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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: June 6, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

OMB

Gordon Adams

OVP

Leon Fuerth

Chief of Staff

Leon Panetta

StateSecretary Warren Christopher
Peter TarnoffCIA

John Deutch

DODSecretary William Perry
Walter SlocombeJCS

LTG Wesley Clark

USUN

Ambassador Madeleine Albright

White House

Sandy Berger

NSCSandy Vershbow
Colonel Nelson DrewSummary of ConclusionsNegotiations with Milosevic

1. Principals decided to recall Ambassador Frasure from Belgrade meetings with Milosevic for consultations, given the lack of progress on the mutual recognition plan and Milosevic's attempt to up the ante. They agreed that, prior to departing, Frasure should meet with Milosevic to stress (a) the need for Belgrade to be more forthcoming on a workable sanctions

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reimposition mechanism in return for sanctions relief; (b) the need for Milosevic to intercede to secure UNPROFOR access in order to resupply its units in the eastern enclaves; and (c) the need for Milosevic to pledge to take action to increase security of U.S. monitors operating along the Serbian-Bosnian border in light of Bosnian-Serb threats to take U.S. personnel hostage (Action: State). ~~(S)~~

Future of U.S. ICFY Monitors

2. Principals agreed to return U.S. border monitors to duty under the following conditions: (a) they must be informed of the serious nature of the threat directed toward them, based on our intelligence information, and allowed to resign and leave if they do not want to return voluntarily; (b) Frasure should obtain the security commitment from Milosevic cited above; (c) upcoming congressional testimony about the U.S. role and policy for Bosnia should ensure that Congress is aware of the participation of U.S. civilian contractors in the ICFY border monitoring mission. A message would be sent at once to inform the head of the ICFY of our decision (Action: State). ~~(S)~~

Visit of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic

3. Principals recommended scheduling a meeting of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic with the Vice-President during Silajdzic's visit to Washington June 8-14, with the option of a drop-by by the President (Action: NSC/OVP). ~~(S)~~

4. Principals also agreed that a meeting should be arranged in the near future between the Secretary of State and Muhamed Sacirbey, in his new capacity as Bosnian Foreign Minister (Action: State). ~~(C)~~

Measures to Enhance Protection for Deny Flight Missions

5. Based on a CIA assessment that the current ROE for Deny Flight might not provide adequate protection for NATO/US aircraft in light of recently demonstrated Bosnian-Serb tactics, Principals agreed that CIA will review the nature of the SAM threat in Bosnia, and OSD and JCS will then determine, subject to Principals' review, whether a new definition of "hostile intent" or new ROE are required for further operations (Action: CIA/JCS/OSD). ~~(C)~~

6. In the interim, Principals agreed that Deny Flight operations will continue under existing ROE (considering all of Bosnia to be a high threat area, permitting attack on SAMs demonstrating hostile intent through radar illumination of

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aircraft), but will seek to avoid provocative action (Action: JCS/OSD). (S)

Response to Croat Offensive near Knin

7. Principals agreed that a strong message should be sent to Zagreb and the Croatian Ambassador to the UN urging the Croatians to exercise restraint in their ongoing offensive operations near Knin lest they provoke another major clash with the Krajina Serbs (Action: USUN/State). (C)

U.S. Support to UNPROFOR

8. Principals reviewed the results of the Paris meeting of Defense Ministers. In this regard, they agreed to await clarification from those providing forces to the UN Rapid Reaction Force to determine the exact nature of lift, air support and equipment that the U.S. might be asked to provide (Action: USUN/OSD). They agreed in principle that the U.S. would support a UNSC resolution to be drafted by France and the UK that would use the Paris decisions as the basis for UNPROFOR reconfiguration rather than any of the four options put forward by the UN SYG (Action: USUN). (C)

9. Principals agreed that airdrops to resupply UNPROFOR units isolated in the eastern enclaves would be a high risk option that would be unlikely to provide any long-term resolution to the problem. They agreed on the need to reassess the stocks/supplies available to the Safe Areas (Action: OVP/CIA) to provide a baseline for evaluating the requirements for resupply (Action: JCS). (S)

10. Principals agreed on the need to resolve on an urgent basis the issue of how UNPROFOR strengthening and NATO withdrawal planning will be funded. Deputies will be asked to approve a funding strategy at their next meeting, based on proposals vetted through the Peacekeeping Core Group (Action: OMB/NSC). (C)

Policy Coordination

11. Principals expressed concern that recent announcements of military deployments to Italy had not been adequately coordinated in advance through the interagency process or with the Government of Italy. They agreed to elevate the level of participation in the daily video teleconference (VTC) on Bosnia to the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary or equivalent and to ensure that all agencies used the VTC to inform the others of any upcoming activity relating to the former Yugoslavia (Action: NSC/State/CIA/OSD/JCS). (S)

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Congressional Consultations

12. Principals reviewed requirements for upcoming Congressional testimony on U.S. policy for Bosnia, and agreed that NSC should serve as a clearinghouse to coordinate all formal testimony and Q&A responses -- which should build on the comprehensive list developed by NSC for the President (Action: NSC/All). They agreed that a concerted effort was required to explain strong administration opposition to unilateral lift measures being introduced in both houses (Action: NSC/All). ~~(C)~~

13. They also agreed that it would be prudent to provide formal 15-day advance contingency 407 notification to Congress of our intent to assist UNPROFOR in Bosnia, in the context of ongoing briefings to Congress on NATO OPLAN 40104 and USG Bosnia policy. This notification should be broad enough to cover NATO withdrawal efforts and support for the UN Rapid Reaction Force, without using potentially provocative funding estimates unless specifically required by law (Action: State/OMB/NSC). ~~(C)~~

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