

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: July 11-12, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS
TIME: 11:00 - 11:30 a.m.
12:30 - 1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meetings
on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

Rick Inderfurth (7/12 only)
David SchefferOVPLeon Fuerth
Rick Saunders (7/12 only)OMBGordon Adams (7/12 only)
Keith Bickel (7/12 only)STATEPeter Tarnoff
John Kornblum
Christopher Hill (7/11 only)CIAGeorge Tenet (7/12 only)
Dennis Blair (7/11 only)
Norman SchindlerDEFENSEJohn White (7/11 only)
Walter Slocombe
Joe Kruzel (7/12 only).JCSWilliam Owens
Wesley Clark
Howell Estes (7/11 only)USUNAmbassador Madeleine Albright
(7/11 only -- via secure
video).NSCAlexander Vershbow
Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met on July 11 and 12 to consider appropriate responses to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at Srebrenica. (U)

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2. Deputies agreed on the need to reassert UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its humanitarian and protection missions in Bosnia, and to halt the pattern of successful Bosnian Serb military aggressiveness that has marked the past month. They also agreed that failure to reverse this pattern will result in attacks on the other enclaves and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission and initiation of a withdrawal under circumstances that will be perceived as defeat for the UN, NATO and our allies. They also expressed concern that it would accelerate passage of unilateral lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that would damage relations with our allies. ~~(S)~~

3. Deputies agreed on the following immediate actions (U):

- To support the UNSCR introduced by the French calling for the use of all available resources to restore the Srebrenica Safe Area, although acknowledging privately that UNPROFOR does not now possess the military capability to reverse the Bosnian Serb occupation of Srebrenica (nor, in all likelihood, to prevent the fall of Zepa). (Action: State/USUN) ~~(S)~~
- To weigh in with Milosevic (and, through the UN, with Karadzic and Mladic) to obtain support for UNHCR efforts to assist in the movement, care and supply of the refugees and the Dutch UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica; at the same time, to work with the Bosnian government to obtain their consent for the evacuation of the refugees to Tuzla rather than forcing them to remain unsupported behind Serb lines. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- To use public statements and consultations with allies to send a clear signal of continuing U.S. resolve to support the retention of UNPROFOR as the best available option for resolving the crisis short of a major Balkan war. (Action: All) ~~(S)~~
- To review the viability of U.S. and NATO quick/emergency withdrawal options as a matter of highest priority in light of the speed with which Srebrenica was overrun. (Action: OSD/JCS) ~~(S)~~

4. Beyond these immediate actions, Deputies also agreed on the need to work with allies on the development of a follow-on strategy to deter further Serb provocations and prevent the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission (Action: NSC/State/OSD): ~~(S)~~

- At a minimum, this strategy must preserve Bosnian government presence in and access to Sarajevo, and it must sustain

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UNPROFOR deployments in Federation territory so as to continue maintaining peace where it exists. (S)

- To this end, we will support robust use of the existing elements of the RRF to secure overland access to Sarajevo using the Mt. Igman route and possibly to restore control over Sarajevo airport. (S)
- Given the political imperative not to be seen as abandoning all of the eastern enclaves and the fact that NATO credibility (through commitment to enforcing the weapons exclusion zone) is engaged in Gorazde, the strategy should include a commitment to protect this safe area, even if protection of Zepa proves unfeasible. (S)

5. Finally, Deputies agreed that efforts to stabilize the situation will be critical to our efforts to avoid Congressional action on unilateral lift. (C)

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