C05960754

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

SECRET

TIME OF RECEIPT:

ER 95-3405


Approved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-34 ... G.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE	X IMMEDIATE PRIORITY ROUTINE	RELEASER: _ 	7 ()
·	ERTH 6-9501	NUMBER)	PAGES: 3 (Including Cover) 298 (ROOM NO.)
TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
USUN	AMB ALBRIGHT	Sto=	
STATE	STROBE TALBOTT/AMB FRASUR	E	
OSD	JOHN WHITE/WALT SLOCOMBE		
JCS	ADM OWENS/LTG CLARK		
CIA	GEORGE TENET		
			DO STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PA
DC. IT IS AN EFFO ENDGAME STRAT SITUATION. HOP ORGANIZATION B	SKED THAT I CIRCULATE THIS CHORT TO DEPICT THE SEQUENCE OF EGY CIRCULATED BY NSC LAST VEFULLY, YOU WILL BE ABLE TO FEFORE TODAY'S MEETING. THER	POLICY DECISION VEEK, ADJUSTED FO AMILIARIZE YOURS E MAY BE AN OPPO	S INHERENT IN THE DECEMBER OF THE CURRENT SELVES WITH ITS PRESERVIEW TO REVIEW

SECRET

Schematic of Endgame Strategy (Revised as of 7/23)



A

UNPROFOR Withdrawal: US and NATO determine scope, duration and objective of withdrawal operation

The mission and ROE for the withdrawal force are a function of the post-withdrawal strategy U.S. and/or allied policy makers wish to pursue. There are four options:

Option One: Neutral Withdrawal and US Disengages

- Withdrawal force treats all parties alike and uses force only in self defense
- UNPROFOR equipment is withdrawn or destroyed
- If arms embargo is lifted, USG only supplies arms on a "cash and carry" basis
 no military aid or training
- U.S. and allies pursue strategy to contain conflict and keep Belgrade out
 - Belgrade gets substantial sanctions relief to seal border and stay out of conflict
 - UN strengthens peacekeeping forces in Croatla and FYROM
 - Contact Group attempts to reach peace accord in Croatia

Option Two: Neutral Withdrawal and US stays Engaged (option in NSC "endgame" paper)

- Withdrawal force treats all parties alike and uses force only in self defense
- UNPROFOR equipment removed or destroyed
- U.S. and others provide arms during withdrawal period
 - After UNPROFOR units depart
 - US-led air and other military support for Bosnian forces continues for a finite time period
 - USG supplies additional military aid and training
 - USG organizes and helps deploy an UNPROFOR successor force (under UNSC mandate or Chapter 51)
- U.S. and allies try to contain conflict and keep Belgrade out (Same as above)

Option Three: Level the Playing Field During Withdrawal after which US Disengages

- Withdrawal force attacks Bosnian Serb forces
 - Pre-emplive SEAD campaign
 - Destroy heavy weapons
 - Disrupt command and control system
- UNPROFOR equipment turned over to GOBH (requires lift)
- U.S. and others provide arms during withdrawal period

After UNPROFOR units depart

- Air and other military support for Bosnian forces ends
 - USG only supplies additional arms on a "cash and carry" basis -- no military aid or training
- U.S. and allies try to contain conflict and keep Belgrade out (Same as above)

Factors affecting scope and duration:

- Missions assigned the withdrawal force (see below)
- Whether UNPROFOR has withdrawn from enclaves (because enclaves no longer exist and/or UN forces have consolidated in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia)
- GOBH and Bosnian Serbs' capabilities and intentions to resist withdrawal
- Whether any nations decide to commit units currently in UNPROFOR to an UNPROFORsuccessor force (see below)

Prognosis (assumes FRY and GOC stay out):

- Increased fighting after withdrawal
- · Bosnian Serbs may try for knock-out offensive
- GOBH will Increase attacks
- GOBH may try to Impede UNPROFOR withdrawal
- Military stalemate with balance of forces gradually shifting to Sarajevo

Prognosis (assumes FRY and GOC stay out)::

- Increased fighting after withdrawal
- Bosnian Serbs more likely to try knock-out offensive
- GOBH increases attacks
- Military balance shifts more rapidly towards GOBH
- Increased pressure on Belgrade to aid Bosnian Serbs
 - Stalemate at higher levels of violence

Prognosis (assumes FRY and GOC stay out)::

- BSA likely to oppose withdrawal operation
- Increased fighting after withdrawal
- GOBH will take offensive during or immediately after withdrawal to take advantage of diminished BSA capabilities
- Increased pressure on Belgrade to aid Bosnian Serbs
 Military balance shifts towards GOBH in immediate aftermath of withdrawal — gradual shift towards GOBH after withdrawal
- Statemate at higher levels of violence

Option Four: Level the Playing Field During Withdrawal and US Stays Engaged

- Withdrawal force attacks Bosnian Serb forces
 - Pre-emptive SEAD campaign
 - Destroy heavy weapons
 - Disrupt command and control system
- UNPROFOR equipment turned over to GOBH (requires lift)
- U.S. and others provide arms during withdrawal period
 - After UNPROFOR units depart
 - US-led Air and other military support for Bosnian forces continues for a finite time period
 - USG supplies additional military aid and training
 - USG organizes and helps deploy an UNPROFOR successor force (under UNSC mandate or Chapter 51)
- U.S. and allies try to contain conflict and keep Belgrade out (Same as above)

Prognosis (assumes FRY and GOC stay out)::

- BSA likely to oppose withdrawal operation
- Increased fighting after withdrawal
- Military balance shifts towards GOBH in Immediate aftermath of withdrawal -- continues to shift towards GOBH after withdrawal
- GOBH may gain enough combat power to retake territory
- Increased pressure on Belgrade to aid Bosnian Serbs



Impact of actions by Serbla and/or Croatia that on the preceding prognoses:

If Serbia intervenes to end the war because balance of power is shifting decisively against the Bosnian Serbs

- BSA, with FRY support, will launch offensives to defeat GOBH or get favorable settlement
- Sharply increased level of violence
- GOBH unlikely to capitulate, but will call for massive assistance from West and OIC

If Croatia makes large-scale attacks against Sectors North and South

- Bosnian Serbs would support Krajina Serbs and go on defensive in Bosnia
- GOBH would step up attacks against Pale
- FRY Involvement in Knin and Bosnia likely to increase

If Milosevic and Tudjman cut a deal

- Bosnian and Knin Serbs free to concentrate against GOBH
- · Federation will disintegrate
- Bosnian Gov't Increasingly Isolated

If Milosevic breaks all contacts with Bosnian and Knin Serbs and seals border

- · Accelerates weakening of Bosnian Serbs
- BSA may try for knock out punch before balance of power shifts decisively towards GOBH
- GOBH would eventually gain military advantage, may be able to regain territory
- Bosnian Serbs may accept a peace settlement

Good → Bad				
Shift in balance of power brings Pale to the negotiating table; sides reach and implement a peace agreement	Shift in balance of power leads to stable equilibrium after GOBH has regained some territory	GOBH unable to regain territory but can defend current holdings; stalemate ensues	GOBH unable to defend curren territory; faces defeat without additional Western support	
e de la comunicación de la comun				

in a spyri