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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Associate Director of Central Intelligence for  
Military Support

FROM: Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia, 5 September 1995

1. Tuesday's Principals' Committee meeting--scheduled to last only one hour--will attempt to review work done by the Deputies on planning for a peace implementation force, a program to arm and equip federation forces, and a reconstruction package, as well as consider the status of the US peace initiative.

- ☐ You will not be required to take the lead on any agenda item.
- ☐ Although not on the current agenda, there almost certainly will be discussion of the status of Serb compliance with the UN ultimatum that Bosnian Serb forces remove all heavy weapons from around Sarajevo. Indeed, if it is clear that the Serbs are not complying, it is likely that there will have been new NATO airstrikes by the time the meeting takes place. If the UN says the Serbs are in the process of complying, you may be called on to provide an assessment.
- ☐ [redacted] Karadzic was most reluctant to agree to withdraw Serb heavy weapons from the Sarajevo area for fear that Bosnian Government forces would exploit the situation. [redacted]

2. The MEETING PAPERS TAB includes the mass of paper prepared by the Deputies. The package lays out in great detail proposed positions on issues ranging from the conditions under which sanctions against Serbia would be suspended or lifted, the extent of reconstruction assistance the US is prepared to offer the Bosnians, the missions and tasks of the peace implementation force, and the details of a program to arm the federation while the peace plan is being implemented. Several areas of contention emerged during interagency deliberations:

- ☐ The Administration appears to have backed off of its initial plan to propose that the Bosnian Government give up Gorazde in exchange for territory around Sarajevo. Maintaining Gorazde--and a corridor to the enclave--as part of the federation, however, will require a significant augmentation of the peace implementation force, not to mention a significant bolstering of federation forces to defend it once the implementation force leaves. OSD and JCS do not believe Gorazde is worth this effort. The GORAZDE TAB includes some background we prepared on population

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movements associated with a decision on whether Gorazde should be part of the federation.

- ☐ There is agreement that the implementation force should complete its mission by 31 December 1996, and that this date should be announced in advance to build political support for the dispatch of US troops. There is disagreement, however, over whether NATO air assets may continue to be made available for a period after the implementation force is withdrawn to assist the federation. JCS is preparing another paper on this issue.

3. The Holbrooke mission is beginning to run into problems. The NEGOTIATIONS TAB includes a particularly candid NODIS message from the Assistant Secretary. "While we have created a public impression of progress...we have made virtually no headway on the fundamental issues dividing the adversaries. Neither side has shown any willingness to compromise on the core issues, especially the political and constitutional ones." Holbrooke recommends that airstrikes against the Serbs be resumed unless the Bosnian Serbs comply completely with the UN ultimatum.

4. This briefing book includes some additional background readings:

- ☐ The AIRSTRIKES-IMPACT TAB includes an in-house assessment of the impact NATO airstrikes have had to date on Bosnian Serb military capabilities. It concludes that the strikes may have decreased the BSA's capability to sustain combat operations around Sarajevo and in eastern Bosnia. The airstrikes have degraded the BSA's air defense net, but it remains effective.
- ☐ The SERB MILITARY REACTIONS TAB suggests that the Serbs will give priority in the near-term to bringing a halt to NATO airstrikes by behaving themselves.
- ☐ The NEGOTIATIONS TAB includes an assessment of the impact airstrikes are likely to have on the negotiations.

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- ☐ The LEADERSHIP TAB includes a background paper on the relative roles played by Milosevic, Karadzic, and Mladic.

A. Norman Schindler

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