct t	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government. Finally, you should be familiar with our paper on threats to US monitors along the Serbian-Bosnian see the SANCTIONS TAB). We have no information of a hreat to the monitors Serbian paramilitary personnel affiliated with have been dispatched to Tuzla and Srebrenica in f American hostages. We extrapolate from this paramilitary personnel in Serbiabeyond the control evicmight be inclined to embarrass the Serbian the by threatening American personnel and even turning
too litt being as Bosnian () 5. possible border () direct t	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government. Finally, you should be familiar with our paper on threats to US monitors along the Serbian-Bosnian see the SANCTIONS TAB). We have no information of a hreat to the monitors Serbian paramilitary personnel affiliated with have been dispatched to Tuzla and Srebrenica in f American hostages. We extrapolate from this paramilitary personnel in Serbiabeyond the control evicmight be inclined to embarrass the Serbian
too litt being as Bosnian () 5. possible border () direct t	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government. Finally, you should be familiar with our paper on threats to US monitors along the Serbian-Bosnian see the SANCTIONS TAB). We have no information of a hreat to the monitors Serbian paramilitary personnel affiliated with have been dispatched to Tuzla and Srebrenica in f American hostages. We extrapolate from this paramilitary personnel in Serbiabeyond the control evicmight be inclined to embarrass the Serbian to the Bosnian Serbs.
too litt being as Bosnian () 5. possible border () direct t	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government. Finally, you should be familiar with our paper on threats to US monitors along the Serbian-Bosnian see the SANCTIONS TAB). We have no information of a hreat to the monitors Serbian paramilitary personnel affiliated with have been dispatched to Tuzla and Srebrenica in f American hostages. We extrapolate from this paramilitary personnel in Serbiabeyond the control evicmight be inclined to embarrass the Serbian t by threatening American personnel and even turning r to the Bosnian Serbs. This is an important issue because US personnel
too litt being as Bosnian () 5. possible border () direct t	problem. The Bosnians worry that they are getting le in the way of recognition, since Milosevic is ked to recognize Bosnia's borders and not the Government. Finally, you should be familiar with our paper on threats to US monitors along the Serbian-Bosnian see the SANCTIONS TAB). We have no information of a hreat to the monitors Serbian paramilitary personnel affiliated with have been dispatched to Tuzla and Srebrenica in f American hostages. We extrapolate from this paramilitary personnel in Serbiabeyond the control evicmight be inclined to embarrass the Serbian to the Bosnian Serbs.

()

TOP SEC	RET	
personnel as w border monitor		reatening the whole
<u>a decision by</u> prepared to ri	<u>Principals on w</u> sk Americans be	ek that he might seek thether they are ing taken hostage in monitoring regime.

TOP SECRET