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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: September 8, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on  
Bosnia (S)

## PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

OVP

Leon Fuerth

Rick Saunders

STATE

Strobe Talbott

John Kornblum

James Steinberg

TREASURY

David Lipton

Stephen Altheim

DEFENSE

Jan Lodai

Robert Osterthaler

USUN

Rick Inderfurth

David Scheffer

Jim O'Brien

OMB

Gordon Adams

Keith Bickel

CIA

George Tenet

John Gannon

AID

Thomas Dine

M. Douglas Stafford

JCS

Michael Byron

Douglas Lute

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

Sue Bremner

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies discussed four topics: 1) the shape and mandate of the political implementation mechanism that would coordinate among the actors in-country during the settlement implementation period; 2) equipping and training the Bosnian Federation; and 3) funding strategies for various aspects of post-settlement policy. They agreed to defer discussion of reconstruction assistance until the return of Ralph Johnson from consultations with the EU.  
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2. On the issue of the political implementation mechanism, Deputies agreed to the following:

- The mission of the political implementation mechanism will chiefly be to coordinate among, rather than to control, the organizations that will play a role in the region after settlement: the NATO implementation force (IFOR), EU, ICFY, OSCE, IFIs, UN, UNHCR, ICRC and other NGOs, bilateral players, etc. Depending on the terms of the settlement, however, some international elements might report directly to the mechanism, or it could be itself directly responsible for implementing certain tasks.
- The political implementation mechanism will serve as a bridge between the various international actors and local officials.
- There should be a strong leader of political stature as the head of the political implementation mechanism.
- The political implementation mechanism should be established as part of the settlement documents and thus have essentially free-standing authority, although we would hope it would be "blessed" by the Security Council.
- Its role will likely extend beyond the termination of the mandate of the peace implementation force. -(S)

3. State agreed to revise and combine its papers on the political implementation mechanism into a final draft for Deputies' consideration the week of September 11. The new draft should include:

- a clear mandate and delineation of tasks for the political implementation mechanism, with initial recommendations on degree of authority desirable on a function-by-function basis;
- pros and cons and recommendations on the desirability of an American head;
- possible transitional arrangements for the period prior to the constitution of the new implementation mechanism. (Action: State) -(S)

4. In light of the September 5 Principals' discussions of equip and train, Deputies reaffirmed that an interagency Task Force, chaired by State and including OSD, JCS, OMB, and others as necessary, would be formed to reexamine and redefine the U.S. role while adhering to our goal of establishing a Federation self-defense capability. Specifically, the Task Force was asked to look at the following questions and prepare a paper for Deputies' consideration the week of September 11:

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- What degree of U.S. leadership, and what size U.S. contribution to the equip/train effort, will be required to keep negotiations going and further the peace implementation process?
- What type of U.S. involvement will be necessary to give us sufficient leverage to prevent pariah states from undertaking military assistance to the Federation?
- Would lifting the arms embargo be enough, in and of itself, to keep the peace implementation process going?
- What provisions and strategy should we pursue to ensure that feasible arms control/limitation mechanisms are included in the settlement agreement?
- When should we begin consultations with the Bosnians on their military needs and wishes?
- If a needs assessment is not possible, how can we best make decisions on the size of our contribution?
- What is the legal framework for equip and train?
- How will we finance our contribution? (Action: State/Task Force) (S)

5. On the issue of funding for the range of post-settlement efforts, Deputies agreed that OMB would produce a paper laying out strategies to obtain sufficient resources to meet our policy goals. (Action: OMB) (C)

6. Deputies briefly discussed the Croatian offensive inland from the Dalmatian coast toward Jajce and agreed that demarches should be made to Croatian leaders to urge restraint, especially as there were signs that the Serbs perceived the Croatian offensive as occurring in concert with the ongoing NATO strikes. (Action: State/NSC) (S)

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