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June 20, 1995

**MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence****FROM: Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force****SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Policy Team,  
At the Oval Office, 21 June 1995**

1. This meeting has been called to discuss longer-term issues related to US policy in the Balkans. Of particular concern for this meeting is:

- US attitude towards the Rapid Reaction Force, particularly funding issues; and
- next diplomatic steps.

2. You have not been assigned any action, but probably will be asked for our assessment of the Bosnian offensive and general military situation. There is not much of an intelligence angle related to the funding of peacekeeping. We will provide you an intelligence update on the morning of the meeting, so you'll have the latest.

### **Funding of Peacekeeping**

3. The United States has not been paying its share of the UNPROFOR funding, essentially running up the tab. The creation of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), if it becomes a UN assessed operation, could cause the UN to run out of peacekeeping funding by yearend. Even if the US succeeds in finding another funding mechanism for the RRF, the UN will run short early next year. Meanwhile, Congress is loathe to fund a UNPROFOR mission that a majority feels is not successful. Last week at a Principals' and Deputies' Committee meeting, it was agreed that Congress was unlikely to fund the RRF if the US voted on it at the UN without prior adequate Congressional consultations. These issues were discussed further at a Deputies meeting on Monday (attended by Admiral Blair for CIA) where a decision was made to form an Interagency Working Group to frame questions to ask the allies.

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~~SECRET~~**Next Diplomatic Steps**

4. One issue will be what to do about the new negotiator Karl Bildt. Reportedly he wants to visit Pale and some of the Contact Group members, particularly France, want him to do so. The Principals last week decided not to give a Bildt a mandate on negotiations and insist he not go to Pale at least until after all the hostages are released. Now that they are free, the US may need to decide whether to support Bildt's trip to Pale or disassociate itself.

5. On Monday Leon Fuerth asked several CIA analysts to come down to his office for a brainstorming session on Bosnia. Apparently he feels the fighting in Bosnia could open prospects for a negotiated settlement. In response to his question of whether the Contact Group plan was a realistic basis for settlement, we said, "no." This led to a detailed discussion of settlement possibilities. He asked us to keep our meeting with him tight hold and not to tell others, probably State, that he was asking these questions.

**What Else Is in Your Book?**

6. Most likely, you will be asked for an update on the military situation. Although the fighting has slackened off, most likely this is because the Bosnians are consolidating their gains to date and repositioning for the major offensive. We have included a paper laying out our views on the current military situation. (See Military- Bosnia.) Tony Lake requested this paper this morning and it probably will be distributed [redacted] tomorrow.


7. A related issue that could arise is the impact of the Bosnian offensive on the humanitarian situation. Our assessment indicates that even with a government offensive, Sarajevo will not face a food crisis before August. However, the eastern enclaves remain particularly vulnerable especially if the Serbs attack them in retaliation for the Muslim offensive around Sarajevo. Also, there is some humanitarian risks to Serb populations that could be cut off in the current fighting. (See Humanitarian Implications of the Bosnian Government Offensive in the Humanitarian Tab.) Meanwhile, the UN is considering forcing an aid convoy through to Sarajevo. The Serbs have agreed to let convoys through, but now the Muslims are blocking the air convoy to Sarajevo. (See UN Plans to Resupply Sarajevo in Humanitarian Issues Tab.)

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8. Also, we have included for you to brief from, if necessary, a paper on some of the problems of the Rapid Reaction Force, including financing. (See Allied Attitudes.) Needless to say, the Serbs will view it as a hostile force while the Bosnian Government forces will try to exploit it to convert the RRF into a force supportive of their goals.

9. Finally we have included a warning item on the possibility of the war expanding to Croatia. Undoubtedly you have noticed that some of the Principals and Deputies continue to focus on either the war in Bosnia or in Croatia without considering the linkages between the two. (See Military- Croatia tab.) We need to keep reminding them of that linkage.



Ray Converse

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